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The President has gone to Vietnam,
A smallish country that we used to bomb
But now would like to send our products to.
And so our corporations take the view
That if the country’s ruling class has picked
A form of rule that can be somewhat strict
That’s up to them. And Clinton went to say
That there is nothing standing in the way
Of being friends with them forevermore.
Remind me, please: Why did we fight that war?
- Calvin Trillin, “The Vietnam Peace” (2000)
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INTRODUCTION
As the revolutionary forces of Vietnam draped and raised their flags throughout
Saigon on April 30, 1975, the sound of gunfire continued.  Although the sound was
nothing new to the city, the intent of these shots was different.  Fired in celebration by
troops outside the former Presidential Palace, these were the sounds of victory; the
second Indochina war was finally over.  Several of the men surrounding Republic of
Vietnam General Duong Van Minh were nevertheless understandably startled by the
noise.  As Bui Tin, a journalist and soldier for the Northern Vietnamese forces, accepted
the formal surrender by the General, he told the his former adversaries,
Our men are merely celebrating. You have nothing to fear.  Between Vietnamese,
there are no victors and no vanquished.  Only the Americans have been beaten.  If
you are patriots, consider this a moment of joy.  The war for our country is over.1
Minh and his South Vietnamese colleagues were not likely put at ease by Tin’s remarks,
but it was certainly true that the Americans, who had hastily evacuated their remaining
personnel the previous day, had been defeated.  What Bui Tin could not possibly have
realized at that moment, however, was that despite, and in fact because of, the successful
campaign against the United States, the war for his country was in fact far from over.
As the revolutionary forces established control across Southern Vietnam, cracks
in the fragile peace began to grow.  To the North, an always contentious and precarious
relationship between Hanoi and Beijing was being further strained as each country began
                                                 
1 Quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, 1983), 683-684.
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to position itself as the regional hegemon in Indochina.  To the West, despite the mutual
exchange of congratulatory messages on their recent triumphs, border tensions with the
Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia began to flare up as each side claimed control over
long disputed areas that had been further destabilized by the American military assaults
in the region.  Although free from foreign occupation for the first time in over a century,
Vietnam remained surrounded by hostile regimes and faced with the difficult task of
rebuilding a nation devastated and deeply divided after thirty years of sustained warfare.
The difficult task of national reconstruction would have proven difficult enough
under any circumstances; it would have been long and arduous even with the billions in
American aid that had been promised as part of the 1973 peace accords; it would have
been a financially imposing project even with the full and unfettered access to sources of
international economic and humanitarian aid to which the Vietnamese were not only
entitled, but in dire need of as well.  Such issues should have been part of the spoils of
war enjoyed by the impoverished and ravaged nation that had just defeated the primary
superpower in the world.  But as the Vietnamese were quickly learning in the years
immediately following the American withdrawal, one of the few things worse than
fighting a war against the United States is winning a war against the United States.  In
contrast to Germany and Japan, which after World War II received billions in American
support, Vietnam found itself quickly cut off from American-controlled sources of
economic assistance, humanitarian aid, and development loans.  Had the United States
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simply abandoned the nation altogether, rejecting calls for reparations and aid, the
rebuilding of Vietnam may still have failed.  The U.S., however, instead maintained an
aggressive, hostile stance toward Vietnam, under which the nation and people of Vietnam
would continue to suffer.  Before the guns had even gone silent in Saigon, policymakers
in the United States had initiated a series of punitive, vindictive policies against Vietnam
that would define the course of relations between the two nations for the next two
decades.  As the Vietnamese war for national independence trudged on in the spring of
1975, a new phase of the American War against Vietnam began.
In this dissertation, I examine the post-1975 phase of United States policy toward
Vietnam, which I call the American War on Vietnam, 1975-2000.  Far from ending its
war after the defeat of its Southern Vietnamese client regime, I argue, the United States
continued to wage economic, political and cultural war on Vietnam after 1975.  In
particular, I examine the ways in which cultural representations intersected and interacted
with the formation of foreign policy.  Both of these activities, I argue, were driven by the
same cultural logic of “normalizing” the historical memory of the war, reinserting
recuperative American narratives at the center of public discourses about the war while
marginalizing and silencing Vietnamese and other alternative and oppositional voices.
By rendering Vietnamese subjects silent or invisible in American films, television shows,
and comic books about the war while ignoring the real impact of United States policies
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on Vietnam, the different “fronts” of the American War on Vietnam combined to
reconstruct the cultural, political, and economic work of American empire in the wake of
a devastating and divisive war.  What I call “The American War on Vietnam” was thus as
much a battle for the cultural memory of the war in American society as it was a lengthy
and bitter economic, political, and diplomatic war against the nation and people of
Vietnam.
I use a range of primary sources to reconstruct the policy history of this period,
focusing in particular on many previously overlooked Congressional hearings, where the
policies governing United States policy toward all of Southeast Asia after 1975 were
discussed, debated, and developed.  I focus on Congressional hearings for several
reasons.  First, they are often less sanitized sources of information than briefings or
policy statements from the executive branch; in the back and forth of often-heated
testimony, small windows can be found into the ironies and inconsistencies of the
production of foreign policy.  Secondly, the prints of committee proceedings often
contain hard to find reports from other government agencies, such as the Government
Accounting Office, Office of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Research
Service; they also often include contemporary accounts from the news media that have
been inserted for the record by participants.  Not only do these reports often save a step in
the research process, they also demonstrate which sources informed and influenced
policy makers and witnesses at these hearings.  Most importantly, however, congressional
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hearings are extremely useful in demonstrating not only how policy debates were
conducted, but also how they were constructed.  What interests me is not only the
discussions of American policy toward Vietnam after 1975, but the ways in which those
discussions, whether they took place in Congress, in the pages of the news media, or on
movie screens, constructed the terms and acceptable limits of debate.  Indeed, as I argue
here, one of the central characteristics of the American war on Vietnam after 1975 is the
way in which it renders certain things completely outside the boundaries of public
discourse.2
Along with these primary sources, I also bring together a large body of secondary
literature from a wide array of fields, including cultural and diplomatic history, cultural
studies, political science, and economics.  Snippets of the story I wish to tell have been
produced in all of these various places, but the entire narrative of American-Vietnamese
relations has never been linked together in the manner proposed here.  Pieced together
                                                 
2 A brief note on news sources: I have used a variety of news sources to reconstruct this
history, but I rely heavily on accounts from five sources in particular: The New York
Times, The Washington Post, Far Eastern Economic Review, Newsweek, and Time.
There are several reasons for this reliance.  To begin with, for much of the period under
consideration here, there were few American news sources with bureaus in Southeast
Asia.  The Times and the Post were among the exceptions to this rule.  Although I
consulted other newspapers in the course of my research, it became clear most other
papers were either relying on accounts from these two sources or on wire service reports.
Either way, reducing the focus of news articles to the Times and the Post and, similarly,
to Time and Newsweek for weekly U.S. news magazines, while reducing a huge range of
possible sources, has not compromised the overall integrity of my findings or argument.
More importantly, with the exception of FEER, these are all among the most popular and
widely-read news sources in the United States; they are particularly popular among
policymakers in Washington, D.C.  As noted above and demonstrated throughout this
project, articles from these sources are widely cited in Congressional Hearings and often
included in appendices in congressional reports and hearings prints.  As such, they are
particularly useful in exploring how public discussions of American policy toward
Vietnam were constructed, and how cultural memory of the American War in/on
Vietnam was actively contested in this era.
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from these disparate sources, the changes and continuities in the American War on
Vietnam over its twenty-five year course are traced here, from the initial imposition of an
unprecedented and ill-conceived program of economic sanctions in 1975 through the U.S.
backing of anti-Vietnamese forces during the Third Indochina War, to the final
ratification of bilateral trade agreement between the two nations in 2000.  The history
constructed in this dissertation is designed to speak to a number of (inter)disciplinary
conversations: on one level, it serves as an exploration of the construction of American
foreign policy in the final chapter of the Cold War; on another, it is a contribution to
recent work on the cultures of U.S. imperialism; it challenges scholars working in a
number of fields to reconsider traditional definitions of what constitutes an act of war;
and it proposes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of American foreign policy that
places cultural representations and diplomatic history alongside one another as part of the
same historical processes.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I discuss the methodological and
theoretical approaches that I will employ in this study, and offer an outline of the chapters
that make up my narrative.  First, however, I will explore the relevant scholarly literature,
arguing that the multifaceted nature of this topic necessitates an interdisciplinary
approach.  By combining approaches from History, the social sciences, and Cultural
Studies, we can begin to grasp the full contours and implications of American policy
toward Vietnam after 1975.  Doing so, this study seeks to transcend the limits of previous
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approaches to the problem, disrupting and transgressing the intellectual, disciplinary, and
chronological boundaries that have contributed to the persistent invisibility of this phase
of the American War on Vietnam and, indeed, of the Vietnamese in American
representations of the war.  Although I have tried to address scholarship in a number of
areas, I begin with a discussion of the two most directly responsible for the development
of this project, American Studies and Diplomatic History.  The increasingly productive
tension between these fields over the past several years has been central to the formation
of the ideas and narrative presented here.
When Disciplines Collide: Historical Narratives of the American War in Vietnam
For several decades, the disciplinary wheels of American Studies and Diplomatic
History have run on parallel tracks.  At times, they seem even to be operating in parallel
universes, never destined to meet.  Over the past years, however, the trajectories of the
fields have been altered, and the two now seem to be intersecting on a more regular
basis—heading, perhaps, toward an interdisciplinary collision.  I propose that this
dissertation is the site of one of these collisions.
Once a fledgling field attempting to define the true nature of “American
Civilization” or demonstrate the uniqueness of “the American mind,” American Studies
has become increasingly interested of late with America’s place in the world.  Especially
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since Janice Radway, in her 1998 Presidential Address to the American Studies
Association (ASA), asked us to reconsider the name of the Association, the field has been
abuzz with calls for the “Internationalization” of American Studies and for the further
development of research and teaching agendas that would focus equally on the global and
the local.3  In a 1993 essay, Amy Kaplan identified what she described as three issues that
contributed to the problem of empire across several disciplines: “the absence of culture
from the history of U.S. imperialism; the absence of empire from the study of American
culture; and the absence of the United States from the postcolonial history of
imperialism.4 As ASA President in 2003, Kaplan echoed these themes in her presidential
address.5
Diplomatic History, during the last decade, has heard similar appeals.  In his 1990
Address, Michael Hunt called upon the Society for Historians of American Foreign
Relations (SHAFR) to develop a “practical” agenda for internationalizing the field,
thinking about the institutional and professional ramifications of such changes.6
However, even more common in the pages of Diplomatic History have been pleas for
greater attention to “culture” as a source of theoretical and methodological innovation for
                                                 
3 Janice Radway, “What’s in a Name,” Presidential Address to the American Studies
Association, November, 1998. Reprinted in American Quarterly 51 (Spring, 1999), 1-32.
4 Amy Kaplan, “Left Alone With America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of
American Culture,” in Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., Cultures of U.S. Imperialism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 11.
5 Amy Kaplan, “Violent Belongings and the Question of American Empire Today.”
American Quarterly 56 (March 2004): 1-18.
6 Michael Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda,”
Presidential Address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.
Diplomatic History 14 (1991): 1-11.
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historians of foreign relations and a significant factor in the production of American
foreign policy.  Perhaps the most prominent of these recent calls came from Emily
Rosenberg, in her 1998 Presidential Address, “Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy.”7  Finally,
and most recently, Robert McMahon’s 2001 Address, “Contested Memory: The Vietnam
War and American Society, 1975-2001,” to which I will return later, noted with great
urgency that the issue of national memory of the American war in Vietnam was “far too
important a subject for foreign relations specialists to abandon to the cultural historians,
the cultural studies specialists, and the political polemicists.”8
Thus as American Studies looks increasingly outward and Diplomatic History
looks increasingly inward, paths, if not research agendas, are beginning to cross; eyes, if
not hearts, beginning to meet across crowded conference halls.  Certainly, collisions have
already begun to occur.  One could argue that the path toward normalized relations
between the two fields has already been blazed.  At the annual conferences of both the
ASA and SHAFR, one is increasingly likely to find commonalities in panel and paper
titles.  Several sessions at the last several American Studies meetings, and even one
conference theme, have been devoted to explorations of American empire. But few, if
any, of these sessions have featured diplomatic historians.  American Studies scholars
have been even scarcer at SHAFR conventions.  Few colleagues of mine, or of the other
American Studies scholar on my panel at a recent SHAFR convention, even knew what
SHAFR was.
                                                 
7 Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness,” Diplomatic History
22 (Spring, 1998).
8 “Contested Memory: The Vietnam War and American Society, 1975-2001,” Diplomatic
History 26 (2002): 159-184; 184.
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In published scholarship, too, one could find a number of recent works that would
seem to belie any great chasm between the fields.  The aforementioned Amy Kaplan and
Emily Rosenberg, as well as Mark Bradley, Kristin Hoganson, Melanie McAllister and
Mary Renda have all produced landmark scholarship that explores the complex
intersections of race, gender, and foreign relations.9  Renda’s book, Taking Haiti:
Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, was honored with top awards
from both the American Studies Association and the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations.10 Yet these exemplary works stand out to a large degree because they
are still bumps in the night, harbingers of things yet to come rather than markers of well
established theoretical or methodological shifts.  They serve as indications that American
Studies and Diplomatic History may still have the occasional run-in, moments which are
to be praised and awarded, but after which we are to return to our respective corners.
At first glance, it seems odd; one wonders why the two fields have not inched
closer in the past.  Aside from the obvious topical connections (both disciplines focus on
the politics, histories, and cultures of the United States), the various addresses and articles
invoked above betray some common history and similar concerns: both fields gained
prominence as a result of the Cold War; both have worked in the service of American
                                                 
9 Kaplan, Cultures of United States Imperialism; The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of
U.S. Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002);  Mark Bradley, Imagining
Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American
Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-
American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Melanie McAllister, Epic
Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001); Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation &
the Culture of U.S. Imperialism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
10 My thanks to Mark Bradley for pointing this out to me.
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empire; both have at times practiced, embraced, critiqued, and abandoned an unabashed
American exceptionalism; both share a desire for greater language skills among graduate
students; and both are in need of greater comparative and collaborative work.
Still, Diplomatic History and American Studies remain separate and somewhat
disparate fields, with distinct practices and politics, each, it would seem, somewhat
suspicious of the other.  I could not agree more with Professor McMahon when he argues
that the study of popular memory, and of popular culture, is too important to be left to
cultural studies scholars, and I am certain that there are others in American Studies who
feel a similar sentiment about foreign policy and diplomatic historians.   My sense is that
these suspicions are as much political as they are intellectual.  I am still somewhat in both
shock and awe of an academic conference that features, as SHAFR does, an official State
Department reception.  Not only would one be more likely to find something along the
lines of a group protest of State Department policy at an American Studies conference,
but I would speculate, only partially in jest, that there are many of us in the ASA who
would have trouble gaining security clearance for such a high level government affair.
The question of politics, however, is best left to another time and place.  Here, I wish to
focus on the intellectual distance between the fields: matters of theory, chronology, and
methodology.  On these matters, there is still much to be concerned about for scholars in
both fields leering warily at the other.
In this section, I offer a brief overview of scholarship about the American War in
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Vietnam, an admittedly daunting task.  The lines between historical scholarship,
polemics, biography, memoir, journalism, and fiction written about the war have always
been blurred.  Even within the category of what might be considered “legitimate”
historical scholarship, hundreds of works on military, political, cultural, and intellectual
history present themselves as potential candidates for review.  Furthermore, given the
interdisciplinary approach central to this dissertation, it is necessary to examine
scholarship on the American War in Vietnam coming out of interdisciplinary fields such
as Cultural Studies as well as work on the war and on Vietnam emanating from Social
Sciences.  While it is clearly impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of all the
variations and trends in this body of literature, it is possible, by examining some of the
major works in the field, to discern certain several narrative patterns, explanatory
schemes, and gaps left to be addressed by future studies.
All of these (inter)disciplines have something to contribute to the understanding
of American-Vietnamese relations since 1975, yet many of the works discussed here
remain limited by their disciplinary boundaries. By working at the intersections of
American Studies and Diplomatic History, I argue, we can develop a very different view
of this period and begin to see some of the potential pitfalls and promises offered by the
collision of these and other disciplines.  Thus I posit that this dissertation, based in the
interdisciplinary space of American Studies, can bring together useful and relevant
strands from these vast bodies of work.  Adding to this my own original contributions to
13
scholarship on America and Vietnam after 1975, the end result will be stronger than the
sum of its parts.  As such, I argue, this dissertation fits into a tradition of American
Studies work as a “third space.”  I will have more to say about this “space” at the end of
this chapter.
To begin with, there are four dominant narratives of the American War in
Vietnam that circulate among historical scholarship and in public discourses about the
war.  The first of these is the “Hand Behind the Back Theory.”  The assertion of this
theory tends to come largely from military histories of the war, especially those written
by members of the armed forces, and from conservative pundits and politicians.  Held
back by policy makers, who were themselves held back by a liberal media and a disloyal
anti-war movement, the story goes, the United States could have triumphed in Vietnam if
it had simply committed more firepower and expanded the conflict into a more
"conventional" war.  Although this tract is less popular among academics, it remains a
familiar explanatory scheme in public discussions of American foreign policy. 11  This
narrative rests on a number of troubling omissions, the most important of which are that it
fails to address the origins of American involvement in the region, neglects to consider
what “victory” might have meant for the United States in Vietnam, and completely
marginalizes the historical victory of the revolutionary forces of Vietnam.
The problems of the second narrative category, however, are more subtle and
                                                 
11  Two prototypes of this narrative are: Col. Harry Summers, On Strategy (Novatno, CA:
Presidio Press, 1982); and Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978). Other clear examples of this theory have come in U.S. Grant
Sharp's Strategy for Defeat (1978), W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell, eds.
Lessons of Vietnam (1977), and several studies done by Michael Westbrook in the
periodicals Army and Combat Effectiveness  (1979).
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pervasive. This is a narrative that has been widely termed the "quagmire" theory.  This
view holds that the United States, led by the "best and brightest" minds in America,
entered Vietnam with the noblest of intentions but ultimately failed as a result of a series
of policy mistakes, trapped in the "quagmire" of Vietnam.  The grandfather of this
narrative line comes from Arthur Schlesinger’s The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and
American Diplomacy, in which he writes that the United States was "lured' into the
"morass" of Vietnam, ultimately concluding, "the Vietnam story is a tragedy without
villains."12  Although James Gibson's The Perfect War (1986) offers an insightful critique
of the quagmire model and Vietnam as "nightmare", by far the best rebuking of the
quagmire narrative comes from Daniel Ellsberg in his Papers on the War.13 As Ellsberg
points out, this quagmire serves as a particularly appealing image for the collective
American consciousness and sense of national identity:
It is not, after all, Presidents and Cabinet Members who have a powerful reason to
deny their responsibility for this war.  And who succeed at it.  It is true that the 
fact of executive deception gives the quagmire model a reality with respect to the 
public... Nevertheless, just as Presidents and their partisans find comfort and 
political safety in the quicksand image of President-as-Victim, so Americans at 
large are reassured in sudden moments of doubt by the same image drawn large, 
America-as Victim.14
These larger psychological needs served by the quagmire theory ultimately allow the
narratives of American history to swallow the events of the war in Southeast Asia.  In
                                                 
12 Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Diplomacy 1941-1968
(Haughton-Mifflin, 1969), 48.  Other examples of this model can be found in the works
of David Hallberstam (The Making of a Quagmire, 1965) and Stanlry Karnow (Vietnam:
A History, 1983).
13 Daniel Ellsberg, "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine," Papers on the War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972) pp.47-135.
14 Ibid., 129-30, all emphases in original.
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order to gain a historical understanding of the American war in Vietnam, according to
Ellsberg, "one must begin by seeing that it is Americans, our leaders and ourselves, that
build the bog, a trap much more for other victims: our policies, our politics the quagmire
in which Indochina drowns."15
The third major narrative of American involvement in Vietnam is the "cultural
misunderstanding" model.  This view holds that the United States could never have
succeeded in Vietnam because policy makers and military commanders alike failed to see
the cultural, historical, and political realities of Indochina.  The best example of this view
comes from Frances Fitzgerald's Fire in the Lake, which has been criticized widely from
both the left and the right.16  As Marvin Gettleman explains in his account of Vietnam
War scholarship, the success of the book is due to its ability to explain the failure of The
United States in Vietnam, "but not too harshly."  Gettleman, along with Vietnamese
historians Ngo Vinh Long, notes that Fitzgerald's account proved too simplistic in its
view of Vietnamese culture and too dismissive of the possibility of an imperialist critique
of American involvement:
In [Fitzgerald's] view, Marxism's appeal to the Vietnamese was merely the 
reaction of an unsophisticated peasantry still sunk in traditional Confucian values.
Fitzgerald's view of the American side of the conflict was almost as shallow, as 
she could not bring herself to use the "i" word-imperialism-and hence missed the 
geopolitical imperatives to consolidate and extend capitalism.17
Slightly different versions of the cultural misunderstanding model come from Loren
                                                 
15 Ibid., 131.
16 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1972).
17 Marvin E. Gettleman, "Against Cartesianism: Three Generations of Vietnam
Scholarship," in Coming to Terms: Indochina, The United States, and the War, Douglas
Allen, and Ngo Vinh Long, eds.  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 297.
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Baritz and James Gibson.  Baritz, in his Backfire: How American Culture Led Us Into
Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did, locates the cultural misunderstanding not
between the cultures of America and Vietnam, but as an aspect of the myopia and
solipsism deeply rooted in American culture.18    Looking at the Vietnamese as a mirror
of themselves, Americans were unable to see the realities of the situation in Vietnam.
Part of the reason the United States was able to justify the war, according to Baritz, was
an ability to see themselves, as Stanley Karnow does, as "different" from other
imperialists.  Baritz argues that “we went into Vietnam in the name of ideas, of
principles, of abstraction,” an argument which he is able to sustain only through a
troubling model of culture on the one hand, and a refusal to engage a massive body of
work which suggests otherwise, on the other:
[T]he North's decision to continue fighting, and our decision to stop, were each 
consistent with the cultural imperatives of each nation.  Because South Vietnam 
was trained by us to fight in the American style, it was forever dependent on a 
supply of hardware and fuel.  That army was incongruent with the culture it was 
trying to defend.19
Despite the intriguing and sometimes insightful arguments of both Gibson and Baritz,
however, both ultimately fall prey to the same trap as Fitzgerald, failing to assess the
larger political, strategic, diplomatic, and economic aspects of American policy.
In his essay "Vietnam," Ngo Vinh Long notes that the fundamental problem with
Western historians is that they, like the American policy makers during the war, have
                                                 
18 Baritz, Backfire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985;1998), 30; James Gibson, The
Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York: Random House,
1986), 11-17.
19 Baritz, Backfire, 180.
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failed to comprehend the "realities" of Vietnam:
It has been convenient for U.S. policymakers and mainstream historians to refuse
to acknowledge the real enemy in order to justify the U.S. war effort as well as the
failure of that effort, but many serious students of Vietnamese history have
realized over the years that the total disregard of the realities of Vietnam had
doomed U.S. intervention from the start.20
Long's sentiments have been echoed by Stephen Vlastos, who, in a critique of
"revisionist" Vietnam war scholarship, notes that an increasing number of works on this
subject obfuscate events crucial to the rise of Vietnamese nationalist resistance and
generally marginalize the Vietnamese as a people, in terms that seek to legitimate
American intervention.21  Further describing the failure of Western scholars to validate
the victories of the Vietnamese, Marvin Gettleman, in describing three "generations" of
Vietnam War scholarship, asserts that the two earlier generations, although increasingly
critical of United States policies in Indochina, also fail to accurately describe the
Vietnamese revolutionary forces.  These generations are part of the historical project that
Gettleman calls "Cartesian Imperialism; I invade you therefore you exist."  In such a
framework, the Vietnamese can only be described in terms of their relationship to the
United States as the object of an invasion, rather than the subject of active opposition.22
A work that provides the foundation for Gettleman's third generation, and as an
important departure for Western scholarship on the war in Vietnam is Gabriel Kolko's
Anatomy of a War.  The narrative presented by Kolko may be termed the "Imperialism
                                                 
20 Ngo Vinh Long, "Vietnam," in Coming to Terms, 10.
21 Vlastos, “Revisionist History,” in Rowe and Berg, eds., The Vietnam War and
American Culture.
22 Marvin Gettleman, "Against Cartesianism: Three Generations of Vietnam
Scholarship," in Coming to Terms, 210.
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narrative."   This narrative argues that American policy toward Indochina was guided by
imperial economic policies, specifically the development of a global capitalist economy
guided by the desire for an integrated, global capitalist economy guided by Western
Europe, The United States, and Japan.  The initial impetus for American involvement in
Southeast Asia, according to this theory, was the development of strong Asian markets
for Japan, which was to become the Eastern "wing" of the global capitalist network,
anchored in the West by Western Europe and The United States.  "The history of the
post-war era is essentially one of the monumental attempts-and failures-to weave together
such a global order and of the essentially vast autonomous social forces and destabilizing
dynamics emerging throughout the world to confound its ambitions," writes Kolko.  "At
stake were the large and growing strategic and economic interests in those unstable
nations experiencing the greatest changes."23
Although far from the most common, or dominant, narrative of American
involvement in Vietnam circulating in American society, the basic evidence on which the
Imperialism narrative rests is undisputed, cited in some textbook histories of the war that
transcend any particular narrative tradition.  Perhaps the best example of this comes from
George Herring’s America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975.24
While not without its flaws, such as an overly American-centered point of view,
Herring’s book is rightly acclaimed by many as the most balanced and even-handed
                                                 
23 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: The New Press, 1985;1994), 73.
24 America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975  (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1979;1996).
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approach to the war.  Herring actually takes a wider chronological view of the war than
his title indicates, noting that American policy makers during the immediate post-World
War Two era were particularly concerned with the stability of a wide region of Asia, in
terms of both stable markets and access to raw materials:
The United States thus set out to defend a region perceived to be the “vital
segment” of the “great crescent” of containment, stretching from Japan to India,
ironically seeking to preserve for Japan in 1950 the sphere of economic influence
it had attempted to thwart in 1941.25
National Security Memos from the late 1940s through the early 1950s repeatedly note the
strategic value of Southeast Asia, both in terms of raw materials, including rubber, oil,
and tin, and as a trading partner for Japan.  The entire region was to be defended at any
cost, according to these documents--a policy stance which eventually led to American
intervention in the Korean War, and in Indochina, which, as a 1952 NSC Memo states,
“is of far greater strategic importance than Korea.”26  By 1952, of course, the United
States’ interest in Japan’s integration into the global capitalist economy was even greater,
given the recent revolution in China.  Another NSC memo from the same year notes that
in addition to Indochina, the “loss” of “Malaysia and Indonesia in particular could result
in such economic and political pressure on Japan as to make it extremely difficult to
prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to Communism.”27  In short, then, the United
States envisioned a Southeast Asia that would serve as a source of raw materials,
particularly for Japan, and as a market for the finished consumer goods of Japan and its
                                                 
25Herring, 16.  Herring here is citing NSC-48.
26  NSC 124/1, 1952, Pentagon Papers, Volume One, Senator Gravel Edition [PP]
(Boston, 1971), 375-381.
27 NSC 124/2, PP, 385-86.
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trading partners.
The most important aspect of the Imperialism narrative, however, is
chronological.  Alone among the dominant narrative strands surveyed here, it has
expanded the narrative boundaries of the American War in Vietnam to include events
prior to 1954 and, importantly, events and actions dating back to 1945.  As Bruce
Franklin notes in his discussion of the Imperialism narrative, the origins of the American
War in Vietnam should correctly be traced to the fall of 1945, when the U.S. began
military support for the French recolonization of Indochina.  At that time, U.S. ships
carrying American soldiers home from Europe were diverted to Southeast Asia to provide
material support to the French effort to reconquer Vietnam.28  This important
development, discovered by Michael Gillen in his 1991 dissertation, is noticeably absent
in histories of the American War in Vietnam, included only tangentially in a few works,
including that of Marilyn Young, who directed the dissertation.29
For all of their differences, every one of these dominant narratives of the war ends
its story of American involvement in Vietnam with the “fall” of Saigon in April, 1975.
Although no one would dispute that this date marks the formal end of the Second
Indochina War, America’s role in Vietnam’s future was far from ended at the time.
Events after 1975, the focus of this dissertation, indeed have a great deal to tell us about
American imperial designs on Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s place in the region and the
                                                 
28 Franklin, “When Did the Vietnam War Begin?”
29 Ibid.
21
world after its victory, about American foreign policy in the late stages of the Cold War,
and indeed, about the conduct, legacies, and, perhaps, even the outcome of the American
War in Vietnam.  Taking the argument of the Imperialism narrative and the abundant
evidence on which it rests as a staring point, we can begin to see contours of an American
War in/on Vietnam that plays out over a much broader chronological spectrum when we
consider the period after 1975 to be a crucial part of the narrative.
For example, Karnow’s Vietnam: A History, an exemplar of the Quagmire model,
uses particular chronological foci during the early Cold War period along with other
narrative structures to tell a particular story of the war.  On the other end of the
chronological spectrum, even the 1991 edition of Karnow’s book fails to adequately deal
with the period after 1975.  With a small section added, ironically, to the Preface,
Karnow brings the reader up to date on events in both the United States and Vietnam
through early 1990.  He describes the troubles of the Vietnamese economy and spends a
great deal of time focusing on what the war has done “to America,” but does so in
separate sections, implicitly arguing that these various developments are “legacies” of a
war in the past rather than part of an ongoing set of relations between the United States
and Vietnam.  The American-led Embargo of Vietnam, for instance, is mentioned only in
passing, rather than taken as a major factor in the troubles of the Vietnamese economy.30
This trend of focusing on the years of direct military involvement, marginalizing
the periods prior to 1950 and after 1975 is also replicated in several anthologies on the
                                                 
30 Ibid., 42-3.  The mention of the embargo comes on 53.
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war.  Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology, edited by Andrew J.
Rotter, is woefully lacking in discussions of Cold War policy and post 1975
developments.31  The 1990 edition of Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War,
cited in the previous section and edited by Robert McMahon, while including several
pieces on Cold War policy and their economic origins, fails to address the period after
1975 in any meaningful way, including documents related to the embargo and American
actions against Vietnam, but focusing almost exclusively on the “legacies of the war” for
the United States.32  In Vietnam and America: A Documented History, Marvin Gettleman,
Marilyn Young, Jane Franklin and H. Bruce Franklin offer a series of documents and
essays to contextualize the American War in Vietnam.  Yet the period after 1975 receives
only two essays, one from H. Bruce Franklin on the POW/MIA issue, and one from
Marilyn Young on “The Vietnam War in American Memory,” both of which mention the
embargo and the ongoing struggles between the United States and Vietnam only in
passing.
George Herring, Gary Hess, and Marilyn Young offer perhaps the best examples
of the limits imposed by the traditional chronological arrangement of the war in Vietnam.
Both of their texts, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975
and The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, respectively, offer very comprehensive histories of
the war, both address issues of the global economic roots of American policy toward
Southeast Asia, both pay at least some attention to post-1975 developments.  For the
                                                 
31 Andrew J. Rotter, ed. Light at the End of the Tunnel (Wilmington, DE: St Martin’s
Press, 1991;1999).
32 McMahon, op cit, especially pp. 72-117 and 608-647.
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period after 1975, Herring does briefly discuss what he calls a “postwar-war,” which
includes economic sanctions against Vietnam, and the ongoing negotiations over
reparation payments and normalization of diplomatic relations.33  These inclusions,
however, read more as an aside than as an important development in Herring’s story.
Young, as the title of her book indicates, considers the American war(s) against Vietnam
not only to be plural rather than singular, but to have consumed a very wide time frame,
from the immediate post-World War Two period through the Gulf War.34  She discusses
in some detail the American policy goals of creating a Japanese-centered, Southeast-
Asian sphere of an integrated, global capitalist economy in the 1940s.  Furthermore, in
her conclusion she examines punitive actions taken by the United States against Vietnam
after 1975.35  So while expanding somewhat our chronological understanding of the war,
none of these books, takes either period as a central focus, leaving that project,
presumably to the next wave of scholarship.  Even the most cursory glance at the most
recent work on the war to emerge in recent years indicates that the gauntlet has not yet
been picked up.36
                                                 
33 Herring, America’s Longest War.
34Published in 1991, however, one must ask if bounding the study 1945-1990 indicates
that the wars were finally over at the point of publication even though Young does not
say as much.
35Young, The Vietnam Wars, esp. pp. 24-30 and 303-305.
36 Peter Lowe’s edited volume, The Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin’s1998), while
an excellent example of international history, remains bound by chronological
limitations, without a single essay that examines post-1975 events. Larry Addington’s
America’s War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History (Bloomington: Indiana University,
2000) spends a great deal of time on the period prior to direct American military
involvement in Vietnam, but spends only a brief paragraph describing the relationship
between Vietnam, the United States, and the world after 1975.  Likewise, in his otherwise
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Recently, Diplomatic History seems to be moving into the area of post-1975
American-Vietnamese relations, but its initial forays should sound alarms for cultural
studies scholars.  T. Christopher Jespersen’s article, “The Bitter End and the Lost Chance
in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration and the Battle Over Vietnam, 1975-76,”
provides a necessary corrective to historical narratives of the war and points to the
shortcomings of other work, noting that “most historical investigations into the nature of
Vietnamese relations stop in 1975, if not 1973.”37  Perhaps the most important statement
on the state of Diplomatic History scholarship with regard to American-Vietnamese
relations since 1975, however, comes from Robert McMahon’s Presidential Address,
quoted earlier.  In that essay, McMahon argues that both the Ford and Carter
administrations began the “vindicationist” revision of war, reinscribing the war in public
discourse as a courageous and heroic venture.  This was accomplished, he notes, largely
by focusing on the recuperation of American veterans of the war and, secondarily, by
rendering outside these discursive structures any sense of what the war did (and was
                                                                                                                                                  
excellent Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1998), Hess has a great deal to say about the origins of the war,
focusing on the rise of Vietnamese nationalism and early American involvement in the
region.  His attention to the “legacies” of the war, however, consists of a scant fifteen
pages describing post-1975 developments. In Gerard DeGroot’s A Noble Cause? America
and the Vietnam War (Pearson Education, 2000), sepecially  pp. 26-35, 325-360), the
author’s historiographic essay, “Historians at War,” asserts that his text will move beyond
the 1945-1975 boundary.  Unfortunately, his discussion of the pre-1945 developments in
Vietnam and particularly of American Cold War policies leaves much to be desired,
moving us nowhere past where Marilyn Young left off.  His discussion of post-1975
developments is actually divided, one chapter for Vietnam, where American policy
toward Vietnam barely consumes a paragraph, and an all-too-familiar chapter on the
United States, entitled “Remembering and Forgetting,” which describes the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the “Vietnam syndrome.”
37 T. Christopher Jespersen, “The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress,
the Ford Administration and the Battle Over Vietnam, 1975-76,” Diplomatic History 24
(Spring, 2000), 267.
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continuing to do) to the nation and people of Vietnam.38  It was in precisely this
atmosphere that Carter was able to proclaim, with a straight face, that the destruction
wrought on Vietnam at the hands of American power was “mutual.”39  Against this
triumphalism, McMahon argues that representations of the war in popular culture worked
within an “antiwar” paradigm, offering an alternative form of cultural memory. Popular
forms, he argues, “represented the war as a lost, pointless, morally ambiguous conflict.”40
In this piece, we get only a very surface level reading of several texts, including
the first wave of American films about the war, released during 1977-1979.  Coming
Home (1978), The Deer Hunter (1978), and Apocalypse Now (1979), McMahon argues,
are the exemplars of popular representations of the war: “together, they powerfully
reinforced notions of the war as a hopeless, pointless, morally tainted endeavor.”  These
are strong claims to make about three historic films, the first major Hollywood movies
explicitly related to the war in Vietnam, yet McMahon spends only three sentences
explaining them.  The only evidence he offers for this explanation is a statement from
Francis Ford Coppola, creator of Apocalypse Now.41
Admittedly, a Presidential Address, even in published form, may not be the place
                                                 
38 McMahon, “Contested Memory,” 164-171.
39 “Remarks at Press Briefing, March 24, 1977,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), 499-500.  This issue
will be discussed at length here in chapter two.
40 McMahon, “Contested Memory,” 177-179.
41 Ibid., 178-79, n.62. The quotation from Coppola reads: “The most important thing I
wanted to do in the making of Apocalypse Now was to create a film experience that
would give the audience a sense of the horror, the madness, the sensuousness, and the
moral dilemma of the Vietnam War.”  The passage is taken from James Olson and Randy
Roberts, Where the Domino Fell (St. James, NY, 1999), 270.
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for a detailed critique of these representations.  Yet the general theoretical and
methodological assumptions underlying this approach indicate a larger intellectual
problem.  McMahon’s essay rests on several assumptions that point out some of the perils
of simply “adding” popular culture to the study of diplomatic history.  Popular culture, in
this formulation, is always secondary, a response to the “official,” top-down discourse
emanating from Congress and the White House.  Also, the texts are taken at face value.
No attempt is made to situate the texts in the political and social contexts within which
they were constructed, disseminated, and received by audiences.  Such an approach, as
we will see, only reinforces the shortcomings of cultural studies approaches to
representations of the war in American culture.
In order to advance our understanding of the war in Vietnam and its continued
importance, we need scholarship which takes the periods prior to 1950 and after 1975 not
as “prologues” or “epilogues” to the main story, but rather takes events of those periods
to be the main stories themselves. Given the disciplinary confines of History, however, it
is unlikely that historians will, in the short term, address this problem in any meaningful
way.  Rather, we should begin by looking to other fields and disciplines to see what
contributions might be made to disrupting the traditional chronology.
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Other Invisibilities: Social Science and Cultural Studies
Compared with historians’ work on the American War in Vietnam, scholars in the
Social Sciences and Cultural Studies have paid a great deal of attention to developments
in America and Vietnam after 1975.  Students of political science have examined changes
in the Vietnamese brand of Socialism over time and studied the development of Hanoi’s
foreign policy after the defeat of the United States.  Economists have explored Vietnam’s
significant economic transformation and Vietnam’s role in the global and regional
economies.42  In the realm of Cultural Studies, a variety of strands of work related to the
war in Vietnam have been developed, all of which have some contribution to make to our
understanding of events after 1975.   Indeed, all of these areas have a great deal to
contribute to a discussion of Vietnam and the United States after 1975, yet they all suffer
from various shortcomings as well.
Political scientists, for example, have explained a great deal about Vietnam’s
political development after 1975, including relations with the United States and China
and the war in Cambodia.  Stephen Hurst, for example, constructs a useful study of
American-Vietnamese relations from 1976-1979 in The Carter Administration and
Vietnam.43  Indeed, I rely heavily on Hurst’s study in parts of chapter two and three here.
However, like many works in Political Science, Hurst places too much emphasis on
                                                 
42 There is also an extensive body of work from geographers and other environmental
science scholars who have discussed and critiqued the nation’s environmental policies,
including reforestation efforts and the tension between industrial development and the
desire to protect Vietnam’s already fragile environment.  They will not be discussed here
for reasons of space and because this dissertation does not actively engage with that
work.  For an example of such scholarship, see Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia: The
Human Landscape of Modernization of Development (New York: Routledge, 1997).
43 Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996).
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fitting his case study into an particular theoretical approach, in this case, determining
whether the forces of “globalist” or “regionalist” approaches to foreign policy determined
the administration’s course of action with regard to Vietnam.  Lost in his quest to
determine the answer to this “belief-systems” problem are the ironies, intersections, and
contradictions of each perspective and, with them, the intricacies of much of the story.44
Even with this problem, however, Hurst has paved the way for future research into
American-Vietnamese relations in the “postwar” era.
A more problematic (and symptomatic) example of the failures of some political
science approaches comes from Stephen Morris.  Morris, in his book Why Vietnam
Invaded Cambodia, discusses the rise of the Third Indochina War, offering useful
insights into the decision making process that led to Hanoi’s ultimate decision to invade
and occupy its neighbor.  However, like Hurst, Morris reveals himself to be too tied to
particular aspects of international relations theory.45   Although other more useful
                                                 
44 For instance, Hurst discusses the Globalist Cold Warrior view represented by Zbigniew
Brzezinski and the Defense Department against the regionalist approach favored by the
State Department.  The Globalist view, he argues, favored focusing on the perceived
military threat posed by the Soviet Union, while the regionalist approach concentrated on
the regional political and economic development and, thus normalizing relations with
Vietnam.  Although the Globalist vision can help to explain the administration’s focus on
improving relations with China in order to triangulate relations with the Soviets, Hurst
never explores the irony, discussed here in chapters three and four, that the United States’
actions with China helped push Vietnam into the Soviet orbit and, eventually, led to a
significant Soviet military presence in Vietnam, precisely the type of Soviet military
proliferation the view was designed to keep in check.
45 Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press). Morris’ conclusions, which boil down to his assertion that the Vietnamese
Communist Party was lead by an “irrational” world-view, become all the more
problematic when Morris’ political leanings are revealed.  As discussed here in chapter
six, Morris’ central role in a POW/MIA hoax during the early 1990s helped bring to light
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contributions to the study of Vietnam’s foreign relations after 1975 can be found
elsewhere, Hurst and Morris’ accounts are unfortunately symptomatic of the
shortcomings of the discipline’s contributions to this topic. 46
The work of Joseph Zasloff and MacAllister Brown is a noteworthy exception to
this tendency.  The two political science scholars collaborated on two significant works
on Southeast Asia after 1975.  The first, Communist Indochina and U.S. Foreign Policy,
written shortly after the end of the American War in Vietnam, is one of the strongest
contributions of that era to the understanding of the region after the U.S. withdrawal.
Their later work, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, provides the most detailed
examination of the protracted diplomacy related to the political settlement of the Third
Indochina War.47  The latter is an especially useful contribution because of the wider
dearth of scholarship devoted to the tragedy of Cambodia after the rise of the Khmer
Rouge.  Aside from the widely hailed work of Ben Kiernan and the less noted studies of
Michael Haas, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been paid to this problem.
Fortunately, a number of invaluable works on Cambodia have been produced by
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journalists Nayan Chanda, William Shawcross and Elizabeth Becker.48  A final edited
work by Zasloff, containing essays by he and Brown as well as a number of other
significant scholars of the region, including Frederick Z. Brown and Chanda, is another
excellent source of information on later developments in the region.49  Unfortunately,
Zasloff and Brown are the exception rather than the rule.  In the final analysis, few works
of political science advance our understanding of Vietnam’s state policies after 1975
further than the work of historian William Duiker, whose Vietnam Since the Fall of
Saigon provides a balanced and constructive summary of the changes the country
experienced while rebuilding after the American war.50
Economists, like political scientists have contributed important work about the
transformation of Vietnam’s political economy after 1975, and particularly after the doi
moi reforms that began in the mid 1980s.  Although this literature is nearly as diverse
and, as it continues to grow, as large a body of work as historical scholarship on the
American War in Vietnam, it is still possible to discern a few commonalities,
contributions, and shortcomings.  The most common aspect of the economic literature on
Vietnam, and the Southeast Asian economy as a whole, after 1975, is that it is caged in
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the neoliberal language of the global economy, situating Vietnam within a largely
predetermined narrative of “development.”  Part of this is no doubt simply a problem of
language: it is difficult to describe the changes countries undergo during industrialization
and integration into the global economy without reinscribing the power dynamics and
division of labor implicit in that economic structure: thus nations such as Vietnam are
“third world” as opposed to “first,” “periphery” as opposed to “core,” or “developing” as
opposed to developed.  Beyond the problem of language, however, there is often an
unstated assumption built into studies of such “developing” nations that ignores the
historical realities and specificities of the country or region in question, placing them
instead on the continuum of development.  As with historical works that render
inconvenient developments outside the realm of their narrative structure, these studies
often ignore the history of particular nations that is often crucial to understanding their
location as “developing.”  One need not look far beyond the titles of many of these works
related to Vietnam to see this process at work: Vietnam Today, Vietnam: The Incomplete
Transformation, Vietnam: Dawn of a New Market.51
To be fair, some of these titles over a more historical view of Vietnam’s economic
transformation.  For the most part though, economists have ignored the historical
conditions that acted as structural constraints on Vietnam’s economy, most notably the
long and devastating American War.  Economist Adam Fforde is one of the more
notorious culprits of this practice.  In his two notable works, From Plan to Market and
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The Limits of National Liberation, Fforde rails against the failures of Vietnam’s
economic planning while ignoring the devastating legacies of the war with the United
States.  In one passage he notes, in a sweeping understatement, that although other
regional nations experienced major economic growth during the period, “in the 1960s,
Indochina was certainly not an ideal place for economic development.”52  Geoffrey
Murray’s Vietnam: Dawn of a New Market also ignores the dusk before the dawn, as it
were, failing to offer any discussion of the ravages of the American War.  Murray’s
narrative begins in 1995, flashing back only to the mid-1980s period of nascent economic
changes in Vietnam and devoting a few sentences to “the American-led embargo,” which
he incorrectly dates to the invasion of Cambodia.53
Other economists are far more attentive to the historical conditions of Vietnam’s
economic transformation.  Henrich Dahm, in his useful book, French and Japanese
Economic Relations With Vietnam Since 1975, notes the United States was “very
effective” in isolating Vietnam from international capital markets after 1975, helping
shape the foreign investment policies of Hanoi in the 1980s and 1990s.54  Australian
economist Melanie Beresford is perhaps most attentive to the ways in which the United
States, both prior to and after 1975 continued to affect Vietnam’s economy.  In a series of
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studies of Vietnam’s economic transformation, Beresford makes a number of important
observations about how the legacies of the American war shaped Vietnam’s political
economy.  For instance, in her introduction to National Unification and Economic
Development in Vietnam, she argues that the lack of a knowledge base about Southern
Vietnam’s economy was partially the result of the American Phoenix Program during the
1960s, a CIA-led assassination program that targeted village level leaders allegedly
sympathetic to the National Liberation Front.55  Although an important insight,
Beresford’s argument leaves out or glosses over other important factors, including the
abandonment of Southern NLF leaders and cadres after the triumph of the Northern
Vietnamese forces.  In a more recent edited volume, Beresford teams with Vietnamese
scholar Dang Phong to demonstrate further the ways in which U.S. policies helped shape
Vietnam’s economy.   Both before and after 1975, the editors argue, the U.S. attempted to
“squeeze the lifeblood out of Vietnam,” by continuing to isolate and punish Vietnam,
consistently pushing Hanoi into the Soviet sphere of influence.  More than any other
piece, this text demonstrates clearly that the neoliberal development model employed by
the vast majority of economists neglects historical factors leading to future economic
developments.  Most notably for Vietnam, they show, the development model ignores the
legacies of European colonialism, the enormous dependency of foreign aid and imports
for both Northern and Southern Vietnam during the American war, and the American
sanctions program after 1975.56  Published by smaller and more obscure presses than her
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development-model colleagues and cited far less often, Beresford’s voice is a lonely one
among economists focusing on Vietnam after 1975.  Her close attention to historical
factors shaping Vietnam’s economy is clearly the exception rather than the rule in this
field.
None of these works coming from social science perspectives offer a more
complete picture of Vietnam’s economy after 1975 than that offered by historian Gabriel
Kolko in his 1997 follow-up to Anatomy of a War.  In Anatomy of a Peace, Kolko
provides a detailed discussion of the transformation of Vietnam’s economy.  As an
historian, Kolko is particularly attentive to the structural limitations placed on Vietnam
after the American War, starting from the assumption that the primary legacy of the war
“was obviously economic.”57  Taking a strong stance against the tendency of economists
to ignore these historical factors, Kolko argues:
To divorce Vietnam’s economic development from war-induced causes, as
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Establishment economists have
persistently done, reflects capitalist economists’ endemic ideological inability to
view politics and economics as intrinsically related dimensions of one unified
social reality.58
Yet Kolko’s own ideological commitments often obscure his view of the post-1975
period in Vietnam.  A committed socialist and one-time advisor to the Communist Party
in Vietnam, Kolko reserves much of the space in his text to lambaste the market-based
ideology and reforms of some of Vietnam’s leaders during the 1980s. Although he rightly
criticizes some of Vietnam’s acquiescing to the neo-liberal line of the IMF and World
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Bank, he also glosses over the seriousness of the nation’s economic troubles in the late
1970s and refuses to acknowledge the success of any policies based on market
mechanisms.  Even with these shortcomings, however, Kolko’s attention to the historical
factors at work in shaping the structural limitations on Vietnam’s economy after 1975
demonstrates the gross shortcomings of the work of economists who ignore or
marginalize these factors.
While historians of the American War in Vietnam have remained lodged in an
outdated chronological paradigm and social sciences have more often than not ignored
altogether the historical factors in American-Vietnamese relations after 1975, the work
produced by Cultural Studies scholars generally falls into three categories.  The first, and
most troubling group can be located within the myth/symbol tradition of the discipline.
Works such as John Hellmann’s American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam, Jonathan
Capps’ The Unfinished War, and Loren Baritz’ Backfire are the exemplars of this mode.59
A brief examination of Hellmann’s argument will suffice as a critique of this approach.
Hellmann begins his description of the relationship between “American Myth”
and “Vietnam” by claiming:
Vietnam is an experience that has severely called into question American myth.
Americans entered Vietnam with certain expectations that a story, a distinctly
American story, would unfold.  When the story of America in Vietnam turned
into something unexpected, the true nature of the larger story of America itself
became the subject of intense cultural dispute.  On the deepest level, the legacy of
Vietnam is the disruption of our story, our explanation of the past and vision of
the future.”60
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Concluding his study, Hellmann reiterates that the “enduring trauma of Vietnam has been
the disruption of the American story.”  As with the myth and symbolists, Hellmann offers
a critical assessment of these “myths” and of American Culture as a whole, but, also like
his predecessors, his connections between “myth,” history, and experience are tenuous at
best, resting on very troubling notions of cultural homogeneity and collective memory.
What exactly are these mythic narratives evidence of?  For Hellmann, the popularity of
The Green Berets, The Deer Hunter, and Star Wars are evidence that “American myth” is
deeply held at some level by the majority of the population.  There is no sense of the
larger context of production and circulation for these texts, nor how or why real people
consume them.  Perhaps more troubling, though, is Hellmann’s insistence on a unified
American society. Who is this “we” who had “our” story disrupted in Southeast Asia?
Who is this “we” who “went into Vietnam” and had “our” expectations shattered?  Who
has the authority to define what the enduring legacy of this thing called “Vietnam” is?  
Placed in the context of the late 1940s and early 1950s, at a time when the links
between American Studies and a Cold War Americanism were very clear, the standard
assumptions of the myth and symbol school are perhaps not surprising.  In Smith’s
America, as American Studies scholar Gene Wise pointed out in his history of the field,
not only was it logical that a literary scholar could discern, or, more accurately, represent
an “American mind,” but also that that mind would be unified and collectively held,
rather than diverse and heterogeneous.61  Maintaining these assumptions after the cultural
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and political upheavals of the 1960s, and particularly after the fractious and divisive war
in Vietnam itself, however, is neither logical nor appropriate.  Equally important, and
keeping in line with their myth and symbol predecessors, the work on the American War
in Vietnam coming out of this school ignores the real historical context in which events
take place: namely, in this case, the larger geopolitical and economic motives for
American intervention of Southeast Asia.
The second school of work on the American war in Vietnam coming out of an
American Studies mold is the popular culture studies which abound in American Studies
journals and conferences, often focused on such topics as “Vietnam-era” poetry and
music, the films of Oliver Stone, or the writings of Tim O’Brien.62  Unlike the previous
category, these studies often contribute greatly to our understanding of cultural
representations of the war and how different groups have made sense of their
experiences.  A number of anthologies, for example, offer close readings of American
films about the war.63  A smaller subset of works has focused on the relationship between
films about the war and the military.64  Others have incorporated a wider variety of media
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in their explorations of the “cultural” legacies of the war.65   For the vast majority of
pieces in these and other collections, however, the close textual readings fall prey to the
trap of ignoring the larger geopolitical and economic contexts in which the texts under
consideration are produced and consumed.  Thus, like the myth and symbolists, the bulk
of these studies fail to consider the texts themselves as historical products and, as such, as
part of the ongoing war against Vietnam.
Not all “textual” studies produce such narrowly applied readings, however.  A
few important works in cultural studies offer close readings of popular American
representations of the war in Vietnam while placing them in the context of the larger
battle against the memory and legacies of the war, if not the ongoing American War on
Vietnam.  Andrew Martin’s Receptions of War, despite its theory-laden focus on “the
body,” offers an intriguing discussion of how many representations of the war in popular
culture were “received” by American culture.66  Keith Beattie’s The Scar That Binds uses
the trope of “healing” to show how American representations of the war have distorted,
inverted, and reconstructed the history of the war to situate the United States as the victim
of the Vietnamese.  Beattie offers a thorough examination of the central paradox of
“Vietnam” in American culture: the war that represented so much cultural and political
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division has more often than not been represented by the imposition of an artificial sense
of unity and consensus.67  Without question, however, the most important contribution in
this realm comes from Susan Jeffords.  In The Remasculinization of America: Gender
and the Vietnam War, Jeffords surveys a diverse group of memoirs, fictional works and
films about the war, arguing that these texts have used a number of “narrative
mechanisms” to reassert the dominance of gendered language and images in the wake of
the war.  These texts, she shows, have aided not only in the remasculinization of
American society after the war in Vietnam, but in the remilitarization of American
society as well.68
Even with the brilliance of Jeffords’ and Beattie’s formulations, however, the
texts under consideration in these types of cultural studies are discussed only in terms of
their relationship to cultural developments within the United States.  What would happen
if we began to view these cultural texts not as representations of historical events, but as
part of an ongoing war, in which “Vietnam” as a signifier has been appropriated to
signify something that happened to the United States, while at the same time these texts
are being constructed, Vietnam the country, and its people, continue to suffer at the hands
of American power?
Why is it, we must ask, that so many Cultural Studies scholars of the war seem to
be repeating the mistakes made by previous generations, reifying “myths” and texts at the
expense of contexts?  Why is that cultural studies scholars seem to have abandoned
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altogether the archives in favor of various types of screens?  To be sure, these studies
contribute to our understanding of how the texts operate as visual and discursive
representations of the American War in Vietnam and, as such, the various screens on and
through which they operate can serve as useful sources of evidence for material that
might not otherwise be “archived” at all?69  The texts that serve as the basis for the
studies of Jeffords, Martin, and Beattie, however, are for the most part well known
popular novels and films, not the sort of otherwise marginalized or oppositional texts that
would be usefully served by the conception of screen-as-archive.  The majority of
cultural studies work on the American war in Vietnam, by focusing on texts at the
expense of context, stops short of offering the truly interdisciplinary work that combine
the use of the screen and the archive.
We know that American Studies and Cultural Studies can do better, because there
is a third and final body of work from scholars in the field, albeit it smaller than the other
two, which has shown that we need not abandon contexts or archives.  I like to think to
think of this body of work as producing “counter-memories,” narratives running against
the grain of popular memory and forcing citizens as well as students of the war to rethink
their assumptions.  By far the best example of this type of work comes from H. Bruce
Franklin, whose works on representations of the war in American culture and especially
the POW/MIA myth, have altered the terms of debate in this country.70  Works such as
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these transcend the limitations of the other modes of inquiry addressed here,
transgressing chronological, disciplinary, and political/ideological paradigms.71  As will
become apparent throughout this dissertation, my work is extremely indebted to
Franklin’s.  He has laid the intellectual, methodological, and chronological framework on
which this project seeks to build.  At the same time, I hope to add to that solid base in
significant ways, extending the legacy of historical inversion and American victimization
identified by Franklin by focusing on the larger context of American policy toward
Vietnam after 1975.
Franklin’s work can also be situated within a larger school of Counter-Memory
scholarship from American Studies and Cultural Studies that does not necessarily
explicitly address the American War in Vietnam.  It is with this body of work that I hope
to situate this dissertation.  As we will see, these works share two primary characteristics:
they embrace various aspects of a Foucauldian framework, focusing on the intersection of
competing discourses and questions of power; and they are fundamentally inter- and
transdisciplinary in their approaches.
Three works exemplify this school.  The first, George Lipsitz’ Time Passages,
builds on the idea of Countermemory developed by Michel Foucault to show how various
marginalized groups in American society have negotiated the polyvalent meanings of
popular cultural forms while developing potentially oppositional forms of consciousness.
Against Foucault and others who have adopted the more radical postmodern and post-
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structural positions on history and totality, Lipsitz suggests that although successful
totalizing narratives remain an impossibility, “the pursuit of such totality remains
essential.” The “refusal of totality,” he argues, “could just as easily obscure real
connections, causes, and relationships.” 72  Lipsitz defines counter-memory within
oppositional traditions of myth and folklore advanced by historically marginalized
populations, but the tactics of counter-memory can also be the tools of the historian:
Counter-memory looks to the past for the hidden histories excluded from
dominant narratives.  But unlike myths that seek to detach events and actions
from the fabric of any larger history, counter-memory forces revision of existing
histories by supplying new perspectives about the past.  Counter-memory
embodies aspects of myth and aspects of history, but it retains an enduring
suspicion of both categories.  Counter-memory focuses on localized experiences
with oppression, using them to reframe and refocus dominant narratives
purporting to represent universal experiences.73
While this study is not focused on the localized or personal in the manner Lipsitz
prescribes, it does seek both to influence existing dominant narratives of the American
war in Vietnam and the more totalizing narratives related to those dominant narratives.
Another more useful model of the Counter-memory school comes from Marita
Sturken.  In her book Tangled Memories, Sturken develops the concept of Cultural
Memory, which she defines as “a field of cultural negotiation through which different
stories vie for a place in history.”74 The field of cultural memory, according to Sturken, is
located between individual memory and historical discourse, although she contends that
the boundaries between all three forms are fluid and “entangled.”  Thus the focus is on
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the manner in which battles between competing narratives are played out, “specifically,
how histories are told through popular culture, the media, public images, and
memorials—how cultural memory engages with historical narrative in the public
sphere.”75  Sturken takes for granted that memory is subjectively constructed and shaped
in the present.  The point in this model is not to determine if a given memory is
“accurate” or “realistic,” but rather how it struggles against other versions of the past.
Sturken also pays close attention to the “technologies of memory,” through which
cultural memory is constructed.  These “objects, images, and representations,” are “not
vessels of memory in which memory passively resides so much as objects through which
memories are shared, produced, and given meaning.”76  This model, by foregrounding
“the contest of stories in the public sphere,”77 and the struggle over both public and
individual meanings of historical events, allows for great flexibility in thinking about
“memories” of the American War in Vietnam.  It is also a much-needed corrective to the
work of many cultural studies scholars, discussed earlier, who continue to embrace an
uncritical collective memory approach.
The final work coming out of an interdisciplinary, cultural studies framework that
serves as a model for this project is Melanie McAllister’s Epic Encounters, which
explores representations of the Middle East in American culture since 1945.78  Among
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the many valuable contributions of this work, the strongest is McAllister’s effort to
consider foreign policy along the same terms as cultural forms.  She explores the
intersections of these and other types of “meaning-making activity,” as part of the same
“politics of representation, the negotiation of political and moral values, as well as the
public understanding of history and its significance.”79  Like Lipsitz and Sturken,
McAllister starts from a position that denies the fixity of meaning to texts, focusing
instead on the ways in which different groups, individuals, and institutions create
meaning in, through, and around those texts.  As such, McAllister encourages readers
“ask less about “what texts mean”—with the implication that there is a hidden or
allegorical code to their secret meaning—and more about how the texts participate in a
field, and then in a set of fields, and thus in a social and political world.”80
The most provocative and challenging aspect of McAllister’s work, however, has
to do with the issues of power and agency.  Again, like Sturken and Lipsitz, she is
interested in the often messy intersections and collisions between history, memory, and
representation.  In particular, her work forces us to consider the question: if there is a
confluence of representations in the realms of cultural and policy production, where do
we situate the convergence on the continuum of coincidence and conspiracy?  McAllister
offers a starting point for such discussions, arguing against any approach that favors
conspiracy, functionalism, or even a unifying cultural logic:
This production of knowledge occurs not through the conspiracy or conscious
collaboration of individuals but through the internal logics of cultural practices,




intersecting with the entirely interested activity of social agents… We can begin
to see how certain meanings became naturalized by repetition, as well as the ways
that different sets of texts, with their own interests and affiliations, come to
overlap, to reinforce and revise one another toward an end that is neither entirely
planned nor entirely coincidental. If the end product is the successful construction
of a discourse of expansionist nationalism [for example], what we examine here is
not conspiracy, nor a functionalist set of representations in the service of power,
but a process of convergence, in which historical events, overlapping
representations, and diverse vested interests come together in a powerful and
productive, if historically contingent accord.81
While there is much to recommend in this approach, it remains the task of a new
generation of scholars, working at these interdisciplinary crossroads, to further probe the
convergence of culture and foreign policy.
Although McAllister is certainly correct to assert that we need to be concerned
less about “what texts mean” than with how they circulate with other texts and larger
systems of “meaning making,” we cannot be too reticent to offer interpretations of a
text’s content or “messages.”  To begin with, a reading of a text is always implicit even in
the most benign, objectivist reading (even in McAllister’s descriptions in Epic
Encounters).  Secondly, given the problematic representations offered by not only the
texts under consideration in this dissertation, but by the discourses that arose (and
continue to arise) around them, interventions are both necessary and just.  All stories are
not equal; some are better or worse, more racist or more malignant, than others. Although
the task of the cultural historian may be simply to relate the history of a historical
moment, the task of a counter-memory is to widen the terms of debate, to construct a
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greater space from which previously marginalized histories and agents may intervene.
To do so, it is sometimes necessary to debunk particular myths, stories, and ideas.
To offer a reading, implicitly or explicitly, within this larger framework, is not to
betray Foucault’s model.  Quite the contrary, the issue of power so central to Foucault’s
method, is embedded precisely in this contest between narratives and representations.
The point is that power, whether discursive or agential, operates not by conspiracy but by
defining the terms of debate and delimiting the boundaries of acceptable, or possible,
action or discourse. As Jay Mechling reminds us, in the contest of stories in the public
sphere, power matters.”82  Those who have access to the means of cultural production or
the halls of government in which policy is constructed and implemented, are invested
with the ways and means to speak their truths, however partial and incomplete, to power.
Does this mean that those in power will construct narratives and images that reinforce
existing power relations?  Not necessarily; but it does mean that the stories they tell will
have a far greater influence in structuring the terms of debate and action; their stories, in
and of themselves, are both an exercise and a form of power.
Toward a(nother) Third Space
From its earliest origins, American Studies has been a “third space,” an
interdisciplinary construct in and through which scholars working at the intersections of
various fields can construct work that is stronger than the sum of its consituent parts.
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Early generations of American Studies explored the possibilities of combining the study
of sociology, cultural and intellectual history, and literature.  Later generations of
scholars would use the spaces made possible in part by American Studies and Cultural
Studies to bring about the development of new fields, such as Queer Theory, Border
Studies, Critical Race Theory, and some strands of Postcolonial Studies.  Most recently,
the scholars with whom I began this chapter—Amy Kaplan, Mark Bradley, Mary Renda,
McAllister, and Kristin Hoganson—have been exploring the intersections of cultural
studies and diplomatic history, helping to forge new directions in what Kaplan calls the
Cultures of United States imperialism.83
As I have shown here, this work offers an example of the ways in which a
collision of disciplines can engender new theories, methods, and new narratives.  Adding
to this new field of work the concept of Cultural Memory, we can begin to see the
possibilities for creating new counter memories to challenge hegemonic interpretations of
American involvement in Southeast Asia and disrupt the dominant chronology of the
American War in Vietnam.  The study I offer here, therefore, is both an exploration of the
battle over cultural memory of the American War in Vietnam and, at the same time, a
narrative of counter-memory, an explicit intervention in that very battle.
The central task of this dissertation, then, is to disrupt and transgress the existing
narrative frameworks and chronological boundaries of the American War against
Vietnam.  As I have argued in this chapter, the structural limitations placed on a given
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narrative by its acceptance of traditional chronologies of the war play a central role in
determining what that the war was “ about.”  The issue of what I call the “narrative
boundaries” of a given “text,” be it a policy debate, film, book, or public memorial, is
thus central to many of the discussions I present here.  This attention to the discursive
structures of texts is another way in which the work of Michel Foucault has influenced
my work.
As discussed above, Foucault’s conception of power is central to my study.  I
argue that the United States continued to exercise its considerable power over Vietnam
after 1975.  This power, although it often operated under the threat of direct force or
military violence, more often than not it was exercised by “guiding the possibility of
conduct and putting in order the possible outcome” of a given situation.84  The United
States found itself in the unique position of emerging in 1975 from the longest—and one
of the costliest—wars in its history defeated and divided, yet still armed with the ability
to dictate the terms of peace to the enemy at whose hands it had been defeated.  The
United States was still able, in the late 1970s, to control many of the international
institutions to which the Vietnamese sought access and aid; it was still able to govern,
more than any other nation, the global flows of capital, technology, and commodities
which the Vietnamese were often in desperate need of.
In short, the United States was both indirectly and directly responsible for
defining the broad terms under which the Vietnamese would reconstruct and rebuild their
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nation.  Foucault’s phrase for such manifestations of power is “structuring the possible
field of action.”85  Thus, for example, I will show that although the brutal American
embargo did not determine the fate of a Socialist Vietnam,86 it did limit the range of
possibilities available to the state and its people, by restricting the amount of aid flowing
into the country, the amount and type of exports flowing out of it, and by blocking
Vietnamese applications for membership in the United Nations.
In focusing on the issue of narrative structure, I am also drawing on the work of
Jill Lepore.  As Lepore shows in her 1999 book, The Name of War, acts of war inevitably
generate acts of narration.87  “Waging, writing, and remembering a war” are all parts of
the same process of defining the war and the nations and people who fought it:
Both acts [of war and narration] are often joined in a common purpose—defining
the geographical, political, cultural, and sometimes national and racial boundaries
between people.  If you kill me and call my resistance ‘treachery,” you have
succeeded not only in killing me (and, in doing so, ensuring that I will not be able
to call your attack a “massacre”), but you have also succeeded in calling me and
my kind a treacherous people.88
Although traditionally such narration was the province of victors in war, again the United
States found itself in the unique position of losing a devastating war but still with the
ability to define the ensuing contest for the war’s meaning on its own terms.   “If war is,
at least in part, a contest for meaning,” as Lepore argues, “can it ever be a fair fight when
only one side has access to those perfect instruments of empire, pens, paper, and printing
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If these statements about the politics of war stories are true for King Phillip’s
War, on which Lepore focuses, they most certainly hold true as well for the American
War in Vietnam, a war that was fought on television much as it has been remembered on
various “screens.”  If the pen and the printing press were once the perfect instruments of
empire, certainly the American culture industries of the late 20th century must be
considered as a key component in the ongoing war on Vietnam after 1975.  Indeed, the
central role played by the popular media in constructing cultural memory of the war in
Vietnam in American society is precisely why it is necessary to consider the intersections
of cultural production and policy formation.
The argument I develop here is that the narratives of the American War against
Vietnam after 1975, whether constructed in the halls of Congress or on movie screens
across the country, operate through the same cultural logic of historical inversion,
recasting the history of the war with the United States as the victim of the cruel, Asian,
Communist Vietnamese.  Doing so requires that the haunting images and stories of that
war—children burned with napalm, rapings, murders, and mass executions by American
soldiers and their allies—be erased, or at the very least marginalized in American cultural
memory.  Lost in this war for American memory, however, is the consideration of the
effects of the war on the nation and people of Vietnam.  Any discussion of the massive
devastation of Vietnamese life at the hands of the United States is a considerable threat to
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the historical inversions enacted on the cultural front of the American War on Vietnam.
As a result, Vietnam and the Vietnamese are rendered increasingly invisible in narratives
of the war after 1975, either rendered outside the discursive construction altogether or
dehumanized and marginalized to the point of invisibility and irrelevance.  Thus in
debates over the POW/MIA issue, not only are the historical roles of victim and
aggressor inverted, but the entire discussion is focused on a small group of American
soldiers.  Hardly any mention of the estimated 300,000 unaccounted for Vietnamese
soldiers can be found in the historical record.  Similarly, in public discussions of the
effects of Agent Orange on American soldiers, no consideration is given to the
Vietnamese who were obviously subject to greater exposure to the effects of American
chemical warfare.  Even in public memorials, as I show in my final chapter here, the
Vietnamese and the legacies of the war are carefully and consistently rendered invisible
so as not to disrupt the cultural and political work of reconstructing the culture of
American imperialism after the war in Vietnam.
With all of these and other considerations in mind, I have constructed a narrative
here that tells the story of the American War on Vietnam, 1975-2000, examining the
intersections and interactions of cultural representations and foreign policy.  In the first
chapter, I examine the early stages of the American War on Vietnam after 1975, paying
particular attention to the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions on Vietnam during the
final hours of the military phase of the war.  We will see that far from abandoning
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Vietnam altogether, the Ford administration pursued an aggressive and hostile policy
toward Vietnam after the fall of the defeat of the South Vietnamese regime.  This policy
of denying humanitarian aid and access to multilateral institutions on top of American
unilateral sanctions, while never intended to be permanent, would continue to serve as the
basis for American policy toward Hanoi for the next two decades.  As I will show, U.S.
policy constituted a continuation of war by other means, sharing many characteristics
with the military phase of the war: the American War on Vietnam consisted of poorly
conceived, indiscriminate warfare that targeted civilians more than the state and was
more harmful than helpful to U.S. political and economic interests.
In chapter two, I explore the process of “normalizing” the American War in
Vietnam through the concept of “mutual destruction” made famous by President Carter in
1977.  Far from the traditional understanding of diplomatic, political, and economic
negotiations between former adversaries, I employ the term normalization to signify the
larger cultural process of reintegrating the war into American cultural memory.  In both
the policy and cultural “fronts” of the ongoing war against Vietnam, the same cultural
logic of inverting the history and public memory of the war was used to situate the United
States as the victim of a savage and cruel and enemy.  Films such as The Deer Hunter,
Apocalypse Now, and Coming Home were central to this process, as was the powerful and
pervasive POW/MIA myth.  In both political discourse and cultural production during the
late 1970s, the ongoing American War against Vietnam was legitimated by
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representations of the war that marginalized and dehumanized the Vietnamese while
focusing on what the war in Vietnam had done to the United States.
Examining American policy toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole
during the Third Indochina War, I argue in chapter three that the United States entered a
new phase of its war on Vietnam during the 1980s, providing various forms of support to
the anti-Vietnamese forces in China and Cambodia during this long and bloody conflict.
The avowed policy of “bleeding Vietnam,” followed by the U.S. and its allies in the war,
was thus an extension but not a departure from previous American actions toward
Vietnam.  The “bleeding” of Vietnam was constituted not simply by prolonging the war
between Vietnam and Cambodia, but by the ongoing political and diplomatic isolation of
Vietnam led by the U.S. and China, and the ongoing economic embargo, joined during
this period by several other key nations.  This period also highlights the inconsistencies in
U.S. policies toward the region as a whole, supporting various incarnations of the
murderous Khmer Rouge while punishing Hanoi, the only government that had stood up
to the genocidal Cambodian regime.
In chapter four, I turn once again to the cultural front of the war against Vietnam.
Against the backdrop of the proxy U.S. wars in Cambodia and Central America and the
resurgence of American militarism, I argue that a new matrix of representations of the
war in Vietnam was established during this period.  Discussing first the “second wave” of
American films about the war, most notably Rambo, I show how narratives of the war
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legitimized and made possible by this text and the ensuing cultural phenomenon of
“Rambomania” established the cultural space into which a third wave of films would
stride.  This third wave of films, defined by Oliver Stone’s Platoon, was constructed
around a discourse of realism that offered Stone’s version of the war as “the way it really
was,” that trickled down into other media, including television and comic books.  By
tracing this process of cultural diffusion, I show how the narrow reality offered by
Platoon and its progeny only served to further the cultural work of the American War on
Vietnam, reconstituting the United States as the primary victim of the war by
systematically erasing the Vietnamese from these representations.
The final stages of the American War on Vietnam are the focus of Chapter five.
Tracing the gradual end of hostilities through the first half of the 1990s, I show how U.S.
policy continued to erode, both at home and in the international community.  The
embargo, however, would remain in place as part of the first Bush administration’s
“roadmap” policy, and would not be lifted until 1994 because of a number of ongoing
investigations into the mythical allegations that Vietnam was holding American prisoners
hostage.  The staying power of the policy is even more significant given the increasingly
vocal and visible lobbying of U.S. corporations during this time, as American business
interests began to lose out on access to the Vietnamese market.   Indeed, I argue, it is only
when the discourse of “access” to Vietnam begins to fit the needs of both the corporate
and POW/MIA lobbies that it becomes politically possible to end the sanctions.  The new
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era of relations between the United States and Vietnam launched during 1994-1995,
however, reflected the strikingly asymmetrical power relations between the nations, with
Vietnam, rather than the United States paying what amounted to war reparations as terms
of a final settlement.
In the last chapter, I explore the larger battle over American cultural memory of
the war by examining the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.  Tracing the
evolution of “the Wall,” as it is commonly called in the United States, I use the changes
made to the memorial over time to sum up the cultural logic of the American War on
Vietnam after 1975.  From Maya Lin’s original design, the Wall has gone through several
changes, additions, and replications, including the jump into cyberspace with a variety of
Virtual Walls.  With few exceptions, these changes have been driven by the need to
impose narrative constraints on the cultural memory of the war in Vietnam, placing
formal limits on Lin’s open-ended vision.  The final result of the Walls, both physical and
virtual, is a form of memorial that focuses cultural memory expressly on what the war did
to America and Americans, rendering outside their narrative boundaries what the war did
to Vietnam and the Vietnamese.  As such, the walls offer a striking summation of the
American War on Vietnam after 1975, reinscribing the war in Vietnam into American
historical metanarratives while silencing important questions about the direction, scope,
and consequences of American foreign policy.
The story I tell here is fraught with ironies, contradictions, and unintended
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consequences.  We will see, for example, that U.S. policy toward Vietnam after 1975
actively worked against American interests in many ways.  While the focus on “live
prisoners” allegedly being held by Hanoi was central to the historical inversion of the war
that situated the U.S. as victim, it actually delayed the very “fullest possible accounting”
sought by members of the POW/MIA lobby by drawing attention away from the very real
and cathartic work of recovering the remains of actual American soldiers.  On another
matter, we will see that the economic arm of the United States’ war against Vietnam after
1975 was indicative of an American hold over the global capitalist infrastructure that was
not in any way decreased by the military debacle in Southeast Asia.  Nevertheless, while
the United States used its control of institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and ADB
to implement its draconian economic sanctions against Vietnam, American business
interests were undeniably harmed by the embargo.  Thus the maintenance and
preservation of U.S. economic hegemony in the late twentieth century came at the
expense of many of its own economic interests.
While the narrative presented in these chapters does seek to include a wide range
of events and stories, it is, like all narratives, necessarily incomplete.  This story, like all
stories, renders certain things outside its narrative boundaries, resulting in a variety of
shortcomings.  Some of these I have anticipated; there are likely others I have not.  For
instance, there are several chapters here that could easily be expanded into books in their
own right.  I have admittedly glossed over at times the type of historical details that one
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might expect from a more traditional study of diplomatic history: the myriad memos and
conversations that contribute to the formulation of a given policy and other intricacies of
policymaking.  While scholars in a variety of fields could undoubtedly benefit from a
tightly drawn history of American and Vietnamese diplomacy from 1975 to 1979, that is
not the goal of this project.
In another limitation, I am aware that in many places, this project could benefit
from a reexamination of various “texts,” be they policy debates, news articles, or films,
through the lenses of race, gender, class, or sexuality.  The choice not to feature these
issues in any developed way in this project is not meant to indicate that they are not part
of the story of American-Vietnamese relations after 1975; issues of race, class, gender,
ability, and sexuality are without question implicit in many of the texts under
consideration here.  Instead, the decision to leave aside such issues is, for the most part, a
reflection of the already long and intricate narrative presented here.
Without question, the largest absence here is also the most ironic: this study is
almost entirely focused on the production of American policy and American culture.  In
trying to draw attention to the ongoing effects of American policy on the nation and
people of Vietnam, I have nevertheless contributed to the ongoing silencing of
Vietnamese voices in American narratives of the war and its legacies.  While part of this
is a structural consideration on my part, refusing to expand and further extend an already
protracted project, the primary reason for this glaring omission is a language barrier.  Not
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having learned Vietnamese, I have been unable to do any meaningful research with
Vietnamese-language sources.  Although a regrettable shortcoming on my part, I fully
believe that it does not impugn the larger project of showing the malignant effects of U.S.
policy on Vietnam.  I remain committed to developing a more comparative, international
approach to the issues I discuss here.  Toward that end, I am currently working on an
edited volume that will include international and interdisciplinary perspectives on
American-Vietnamese relations since 1975.
In all of these cases, I have tried to point to the relevant secondary literature,
when available, in footnotes.  In others, I can only hope that I have the chance to expand
this study, pursue additional related projects, and inspire and provoke other works in this
area.  It is important to note that this study, while presented as a fairly straightforward
and largely chronological narrative, is not intended as the story to replace others, a new
narrative to trump all others.  It is, I believe, an original and potentially significant
contribution to related scholarship, but it is also an intervention in the contestation of
cultural memory.  My focus remains set on disrupting the chronological and disciplinary
boundaries of the history of the American War in Vietnam.  Thus, my story begins where
most historical narratives of the war end: with the toppling of the South Vietnamese
regime on April 30, 1975.
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CHAPTER ONE
A Continuation of War by Other Means:
The Origins of the American War on Vietnam 1975-1977
As the last helicopters were leaving the roof of the American embassy in Saigon
on April 30, 1975, Henry Kissinger sat helplessly in his corner West Wing office.
“Neither Ford nor I could any longer influence the outcome,” he wrote in his memoirs,
“So we each sat in our offices, freed of other duties, yet unable to affect the ongoing
tragedy, with a serenity rarely experienced in high office.”90  For neither the first nor last
time, Kissinger greatly underestimated his influence on the world.  Kissinger has been
many things at many times, but rarely has he been benign.  As the primary architect of
American foreign policy in the 1970s, Kissinger already had helped supervise from afar
the catastrophic events in Bangladesh, Chile, and Cyprus.  Before the end of the year, he
would help give the green light to a bloody coup in Indonesia. And, of course, he had
personally overseen the deadly American bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Northern
Vietnam.  Indeed, much of the world has yet to recover from the impact made by
Kissinger.  Yet on this day, as he describes it, he was mostly contemplative, his
reflections interrupted only by the occasional update from a staff member and, later, a
press conference in which he argued that “what we need now in this country, for some
weeks at least, and hopefully for some months is to heal the wounds and to put Vietnam
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behind us and concentrate on the problems of the future.”91
Kissinger was certainly not alone among Americans in wanting to put Vietnam
behind him.  The steady erasure of Vietnam from American attention actually had begun
after the Paris accords two years earlier.  As the United States became engulfed in the
Watergate scandal during 1974 and as most American personnel were evacuated from
Southeast Asia, interest in the ongoing wars in both Vietnam and Cambodia declined
steadily.  A Time essay described this solipsism, noting that many Americans had for
some time “enjoyed a comforting illusion: that Viet Nam and all its horrors had gone
away for good” now that the Vietnamese were simply fighting each other. 92  Newsweek
echoed these sentiments, claiming that after the 1973 Accords, “the agony of Vietnam
seemed to recede.”93
As Saigon fell in the spring of 1975, however, “the war burst upon the U.S. all
over again,” making clear to all those in the United States seeking to forget the war that it
was their agony, not “the agony of Vietnam,” that had seemed to recede over the past two
years.94  The Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia and the fall of Saigon once again
brought the wars in Southeast Asia to the forefront of American consciousness.  Images
of suffering children, abandoned allies and clients, and fleeing Americans reclaimed the
nightly news, the newspaper headlines, and the covers of magazines for one final flurry.
Since 1950, the cover of Time had been devoted to some aspect of American involvement
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in Southeast Asia sixty-four times.  For Newsweek, the count was sixty two times since
1961.  From early April until early May, Vietnam was once again the story, as the
mainstream media pondered the United States’ role in the world, the plight of those we
left behind, and, most of all, “where do we go from here?”  Just as quickly, though,
Vietnam was once again disappeared.  In the second week in May, the covers of both
major newsweeklies featured Mikhail Baryshnikov, rendering Vietnam increasingly to
the back pages, where it would remain indefinitely.
The war thus ended for Americans, but not for America.  By the time the
Vietnamese were erased once again from American eyes in mid May of 1975, the new
war against Vietnam already had begun.  As Saigon was falling, the Ford White House
swiftly imposed harsh economic sanctions on South Vietnam to match those long in place
against the North.  Amid his pensive meditations on April 30, the Secretary of State
found time to recommend to the Commerce Department that it freeze an estimated $70
million in South Vietnamese assets held by American-owned banks and their foreign
subsidiaries.  Such a decision was not new; the Truman administration had frozen close
to $200 million in Chinese assets in 1949, and Kissinger himself had authorized a similar
arrangement for holding $9 million in Cambodian assets less than two weeks earlier, as
Phnom Penh was being overrun by the Khmer Rouge.95
Two weeks later the White House was again in crisis mode, after a Khmer Rouge
gunboat detained the SS Mayaguez in the Gulf of Thailand.  Kissinger, returning to
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Washington on May 13 after a trip to the Midwest, arrived just in time for a meeting of
the National Security Council.  Kissinger later described the next twenty-four hours as
“one of the most bizarre and tense evenings of my experience in government.”96  After
another long day of NSC meetings, diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese, and the
authorization of military force to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez, The White House
went on with a dinner for Dutch Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl.  By the end of the
dinner, from which Kissinger and Ford repeatedly took leave, the ship and its crew of
forty had been recovered, although forty-three American military personnel had been
killed in the efforts.  The next morning a 15,000 ton bomb was detonated on the island
from which the crew had been released several hours earlier.  The White House declared
victory, believing it had demonstrated America’s resolve to use military force despite the
humbling defeat at the hands of the revolutionary forces of Vietnam.  “With this,”
Kissinger wrote, “Indochina disappeared from the American agenda.” 97
Yet again, the Secretary of State had underestimated himself.  Somehow, amid all
the distractions of the Mayaguez incident, Kissinger authorized another decision that
would keep Vietnam from disappearing from view for at least a little while longer.  On
May 14, the State Department recommended to the Secretary of Commerce that South
Vietnam and Cambodia be placed in the most restricted category of export controls,
under which American citizens were forbidden to send people in those countries any
humanitarian aid.  Within the year, the U.S. would be enlarging its sanctions program,
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denying the Vietnamese international aid, access to international capital, and membership
in the United Nations.  Far from “unable to affect the ongoing tragedy,” as Kissinger put
it, the United States began a new campaign against Vietnam before the old guns had even
gone silent.
In this chapter, I explore the initial stages of the American War on Vietnam after
1975, tracing the evolution of U.S. policy toward Vietnam from the fall of Saigon
through the failure of the two nations to normalize relations by the end of 1977.
Although I will touch on the political and diplomatic aspects of this phase of the war, I
pay particular attention to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States.  In
considering the legal authority and the justifications offered for the embargo, I will show
that the sanctions program was yet another step in a long history of destructive and ill-
advised American policies against Vietnam.  What we will see is that although the
sanctions were initially imposed without serious consideration, debate, or any sense of
the larger policy goals they were being used to achieve, this lack of definition proved
malleable enough to allow for future justifications of the program.  Initially put in place
by what can only be described as a petty and symbolic policy—to “monitor the attitudes”
of the new nation toward the United States—the sanctions were later justified by a
number of shifting policy goals.  Initially, however, they embodied no larger objective.
By far the most troubling aspect of the economic warfare waged on Vietnam after 1975,
however, is the way in which the United States used its power (and the threat of power)
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over international organizations including the United Nations, International Monetary
Fund, and World Bank to extend what should have been unilateral sanctions to a de facto
multilateral aid embargo, effectively cutting the Vietnamese off from much needed
sources of aid and other assistance.  Far from receding into isolation, the United States
after 1975 remained in a position to shape the direction and contour of events in Vietnam
and in Southeast Asia as a whole.  In more than one way, only the weaponry had
changed.
In fact, the sanctions merely replaced bombing campaigns as the tools by which
the United States tried to force the Vietnamese to acquiesce to American demands.  Like
the bombings, the sanctions were an act of war, implicitly designed to destroy Vietnam’s
industry and economy and were damaging and indiscriminate in their effects on the
Vietnamese people.  Like the bombings, the legal justifications for the sanctions were put
in place under dubious circumstances; they rested almost entirely on authority previously
and shortsightedly delegated from Congress to the executive branch, and were later
revised or dismantled because of the experience in Vietnam.  Like the larger military
campaign against Vietnam, the sanctions were ineffective in achieving any of the United
States’ short-term goals, making their effects on the population seem all the more
senseless.  And just as with the gradual escalation of American military involvement in
the region, it became more difficult over time for policymakers to alter the American
course of action.
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Despite these similarities, however, one major difference distinguished the two
phases of the war: the new phase would be met with silence in the United States,
rendering it largely invisible.  There would be no television cameras, no daily dispatches
from the frontlines of this conflict, no antiwar rallies, and no major policy addresses.
American families would not see, on a nightly basis, the suffering imposed by policies
carried out in their name.  But that did not, of course, alter the events taking place in
Southeast Asia.  If anything, the silence made it worse.  The invisibility of the embargo is
also indicative of the nature of sanctions policies.  Embargoes are themselves invisible
forms of economic warfare; they do not make for exciting on-location news reports, nor
do the battles over them shake the earth.  Rather, sanctions are a slow and silent form of
weaponry, but no less deadly.  They can choke off the lifeblood of a nation and contribute
to famine, starvation, and other forms of misery.
It is a central tenet of this project that culture “matters” as it intersects with
foreign policy, and vice-versa.  Just as the images and information of the American War
in Vietnam helped bring a sense of the devastation of that war home to the American
public and to the rest of the world and contributed to efforts to end that phase of the war,
the initial absence of images and information from the American War on Vietnam after
1975 allowed those policies to go largely unchecked.  While later chapters in this study
will examine the intersections of culture and policy, the real story of the years
immediately following the end of the military phase of the war is silence.  There are no
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images, no films, no books of record to examine alongside policy formation from 1975 to
early 1977.  What little debate about American policy toward Southeast Asia that took
place during this period was conducted within the halls of government, and even those
discussions were often marked by silence on the question of Vietnam itself.  Wanting to
avoid “controversy” or “divisive issues,” Congress regularly shelved discussion the
actual policies affecting the lives of people living in Southeast Asia for the sake of
convenience and political expediency.  I am not suggesting that Americans did not
discuss and debate the meaning of the war in the immediate postwar period, rather that
“Vietnam” during this time began to signify the war more than the nation of Vietnam. 98
This transformation, enacted in and through the cultural vacuum of the period from 1975-
1977, helped create the cultural space into which the next phase of the battle, discussed in
the following chapter, would take place.
Many American citizens and members of Congress initially favored reconciliation
with Vietnam and sought an end to the embargo in the months immediately following the
fall of Saigon.  But whatever goodwill existed in the spring of 1975 was quickly
squandered by vetoes and intransigence on the part of the Ford administration as well as a
lack of perseverance by those in Congress who supported reconciliation.  In that election
year, few politicians could run on a policy of increased foreign aid, particularly to
Vietnam.  Meanwhile, the POW/MIA issue, conspicuously absent immediately after the
war, became the centerpiece of American policy toward Vietnam.  Once that issue took
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hold in late 1975, it would dominate future discussions of American-Vietnamese relations
for decades to come.
The course of action set in motion on by Kissinger’s authorization of the embargo
on May 14, 1975—not considered at the time for its long-term policy implications and
never intended to be permanent—would nevertheless define and limit the range and
scope of future interactions between Vietnam and the United States.  Decades earlier, the
United States had supported a French war in Indochina and later gone to war there itself,
continuing politics “by other means,” as the saying goes.  In 1975, the U.S. began a new
phase of the battle for Vietnam and Southeast Asia, continuing war by other means.
History of United States Sanctions Programs
In the annals of diplomatic history and international relations, economic sanctions
have a long and sordid past, even though they have only recently become a common tool
of foreign policy.  Sanctions scholars normally point to Pericles’ 432 B.C. embargo of
imports during the Pelopennesian War as the first recorded economic sanction.  The
United States’ early formation often revolved around a variety of economic measures,
ranging from the Stamp Act to the trade embargoes leading up to the War of 1812.99  The
modern history of sanctions programs, however, dates from the outbreak of the first
World War, when sanctions by the League of Nations were used either as a substitute or
deterrent, rather than a precursor or supplement, to military force.  Those measures
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helped to initiate cyclical phases of sanctions and armed conflict, during which questions
over the efficacy of such policies would be regularly revisited.
In 1919 Woodrow Wilson, lobbying for the League of Nations, argued for the use
of sanctions as a tool to prevent military warfare:
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.  Apply this
economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force.  It
is a terrible remedy.  It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it
brings a pressure on the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could
resist.100
Wilson’s beliefs were given an initial boost when the League’s trade sanctions against
Yugoslavia and Greece helped produce peaceful resolutions to territorial disputes in the
1920s. 101  The League’s failure to act swiftly against Italian aggression in Abyssinia
several years later was a setback for sanction supporters.  More comprehensive programs
against the Axis powers leading up to World War II, however, reinforced the belief that
sanctions could be an effective measure to diminish, if not destroy, the ability of nations
to make war.102  Since the end of the Second World War, no nation has made such
prolific use of economic sanctions as the United States.  Out of the 116 cases examined in
a massive study by economists Gary Hufbauer, Kimberly Elliot, and Jeffrey Schott, the
United States was involved, either unilaterally or multilaterally, 77 times, compared with
22 instances by England and 10 by the Soviet Union, the next most common users.
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The modern history of American sanction programs rests on a series of legislative
acts, most of which are related in some fashion to the war against Vietnam.  In fact, one
of the great ironies of the embargo on Vietnam is that much of the authority under which
the program was put in place was revisited shortly thereafter because many lawmakers
took issue with the manner in which the program was imposed.  In yet another similarity
between the military campaign against Vietnam and the sanctions program, Congress
attempted in the years following the imposition of the embargo to reclaim some of the
powers previously delegated to the executive branch.  As we will see, although
lawmakers took issue with procedures and policies, they proved unwilling to ease the
sanctions themselves, and quietly grandfathered Vietnam in to new legislation.
One of the most important and problematic pieces of legislation providing for
economic sanctions, including those visited on Vietnam, is the Trading With the Enemy
Act.  Originally made law in 1917 to prevent trade with Germany in advance of the U.S.
involvement in World War I and, more generally, to grant the President expanded
economic powers in times of war, the act was designed to punish “declared enemies of
the United States” or states posing an active threat to “U.S. interests.”103  In 1933,
however, Franklin Roosevelt declared a national emergency for a banking holiday to
prevent a run on gold, a decision retroactively amended into the law by Congress a few
days later.104  This amendment resulted in section 5(b) of the act, which formalized
executive authority to invoke the law “during any other period of national emergency
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declared by the President,” and was later used by Roosevelt to preemptively thwart Nazi
property seizures in Western Europe prior to American involvement in World War One.
On December 16, 1950, on the heels of China’s entry into the Korean War, President
Truman declared a national emergency that would remain in place until 1978, when the
National Emergencies Act of 1976 terminated all existing national emergencies. In those
years, however, this declaration provided the justification for Foreign Asset controls and
other sanctions against China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, South
Vietnam, and several other states.
The other significant piece of legislation to the American sanctions program
against Vietnam is the Export Administration Act (EAA).  Originally passed as the
Export Control Act of 1949 (ECA), this law was yet another delegation of authority from
Congress to the Executive Branch.  The ECA was intended to be “commodity-specific”
rather than “nation-specific,” initially to prevent the export of materials that might be
used in military efforts that might effect U.S. security and later to prevent “abnormal
foreign demand” for American goods.105  Originally set to expire in 1951 the ECA was
revised and extended six times before being replaced by the Export Administration Act of
1969.  The EAA was different from the ECA in several aspects, including seeking to
promote, rather than restrict, trade, and making a greater distinction between military and
non-military aid.106  The trade embargoes imposed on the countries listed above as targets
of the TWEA were justified by the EAA, which also underwent significant revisions in
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the late 1970s.  After the severe alterations to the TWEA and EAA—together the
foundation for nearly all American sanction programs from World War I through the war
in Vietnam—the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), passed in
1977, became the primary tool for imposing sanctions.  Although this act, like the
TWEA, was only supposed to be used during period of “rare and brief emergencies,” it
was similarly vague in the powers it delegated to the President, which allowed for its
regular invocation by the Reagan White House.  First used during the Iranian hostage
crisis, the IEEPA was invoked more in the next twenty years than the TWEA had been
since 1917.107
Within this legislative framework, scholars have long sought to consider the
relative effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.  Hufbauer,
Schott, and Elliot argue that five major policy goals have been pursued through economic
sanctions: getting a target state to mildly alter its policies; destabilization of the target
country’s government; disrupting “a minor military adventure”; impairing “the military
potential of the target country”; and producing a major policy alteration by the target
country.108  Drawing upon these ideas, legal scholar Michael Malloy’s framework allows
for three broad categories of policy objectives in sanctions programs: Directive (“to
create economic pressure calculated to alter behavior of a target state”; Defensive (“to
reduce or slow development of an adversary’s military or strategic capabilities by raising
the cost of acquiring imports or import substitutes”); and Communicative (“to send a
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symbolic message of displeasure with another country’s behaviour (which may also be
for internal political purposes or directed at allies).” 109  Whereas the first two can be
measured objectively, Malloy argues, the latter is more problematic.  Communicative
policy goals are “less susceptible to measurement, redundant in that all sanctions are by
nature communicative, motivated more by domestic policy than foreign or economic
policy, likely to be “trivial or disproportionate” in its effects, and “of questionable
appropriateness as a policy justification for economic sanctions.”110  All this is certainly
true, but that does not diminish the symbolic role of sanctions that Malloy wishes to
downplay.  In fact, as I will argue here, the American sanctions on Vietnam, although
they at different times were justified by all five of Hufbauer et. al’s goals, were also in
large measure, symbolic, clearly driven more by domestic political concerns than any
foreign policy objectives.
Evaluating the effectiveness of a sanctions program is a complicated project, and
scholars approaching the problem from different angles, unsurprisingly, have come to
different conclusions.  Barry Carter’s economic and legal analysis demonstrates that
some sanctions, particularly those on import controls rather than export controls, have
been successful, but that the American legal system “is decidedly not structured to
facilitate” the use of those types of sanctions.111  Political scientist Ernest Preeg, using
five case studies of American unilateral sanctions, concludes that sanctions “have been
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almost entirely ineffective in achieving their intended policy goal,” due not only to their
reliance on exports controls but because they inflict more damage on the population than
the government and have an adverse impact on United States’ commercial interests.112
Hufbauer’s study acknowledges that, “in most cases sanctions do not contribute very
much to the achievement of policy goals.”113  Malloy’s legal analysis argues persuasively
that most previous studies, many of which he explores at length, have oversimplified the
effectiveness question.  He posits a more “multiplex and multidimensional” analysis,
including factors others have ignored, such as the role of other states, the passage of time,
and extraneous events.114  Perhaps Malloy’s most important point, however, is his
simplest: the effectiveness of a sanctions program can only be judged in relation to a
clearly defined overarching policy of which the program is a part.  As we will see, the
lack of clearly articulated policy goals with regard to Vietnam makes the question of
effectiveness even more complicated.
By the mid 1970s, the United States faced a foreign policy dilemma.  No longer
the sole hegemonic power, it was home to a reluctant population and government that
shied away from foreign military commitments and increased foreign aid.  After, and
largely as a result of the war in Vietnam, the United States preferred instead to ride the
wave of economic sanctions that were once again in vogue.  The Soviet Union and China,
as well as a number of developing nations, had become more independent of American
trade and aid,115 and both of those major powers also had become increasingly willing to
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commit massive amounts of aid to nations targeted by western sanctions, including
Vietnam and Cambodia—a situation that would lead to a long and bloody war in
Cambodia in the 1980s.116  It was in this context that the United States placed sanctions
on Vietnam in the mid-1970s.
Although the socio-economic analyses necessary to examine in full the relative
impact of the American sanctions on Vietnam falls outside the scope of this study, we
will see over the course of the next several chapters that it is nearly impossible to say
with any certainty that the program was either a success or failure, because at no time
was there a clearly and consistently articulated policy goal toward which the sanctions
were intended to contribute.  Initially set up to “monitor” the Vietnamese, the program
was later justified by claiming it would force the Vietnamese to stop their border war
with Cambodia (“disrupt a minor military adventure”), provide a full accounting of
unaccounted for American personnel and alter Hanoi’s policies on religious practice
(“mild policy alterations”), end their occupation of Cambodia (“major policy alteration”),
and “limit their military potential.”  Many also hoped that the embargo would destabilize
the government.  Together, these goals satisfied at various times all five of the Hufbauer
studies potential policy goals.
By examining the conditions under which the embargo was initially imposed and
maintained, however, we can see that the sanctions were little more than symbolic,
punitive actions by a discomfited administration.  As I will show, the embargo was not
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initially implemented in order to further any specific policy goal, served no clear
economic interests, and was considered a mistake by many in (and out of) Congress.  The
sanctions on Vietnam quickly became another point of contention in the post-Watergate
efforts by Congress to reclaim authority previously given to the President.  Discussions of
the embargo at Congressional hearings would lead to the realization by members of
Congress that several Presidents had in fact been using the Trading With the Enemy Act
to authorize a number of policies over the years, and would eventually culminate in a
revision of that legislation in line similar action taken in the War Powers Resolution.
And although the laws under which the program was imposed would be revised and
discarded, the sanctions on Vietnam would remain for two decades.
The 1975 Embargo Hearings 
From the beginning, the economic sanctions placed on Vietnam were problematic.
As stated previously, the asset controls, invoked under the authority of the Trading With
the Enemy Act, were put in place as Saigon was being overrun by the Revolutionary
Forces of Vietnam.  The Export Administration Act of 1969 provided the additional legal
cover for the trade embargo, which appeared to be even more hastily conceived than the
asset seizures, given that its development took place during the Mayaguez crisis during
the second week of May 1975.  In neither of these decisions was Congress consulted by
the Administration.  As hearings commenced in the early summer of 1975 the White
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House remained unable to articulate any coherent reason for the sanctions.
As Robert Miller, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
told Congress on June 4, the export controls, which had been placed on “the Communist
controlled areas of Vietnam” in 1958, were extended to South Vietnam because they
“further[ed] significantly the foreign policy of the United States,” and that such controls
can be authorized by the President “for national security reasons.”117  “Communist
controlled Vietnam,” originally had been placed in Category “Z” in 1958, a category
normally reserved for nations with which the United States was at war.  North Korea and
Cuba were the only other nations included in the “Z” category at the time.  Under this
distinction, even private shipments of humanitarian aid to those countries must be subject
to licenses granted by the federal government.  Rarely, if ever, were such licenses
granted.  Category “Y,” a slightly less hostile category used to identify nations to whom
the United States sought to deny “strategically important goods,” was at the time
applicable to the Soviet Union and China, among others.  Under that category, military
aid and other supplies deemed “strategic” were subject to the same licensing procedures,
but humanitarian aid was not.  Ironically, this policy placed greater restrictions on aid
than had been in place during the war.
  Led by subcommittee chair Jonathan Bingham of New York, many committee
members took the opportunity to express their concerns over the imposition of the
embargo.  In his opening remarks, Bingham noted:
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It has been my hope, and that of many Members of the Congress, that our
peacetime policies toward Indochina would not be mere extensions of our
wartime sanctions—that the end of the fighting in Vietnam and the end of U.S.
military involvement there would make possible a gradual normalization of
relations with the people and governments of Indochina… Symbolic gestures with
little practical impact when they are invoked, embargoes often become serious
hurdles indeed when the time comes for them to be revoked.118
After listening to Miller’s testimony, Bingham offered that he found the administration’s
reasoning for the trade embargo “totally unconvincing,” and a “purely bureaucratic
procedure.”119  While Miller continued to focus attention on the asset controls, which
most members of the committee found less controversial, it became clear that Bingham’s
concerns about both the “practical impact” of the embargo and the permanence of them
would become major issues.
The freezing of assets in such situations had indeed become standard operating
procedure for the United States government.  At the time of these 1975 hearings, the U.S.
still controlled over $100 million in Chinese assets.  The blocking of assets was normally
justified with the argument that the monies would be used to protect the government
against claims from corporations and private individuals who lose foreign investments
and property when governments seize or nationalize that property.  Under the Foreign
Claims Settlement Act (passed after the Communist victory in China), American citizens
could file claims with the government that eventually could be settled using the foreign
assets blocked by the U.S. as collateral.  In March of 1977, as the Carter Administration
was moving closer to normalizing relations with Beijing, the Chinese agreed to pay $80.5




million in cash to help offset the estimated $197 million of American assets frozen since
1949.120  As the revolutionary forces of Vietnam rolled into Saigon in 1975, the Ford
Administration acted to ensure that these measures would be in place to protect the
millions of dollars abandoned during the American evacuations that year.
Few congressional representatives took issue with the freezing of assets.  The
embargo was another matter.  Asked to explain how imposing a trade embargo on
Vietnam was a matter of national security, Miller answered that the controls would
permit the U.S. government “to monitor the evolving attitudes of these new regimes
toward the United States and toward its citizens.”  It would have been “inappropriate,” he
went on to claim, “to relax the controls on North Vietnam or Vietnam in light of the
circumstances that pertained at the time.”121  The policy of the administration, he argued,
was to extend the embargo to all of Vietnam and then to evaluate at some later date “the
attitude” of the new government.  Yet Miller, after further prodding from the committee,
also conceded that Vietnam was not at all a threat to the security of the United States, as
the legislation demands, but was rather potentially hostile to “American interests” in
Southeast Asia.  Having claimed that the North Vietnamese came to power in South
Vietnam “in gross violation of the Paris Agreements,” Miller was put on the defensive in
explaining how an embargo was in the interests of the United States.  In a notable
exchange with Representative Don Fraser of Minnesota, Miller revealed the confused and
punitive nature of the policy:
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Fraser: You agree Vietnam is not threatening the United States?
Miller:  I agree Vietnam is not threatening the United States directly, but that it
has taken power in South Vietnam by force of arms against the interests of the
United States.
Fraser:  This is a form of punishment then.  It is for past behavior. It is not a
present problem.  It is past behavior.
Miller: Our judgment is that the application of these controls is a prudent and
orderly way to establish a basis for judging how the attitudes of these new
regimes evolve.
Fraser: Why do we have to put a restraint on trade in order to evaluate the
regimes?  Does that help our intelligence gatherers?
Miller: It puts us in a position to monitor the activities of these countries, of these
regimes.
Fraser:  How does putting an embargo on trade help to monitor their activities?
Miller:  First, as I said, we want to be sure we deny any strategic goods to them.
Second, as I have said, the controls already applied to all of Vietnam in effect.122
This line of questioning resumed, with Chairman Bingham chastising Miller:
Bingham: Isn’t it also true that clearly the purpose of the earlier embargo against
North Vietnam was to try to impede North Vietnam’s effectiveness in a military
struggle to which we were opposed?
Miller: That is undoubtedly the case; that is correct.
Bingham: Then to impose an embargo after the contest is over is to close the barn
door after the mare is stolen.
Miller responded that the extension of the embargo was “automatic,” but the rest of his
testimony made clear that it was hardly that easy.  The committee later returned to this
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question when the underlying policy justifications given by Miller and others remained
unclear.  Asked if the decisions were made in “routine fashion,” as if “they were not very
important decisions,” Miller replied that, no, “they were given careful consideration,” to
which Chairman Bingham retorted, again, that the actions “were taken without
consultation with Congress and without consultation with any of our friends in Southeast
Asia.”123
Administration officials also testified that President Ford actually had not been
involved in the decision, further demonstrating the haphazard and surreptitious manner in
which the embargo was put in place.  When asked why there hadn’t been more debate on
the matter, Phillip Trimble, a legal adviser at the State Department, stated that “the
President has statutory authority, but that has been delegated.”  The questioning
continued:
Fraser: With respect to all of the controls that have now been applied, the
Secretaries of the Departments can sign off without involving the President; is
that correct?
Trimble: That is correct.
Fraser: No decision is required by the President?
Trimble: The authority is delegated; that is correct.  Treasury and Commerce act
on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.124
In the end, the embargo was pushed through the administration without any trace of a
serious debate.  The ostensible reason given for the embargo was so that the United States




could “monitor” the new Vietnamese government, and neither Congress nor even the
President were involved in the decision making process. Authority to impose the trade
sanctions rested with the Treasury and Commerce departments, which acted on the
instructions of none other than Henry Kissinger.
Several other things about these hearings are worth noting.  First, although it
would quickly become the defining policy goal of the embargo, there is not a single
mention in the pages of the Subcommittee print of the POW/MIA issue.  No hearing on
any issue related to Vietnam for the next twenty years would take place without a
significant portion of discussion committed to the topic of missing American personnel,
yet in the initial discussion and imposition of the embargo, it is completely absent.
Secondly, it is clear that the administration never intended the embargo to be permanent.
When asked if the committee was correct in assuming that the sanctions were a
“temporary measure,” Miller replied, “I don’t think anything is permanent, and I think
this seriously is our intention, to watch and observe and evaluate the evolving attitudes of
these regimes toward us.”125  Yet the administration and Congress failed to lay out any
specific criteria under which the sanctions would be revisited or lifted.  As Miller told the
committee, “I am not aware of any regular or periodic mechanism for reviewing [the
policies].”126  This absence of policy allowed for the future malleability of justifications
for the program.
Finally, many in Congress were aware that beyond lacking any definitive policy




objectives, the sanctions might actually work against U.S. interests in the region in two
ways.  First, members of the committee assumed the sanctions would push Vietnam
further toward its Communist sponsors.  Michael Harrington of Massachusetts was
particularly stringent in his criticism on this point, arguing the case of Cuba and
numerous “other examples where we have driven the wedge of isolation only then to
witness as the isolated nations move closer to the orbit of those with whom they are
forced to deal for economic sustenance.”127  In fact, Harrington’s sentiments would be
borne out by future events, as the continued isolation of Vietnam by the United States
resulted in the formal alliance of Hanoi with the Soviet Union, which in turn led to a
triangular proxy standoff in Cambodia between the Soviets, The United States, and
China.128  Secondly, there was absolutely no economic justification for the embargo
given by the White House, which indicates that they clearly had not given the issue much
thought.  Aside from direct American military and development aid to Southern Vietnam,
which had already been discontinued and was further restricted by Congress, there was
no trade relationship with Vietnam that would be missed.    In Miller’s testimony, he
noted that “the trade effect of the export controls was not a major consideration… and it
is reasonable to assume that even without controls U.S. trade with South Vietnam would
be practically nil for the foreseeable future.”129
As in so many earlier instances, however, policymakers in Washington ignored or
were unwilling to realize the Vietnamese desire for better relations between the two
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nations.  Only a few weeks after the fall of Saigon, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong had
reached out for American aid, albeit not in the most conciliatory manner.  The Prime
Minister cited “obligations” of the United States stemming from its “criminal war of
aggression” against Vietnam.130  Rather than seizing the moment as an opportunity for
negotiations, or simply ignoring the gesture, the State Department “issued a stiff
denunciation” of the Prime Minister’s comments, reasserting the Administration’s views
that the United States “has no intention of giving aid to any Indochinese communist
nation.”131  Senator George McGovern, at a hearing on American MIAs in the spring of
1977, recounted a conversation he had had with Dong not long after the war had ended
that further demonstrated the lack of understanding about possibilities for improved
American-Vietnamese relations.  The Senator asked the Prime Minister what he “thought
was a facetious question [about] American oil companies going over there to develop
their oil.”  When Dong responded that Vietnam would indeed support American
involvement in their offshore oil operations, McGovern was taken aback, having
foolishly assumed that the last thing the Vietnamese would want would be a return of
American industry.132  In fact, according to Nayan Chanda, American oil executives, who
had invested hundreds of millions of dollars exploring oil in the South China Sea during
the war, had quietly held several meetings with Vietnamese officials in Paris and later, in
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February of 1976, were invited to Hanoi for further discussions.  Because the embargo
remained in place, however, the contracts never took shape. 133
In November of 1975, the embargo issue was given one last public hearing.  That
fall had seen the issue of normalizing relations with Vietnam back in the news, as
business groups stepped up pressure on the Ford administration to repeal the embargo
and as Hanoi’s tone softened on the issue of American financial aid rather than
“obligations.”134  On November 17, The Bingham Subcommittee on International Trade
and Finance was again the forum for discussion of the embargo as members of various
Church communities were invited to testify about export restrictions to Vietnam.  The
stated reason for the “Church Views” hearings was consideration of a House resolution,
HR 9503 that would amend the Trading With the Enemy Act in order to repeal the
embargo on Vietnam.  Like the previous hearings, the testimony at this inquiry exposed
the absurdity of American policy.  Unlike the initial investigation, however, the
POW/MIA issue began to surface in the Church hearings, marking the first of many shifts
in policy justifications for the Embargo.
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization that
had been very active in supplying aid to the people of Vietnam during the American war,
had been quietly subverting the embargo while repeatedly being denied export licenses
by the Ford administration.  On November 10, “several hundred” members of the AFSC
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protested outside the White House, demanding that the State and Commerce Departments
approve licenses to the group for humanitarian aid and other supplies.135  In response to
the increasingly visible protest, and to the release of nine American prisoners being held
in Hanoi, the administration made modest revisions to its policy, which seemed to only
further complicate matters.
After meeting with Kissinger on November 14, Sonny Montgomery, a
Democratic Congressman from Mississippi and Chair of the House Select Committee on
Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, announced that over the weekend the White House
had approved the AFSC license and that new requests would be considered on a case-by-
case basis.  The changes to the policy, however, turned out to be little more than
cosmetic, attempting to draw a distinction between “humanitarian aid,” which would be
allowed, and “economic assistance,” which would not.  As several witnesses at the
Church Hearings would testify, the distinction was both tenuous and arbitrary.  The Los
Angeles Times jumped on the story, calling American policy toward Vietnam
“conspicuous silliness” being carried out “as if the war were still being waged.”136
Taking the AFSC licenses as a case in point, the editorial noted that sweaters from the
group were approved, but “16 tons of yarn” were not.  “Medical supplies, powdered milk,
canned pork, school supplies and pediatric drugs are licensed.  But not fishing nets, not
rotary tiller diesel plows, not the machinery to make prosthetic devices.”137  By the time
that the Subcommittee opened its hearings on the bill, the State department did reconsider
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and approve licenses for the fishing nets and rototillers, making clear that they had been
granted in response to the release of the American citizens, and did not constitute a new
direction in the overall trade policy.
Inside the Committee room, Bingham opened the hearings by stating that the
announced change “constitutes no change in policy at all,” a point he continued to press
with witnesses throughout the proceedings.138  Edward Doherty of the United States
Catholic Conference argued that many American citizens were ready to begin the process
of reconciliation with Vietnam but that the Ford administration was standing in the way
of peace.  Doherty called upon the United States “to begin a national examination of
conscience,” asserting that the American government and the American people has [sic] a
responsibility to help rebuild Indochina.139  In questioning from the Committee, however,
the question of responsibility was quickly and deftly turned on the Vietnamese, as
members asked about Vietnamese assistance regarding “those who are missing in action,”
as a precondition for bilateral aid, which was completely outside the purview of the
committee at the time.  Several members also put the question of aid to Vietnam within
the context of the larger battle of the period over the distribution of American foreign aid.
Congressmen Edward Beister of Pennsylvania, for instance, asked why the American
people should focus on Vietnam, which would not even be at the “top of the list” of
poorest countries.140
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The next witness, Herman Will, of the United Methodist Church, offered similar
testimony, noting how active his Church had been in providing aid during the American
war in Vietnam, and how despite raising hundreds of thousands of dollars in relief aid
since the end of the war they were now unable to continue those efforts under current
policy.  Again, however, the talk quickly turned to Vietnamese responsibilities,
particularly on the matter of Americans still listed as missing in action.  Congressman
Beister again took the lead, this time arguing that the MIA issue was not a “governmental
relationship,” but a “human” relationship.  In response, Will countered that given how the
United States has “laid waste” to Vietnam, the Vietnamese may have difficulty seeing the
recovery of American personnel as a priority, given the vast human tragedies that
affected so many Vietnamese lives.141  Most notably, however, Mr. Will made the crucial
point that the recent decision of the State department to consider further openings of the
relationship between Washington and Hanoi on a quid pro quo basis actually encouraged
the Vietnamese to withhold any information they might obtain about missing American
personnel.  This claim is important, because later debates over normalization of relations
and aid to Vietnam would focus on the apparent willingness of Hanoi to trade
information, or bodies, for aid. Similar testimony was offered by members of the United
Presbyterian Church and by Clergy and Laity Concerned, and similar reactions were
given by members of the committee.  The Legislative Director of the American Legion
included a written statement arguing that the United States “should not reward Hanoi’s
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intransigence” on the MIA issue.  “Thousands of American families remain in limbo,”
according to the statement, “because of Hanoi’s refusal to assist us in determining the
fate of American servicemen who fought for us all in Indochina.”142
In the period of just a few short months, the focus of the Congressional debate
over the American embargo in Vietnam had gone from the statutory authority under
which such measures can be imposed to Vietnamese responsibility for assisting the
recovery of missing American military personnel.143  Lost in this shift were questions
over American responsibility for the devastation of Indochina, the fact that the United
States seemed to be continuing the war by other means, and whether the trade embargo
was actually a practical, effective, or humane means to a muddily or ill-defined end.
The United Nations
The embargo was but one piece of the initial phase of the American War on
Vietnam.  While the sanctions remained in place, the United States further demonstrated
its ongoing obstinacy with regard to Vietnam at the United Nations.  On August 6, 1975,
the United Nations Security Council denied a hearing to South Korea’s application for
membership.  Although the South Koreans had been repeatedly denied admission since
their first application 1949, the decision not to hold even a hearing on the matter was
somewhat unusual.  The standard U.N. position had been that divided nations, such as
Korea, Germany, and Vietnam between 1954 and 1975 would not be admitted unless
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both parties agree on entrance.  Thus East and West Germany were not admitted until
1973, when they signed a mutual recognition treaty.144  North Korea’s continued
intransigence on joining the United Nations effectively rendered void their Southern
counterparts’ request.  As it turned out, however, the refusal of the Security Council to
consider the Korean question provided the Ford administration the fodder it desired to
take the unprecedented step of vetoing the two Vietnams’ applications.
The Vietnamese applications, to be sure, provided an unusual case in their own
right.  At the time of the applications, North Vietnam remained clearly in control of
South Vietnam, and there was little doubt in Southeast Asia, the United States, or the rest
of the world, that the two would soon be reunified.  As The Economist opined at the time,
“there are now about one and a half Vietnams,” united politically and militarily and
separate primarily only in economic planning.  Given that the DRV had taken over the
RSV by force, regardless of the politics involved, the dual applications from “two
governments, one of which has just helped overthrow the other’s predecessor in a war
fought to decide, among other things, whether their countries should be two or one,”
certainly constituted a unique situation.145  The United States, though, was not interested
in a debate on the subtleties of U.N. procedure, as the White House quickly made up its
mind to reassert its power over the process.
The members of the American delegation were unanimous, according to Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, then the American ambassador to the U.N.  Although the admission of
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“the Vietnams” would “symbolize and confirm” the humiliation of the United States and
serve as yet another marker that “the end of the period in which the United States was the
principal actor in world affairs, the mission agreed that an American veto would provoke
the General Assembly, perhaps even to the point of expelling Israel.146  In a lengthy cable
to the White House, Moynihan informed Kissinger that a veto “would be a calamity:
We would be seen to act out of bitterness, blindness, weakness, and fear.  We
would be seen not only to have lost the habit of victory, but in the process to have
acquired the most pitiable stigma of defeat.  But there would be little pity.  The
overwhelming response would be contempt.147
Kissinger would have none of it, nor would President Ford. They instructed Moynihan to
cast a veto against the Vietnamese application.  The votes, cast on August 11, were only
the eighth and ninth vetoes ever cast by the United States in the Security Council, and the
first against the admission of another nation.148
When the General Assembly convened in September, they responded to the
American action with a vote of 123-0, instructing the Security Council to “reconsider”
the applications “immediately and favorably.”  The United States and a few select allies
abstained from this vote.  Although few likely took him at his word, those listening to
Kissinger’s September 22 address to the U.N., could be forgiven for thinking that he had
indeed reconsidered:
So we say to all peoples and governments: Let us fashion together a new world
order. Let its arrangements be just.  Let the new nations help shape it and feel it is
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theirs.  Let the old nations use their strengths and skill for the benefit of all
mankind.  Let us all work together to enrich the spirit and to enoble mankind.149
One week later, however, the United States once again cast the lone veto against the
admission of Vietnam into the United Nations.  In December of 1975, when members of
the Select Committee were meeting with Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi, Foreign Minister
Phan Hien was told by members of the American delegation that the U.S. veto “was
nothing directed at the Vietnamese,” at which Hien and his colleagues could only
laugh.150
Even taking into consideration the unusual nature of the Vietnamese applications,
the clear international consensus was to allow the admission of both states under the
assumption that reunification was little more than a formality.  Although it has become
increasingly common since the end of the war in Vietnam for the United States to be on
the short end of near unanimous U.N. votes, at the time it was a major departure.151
While Moynihan’s comments in the Security Council justified on the vetoes on the
grounds that the simultaneous denial of the South Korean application constituted
“selective universality,” it seems clear that the administration’s motivations were far less
idealistic.  Kissinger and Ford could easily have instructed Moynihan to abstain from the
votes, voicing displeasure at the process without making such a radical shift in policy.  In
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another scenario, the delegation could have voiced its dissent while indicating that
Vietnam should wait for admission until it was formally unified, a much more tenable
position than seeking to barter one unorthodox set of applications for another.  By noisily,
publicly, and solitarily denying Vietnamese membership in the U.N., the White House
echoed its actions after the fall of Saigon, enacting punitive measures that only made the
nation appear more like a “petty and frustrated tyrant.”152
This view was borne out a year later, when the recently reunified and renamed
Socialist Republic of Vietnam applied for United Nations membership and was promptly
greeted with an announcement by the Ford administration that it would once again veto
the application in the Security Council.  Although understandably frustrated, the
Vietnamese were persuaded by the French to wait to apply until after the upcoming
American elections.  Working behind the scenes, Kissinger had secured this arrangement
the previous week in Paris.153  Public statements by the Hanoi regime, echoed by many in
the international press, suggested that the continued obstinacy of the United States was
based more on the personal pettiness of Kissinger than anything else.  These feelings
were seemingly confirmed yet again when, after the 1976 Presidential elections, the
United States cast the lone veto against Vietnam’s application.  Yet again the General
Assembly responded with an adamant message to the Security Council to reconsider, and
yet again the United States cast its veto.
Despite the strong appearance of Kissinger’s personal animosity driving United
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States policy, the real story in the decision in the latest round of vetoes was the shift in
justifications for the votes.  From the muddled and unclear “selective universality”
position of 1975, the United States was in the fall of 1976 asserting its rejection of the
application solely on the basis of the POW/MIA issue.  Ambassador William Scranton,
who replaced Moynihan as head of the U.S. delegation, claimed that Vietnam was not fit
for membership in the United Nations because it did not fulfill the criteria set forth in the
U.N. charter.  The unwillingness of Hanoi, he claimed, to provide a “full accounting” of
missing American servicemen, violated the precepts of “humanitarianism” and “peaceful
intent” set forth in the charter.  As Far Eastern Economic Review columnist Louis Halasz
pointed out at the time, however, the relevant section of the document says nothing about
humanitarianism.154  In fact, at the time, Hanoi had made a number of gestures, both to its
neighbors and toward the United States, indicating its desire for improved bilateral and
international relations, and was continually met only with increasingly unreasonable and
unjustified American demands.
By the time the final veto was cast against Vietnam in December of 1976, Jimmy
Carter had defeated Ford for the Presidency.  Although the Carter administration would
reverse the veto policy by 1977, the POW/MIA issue had been firmly established as the
central facet of American policy toward Vietnam during the course of the campaign.  As
T. Christopher Jespersen has accurately described it, “Vietnam” had little effect on Ford’s
defeat, but the domestic electoral process had a “substantial impact on decisions relating
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to Vietnam.”155  Ford had been forced to move further to his political right on the
POW/MIA issue to ward off a conservative challenge from Ronald Reagan, and to deflect
Carter’s criticisms of his policies during the campaign.  Ironically, the POW/MIA issue
would play a far greater role in the normalization process of the 1990s than it did in the
1970s.  But even without the POW/MIA issue on center stage, the Vietnamese faced a
stalwart opponent in the United States Congress.  During the early years of the Carter
Administration, the House and Senate would seemingly pave the way for the White
House to pursue full normalization, only to later throw up new roadblocks.
The Congressional Paradox: Revising TWEA, Hamstringing Holbrooke
While some Legislative Committees consulted members of Church communities
and the White House continued to exercise its veto power at the U.N., other members of
Congress had already initiated proceedings to significantly revise the Trading with the
Enemy Act, under which the initial embargo had been imposed.  The corrective
legislation called for in 1975, however, would not be passed for two years.  The changes
to the law made in 1977, however, further demonstrate the extent to which many
policymakers at the time considered the sanctions program against Vietnam to be a
mistaken course of action put in place under questionable authority.
As described above, the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) was later amended
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several times to allow for various measures to be taken by the Executive branch of the
government when it declared a “national emergency.”  The first attack on this statutory
authority came in 1976 when Congress passed the National Emergencies Act, which
scheduled all existing emergencies to be terminated on September 14, 1978, with the
exception of eight laws, including the TWEA.156  The 1977 law further consolidated the
moratorium on National Emergencies by further termination of existing emergencies and
by requiring the President to declare a new state of emergency for any application of the
powers granted in Section 5(b) of the TWEA.  The new act also limited the application of
the law “to the case of a declared war,” although the bill’s authors were careful to allow
for sufficient gray area in the language of the legislation so that it might be applied in
instances of undeclared wars such as the war on Vietnam.157
The discussion and testimony in the hearing makes clear that representatives in
both the Legislative and Executive branches found the previous policy regime haphazard,
yet no one involved in the hearings was willing to extend the discussion to consider
terminating the various sanctions programs in place at the time under the auspices of the
TWEA.  Instead, the existing sanctions against Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and a few
other Eastern Bloc countries, were grandfathered into the new law.  Congressman
Bingham, who chaired the initial embargo hearings described above, and who was one of
the authors of the TWEA revisions, explained the decision to continue those decisions by
the need for an “uncontroversial” bill:
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What we are focusing on is a procedural arrangement, and we are avoiding
substantive issues of controversy.  I think for us to attempt to deal with those
controversial issues would be a mistake even though I personally favor lifting the
embargo against Cuba and Vietnam… I think in time those embargoes will be
lifted, but I think that will probably not occur until the President has made up his
mind that that should be done and then persuades the Congress to concur in that
judgment.158
 The new law did alter the terms of the embargoes such that if the President did decide to
continue the sanctions, he would need to make an annual declaration to Congress, stating
why it was in the national interest to do so.  Certainly Bingham is right in noting that a
Congressional cancellation of the existing embargoes, particularly against Cuba and
Vietnam, would have greatly complicated the passage of the bill, but the multiple ironies
are difficult to ignore.  First, the entire Congressional backlash against Executive misuses
of power during the war in Vietnam and Watergate, ranging from the election of the
Watergate class of 1974, the War Powers Act, and the National Emergencies Act, was
ostensibly intended to curb those abuses by reasserting the role of the legislative branch
in constructing foreign policy.  Yet the only ongoing material policies stemming from
those abuses, the sanctions programs, were basically delegated back to the White House.
Furthermore, in the 1975 embargo hearings previously mentioned, several members of
the committee chastised representatives from the State and Commerce Departments for
putting the sanctions in place as a matter of “bureaucratic procedure,” but by the time of
these 1977 hearings, they had assumed the same procedural methods, eschewing any
debate about the merits, purpose, or impact of the policy.  Congress would not remain
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passive for long, however.
On May 3, 1977 Foreign Minister Phan Hien met Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Holbrooke in Paris to begin the process of normalization negotiations. Both of
the men had been aides during the 1968 peace negotiations.159  Holbrooke’s intention was
to inform the Vietnamese delegation that the United States would end its practice of
vetoing the U.N. membership for Vietnam and, more importantly, that the U.S. was
prepared to accept unconditional normalized relations between the two nations.160
According to Elizabeth Becker, who later interviewed both men, Holbrooke began the
meeting by offering this request: “May we go out this afternoon and announce
normalization? The United States has no preconditions.  After our embassies are
established, we’ll lift the trade embargo.”  To which Hien replied “just as simply: ‘No,
without aid it is impossible.’”161
The talks broke off immediately, but events continued to spiral when Hien
addressed the press (which had been expecting the announcement of normalization as
well), quoting directly from the Nixon letter (which had not yet been made public), and
declaring, “Vietnam would not agree to normalization without an American promise of
aid.”  The United States, of course, continued to insist that the letter was void.
Furthermore, aid to Vietnam was still prohibited by law.  The fallout was swift and
immediate, as Congress immediately leapt into action. The House voted the same day,
266-131, to further prohibit American aid to Vietnam.  Such aid, of course, was already
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prohibited, but the new measure barred the administration from even discussing the
matter with Hanoi. The resolution, part of a State Department appropriations measure in
the Foreign Aid Bill, specifically prohibited “negotiating reparations, aid or any other
form of payment to Vietnam.”  On May 5, the State Department issued a statement
affirming that the United States indeed would not provide aid to Vietnam.162
Why would Hien make such a declaration? American journalist Elizabeth Becker
maintains that the Vietnamese believed their public proclamations could sway the
American public to their cause, just as the anti-war movement had seemingly come to
their defense years earlier.163  Hurst offers several additional explanations for Hien’s
public declaration, ranging from their own misinterpretation of the “compromise”
reached during the Woodcock mission164 to their ambitious long-range economic
planning to the Sino-Soviet dispute.165  The one certainty is that the Vietnamese were in
dire need of aid as the summer of 1977 approached.166  New talks were scheduled for
June, but the damage from the failures in Paris had already been done.
Although they clearly misread both the intentions of the United States
government and the loyalties of the American public, one can certainly make an
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argument that the Vietnamese were rightly insistent that the U.S. provide a promise of aid
upfront. Had Hien agreed to announce normalized relations that afternoon in Paris, there
was absolutely no guarantee that the United States would be willing or able to provide
aid.  As the numerous congressional hearings and legislative maneuvers in the spring and
summer of 1977 would demonstrate, despite the intentions of the White House, many
policymakers were not interested in the symbolic healing that normalization would
represent, much less the actual healing to which the United States could contribute by
providing trade and aid to Vietnam.  Even assuming that the embargo would in fact be
lifted after diplomatic recognition (which was far from certain), allowing American
business interests to deal with the Vietnamese, there was little chance that any aid would
be headed to Hanoi.
Even the possibility of trade with the United States was beginning to recede.
While business interests were nowhere near as visible in their lobbying efforts, they were
beginning to take their place alongside the POW/MIA lobby as the most active force in
constructing U.S. policy toward Vietnam.  American firms had lost over $100 million in
Vietnam, and began pushing proposals that tied the resumption of normal trade relations
to the settlement of these claims.  While many companies, especially those in the oil and
telecommunications industries were anxious to reenter the Indochinese market so as not
to lose out to European companies, many were more firm in their commitment to recoup
the cost of their abandoned assets. Frank Zingaro, CEO of oil giant Caltex, was a
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particularly vocal opponent of normalization, let alone aid.  “We are not ready to forgive
and forget,” he told Far Eastern Economic Review before the Administration’s
resumption of negotiations with the Vietnamese. “We are deeply interested in getting
paid.”167  With several major American corporations lined up against Vietnam as well, the
possibility of normalization was fast eroding.
Clearly, given the tone of American-Vietnamese negotiations taking place in Paris
and the domestic sentiment in the United States, direct bilateral aid was out of the
question at this point, buried under layer upon layer of prohibitive legislation, but that did
little to ease the most vehement opposition to economic assistance.  Many in Congress,
identifying what they considered to be a “loophole,” moved to prohibit American funds
from reaching Vietnam even through International Aid Agencies or International
Financial Institutions (IFIs).  As numerous Congressional investigations had made plain,
even without direct assistance from the United States Vietnam could still become the
indirect recipient of American dollars.  Although Congress had refused to seize many
opportunities to reclaim the economic tools of foreign policy, many in the Capitol were
determined to exercise control over the direction of foreign aid, particularly to IFIs.
The Battle over IFIs
In September 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam assumed the place of the
former South Vietnamese regime in the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and
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International Monetary Fund.  This was a very significant development for a number of
reasons. Symbolically, it further legitimized the newly reunified nation and further
demonstrated Vietnam’s desire for independence and sovereignty.  At the time, neither
the Soviet Union nor China had agreed to participate in the institutions because they were
unwilling to divulge all the required economic data required by members.  Vietnam’s
willingness to participate in the process confirmed both its distance from those nations
and its need for international aid.  The Vietnamese would soon come to realize that the
Bretton Woods institutions were not democratic, nor did they offer a particularly healthy
path for developing nations.  The crucial point here is that despite their charters, these
institutions were subject to the will of the United States, the largest contributor to the
IFIs.  The 1976 Final Report of the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia noted that through these agencies and the United Nations, the Vietnamese would be
receiving around $34 million in United States aid in 1977, $24 million in low interest
loans and $10 million in grants.  The Select Committee recommended that the
administration not “lose sight of these indirect contributions to Vietnamese humanitarian
projects.”168
In June of 1977 it became clear that Congress would not allow the Carter White
House or the Vietnamese to lose sight of the contributions.  On June 2, Hien and
Holbrooke met in Paris for another round of negotiations.  The Vietnamese delegation
delivered a list of information on twenty Americans listed as Missing in Action, and were
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again hopeful that some agreement on aid could be reached.169  Holbrooke’s response
remained the same, however, as he informed them that any question of aid would have to
be deferred until after normalization.  He did inform Hien that the United States could
“help you through different international organizations,” but he could not pledge a given
amount nor guarantee that Congress would agree to the general increase in funding to
IFIs the administration was already promoting.  Hien remained particularly frustrated by
Holbrooke’s insistence that congressional measure could continue to determine the fate
of Vietnamese aid.  “What would you do if I said the Vietnamese National Assembly had
passed a law prohibiting searches for the MIAs?” he asked Holbrooke.  “ How can I go
back to Hanoi empty handed?”170  Again, no progress was made, and Hien indeed left
empty handed.
Back in Washington, however, the resumption of negotiations had again raised
the specter of aid to Vietnam, and the fact that Holbrooke had even raised the possibility
of channeling aid through IFIs set off yet another firestorm of legislation.  Just as after
the May meetings, Congress took only a day to respond to the actions of the
administration.  On June 4, the House voted 359-33 to approve another amendment to the
Foreign Aid Bill.  The measure, Sponsored by Lester Wolff of New York, Chairperson of
the Subcommittee, was supposedly designed for Congress to put to rest the idea of
reparations as promised in the Nixon letter, adding “reparations” to the categories of aid
which the United States could not provide to Vietnam, as if somehow the government
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would approve reparations but not humanitarian aid.  Although basically redundant, the
amendment served to further demonstrate the degree of Congressional hostility toward
Vietnam. 171
Congress, however, was just getting warmed up.  In the Senate on June 14, Robert
Dole introduced an amendment that would force the United States to oppose funding to
Vietnam provided through the World Bank and other IFIs and, if outvoted, to hold back
the amount of funds used toward the projects from the next American contribution.
Describing the amendment, political scientists Joseph Zasloff and McAllister Brown took
note of the “emotion aroused by the Vietnam aid issue.”  After John Glenn of Ohio spoke
against the measure, citing the stance of the Select Committee and the State Department,
“that to get tough may be counterproductive,” his office received a barrage of angry calls
from the POW/MIA lobby arguing that getting tough was exactly what was required.
The next day, claiming that his remarks had been misinterpreted, he introduced his own
amendment, “barring any commitment by U.S. negotiators ‘to assist or pay reparations’
to the Indochina states.  It passed 90-2.”172  On June 22, the House passed a similar
measure, prohibiting American aid to six nations, including Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, although this amendment was later withdrawn as part of a larger compromise
with the Senate.173
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Ironically, it was in part the rhetoric coming from the Carter White House that
provided the fodder for consolidating the anti-Vietnam sentiment in Congress.
Throughout his administration, Carter had pursued a foreign policy defined by human
rights issues, and it was precisely that issue which many congressional opponents used to
derail many of the administration’s foreign aid requests in 1977.  To Carter’s opponents,
Vietnam and other “Communist-controlled states” were guilty of numerous violations of
basic human rights.  Congress clearly missed the irony of constructing the POW/MIA
issue and other actions of the Vietnamese government as “humanitarian” or human rights
issues while they upheld the unprecedented economic sanctions—to say nothing of the
American war waged on Vietnam for the previous two decades.  Regardless, it was an
effective foil to Carter’s policy.  As Susumu Awanohara wrote in the Far Eastern
Economic Review, “the human rights issue boomeranged on Carter,” when “pro-human
rights liberals” and “anti-aid conservatives” aligned in support of the various
amendments restricting aid to a number of countries.174  Although the battle over human
rights never coalesced into a coherent policy, it did further hamstring Carter’s efforts at
increasing foreign aid and provided yet another angle from which the Vietnamese became
dehumanized in cultural and political discourses.  The general hypocrisy of a foreign
policy based on a muddily-defined concept of “human rights” would become even more
pronounced as Carter began to move toward normalized relations with China while
further alienating Vietnam.
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To be sure, the many amendments to foreign aid legislation were part of the larger
battle over foreign policy taking place in the late 1970s.  Throughout the Carter
administration The White House and Congress locked horns on the substance, direction,
and means of American foreign policy, particularly on the question of foreign aid.  But it
took a persistent hostility toward Vietnam to help solidify the general distaste for aid
among many in Congress into a coherent, if troubling, expression of policy.  Previous
targets of state-specific aid restrictions, such as South Korea, Chile, and Angola, proved
unable to muster the considerable ire of Congress; Vietnam and its neighbors experienced
no such shortcomings.   The most vociferous advocates of the anti-Vietnam policy,
though, claimed that they were simply voicing the concerns of their constituents.  Dole
responded to questions about his amendment by claiming, “Vietnam is still such a
controversial issue, from an emotional standpoint.  My folks tell me that they want no
part of this so-called normalization of relations with Vietnam.”175  Although it is difficult
to assess public support for aid to Vietnam in the late 1970s, A New York Times/CBS
News Poll in July of 1977 indicated that “66 percent of Americans favored food or
medical assistance to Vietnam and 49 percent favored assistance in industrial and farm
equipment.”  As Hurst points out, however, that same poll dropped to around twenty
percent on the question of providing “actual money and grants.”176  Even if Dole and the
Times poll were correct in assessing Americans’ feeling towards normalization and aid,
there is no evidence whatsoever that the public favored the draconian and unprecedented
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measures taken by Congress to deny the nations of Indochina access to humanitarian and
international aid.  That, in the end, is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the debates
over aid to Vietnam.  Lost in the concern over providing aid or allowing trade with
Vietnam was the radical nature of the sanctions themselves.
Also very troubling was the battle over funding for the World Bank and IMF, or
what Hurst refers to as “the politicization of the IFIs.”  Given Carter’s pledge to increase
foreign aid and help increase the capital reserves of the World Bank and IMF, many
legislators were prepared for a battle over the role of the United States in the Bretton
Woods Institutions.  Just as we saw in the previous chapter, when Vietnam became the
convenient test case for a new, preemptive sanctions policy, in the battle over foreign aid
in the summer of 1977 Vietnam became the testing ground for a reassertion of American
hegemony over the international financial order.
Throughout the summer, Congress and the Administration battled over American
contributions and veto powers at the IFIs.  An appropriations bill containing $5.2 billion
in funds for the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which, as noted above, had
already been subject to amendments restricting loans to Vietnam and other countries, also
became a battleground for protectionists in Congress, including Tom Harkin of Iowa and
W. Henson Moore of Louisiana.  The protectionist-bloc, along with the “anti-Vietnam”
bloc again used the ill-defined human-rights platform of the White House in proposing
their restrictions.  The Harkin Amendment, for instance, prohibited American aid from
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reaching “any government guilty of a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”177  Such measures, of course, were in direct
violation of the World Bank Charter, which specifically prohibits basing lending
decisions on political matters.178
The amendments also prompted a sharp response from the World Bank itself.  In
one of the supreme ironies of the ongoing American War against Vietnam, Robert
MacNamara, who had taken over as President of the World Bank in 1967 after leaving
the Johnson Administration, came, in effect, to Vietnam’s defense a decade later,
admonishing Congress not to place any restrictions on American contributions to the
World Bank.179  The letter was crucial in eventually getting the restrictions dropped, but
the resolution of the foreign aid battle still ended badly for the people of Southeast Asia.
Facing heat from many corners of the legislature, and having already committed an
enormous amount of political capital on other international issues, Carter was ultimately
forced to give in to the politicization of the IFIs.  In September, Congress and the White
House reached an agreement on the foreign aid bill, which placed no restrictions on
American contributions to the IFIs, but only after the White House agreed that it would
instruct its representatives at those institutions to vote against any aid to Vietnam and the
other countries. As Hurst notes, “the administration thus closed off the last avenue by
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which it could reach an accommodation with Hanoi involving the provision of aid.  All it
could do now was wait and hope that the Vietnamese would drop their demand.”180
The Vietnamese, however, desperate for aid and still suffocating under the
embargo, were in no position to drop their demand.  On December 19, the two
delegations again met in Paris, but Holbrooke informed Hien that he had no instructions
to offer any aid, even as a private, off-record statement.   Holbrooke later told Nayan
Chanda that during a break in the sessions, Hien said, “You just whisper in my ear the
amount you’ll offer, and that is enough.”  “I said, ‘I am sorry.  I have no authority to do
that.”  Holbooke also informed Hien that the United States was not willing to drop the
embargo, and the talks once again ended with no substantive progress.181
The prospects for normalization, so strong only a few months earlier, had been
greatly diminished.  As Hurst describes it, the failures of normalization in 1977 should be
chalked up to both Hanoi and Washington.  Without question, the Vietnamese
underestimated the strength of aversion toward Hanoi felt by many in Congress, and,
given their need for American aid, could have occasionally played their hand better in the
face of such Congressional animosity.  Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for
failure must be placed with the United States.  The Vietnamese, despite their initial
obstinancy on the matter of reparations, continually demonstrated their flexibility in
achieving some form of aid that would be acceptable to the United States.  Earlier, in
spring of 1977, the same type of amendments restricting aid through IFIs, had been
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defeated in Congress, and the Vietnamese had indicated their willingness to receive aid
through those institutions.  But, as Hurst argues, an “opportunity was missed,” because of
the Carter administration’s “overconfidence and unwillingness to provide Vietnam with
aid.”182
Hurst goes on to propose a scenario under which he believes that an agreement
could, and should have been reached in the spring of 1977: Given that the politicization
of the IFIs had been defeated at that time, he argues, “the administration could have
agreed to a pledge of aid in escrow in return for a satisfactory MIA accounting.  Hanoi
would have accepted such a deal, and so would have the National League of American
Families.  With the latter’s backing, the administration would have been in a strong
position to challenge Congress by arguing that measures to restrict the United States’
ability to channel aid to Vietnam would hinder an accounting for the MIAs.  Free to
increase its contributions to the IFIs and to vote in favor of loans by them to Vietnam,
Washington would have opened the way to normalization.183
The failure to normalize relations in 1977, however, should rest primarily with the
United States, which ultimately failed to recognize the amount of destruction and
devastation it wrought on Vietnam over the previous two decades.  By way of contrast,
consider the actions of France and Japan in their relations with Vietnam.  In 1973, France
began to provide aid to Vietnam through both loans and grants, with an initial $20 million
(in U.S. dollars) as a “contribution to the reconstruction and development of the country.”
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Over the next five years, France would make another $350 million available. 184  After
Japan and Vietnam normalized relations in 1975, Japan made an immediate contribution
of $40 million in direct foreign aid to Vietnam, acknowledged by both sides as
reparations for the brutal Japanese occupation during World War II.185  The damage
inflicted by the French and Japan, while unconscionable and severe, pales in comparison
with that wrought on Vietnam by the United States; and France and Japan, although
central to Vietnam’s economy as investors and trading partners, did not hold the keys to
the global economy; they could not single-handedly proscribe international aid or IFI
funds from reaching Vietnam.  The Vietnamese, and the rest of the world, was well aware
that in their search for international aid no nation was more important than the United
States.
Despite winning their decades-long war for independence, the Vietnamese were
learning that the world had changed a great deal since their declaration of independence
from the French thirty years earlier.  Although a sovereign nation, with a new constitution
and a seat in the United Nations, the leaders in Hanoi were learning that “independence”
in the late 1970s had more to do with their position in the regional and global economy
than with their political hegemony in Indochina.  Vietnam had cast off the yoke of several
colonizing powers, at an unimaginable cost.  They were much less prepared, and would
be much less successful, in their battle against the neo-colonial global economic order.
They would also, however, face another powerful, and even more elusive
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opponent as the 1970s drew to a close: the American culture industry.  Armed with the
cultural tools of empire, American society would build on the resurgence of the
POW/MIA issue to pursue a remarkable and wide-scale historical and cultural inversion.
Despite the fact that the United States continued to wage economic and political war on
Vietnam after 1975, representations of Vietnam in American culture at the end of the




The Cultural Logic of “Normalization,” 1977-1979
15.35 million tons of bombs.
2.5 million occupying troops.
2 million hectares of forests defoliated or destroyed.
80 million liters of chemical agents deployed.
300,000 missing in action.
14 million wounded.
More than 3,000,000 dead.186
For many of the statistics of the American War in Vietnam listed above, a
comparison or equivalency with the United States is not even possible.  The Vietnamese
did not, of course, occupy, bomb, defoliate, or wage chemical warfare on the United
States at any time.  Yet even for those for which a comparison is possible, the numbers
clearly suggest who the victims in the war were, and who the aggressors were.  For
example, the United States at the end of the war had only a few thousand servicemen
unaccounted for compared with 300,000 Vietnamese.  The United States lost close to
60,000 personnel in the war, which, while tragic, stands in stark contrast to the 3 million
Vietnamese.  Before 1975, with numbers like these no one in their right mind in the
United States—regardless of their feelings about the war or the Vietnamese—would ever
have suggested that the destruction was “mutual.”
Indeed, it is difficult to fathom what “mutual destruction” would have looked like.
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The Environmental Conference on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, in a 2003 report
entitled “Long Term Consequences of the Vietnam War,” attempted such a comparison,
and the numbers are nearly impossible to comprehend.  If the United States had
experienced similar consequences to those of Vietnam, the reports shows, the figures
would be as follows:
Bombs Dropped: 430 million tons
Occupying Troops: 12.5 million
Hectares Defoliated or Destroyed: 56 million
Chemical Agents Deployed 2.24 trillion liters
Wounded: 70 million
Dead: 17,500,000187
Even these numbers, however, do not do justice to the scale of destruction to which they
refer.  They do not, for instance, acknolwedge the effects of the war on Cambodia or
Laos, which are difficult to separate from those felt by Vietnam.
More importantly, however, the numbers do not indicate some of the most
devastating aspects of the United States’ war on Vietnam: the terrible legacies of the war
that continued to harm the Vietnamese after the departure of the United States.  For
instance, 3.5 million land mines remained in the ground in Vietnam after 1975.  23
million bomb craters littered the country’s landscape.  Since 1975, at least 38,000 people
have been killed by landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the Vietnamese
countryside.  Another 70,000 have been injured.188  Most significantly, however, and
most horribly, the deadly chemicals dumped on the region remained in the ground,
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poisoning the water and the food supply and contaminating future generations of
Vietnamese children.  Decades later, extraordinarily high levels of Dioxin, the cancer-
causing chemical found in Agent Orange, are still present in “hotspots” throughout
Vietnam.  The chemical can still be found in animals and groundwater, has been detected
in the milk of nursing women, and has actually been found in the genetic code of some
Vietnamese.  Recent studies have also shown that the levels of Dioxin present in the
chemical agents were at least twice as high as previously thought.189  While these and
other horrible environmental legacies of the American War in Vietnam could not have
been known to Americans in the immediate “postwar” era, the figures from the military
war itself certainly were.
Less than a year after the fall of Saigon, a United Nations mission visited Vietnam
and detailed first-hand the ruins in which much of Vietnam found itself, the results of
what the report called “a savage war of destruction.”190  It detailed the utter devastation
of Vietnam’s industrial infrastrucure, agricultural base, and transportation system; and it
spoke of the large loss of life experienced by the Vietnamese and how that loss would
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affect the nation’s ability to rebuild.  When this report was included in a Staff Report for
Senator Ted Kennedy’s Senate Judiciary Committee in 1976, the Senator noted in the
introduction how stark the situation was in Southeast Asia and how the United States was
finally positioned to help, rather than harm, the people of that region.  “Having
contributed so heavily to the years of war, our country must not fail now to pursue
policies and programs that will contribute to the peace.”191
We saw in the last chapter, however, far from pursuing peace and reconciliation
in the years immediately following the end of the American War in Vietnam, the
American government began to pursue “war by other means,” reclassifying the newly
reunited nation of Vietnam as an “enemy,” and pursuing openly hostile and
unprecedented economic and diplomatic policies against the Vietnamese.  Although the
election of Jimmy Carter initially held out the promise of peace and progress between the
two nations, the period was ultimately shaped by a different type of “normalization.”
Usually understood as a political, economic, and diplomatic term used to denote a state of
open, peaceful, and, theoretically, mutually beneficial relations between nations,
“normalization,” I will argue here, can better be understood as the way in which the
United States in the late 1970s began the process of reconstructing its imperial project in
Southeast Asia—a cultural and political process which inverted the history of the recent
war by dehumanizing the Vietnamese and casting Americans as the principal victims of
the conflict.  We already have seen how this happened in the halls of Congress, where the
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Vietnamese were routinely described as irrational and dehumanized figures, refusing to
sufficiently cooperate with what the United States deemed “humanitarian” efforts,
namely aiding in the search for missing American servicemen. Beginning in late 1977,
however, these constructions were supplemented by major contributions from the
American culture industries.  On the big screen, Vietnam “Came Home” in the first wave
of Hollywood films to deal directly with the war; the familiar images of the war, already
fading in the absence of cultural representations of the war between 1975-76, began to be
contested by another series of images: wounded and deranged American servicemen,
fractured American communities, and savage and torturous Vietnamese figures.
Ignored by the culture industries in the years immediately following the war, by
1979 films about Vietnam had become huge box office draws and received the highest
awards from the industry.  Although the Carter administration had come painfully close
to officially normalizing relations with Vietnam between 1977 and 1978, by the end of
Carter’s term the United States had reinforced and strengthened the economic embargo,
turned a blind eye to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and set in place the
policies and alliances under which the next administration would resume direct support of
anti-Vietnamese forces in the Third Indochina War.  This process of normalization,
whether in foreign policy or the arenas of cultural production, is based on the same
cultural logic of inverting the historical legacies of the war to cast the United States as the
victim of Vietnam. Even before the formal normalization process had begun, Carter was
117
able to proclaim that the destruction of the war in Vietnam was “mutual.”  Just as Ford
and Kissinger’s policies toward Vietnam were shaped by what Christopher Jespersen
called the “national mood” of “denial and punishment,” the same sense of mutual
destruction that helped the Carter adminstration navigate its foreign policy priorities in
the late 1970s shaped cultural representations of the war in American society as well.192
While it gained expression in the later 1970s, the process of normalizing the American
War in Vietnam—of culturally constructing mutual destruction—can be traced back at
least a decade to one of the most strange and remarkable political and cultural movements
in American history: the POW/MIA myth.
The POW/MIA Myth
In his landmark work, M.I.A., or Mythmaking in America, H. Bruce Franklin
offers a definitive history of the rise of the POW/MIA myth as both a “national religion”
of sorts and as “a basis—or at least an ostensible basis—for foreign policy.”193  From
1954 to 1968, he demonstrates, there was no “POW/MIA” issue, largely because no such
classification existed.  In other wars, missing service personnel and prisoners were
categorized separately.194  But in the Spring of 1969, conservative forces in American
society conspired with the incoming Nixon administration to conjure the issue that would
provide justifications for Nixon’s escalations of the war, serve as an obstacle to
negotiations, and remain the primary impediment to normalizing relations between the
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United States and Vietnam for the next quarter of a century. By the 1980s, the POW/MIA
myth took on a life of its own, which will be explored in chapter five.  From 1969 to
1979, however, the issue drew the boundaries within which Vietnamese-American
relations would be established.  By dehumanizing the Vietnamese, portraying them as
ruthless and cold-blooded figures, and helping to recast the United States as the primary
victim of the American War in Vietnam, this issue came to define the matrix of the
American War on Vietnam in the production of both foreign policy and cultural
representations.
Immediately after their inauguration, members of the Nixon administration raised
the issue of American prisoners of war in terms of a “prisoner exchange” at the Paris
Peace Talks.  The Vietnamese refusal to agree to such a plan unless the United States
would end the war led to unfounded assertions by the American delegation of inhumane
treatment in detention camps.  The Vietnamese, they claimed, were cruelly using the
prisoners as political bargaining chips.195  As Ambassador William Sullivan later
described this view to Congress, the Vietnamese
are attempting coldly, ruthlessly to use prisoners that they hold, our prisoners, as
leverage for the achievement of political objectives which they have not been able
to accomplish by military or psychological means… We think, however, that in
making and in formulating proposals we have to treat that sort of mentality as one
would treat any other blackmailer attempting to extract ransom and extortion from
a law abiding citizen.196
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The equation of the United States with a “law-abiding” citizen while the Nixon
administration widened a devastating, unjust, and undeclared war in Southeast Asia, here
alongside a portrayal of a “cold” and “ruthless” enemy is indicative of the cultural logic
of inversion that would define the period of “normalization” in the late 1970s.
As became clear over the next several years, it was the United States, not
Vietnam, which would use the POW/MIA issue for political gain, at home and abroad.
On March 1, 1969, the White House launched its “Go Public” Campaign, which garnered
immediate support in the mainstream media and gained resonance with the public
throughout the summer as it became closely aligned with organizations of POW families
and billionaire H. Ross Perot.  Particularly effective was the campaign’s use of language
describing the Vietnamese as “inhuman.”  The New York Times, Franklin notes, was
among the major newspapers to take hold of the issue, denouncing North Vietnam in an
editorial entitled “Inhumane Stance on Prisoners.”  In December, using similar language,
the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution condemning the “the
ruthlessness and cruelty of the North Vietnam.”197  As the coverage of the POW issue
intensified, Franklin notes that not only the history of the war, but the cultural
representations of the war had begun to be inverted:
America’s vision of the war was being transformed.  The actual photographs and
TV footage of massacred villagers, napalmed children, Vietnamese prisoners
being tortured and murdered, wounded GIs screaming in agony, and body bags
being loaded by the dozen for shipment back home were being replaced by the
simulated images of American POWs in the savage hands of Asian
Communists.198
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In the late 1960s, however, these images were still being contested in daily newspapers
and televised news reports from Vietnam.  Yet in a war so often defined by mediated
images, the very fact that the inverted logic of the POW/MIA myth had become part of
the battle over the cultural memory of the war is itself significant.  The more crucial point
in the context of post-1975 American relations with Vietnam is that the inverted
constructions begun by the POW issue would continue to resonate in the production of
both cultural representations and foreign policy.  No longer constrained by competing
images of American violence and atrocities in Vietnam, by the mid 1970s the
dehumanization of the Vietnamese and the victimization of the United States could
continue relatively unfettered.
One of the many sad ironies of the POW/MIA myth is that the American War in
Vietnam produced the lowest percentage of unaccounted for American service personnel
in major wars waged by the United States.  As the government’s own study of the topic
indicates, of over 360,000 American soldiers killed in action during World War Two,
twenty-two percent were never recovered, even with unfettered access to all sites of
battle.199  In the Korean War, according to Franklin, over fifteen percent of the 33,000
American casualties were not accounted for.  The number for Vietnam was significantly
lower; of close to 60,000 Americans killed in Vietnam, around 2,500, or four percent,
were initially unaccounted for.200
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Yet the POW/MIA issue has always had as much to do with letters as with
numbers.  As both Franklin’s MIA and the Final Report of the Select Committee on
Missing Persons make clear, very few of the missing American servicemen being
discussed at Paris in 1972 or represented by the still ubiquitous POW/MIA flags should
have been classified as such in the first place.  Unaccounted-for soldiers had previously
been classified in one of three categories: Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered
(KNR/BNR), POW, or MIA.  As part of the Go Public campaign, the administration
merged the latter two categories, creating the category of “POW/MIA.”  In various
hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia,
several members of the United States defense establishment and the Intelligence
Community testified about the confusion over the reclassification.  Roger Shields, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense, noted in the fall of 1975 that, “at the present time, the
distinction between ‘prisoner of war’ and ‘missing in action’ is probably an academic
one.”201
This public reclassification (the defense department still maintains a distinction in
its own records) had a number of unfortunate effects, not least of which was the cruelty to
which families of missing service personnel were subjected—many understandably
bought into the myth that their missing loved ones might still be alive.  Furthermore, the
reclassification complicated the efforts to resolve all the cases of those unaccounted for.
Out of the 2505 American soldiers listed as missing in the Final Report of the Select
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Committee, 1113 were categorized as KIA/BNR, 728 as MIA, and 33 as POW.
According to the Committee, the vast majority of those placed in the MIA category
should have been listed as KIA/BNR. Of the thirty-three POWs, the House Select
Committee notes that there is no evidence that sixteen of them were ever taken prisoner,
and that six were wrongly classified to begin with.  The remaining eleven were
“unaccounted for by their captors.”202  As Franklin further explains in his close reading of
the Final Report, “six of these [eleven] were known to have died and there was no
evidence that four of the others had survived later than 1969.  The remaining one turned
out to be Robert Garwood, a former prisoner who had chosen to remain with the Viet
Cong after his 1967 release.  Garwood would eventually return to the United States in
1979 and would, several years later, contribute his fabricated stories to the then-
established myth that Hanoi continued to hold Americans prisoner.203
Despite a complete absence of evidence and testimony denying the existence of
live prisoners from all relevant government agencies, the POW/MIA issue became a
significant factor in determining the fate of peace in Vietnam.  From the Paris
negotiations of 1969 on, the Vietnamese delegation was consistently met with
unparalleled and unreasonable demands by the United States.  In late 1969, the U.S.
delegation presented a list of personnel it considered “missing or captured” to the
Vietnamese.  Attached to the list, notes Franklin, was a “bizarre” and “unprecedented”
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statement: “We are holding the Communist authorities in Southeast Asia, responsible for
every individual on this list whether or not he is internally classified by the services as
captured or missing.”  Franklin describes the impact of this attachment, worth quoting at
length:
This demand is probably unprecedented in the annals of warfare.  It has no basis
in international law, which hardly requires belligerent powers to furnish each
other with information on the identities of those they have killed.  It could never
even conceivably be met, for it holds all the opposing forces individually and
collectively “responsible for every individual” missing, including those in planes
lost at sea or exploding above mountains and jungle. It thoroughly and effectively
confuses the question of the missing with that of prisoners.  It has been the official
policy of the United States since it was issued in 1969.  It is the foundation upon
which the entire POW/MIA myth has been built.204
This absurd demand further demonstrates that the reconstruction of Vietnam as an
“enemy” state in the later stages of the war and, especially, after the fall of Saigon, was
hardly the result of “business as usual” in Washington.  Whether on political, economic,
and cultural terrain, the United States continued to develop new and unprecedented
means to castigate and punish the Vietnamese.
What is perhaps even more remarkable than this request, however, is how the
Vietnamese repeatedly went above and beyond the call of what could have been
reasonably expected from a former adversary that was still fighting off a war of
aggression and, later, rebuilding a devastated and deeply divided country.  Constantly
being bombarded with different, conflicting numbers from the Pentagon, the Vietnamese
and Laotian governments initially produced an accounting “for fifteen more prisoners
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than the Defense and State departments had listed as likely prisoners,” even though those
numbers were themselves inflated.205  In fact, as Franklin goes on to argue, “what was
truly remarkable about the accounting of American POWs was how closely each side’s
list correlated with that of the other.”206  The Vietnamese, it turned out, were keeping
better track of missing Americans than the United States.
Had it been left to the military, the issue may well have disappeared, despite the
initial embarrassments of having the “Communist authorities in Southeast Asia”
demonstrate superior record keeping of American forces.  But in creating the POW/MIA
issue, the White House had truly created what Franklin accurately terms a
“Frankenstein’s monster:” the invention succeeded in shoring up support for Nixon’s
war, but became an uncontrollable creature that would create policy dilemmas for all
future administrations, turning bereaved and misled citizens against their own
government.207  The Vietnamese, of course, remained the primary object of this ire,
caught in the twisted logic of the POW/MIA matrix.  Instructed by the American
government and public that they would not receive any aid until they released these
phantom captives and later accused, as Franklin points out, “of withholding prisoners
because the United States had not carried out its promise to help rebuild Vietnam,” the
Vietnamese people became the true prisoners of this myth. 208
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Beginning with the signing of the Paris Agreements, the Victory in Vietnam
Association (VIVA) and the National League of American Families (NLOF) led the
charge against the Vietnamese, selling millions of bumper stickers, POW bracelets, and
other memorabilia to publicize the cause, all the while mounting a campaign to prevent
the United States from fulfilling its obligation of reconstruction aid promised in the Paris
Accords.  Even though the Accords had been systematically violated and rendered all but
void by the United States and its South Vietnamese clients and, later, by North Vietnam,
the VIVA/NLOF coalition maintained its insistence that the United States not offer any
aid whatsoever to the Vietnamese.  Before the end of the war, it attempted to get a
majority of members of Congress to sign a pledge
that any economic assistance, trade, or technological aid to North Vietnam,
Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos be withheld until we get the return of all
POWs and the fullest possible accounting of the missing in action and the return
of the remains of those who died in the Vietnam conflict.209
One of those to sign was Sonny Montgomery, the Congressman from Mississippi who
was selected to lead the House Select Committee on Missing Persons when that group
was formed in the fall of 1975.210
Although led by Montgomery, an ardent believer in the POW myth, the Select
Committee succeeded, as the discussion of their findings above demonstrates, in all but
disproving the existence of live POWs.  After its exhaustive investigation during 1975-
1976, the Committee’s Final Report also encouraged Americans to have “reasonable
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expectations” about the “fullest possible accounting” that had been demanded of the
Vietnamese.  In a large section devoted to “Difficulties,” the report listed the numerous
factors that would make a “full” accounting impossible.  “It must be recognized at the
outset,” the section begins, “that many of the missing men cannot be accounted for, either
by enemies or by our own forces.”  The report continues:
Some losses occurred in remote areas or at sea or wreckage of an aircraft.  Other
men simply disappeared while on an aerial combat mission… Where aircraft
losses are involved, the traumatic nature of the crashes suggests there will be few
identifiable remains, particularly in cases where local indigenous persons are the
only witnesses to an event which may have occurred many years ago… The
ravages of time and climate and actions of predatory animals combine to destroy
traces of crash and grave sites, particularly in remote areas where other humans
are unlikely to have witnessed combat incidents or to have chanced on the scene
afterwards.  In some crashes, disintegration is so complete that no recognizable
debris or remains can be located.211
The report goes on to detail numerous examples of situations where there the remains
would be “obviously unaccountable,” especially given that at the time of the report the
average time the person had been missing was over eight years.
Even if it were common practice for former adversaries to perform such tasks for
one another, and even if the Vietnamese were inclined to assist in such Herculean efforts,
the variables detailed above demonstrate how unlikely it would be that they could offer
much.  The Select Committee, however, took pains to point out that the American
demands were even more unreasonable in light of the course and eventual outcome of the
war than they had been when first made in Paris in 1969.  “It is important to note that the
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people of the United States know what constitutes an accounting,” the report explains.
There are no convenient historical examples to serve our interest.  What is now
being demanded of the Indochinese governments is unusual.  After the 1946-54
war, the French did not receive information on their missing.  The United States
has never asked for such a volume of information on its missing, especially from
a former enemy that was not defeated, and in a war as complex as the Vietnam
war proved to be.  There are no examples in world history to compare with the
accounting now being requested.212
Yet the Vietnamese had set up a “research program” to further assist in the recovery of
remains, again demonstrating their willingness to help in the project.  They informed the
Select Committee delegation of this at a meeting in Paris in early December 1975, and
then again on the Committee’s visit to Hanoi later in the month.  Understandably, the
Vietnamese pursued discussion of American trade and aid at both meetings, but were met
with the insistence of the delegation that aid was “out of the question.”213  Nevertheless,
the Committee recommended that The United States normalize relations with Vietnam
and the other nations of Indochina as soon as possible, “based not on unequal and
humiliating war reparations, but on agreed principles of equality and mutual benefit.”214
Although the formal process of normalization would begin shortly after the release of the
final report, the questions of “equality” and “mutual benefit,” would complicate the
negotiations, ultimately allowing the war to continue.  We saw in the last chapter how
normalization between the two nations had become an increasingly distant possibility by
late 1977.  As the “normalization” of the war in American culture continued to take hold,
the possibility of actual normalization began to disappear completely.






A year earlier, however, as Carter took office, optimism reigned supreme in the
White House.  According to the February 28, 1977 edition of Time, the Carter
Administration began making “top-secret” overtures to the Vietnamese shortly after the
inauguration.215  In late January, Carter met with several members of Congress, including
members of the Select Committee, reiterating his intention to move toward normalized
relations.  The article went on to note that the Vietnamese had softened their stance on
American reparations over the past two years, indicating that they were equally interested
in opening ties to American business interests.  So certain of developing these ties were
the Vietnamese that a group of oil executives visiting from Japan had been told in late
1976 that future development of Vietnam’s substantial petroleum interests “was reserved
‘for the American sector.’”  “Washington, in turn,” concludes the piece, “seems almost
ready to accept the fact that the fate of most of the MIAs will never be known.” 216
Although the Select Committee had all but declared that the MIA issue was a red
herring, Carter clearly thought that he needed one final show of his attention to the matter
before beginning to negotiate with the Vietnamese.  On February 25, the White House
announced that a delegation, led by Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto
Workers (which had helped deliver the White House to Carter), would visit Hanoi to
pave the way for negotiations.  Woodcock would be accompanied by four others,
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including former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Sonny Montgomery.  In
the announcement, the administration indicated a new phase in Vietnamese-American
relations by noting that it would be “more flexible” in its policies, including an easing of
the current embargo.217  Presumably, this also meant an end to the official stance of
requiring the impossible “full accounting” of missing Americans by the Vietnamese.
The mission, from the beginning was marked by a tension between the dictates of
domestic politics and foreign relations.  In his close study of the Carter administration’s
policy toward Vietnam, Stephen Hurst shows that although the public presentation of the
commission was to “discuss matters affecting mutual relations as part of a long-term goal
of establishing normal relations,”218 the real reason for the mission was more complex.
According to Frederick Brown, a State Department spokesperson at the time of the
commission, the administration needed to “neutralize” the MIA question as a domestic
political issue.  According to an internal White House memo unearthed by Hurst,
however, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski further wanted to “defuse the
MIA issue” for the Vietnamese, taking away what most policymakers viewed as the only
card held by Hanoi in negotiations.219  Defusing either side of this coin, though, would
prove more difficult than anyone in the White House had expected.
In Hurst’s account, when the delegation landed in Hanoi, it was met with
immediate demands by the Vietnamese foreign minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, that the
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United States was still under a legal obligation, from both the Paris Accords and the
Nixon letter, to provide aid.  Without aid, he allegedly told Woodcock, “there would be
no accounting for the MIAs.”220  Hurst’s only references for this claim are later
statements made by Woodcock, both in Congressional Testimony and in interviews by
Nayan Chanda and Elizabeth Becker.  If this was indeed the note on which the
negotiations began, both parties kept the tension hidden from the press accompanying the
mission.
All major accounts of the meetings reported in the American press took special
note of the friendly manner in which the delegation was greeted.  “From the moment the
Americans arrived in Hanoi,” noted Time, “they were made to feel welcome by the
Vietnamese, who avoided any macabre linkage between the remains of U.S. servicemen
and money for reconstruction.”221  The article went on to quote Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien’s remark that:
[t]his is not a question of what amount of money.  It is a question of
responsibility, honor, and conscience, and it does not relate to Nixon—it relates to
the U.S… If the U.S. does not make any contribution toward the healing of the
wounds of war, then we will do it all ourselves.  We’ve already begun doing
that.”222
The Economist also took note of the conspicuous, outgoing nature of the Vietnamese
leaders, noting in particular that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong “had given the mission
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a friendly welcome” and was the prime mover in proposing formal negotiations later in
the spring.223
There is no question that the Vietnamese, justifiably, felt entitled to war
reparations from the United States.  The issue here has to do with how the Vietnamese
are portrayed in terms of the MIA issue – as a friendly, peace-loving people interested in
putting the wounds of the American war behind them, or as a cruel and heartless Asian
menace, holding knowledge of missing Americans, if not the missing Americans
themselves, ransom for several billion dollars.  Although the encounters were all
described in glowing terms at the time, the Vietnamese had initially suggested that the
biggest obstacle to normalization lay not with them, as the Americans had long
suggested, but with the continuation of “erroneous policies of the past,” including the
trade embargo and the veto of Vietnam’s United Nations application.224  Given the recent
history of war and the hostile attitude toward Vietnam that continued after 1975, had the
Vietnamese leadership been less than receptive to American demands, it certainly would
have been understandable. But there is little evidence in the record that this was the case.
In Hurst’s account, based almost exclusively on the later interviews with
Woodcock, the talks had stalled to the point of stalemate.  At a crucial juncture,
Woodcock took Hien aside privately and gave him what Hurst describes as an
“ultimatum:” that “No American President or Congress could approve” an exchange of
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aid for information.  “Certainly Woodcock’s forceful presentation had an immediate
effect on Phan Hien,” concludes Hurst.  After the conversation, the Vietnamese position
was “altered,” declaring “that the three main issues (MIAs, aid, and normalization) were
‘separate… but clearly interrelated,’” and that the basis for proceeding would be “moral
and humanitarian, rather than legal.”225
Hurst’s account leaves out some important issues however, constructing a
narrative of a stubborn and somewhat irrational Vietnamese leader being persuaded
forcefully by the skilled and experienced American negotiator.  As such, it oddly
reinforces the process of cultural revisionism that portrayed the Vietnamese holding the
United States hostage.  One week after reporting the results of their trip to the President,
Woodcock and Montgomery appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
do the same.  The bulk of the hearings focused on the still muddled relationship between
MIA information and aid.  Woodcock answered a number of questions about the
Vietnamese position, but related nothing approaching the “stalemate” characterization.
He notes only that “in the course of our discussions they abandoned the linkage” between
the MIA and reparation sections of the Paris accords, while noting that the issues are
“interrelated.”  Woodcock later added, “[t]hey did make it very clear that they had
humanitarian needs which could be separated from so-called obligations. I think that was
a significant indication [of future cooperation].”226  There is absolutely no mention in the
documents of Woodcock’s private conversation with Phan Hien, nor any indication that
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the Vietnamese were as obdurate in their demands as Woodcock later recalled.
At the end of the day, the Vietnamese were looking for an indication that the
United States would stop its hostile economic and diplomatic policies and make some
commitment, however nebulous, that they would provide some form of economic
assistance to Vietnam.  They dropped the terminology of reparations and obligations as
well as their demand for the $3.25 billion promised by Nixon in 1973.  As Woodcock put
it, “They put the emphasis on bilateral, multilateral, on the many ways it could be
done.”227  Unfortunately for the Vietnamese, the United States was still unwilling to live
up to its own humanitarian obligations. The refusal of the U.S. to in any way follow
though with a pledge of some form of aid would remain the primary obstacle to
normalization.
Upon its return, the Woodcock Mission was widely portrayed as a major success
in paving the way for normalization.  On March 24, Carter gave a public press conference
to highlight the work of the Woodcock Mission.  Addressing the question of
normalization, Carter noted that he would favor normalizing relations with Vietnam when
“convinced that the Vietnamese had done their best to account for the service personnel
who are missing in action.” The President then reiterated some of the successes of the
trip: “They not only gave us the bodies of 11 American servicemen, but they also set up a
Vietnamese bureaucracy” to assist in further efforts.  In short, Carter was already
convinced:
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I think this is about all they can do.  I don’t have any way to prove that they have
accounted for all those about whom they have information.  But I think, so far as I
can discern, they have acted in good faith… In the past, the Vietnamese have said
that they would not negotiate with us nor give us additional information about the
MIA’s until we had agreed to pay reparations.  They did not bring this up, which I
thought was an act of reticence on their part.228
Yet again, there is no mention of the demands Woodcock later claimed were made by
Hien.  Just as in the press reports of the mission, the Vietnamese are presented as
cooperative and open to negotiations.
Later, Ed Bradley of CBS began a line of questioning that would give an accurate
indication of the administration’s stance on Vietnam.  Although much would be made of
President Reagan’s rewriting of history in a 1982 press conference, Carter’s own
interpretation of the war on March 24 are in some ways equally disturbing:229
Bradley: Mr. President, on the subject of Vietnam, if you feel the United States is
not obligated to uphold the terms of the Paris Peace Accords because of the North
Vietnamese offensive that overthrew the South Vietnamese Government, do you
feel, on the other hand, any moral obligation to help rebuild the country?
Carter: I can’t say what my position would be on some future economic
relationship with Vietnam.  I think that could only be concluded after we continue
with negotiations to see what their attitude might be toward us.
After further elaboration, the questioning continued:
Bradley: Beyond that, do you still feel that if information on those American
servicemen who are missing in action is forthcoming from the Vietnamese, that
then this country has a moral obligation to help rebuild that country, if that
information is forthcoming?
Carter: Well, the destruction was mutual.  You know we went to Vietnam
without any desire to capture territory or to impose American will on other
people.  We went there to defend the freedom of the South Vietnamese.  And I do
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not feel that we ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves or to assume the
status of culpability.  Now, I am willing to face the future without reference to the
past.  And that is what the Vietnamese leaders have proposed.  And if, in
normalization of relationships, there evolves trade, normal aid processes, then I
would respond well.  But I don’t feel that we owe a debt, nor that we should be
forced to pay reparations at all.230
This final statement by Carter has to be considered one of the most remarkable utterances
ever made by an American official about the war in Vietnam.  Leaving aside his
statements about why the United States “went” to Vietnam, and even his belief that the
United States did not “owe” Vietnam anything, sentiments which were likely shared by
many Americans in 1977, an assertion of “mutual destruction” on the part of the
Vietnamese can only be understood in terms of the ongoing cultural and political
reconstruction of the war taking place in the mid-1970s.  Surely no reasonable person
would accept that Americans endured hardships on par with those suffered by the
Vietnamese during the war.  But in the “normalizing” process that inverted the role of
victim, such statements became not only possible, but became accepted logic.  Carter’s
willingness “to face the future without reference to the past,” should thus be read not
simply as an attempt to “put the war behind us,” but as part of a larger will-to-forget, a
critical statement in the contest for cultural memory that defined this period in American
life.
A Presidential declaration of “mutual destruction” not withstanding, The
Woodcock Mission appeared at the time to be a success for Vietnam as well.  Aside from
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demonstrating to the United States that it was willing to continue to assist in the recovery
of MIAs, the spring of 1977 saw a number of developments that boded well for
Vietnam’s own economic recovery.  “It was not a coincidence that the Woodcock
delegation’s trip was preceded by an unpublicized three-week trip by the World Bank and
two separate missions by United Nations Development Program [UNDP],” Nayan
Chanda wrote in Far Eastern Economic Review.231  Although neither program committed
to specific aid projections at the time, the understanding among those agencies and the
Vietnamese was that a normalization of relations with the United States would result in
greater development aid for Vietnam.  As Chanda described it, the UNDP informed the
Vietnamese that the current allocations for two projects was insufficient and “that they
would have to look for additional donors.  As one diplomat noted: ‘The Vietnamese
know who the donors could be.”232
We saw in the last chapter, however, how the Paris negotiations fell apart under
the mutual pressures of the Vietnamese need for economic assistance and the desire of
many in the United States congress to do away altogether with foreign aid.  In the end,
the failure has to be ascribed primarily to the unwillingness of the United States to
acknowledge that the destruction of Vietnam by American hands over the past twenty
years, far from being “mutual,” was indeed something that Americans should seek to
rectify.
Thus, as 1977 ended, there was little to be optimistic about in Hanoi.  Failure to
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normalize relations with the United States and to secure other significant international
aid, both of which were central to the Politburo’s economic plans for postwar
reconstruction, and increasing border tensions with Cambodia all loomed large as 1978
began.  In less than a year, Vietnam would once again be at war, and normalization with
the United States would be shelved indefinitely.  And while all this was going on, another
“front” in the American War on Vietnam opened in the United States: the cultural front.
“Vietnam Comes Home:” Normalizing the War on the Big Screen
The policies established in the period immediately following the fall of Saigon
had been established in a relative cultural void.  Compared to the flood of discourse and
images to which Americans had grown accustomed during the period of direct American
military involvement in Vietnam, Vietnam was disappeared from the nightly news, from
the pages of daily and weekly news magazines, and was all but banned as a subject for
films in the summer of 1975; the same cannot be said after 1977.  “Vietnam” had never
been completely erased from the cultural sphere, of course.  As Julian Smith pointed out
in Looking Away: Hollywood and Vietnam, the first major work to deal with the relative
absence of the war in American film, for a number of years the war was simply marginal
to the action of films.233  Films ranging from Shampoo (1975), where the war is literally
background noise on the television, to the early veteran exploitation movies, such as
Welcome Home Soldier Boys (1971), The Visitors (1972), Heroes (1977), and Rolling
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Thunder (1977), presented the war in Vietnam as literally on the margins of American
consciousness, something not yet completely forgotten, but certainly of minor
importance.  As scholar Rick Berg describes, this marginalization was in fact deeply
rooted in the history of American films even connected even secondarily to Vietnam:
“For Hollywood, Vietnam—both the country and the war—seemed to be just off screen,
at the edge and on the frontier, always about to be found.”234  Indeed, from the middle
through the end of the twentieth century, Vietnam, in American film and American
foreign policy, would always be viewed through the colonial “gaze.”235
But in 1978, “Vietnam Came Home,” as the floodgates of cultural production
opened, producing a series of landmark movies, novels, memoirs, and television shows
about the war.  Commentators of all stripes, recognizing the significance of the moment,
wrote extensively about the reappearance of “Vietnam” in American culture.  The focus
of the commentary, as well as the focus of public debate, has been the motion pictures; it
is for this reason, as well as limiting the size and scope of the present project, that I have
chosen to focus on film here, leaving the issues raised by other media aside for now.  Few
critics at the time, however, and fewer scholars of the subject since, have connected the
cultural representations of the war in film produced and disseminated in the late 1970s to
the formation and consolidation of American policy toward Vietnam in the same period;
that is my goal in the remainder of this chapter.
Drawing on the important work of Melanie McAllister in Epic Encounters:
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Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000, I want to examine
these films less as texts in their own right than as part of the larger project of
“normalization” taking place in American politics and American culture in the wake of
the war Vietnam.  In her book, McAllister argues for the fundamental interconnectedness
of cultural and “political fields,” and demonstrates convincingly that “cultural
productions help make meanings by their historical association with other types of
meaning-making activity:”
This suggests that we might ask less about “what texts mean”—with the
implication that there is a hidden or allegorical code to their secret meaning—and
more about how the texts participate in a field, and then in a set of fields, and thus
in a social and political world.236
While what these films have to say about both the war in Vietnam and its effects on the
United States is significant and important, I am less concerned here with how cultural
texts function as representations of the war itself than how they intersect and interact with
public discourses about Vietnam and the production of foreign policy with regard to
Vietnam that was explored in the previous chapter and in the first section of this chapter.
As McAllister argues, highlighting such parallels does not necessarily mean that
there is some underlying conspiracy, nor even a unifying cultural logic.  In Epic
Encounters, McAllister uses this model to demonstrate how a variety of cultural
representations related to the Middle East in the post-World War Two era coincided with
the dictates of American foreign policy during the same period.  A similar phenomenon, I
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argue here, is at work in the “normalization” of the American War in Vietnam in the late
1970s.  Just as American policy toward Southeast Asia actively denied American
responsibility for the war, refused to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war in
Vietnam by prioritizing American suffering, dehumanized the Vietnamese as violators of
humanitarian accords, and moved (as we will see in the next section) toward rendering
Vietnam effectively invisible in its foreign policy, the films of this period work within the
same cultural logic and the same matrices of representation.  These texts, then, and the
discourses surrounding them, must be considered part of the same normalization process.
Along with the economic and political assaults being waged on Vietnam, this cultural
front of the war helped to pave the way for the reconstruction of the American imperial
project in the wake of Vietnam.  The first step in this process was the construction of
mutual destruction, focusing on the effects of the war on the United States rather than on
the devastation of Vietnam.  The most significant examples of this first wave of films
accomplished this in different ways.
Most of the smaller movies of 1977 and 1978, such as Who’ll Stop the Rain, Go
Tell the Spartans, and The Boys in Company C, were overshadowed by three films that
quickly came to constitute the early canon of American films about the war: Coming
Home, The Deer Hunter, and Apocalypse Now.  As Peter Marin wrote in Harper’s in
1980, the “big three” of the late 1970s
were not necessarily the best or most intelligent films; they were events.  Despite
the fact that they failed to confront the moral issues of the war, they were treated
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with the same seriousness and granted the same attentiveness that we ordinarily
reserve for important books; many regarded them as summary statements about
the war, which tells us something about ourselves, if not about Vietnam.237
It is undoubtedly true, as Marin and others have argued, that these films tell us more
about Hollywood than they do about the American war in Vietnam; my argument is that
by, for example, rendering the Vietnamese completely invisible (as in Coming Home) or
as savage, inhumane villains, (as in The Deer Hunter), or by taking an ambivalent stance
about American responsibility for the war (as in Apocalypse Now), these films worked
within the same grid of representations that defined and shaped American policy towards
Southeast Asia in the period.
Just as important as the films themselves, however, is the way in which these texts
were criticized and discussed during the period.  Thus after summaries of the films I will
examine the ways in which critics, journalists, and other cultural commentators spoke and
wrote about the films.  I do this not only to contextualize the films, but also to show the
ways which the discourses about the texts also contribute to the same intersection of
cultural and policy production.  These movies, we will see, provoked strong, often
visceral reactions, and were discussed primarily for their “politics,” but the politics at
stake were always domestic in nature.  What I will do here is move beyond the scope of
domestic political opinion, placing the films of this first wave of American films about
the American war in Vietnam alongside the foreign policy debates of the Carter years.
As the first shots fired in the battle for the American cultural memory of the war, these
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films ask their audiences to remember and forget in particular ways, which are always
already “political.”  What I hope to show is that the consequences of this battle are
important not only for America—the subject of all three films—but also for
Vietnam—the often invisible, but always present object of the texts.
 Coming Home
The genesis of Coming Home lies as much in the vision of Jane Fonda as director
Hal Ashby, although the final product owes less to the political convictions of the artists
involved than to the genre conventions and financial realities of Hollywood.  In The Land
of Nam: The Vietnam War in American Film, Eben Muse describes how Fonda, who
worked with wounded American veterans during the war, originally wanted to make “an
anti-war polemic,” focusing on the return of American soldiers, but was persuaded by
Ashby to tone down the politics of the film to reach a wider audience.  “The film thus
became a love story with a Vietnam era backdrop,” he writes.  “It makes the war
palatable to a general audience by sentimentalizing the issues surrounding the conflict
while evading the war itself.”238
As the film begins, however, the viewer could be forgiven for thinking that they
were watching a documentary, rather than the melodrama that ensues.  The opening scene
shows a group of American veterans around a pool table, discussing the various
rationalization mechanisms they and their peers have used to justify their roles in the war
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and the injuries that resulted from their participation  “They don’t want to see what they
did as a waste,” says one.  One of the vets, Luke (Jon Voight), lays flat, face down, and
motionless on a gurney. The scene then shifts from Luke to a pair of legs running during
the opening credit sequence.  The legs are revealed to belong to Bob (Bruce Dern), in the
first of what becomes an endless series of juxtapositions of the two men.
Coming Home revolves around the transformation of the two men, and of Bob’s
wife, Sally (Fonda).  As Bob heads headstrong off to war, determined to bring home a
Russian made rifle as a keepsake, Sally begins her transformation by moving out of
officer’s housing and volunteering at the local VA Hospital.  There she meets Luke, a
former high school classmate, who became a paraplegic in Vietnam.  As Luke sheds his
anger and hostility for sensitivity and intimacy, Sally’s transformation is highlighted,
although hers is more physical and material than emotional; she remains passive and
submissive in relationships while letting her hair down and buying a new sports car.  “In
short,” as Gilbert Adair has written of Sally’s metamorphosis, “she turns into Jane
Fonda.”239  Sally and Luke eventually strike up a romance, which culminates in a long
love scene.
Bob has undergone his own change, although Coming Home is much less
concerned with exploring his experience.  Upon returning from the war, he walks with a
limp, which we later learn is a result of a self-inflicted mishap, and the mood of the
scenes suggests something is different, but other than his reluctance to talk about the war,
                                                 
239 Gilbert Adair, Hollywood’s Vietnam: From the Green Berets to Full Metal Jacket
(London: Heinemann, 1989), 72.
144
we learn little of Bob’s story.  The implication of the film is that the transformations of
all the characters are a result of the war, but as the film moves on, the love triangle
becomes the plot’s catalyst.  As one reviewer suggested at the time, “as the romance
develops, Vietnam recedes and Hollywood takes over.”240  Indeed, Bob is pushed “over
the edge” only when he learns of Sally’s infidelities during his tour of duty.
During Sally and Luke’s romance, Luke became the object of FBI surveillance, as
a result of protesting the war by locking himself to the gate of the local army base.  The
surveillance tapes include sexual encounters between he and Sally.  The FBI makes Bob
aware of the affair while questioning him about Luke, leading Bob to confront Luke.
Instead of focusing on the affair, however, Bob simply warns Luke about the
surveillance.  Upon his return home, Bob takes his rifle from the garage.  Although the
original version of the film had Bob take on the role of a deranged sniper, in the final
version he enters the house silently, never revealing his intentions.241  After Sally
confronts him and they argue, Luke shows up, and Bob threatens them both with the
bayonet end of the rifle.  As Sally passively watches, Luke tells Bob, “I am not the
enemy.  The enemy is the fucking war.  And you don’t want to kill anyone here.”  Bob
drops the rifle, and both men exit, leaving Sally alone in the house.
In the final scene, we see a montage of the characters, unsure of what really
becomes of any of them.  Luke gives a moving speech to a group of high school students,
instructing them about the realities of war: “I have killed for my country. And I don’t feel
                                                 




good about it… I don’t see any reason for it. And there’s a lot of shit I did over there that
I find fucking hard to live with.”  Interspersed with the speech are shots of Bob walking
along the beach, stripping from his uniform, removing his wedding ring, and swimming
out into the ocean.  Many reviewers read Bob’s actions as suicide, but the film leaves
Bob’s fate open and unresolved.  Sally, in the final shot of the movie, enters a market to
buy steaks for a barbecue.  The door of the market swings open to display the word “out.”
For all its drama and its place in the pantheon of Vietnam War films, then,
Coming Home has almost nothing to say about the war.  Muse argues that “[a]ll we know
of the war we learn from Bob—we never see any of it apart from a flash of news
coverage—and his description is tantalizingly obscure: “I don’t know what it’s like; I
only know what it is. TV shows what it’s like.”242  We do learn that war is hell, from the
shots of wounded men at the hospital, from Luke’s final speech, and from Bob’s brief
recounting of troops under his command cutting the heads off of dead Vietnamese
soldiers, the only moment in which he speaks about the war.  One could argue that one of
the messages of the film is indeed the need for veterans, and indeed for all Americans to
talk about the war.  Luke, the figure of redemption, does his duty by passing on his
knowledge to the students, while Bob, who again and again refuses to talk about the war,
ends the film in silence and, perhaps, suicide.  The implication of this dichotomy, for
many is that the film is thus “anti-war” because redemption came to the supposed anti-
war figures.243  Yet the film itself does not provide any space for commentary about the
                                                 
242 Muse, The Land of Nam, 99.
243 For instance, see Jack Kroll’s review of The Deer Hunter in Newsweek, which
contrasts the politics of the two films. Kroll, “Life-or-Death Gambles,” Newsweek,
December 11, 1978, 113-4.
146
war in Vietnam; the war itself is completely and conspicuously absent, and the enemy,
invisible.  Instead, through the images of the mentally, emotionally, and physically
traumatized American veterans, the film explores only what Vietnam did to “us.”
The reactions to Coming Home ranged widely.  Conservative groups predictably
reacted to “Hanoi” Jane Fonda with the same venom they had a decade earlier when she
visited Northern Vietnam.  In his more balanced account, Peter Marin noted “the
smugness and self-satisfaction at work” in the film, sidestepping an honest attempt to
deal with the problems of veterans for “a ritualized love story and a vehicle for Ms.
Fonda’s perpetual moral posturing.”  Frank Rich of Time found many faults with the film,
but they were artistic, not political or moral in nature.244  In certainly one of the most
even-handed reviews of Coming Home, Morris Dickstein, in Partisan Review, praised the
film, despite its many faults, simply for being made:
Modest, flawed, even a little compromised by box office conventions, the film is
nevertheless a serious act of witness, made by obsessed people with long
memories and a determined conscience, a refusal to forget.  This is what Coming
Home finally means: bringing the war home.  For once the Hollywood left has
done itself proud.245
For Dickstein, the film’s attempt to break “the silence itself, the graveyard calm,
the mood of national forgetfulness that is one of the hallmarks of the seventies,” is reason
enough to celebrate.  But to what, exactly, does Coming Home bear witness?  What is it
that Ashby and Fonda are seeking not to forget?  The film has been credited with raising
awareness of the treatment of veterans, which Dickstein sees as part of a larger struggle
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for public memory: “Our callous treatment of the unwelcome veteran is part of the
avoidance of the memory of the war itself, and we may be condemned to repeat it unless
we’re willing finally to face it.”246  Perhaps Dickstein was simply being overly optimistic
that as the opening act in the veritable Vietnam War film festival that was 1978, Coming
Home would be followed by films that would help Americans to “face” Vietnam.  As I
argued above, the need for dialogue, for a discussion, is proposed, but not fulfilled by the
film; to the extent that Coming Home presents dialogue of the war at all, it is only inward
looking and myopic. Even if successful in drawing attention to the plight of American
veterans, Coming Home, and the other 1978 representations of the American War in
Vietnam follow the logic of “mutual destruction” proposed by President Carter. They
deliberately silence the past and situate Americans as the primary victims of the war.  In
short, Ashby’s films, and several others, face the war by not facing it at all.  By keeping
“Vietnam” and the Vietnamese, especially, silent, off-screen, and invisible, Coming
Home, at best, asks viewers to remember certain things at the expense of others.  It
focuses attention on what “Vietnam” did to “us” at the expense of what “we” did, and
what we were continuing to do, to the people of Vietnam.
The Deer Hunter
The Deer Hunter has never been accused of rendering the Vietnamese invisible.
Michael Cimino’s film, which initially garnered none of the pre-release attention lavished
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on Coming Home or Apocalypse Now, quickly gained infamy for its portrayal of Viet
Cong soldiers as dehumanized savages who torture their American captors.  In many
ways, The Deer Hunter changed the way in which commentators wrote about the
Vietnam War film; Coming Home only began to be widely discussed as overtly political
when juxtaposed with The Deer Hunter.  With the exception of the cartoonish Rambo
(1985), no American film dealing with the war in Vietnam has aroused such vehement
responses.  As we will see in a later chapter, however, the connections between Rambo
and the Reagan administration’s foreign policy were all too apparent.  Although The Deer
Hunter has been criticized on a number of levels, as we will see, it has yet to be
connected to the formation and consolidation of American foreign policy toward
Vietnam.
The film takes place in three acts.  In the first, the audience is introduced to the
community of Clairton, Pennsylvania, a steel town populated largely with Russian
Orthodox Christians.  In the opening scene, we see the steel mill where Michael (Robert
DeNiro), Nick (Christopher Walken), and Steve (John Savage) are ending their final shift
before leaving for a tour of duty in Vietnam.  On their way through the locker room, their
co-workers wish them well. One encourages Michael to “kill a few for me.”  As the
friends make their way to their local bar, we meet the rest of the gang, who are all
preparing for Steve’s wedding.  The wedding and reception, long and elaborate scenes set
in the VFW hall, portray a tightly knit community, grounded in tradition and nationalism.
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The head table and reception floor, where the guests perform traditional Russian folk
dances, are adorned with in red, white and blue banners proclaiming “Serving God and
Country Proudly.”  At the reception, after Michael has made an awkward, half-hearted,
and unsuccessful pass at Nick’s girlfriend, Linda (Meryl Streep), the three soldiers-to-be
notice a Green Beret at the other end of the bar and buy the man a drink.  “We’re going
over there. We’re going airborne,” Michael tells him.  “I hope they send us where the
bullets are flying,” Nick adds. The soldier, with a blank stare, simply responds: “Fuck it,”
as he drinks the shot.  “What’s it like over there?” they ask.  Again, the same response:
“Fuck it.”
After the wedding, the men go hunting. The scenes, set ostensibly in the
Appalachians of Pennsylvania, but shot in the more majestic Rockies, further establish
Michael’s connections both to nature and to the idealized western hero.  On the way to
the cabin, Michael has a blowout with Stanley and the others over his “fanatical” ways
about hunting (Michael will not allow Stanley to use an extra pair of boots because
Stanley is never properly prepared).  Michael, who Cimino constructs as an outsider, not
entirely comfortable in the community, tracks a deer by himself, shunning the group
dynamic of the others.  He shoots the deer with “one shot,” the only acceptable form of
hunting for Michael, as he explains at length to Nick in an earlier scene.  Immediately,
the film cuts to the boys driving back through town.  They pull up to the bar with the
ubiquitous steel mill in the background. Upstairs in the bar, a raucous celebration turns
150
somber as (the bartender) sits at the piano and plays a quiet ballad. The men exchange
glances as the song gradually ends.
The next shot is a jarring cut to a village being bombed, and bamboo huts
engulfed by flames while the sound of a helicopter rages in the background.  Over an
hour into the film, we reach act two, set in Vietnam.  We see Michael lying injured as a
Viet Cong soldier comes into the village, throws a hand grenade into a bunker filled with
villagers. A lone Vietnamese soldier shoots down a defenseless woman carrying a baby,
and Michael attacks him with a flamethrower, later killing him with his rifle after the
other reinforcements, including Nick and Steve, appear.  Soon, Vietnamese forces arrive,
though, and the men are taken captive, setting up the scene for which the film is
infamous.  In just a few short minutes, Cimino establishes that the Viet Cong are cold and
ruthless killers, executioners of women and children.  The Americans are there to protect
the Vietnamese people from such figures, but are themselves captured and taken prisoner.
In the POW camp, the prisoners are forced by their savage, caricatured
Vietnamese captors to play Russian Roulette.  The Viet Cong figures speak in sharp tones
(and in Chinese, not Vietnamese), and they cackle and exchange money when one of the
prisoners “loses” the game.  The use of Chinese actors to play the role of the Vietnamese
is nearly as offensive and racist as the total representation of the Vietnamese in the scene.
In the context of 1978, when the United States was effectively choosing whether to
normalize relations with China or Vietnam and, thus, choosing which side to back in the
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Third Indochina War, the scene also acts as a harbinger of things to come: the United
States siding with the Chinese.  Just as the U.S. would, in 1978 and 1979, negotiate with
China while abandoning Vietnam, in this scene, Vietnam is silenced by the Chinese who
literally speak for them.
  When Michael and Steven are forced to play the game, a bullet glances off
Steven’s head, leaving him wounded, but alive.  He is then relegated to “the pit,” an
underwater holding cage littered with rats and corpses.  In another cage, Michael hatches
a plan to play the game with more bullets in the chamber, which allows them to kill their
captors and escape.  The “enemy” is on screen for less than fifteen minutes, but the scene,
described by one reviewer as “one of the most frighteningly, unbearably tense sequences
ever filmed, and the most violent excoriation of violence in screen history,”247 leaves a
horrific and lasting impression.  While Coming Home argues for an acceptance of all
Americans as victims of “the war” as the enemy, The Deer Hunter puts an all-too-real
face on both the enemy (cruel and inhuman Vietnamese) and the victim (well intentioned
Americans).  As Bruce Franklin argues in Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, this
scene was central to the revisionism of the war that seized American culture well beyond
the 1970s: “The Deer Hunter succeeded not only reversing key images of the war but
also in helping to canonize U.S. prisoners of war as the most significant symbols of
American manhood for the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond.”248
After their escape, Nick is rescued by a helicopter, but Michael stays behind with
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Steven, who is too weak to hang on to the chopper.  Michael and Steve are then shown
walking back to Saigon amidst a flood of Vietnamese refugees, further reinforcing the
view of the film that the Americans and, secondarily, the Vietnamese people, are the
victims of the war waged by the “enemy” Vietnamese forces.  In Saigon, Nick recovers at
a hospital, but upon his release wanders back into the Saigon underworld, where he
discovers a Russian roulette “club” where people play the game for money.  Michael
finds him there on chance, but Nick flees after the encounter in the club, and Michael
returns home without him.
A shot of the familiar steel mill indicates that the final act, back in Clairton, has
begun.  Michael avoids his welcome home party upon return, and only later sneaks into
his own house where Linda has been staying.  With the status of Nick unknown, the
romantic tension between Michael and Linda gives way to an affair; Michael, the western
hero, has broken his own “code” of chastity and honor, notably with his best friend’s
fiancée.  Another hunting trip ensues, where Michael has yet another blowout with
Stanley, this time over the gun that Stanley carries.  On this trip, Michael is unable, or
unwilling, to shoot the deer when face-to-face with it.  Instead, he fires a shot into the air
and repeatedly yells “O.K!” which the forest echoes back to him.
Unable to fully enter the community, even after he brings Steven home from the
VA hospital, Michael returns to Vietnam to fulfill his promise to bring Nick home.  It is
now 1975, and the war is all but over, which further confuses the admittedly skewed
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chronology employed by Cimino in dehistoricizing the war.  Refugees clamor at the gate
of the American Embassy while Michael wades back into Saigon to find the Russian
Roulette club.  Michael arranges to play Nick, who still does not recognize him.  Michael
puts the gun to his head, looks at Nick, says “I love you,” closes his eyes, and fires a
blank.  Nick takes the gun, while Michael pleads with him, “Come on Nicky, come home.
Just come home.”  Nick smiles as Michael reminds him of the trees in the mountains
back home.  “One shot?” he asks Michael, finally making a connection.  “One shot,”
Michael tells him.  Nick smiles, places the gun to his head, and fires, falling dead. The
scene cuts to footage of the end of the war on an unknown television screen. “This seems
to be the last chapter in the history of American involvement in Vietnam,” tells a CBS
news reporter.
In the final scene, second only to the Russian Roulette sequence to those who
indicted the film as jingoistic, the group reassembles after Nick’s burial for breakfast at
the bar.  John, cooking eggs in the kitchen, begins to hum “God Bless America.”  As he
walks to the main room, the others, including Michael, join in, as Cimino demonstrates
through close shots of the individual figures.  On the second verse, we see the whole
table, and Linda leads the singing.  The singing gets louder on the bridge and the chorus,
although it never reaches a triumphant pitch.  As the song ends, Linda smiles at Michael,
who toasts, “here’s to Nick.” The frame freezes and cuts to credits.
The controversial ending, along with the rest of the film, became an immediate
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lightning rod for debate among critics about representing the war on screen.  In American
Myth and The Legacy of Vietnam, John Hellmann argues that “smaller films,” including
Coming Home, “more consistently pleased film critics,” because the politics of such films
were clearer.  The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, he claims, “were widely attacked in
reviews and articles for being implausible and incoherent.”249  While that account may
hold up for Apocalypse Now, as I will demonstrate below, The Deer Hunter brought forth
a more diverse set of responses than Hellmann acknowledges.
When the film was released in late 1978, early enough to be considered for
Academy Awards, several critics seized on it as a fascist, racist, and gross
oversimplification of the war.  Peter Marin lambasted Cimino for “intentional
misrepresentations of the war, his implicit absolution of Americans for any illegitimate
violence or brutality, and a xenophobia and racism as extravagant as anything to be found
on the screen.”250  Peter Arnett, who covered the war as a reporter, labeled the film
“fascist trash.”251  Jane Fonda joined Arnett in calling the film “fascist,” adding that it
was “a racist, pentagon version of the war.”252  In international circles, the rifts over the
film were even greater. At the 1979 Berlin International Film Festival, where the Deer
Hunter represented the United States, the delegations from the U.S.S.R. and several
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Soviet-aligned countries withdrew over what they termed “an affront to the struggles of
the Vietnamese people.”253
Although certainly a racist, dehistoricized representation of the war, the film is
not without its contradictions.  For all the violence the film does to the Vietnamese
people, and to the memory of the war itself, it is, as literary scholar Rick Berg points out,
the only film of its time, and perhaps since, that “bothered to look at the community that
fought the war.”  While he acknowledges that Cimino’s representation of working class
life in Clairton is as essentialized as that of the Vietnamese in the film, Berg praises the
director for focusing on how the war in Vietnam destroyed many working-class
communities.  Even in the controversial final scene, one “that many read as just another
attempt to recuperate the patriotic myths that led us into the war,” Berg finds an intimate
portrayal of the impact of the war on those Americans who fought it: “What we see,” he
concludes, “is a community shattered by Vietnam, trying to express a deeply rooted
nationalism, with all its ironies and contradictions.”254
Leonard Quart, however, offers the counter view of this final scene, which he
describes as “politically disturbing.”  “There is no directorial irony in the sequence,” he
notes.  “The mise-en-scene and camera setups move us toward total empathy with their
feelings.”
As a result, The Deer Hunter leaves us with the indelible image of Vietnam as an
abattoir but then implicitly absolves the U.S. of the responsibility for helping
bring it about by creating a working class who are viewed as both the war’s
heroes and its victims.  The portrait is so sympathetic that it allows the late 1970s
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audience to feel somewhat relieved of its uneasiness and distress about America’s
role in Vietnam, and with some hope that the American Dream can be renewed by
men like Michael Vronsky.255
Implicit in both of these accounts, though, regardless of whether the sequence seeks to
exonerate the United States, is the focus on what the war “did” to Americans.  My intent
is not to criticize the films for their myopic and often narcissistic focus on American
Culture; indeed, as with Coming Home’s focus on the plight of veterans, The Deer
Hunter should be credited for bringing attention to previously marginalized or ignored
effects of the war on Americans.  However, to ignore the parallels of the logic of mutual
destruction at work in the texts is to miss a great deal of their significance.  These films
effectively operate as the cultural front of the ongoing war on Vietnam in the late 1970s:
reinforcing the structure and content of American policy toward Southeast Asia, the texts
either render the Vietnamese invisible or represent them as cruel and inhuman subjects,
reinforcing and solidifying the distorted cultural memory that the United States was the
primary victim of the war.  And, just as with the films themselves, the discourses
surrounding the films constructed by critics and commentators do the cultural work of
“normalization” during 1978, framing the public discussion of events in such a way to
render the United States as the victim of the Vietnamese.
  Certainly the earlier quotes demonstrate that many critics on the left took issue
with the film, but many critics also praised The Deer Hunter for its “courage,” and for its
politics, or, rather the perceived lack thereof.  In Time, Frank Rich held up Cimino’s film
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as “the first movie about Vietnam to free itself from all political cant,” pointing out that
The Deer Hunter has no anti-war characters at all and that “its pro-war characters are
apolitical foot soldiers, not fire-breathing gook-killers,” (failing, apparently to remember
the only combat scene in the film, in which Michael sprays “a gook” with his
flamethrower).  “Cimino,” Rich concludes, “has attempted to embrace all the tragic
contradictions of the U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia.”256  In Newsweek, Jack Kroll
likewise extolled what he viewed as the apolitical nature of the film, calling it “the first
film to look at Vietnam not politically, but as the manifestation of an endemic
murderousness.”  “Many people will react angrily to the film as politically reactionary.”
he predicted, “But The Deer Hunter is a film of great courage and overwhelming
emotional power.”  Kroll took special pains to defend the Russian roulette scenes, calling
them “dramatic and moral,” not “political,” a symbol of a society committing moral
suicide.257  Leonard Quart later describes the view of the war in The Deer Hunter as “a
politically indifferent one,” but then finds himself “politically troubled” by the final
scene.258  So how can such an apolitical film be charged with causing people to view it as
“politically reactionary?”
Indeed, what is most troubling about The Deer Hunter is that it is described even
among many of its strongest critics as apolitical. It is hard to imagine any representation
of the American War in Vietnam as being apolitical, particularly one appearing only a
few years after the end of the war, and particularly one with seemingly overt racist
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representations of the Vietnamese.  The reason for this dichotomous thinking, whereby
something apolitical can still intersect with “the political” as a larger field, is a very
narrow and myopic view of the meaning of “politics.”
In the debates over the meanings of these films, “politics” is used to refer almost
exclusively to “pro-war” or “anti-war,” as though the films were released in 1968, not
1978.  Thus Coming Home, because it has a recognizable “anti-war” figure such as Jane
Fonda, and because it seems to tilt toward a traditional anti-war bias in its redemption of
Luke and condemnation of Bob, can be described as anti-war.  Because The Deer Hunter,
as Kroll and Rich argued, is conspicuously not anti-war, especially when read alongside
Coming Home, it can be described as apolitical.  Such simplistic characterizations, aside
from doing a gross injustice by reducing complex texts with multiple contradictions to a
binary construction, also fail to consider the many ways in which texts are always already
political.  Just as there were many reasons for one to be anti-war or pro-war during the
American War in Vietnam, there are multiple ways in which a film could “be” pro-war or
anti-war.  Certainly to dehistoricize the war, as Cimino does, is a political act, as is the
rendering of the war itself invisible in Coming Home.  The decision not to address the
historical and political implications of the war in Vietnam, while understandable within
the genre conventions and Hollywood mode of production, is nevertheless a political act.
But the larger problem inherent in such constructions of the political is that by focusing
the debate over the films in terms of domestic political attitudes, it ignores the
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implications of the films for foreign policy.
As McAllister’s work has demonstrated, the point is not whether or not a
particular representation is accurate, realistic or racist –and more about how the texts
participate with, intersect, and interact with other constructions, including the
construction of foreign policy.  Certainly, the dehumanized portrait of the Vietnamese
offered by The Deer Hunter has a wider significance when considered alongside the
similar portraits offered in Congressional debates about the POW/MIA myth.  The
POW/MIA films of the early 1980s, which will be discussed in a later chapter, make
explicit such connections to ongoing political battles, but The Deer Hunter has never
been implicated in the failures of normalization in the late 1970s.  At the very least, the
film argues for an acceptance of Carter’s “mutual destruction,” whereby the working
class communities of Appalachia were as devastated by the war, if not more so, as the
villages of the Mekong Delta.  It is also important to situate the representations offered by
The Deer Hunter in the dearth of any other images of the Vietnamese in American
Culture at this moment.  If Bruce Franklin’s earlier assertion about the cultural inversion
of the war beginning with the POW myth of the late 1960s is correct, then certainly the
Russian Roulette scenes and the dehumanized portrayal of the Vietnamese in Cimino’s
film would seem to offer a fatal blow to any hopes of reversing the process.  Against the
backdrop of violence and inhumanity portrayed in the film, what American would
actively support aid to Vietnam to heal the wounds of war?
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Apocalypse Now
Apocalypse Now had become a legend even before it hit the big screen.  Rumors
had been circulating in Hollywood that Coppola was making a Vietnam film, that he had
mortgaged his house to do so, that it was based on Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, and that
he and his crew had been stranded in the Philippines for almost a year. In the summer of
1978, about halfway between the releases of Coming Home and The Deer Hunter,
Newsweek ran a special piece by Maureen Orth entitled “Waiting for the Apocalypse.”  In
it, she chronicled the various disasters that had put the film years behind schedule and
tens of millions of dollars over budget: Harvey Keitel, originally slated to play the lead of
Willard, had been fired.  Martin Sheen, his replacement, had a heart attack.  Marlon
Brando, cast in the role of Colonel Kurtz, wouldn’t work unless he was given one million
dollars per week, and later arrived 75 pounds overweight, forcing Coppola to rewrite and
reconceptualize many of Kurtz’s scenes.  The Philippine army helicopters, which were
lent to Coppola by the Marcos Administration, were diverted for several days to put
down a political insurrection.259
For all of these difficulties, however, “the longest running battle on the set was
over what the film was really about.”  In the article, everyone from Coppola down
weighed in with his or her view on the message of the film, and not one of them sounds
remotely like the other.  As later reviews and essays would further demonstrate, the film
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was pieced together on the fly, not simply in the face of production challenges, but in the
face of an uncertain narrative and an uncertain message.  Although it was originally
based on The Odyssey and Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, the film draws on such a variety
of influences, from The Doors to T.S. Elliot, as to make it all but incoherent at times.
Peter Marin accurately described it as
a sampler, a variety show of Coppola’s talents: bits and pieces of successive
scripts, fragments of John Milius’s originally hawkish screenplay, Michael Herr’s
antiwar narrative added late in the day, set pieces of surreal exaggeration
derivative of Catch-22 or MASH, mawkish images of the Vietnamese, and,
finally, the entire last convulsive third of the film, a pastiche of borrowed
meanings and second-hand myths, in which Coppola, striving to locate the
significance of his work, loses his way completely.260
Screenwriter John Milius would later tell Film Comment that the character of Willard was
a combination of “Adam, Faust, Dante, Aeneas, Huckleberry Finn, Jesus Christ, the
Ancient Mariner, Capt. Ahab, Odysseus, and Oedipus.”261  Nevertheless, if any of these
three films was a spectacle, Apocalypse Now was it.  “My movie isn’t about Vietnam,”
Coppola arrogantly told an audience at the 1979 Cannes Film Festival, where the film
shared the Grand Prize. “It is Vietnam.”  Although he was referring in part to the
disastrous quagmire of production experience of the film, Coppola’s statement becomes
all the more loaded when considered within the matrix of normalization I am proposing
here.  In the context of the rewriting of the war in late 1970s American culture, his claim
constitutes the ultimate act of cultural appropriation: allowing a fictional representation to
displace and silence the historical reality of the war.
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Coppola’s mythic journey up river follows Willard on his mission to “terminate
the command” of Colonel Walter Kurtz.  Willard has been informed that Kurtz, once a
rising star in the military bureaucracy, has gone insane, and is now using “unsound
methods” to wage his own war, without borders or boundaries of any kind.  As he is
escorted up the river by an army boat crew, Willard pours through Kurtz’s file.
Struggling to balance his concern for Kurtz’s descent into madness with his own personal
identification with Kurtz, Willard recognizes at least the insanity of his own mission, if
not the war: “Charging a man with murder in this place,” Willard tells the viewer through
a voiceover, “is like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500.”  This statement also
defined what critics would come to call the film’s moral ambiguity.  In Coppola’s
Vietnam, there is no useful distinction to be made between the killing of enemy
combatants and the slaughter of innocent civilians.
The journey becomes more surreal as the crew moves farther up the river.  In one
of most legendary sequences of scenes in any Vietnam war film, they meet up with
Colonel Kilgore (Robert Duvall), originally designed to play the Cyclops figure to
Willard’s Odysseus.262    After mopping up the wreckage from his unit’s last assault on
the Vietnamese, Kilgore agrees to drop Willard and his crew in a “hairy,” Viet Cong
controlled area.  The primary motivation for the mission comes when Kilgore learns that
Lance, one of the men escorting Willard, is a legendary California surfer.  Kilgore
decides that the point can be taken and held long enough to enjoy some surfing.  When
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one of his troops shows reluctance, claiming that, “it’s Charlie’s point, sir,” Kilgore
shouts back, “Charlie Don’t Surf!”
The next morning, Kilgore’s unit attacks the village, while blaring “Ride of the
Valkyries” from its speakers.  ““I use Wagner,” Kilgore tells Lance. “It scares the shit out
of the Slopes.”  The village, marked at first by a seemingly innocuous schoolyard, turns
out to be a Viet Cong stronghold, replete with anti-aircraft weaponry.  Kilgore rewards
one crew with “a case of beer for that one,” as they take out one of the gunners. “Don’t
these people ever give up,” Kilgore asks as he takes out a vehicle on the bridge and then
sips his coffee.  The men land on the beach, and begin to take the village.  An American
soldier is shown close up, suffering from a severe leg wound (in far greater detail than we
ever see for Vietnamese subjects).  As one helicopter sets down in the schoolyard to
evacuate the wounded, a young girl throws a grenade into the helicopter, blowing it up.
“Fucking savages,” Kilgore responds.  “I’m going to get that dink bitch,” adds another
pilot. The girl and her mother run, and are gunned down from above by the helicopter
On the beach, the Colonel further secures the beach by ordering in a napalm strike along
the treeline.  The odor of the strike forces Kilgore to recall his fondness for the smell: “I
love the smell of napalm in the morning… the smell, that gasoline smell… smells like…
Victory. … Someday this war’s gonna end.”
The scene sums up the ultimate ambivalence of Apocalypse Now.  On the one
hand, it seems determined to demonstrate the absurdity of the entire American
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involvement in Vietnam: wiping out an entire village in order to surf.  Coppola also
makes a point in the sequence of alluding to the racism and hypocrisy of Kilgore and his
men, who refer to the Vietnamese as “slopes,” and “savages.”  That the Americans are
clearly the initiators of the violence is itself somewhat remarkable.  It is very rare, in fact,
for the American forces in a Vietnam War film to initiate the action that results in a large
battle or in the deaths of Vietnamese subjects.  Normally, American troops are ambushed
or caught off guard.  Even in atrocity scenes, such as the one in Platoon, the American
violence is set up by the gruesome killing of an American soldier.  Yet the film at another
level justifies the attack by showing it to be a Viet Cong controlled village.  This is not
the slaughter of innocents; they are the enemies of the Americans, who shoot back at the
aircraft and throw grenades in helicopters.  The ends of the particular mission are
unquestionably absurd, but the battle itself and the killing of Vietnamese women and
children are not.263
Later, up river, the film offers another instance of American-initiated violence,
also ambiguous in its moral implications.  On a “routine” stop of a Vietnamese family’s
boat, the young and frazzled crew members accompanying Willard are ordered to inspect
the cargo.  Willard pleads with the chief to ignore the boat so that they can continue
toward his destination. “Chef” reluctantly boards the boat.  Frustrated and scared, he
pushes a young girl down.  “Shut up slope,” yells “Mr. Clean” (Larry Fishburne), who
keeps the boat’s gun fixed on the family.  The girl gets up to run after Chef, who is
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ordered to inspect another basket.  As she rushes toward Chef, Mr. Clean opens fire,
killing the girl. Lance joins in, and in a frantic scene, they slaughter the entire boat. Chef
reveals that the girl was only attempting to protect her new puppy, which was hidden in
the basket.  The girl, the Chief points out, is moving, still alive.  Willard instructs the
chief that they will not take her to ARVN hospital, and executes the girl on the spot. “I
told you not to stop, so let’s go.”  In the voice over that follows, Willard elaborates: “It
was a way we had over here. We’d cut em in half with machine guns and give them a
band-aid.  It was a lie; and the more I saw of them, the more I hated lies.”  Through the
use of the voice over, Willard justifies his murder, chalking it up to the “lie” of American
policy in Vietnam.
Perhaps the most remarkable scene in Apocalypse Now, however, is one that was
not included in the original 1979 release.  After the apex of surrealistic adventure at the
Du Long Bridge, where haunting and hallucinatory music is accompanied by the taunting
voices of the Vietnamese in the wilderness (“Hey G.I., fuck you G.I.! I kill you G.I.!”),
the crew comes upon an old French rubber plantation.  The family, which has been on the
land since the early years of the French colonization, treats the crew to dinner and offers
Willard a historical lesson on the First and Second Indochina Wars.  The patriarch of the
family explains to Willard how the Americans never understood the primacy of
Vietnamese nationalism.  “If the Vietnamese are Communist tomorrow,” he says, “they
will be Vietnamese Communists.”  A younger man, recounting the domino theory,
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appears more supportive what he perceives as the American position: “They are fighting
for freedom,” he tells the patriarch.  The conversation turns, at considerable length, to the
Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu.  “Why don’t you Americans learn from us, learn
from our mistakes. You are stronger, you could win,” the younger man pleads with
Willard.  In a twisted defense of Colonialism, the patriarch concludes that they stay
because they
worked very hard bringing the rubber from Brazil.  We worked very hard with
Vietnamese to build something out of nothing. That is why we stay.  Because it
belongs to us. It keeps our family together. But you Americans are fighting for the
biggest nothing!”
The scene offers no definitive historical account of either the French or American
historical involvement; it actually reads as more of a strange hybrid of several
explanations for Franco-American failures than anything else.  In the Redux version of
the film, released in 2001, the scene was reinserted, standing out like a sore thumb as a
half-hearted attempt to historicize the otherwise largely surreal, mythic narrative.
Nevertheless, it is worth questioning why the scene was not included in the original
version.  Like The Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now is unconcerned with the historical
realities of the American War in Vietnam, attempting, according to Coppola, to get at
larger questions of human nature.264  In the end, it is simply one more contradiction of the
film, unsure of whether the history of American involvement matters, or whether, like the
President claimed in his press conference on Vietnamese aid, the United States should
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move forward “without reference to the past.”
The final scenes at Kurtz’s compound are similarly notable as much for what they
are as for what they are not.  As Coppola explains in the 1991 documentary Hearts of
Darkness, shot during the filming by his wife, Eleanor, the improvisational nature of the
story began to catch up with the filmmaker in the final scenes.  On top of the various
crises and adaptations detailed above in the 1978 Newsweek piece, Coppola was unable to
come up with a suitable ending for the film.  As Muse explains in The Land of Nam, three
separate endings were shot: one in which Willard joins Kurtz, one in which Willard dies
alongside Kurtz after calling in an American air strike on the compound, and one in
which Willard kills Kurtz.  The latter of the three was eventually used, but only after
several audience focus groups found it the most appealing of the three.265
For many reviews and scholars, the inability of Coppola to articulate or symbolize
any coherent message in the film’s climax was indicative of the larger moral and political
failures of the film.  Even among sympathetic reviewers, Coppola was often criticized for
falling prey to his own delusions of grandeur.  “A failed masterpiece,” was indicative of
the descriptions offered by such reviews.  Others were not as generous.  Peter Marin
derided the film as “morally stupid:” “an essentially unintelligent investigation of themes
too complex for Coppola to handle… crippled by a morally incoherent attitude toward
the war and its attendant issues.”266  Frank Tomasulo later took the film to task for its
moral and political ambivalence.  Coppola, in Tomasulo’s account, wanted to have it both
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ways—to have both an “anti-war” and “pro-war” film, as well as a film that aestheticizes
the violence of war while attempting to comment on the events critically as well.267
One of Tomasulo’s concerns has to do with what the terms “the politics of film
reception.”  Working against the grain of theories that promote an “open,” multivalent
text, Tomasulo argues that, “what is really needed—at least in terms of Vietnam War
movies—is a closed text, a film that takes an unambiguous stance on the imperialist
involvement and illegal conduct of the Vietnam Conflict.”268  Yet Tomasulo misses the
very point of reception theories that focus on the polyvalence of textual meaning: it is not
that artists actively create “open” texts and could simplify the articulation of a particular
message by creating a less ambiguous text; ambiguity, after all, is not necessarily
synonymous with polyvalency.  Reception theories hold that texts, by the manner in
which they are produced, received, and consumed, are open to a variety of readings based
on the subject positions of their audience.  Nevertheless, Tomasulo’s larger point is well-
taken: films such as The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, which seek to displace and
abstract “political realities onto the universal and ambiguous realm of myth,” contribute
to the “social amnesia” of American culture.
“Lifting the Moral Burden”
In one of the many articles to declare that Vietnam had “come home” in 1978, a
piece in Time noted the rather remarkable spectacle of the Oscar Ceremony in April of
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1979.  Already that night, Jane Fonda and Jon Voight had won their respective awards for
best performances in Coming Home, but the highlight of the ceremony came when John
Wayne, of all people, awarded the final award of the night, Best Picture, to Cimino for
The Deer Hunter.  The piece also noted that headlines around the country cleverly
appropriated the awards to comment on the irony of the situation, such as the Los Angeles
Examiner, which proclaimed: “The War Finally Wins.”269
“Vietnam” had indeed been brought home in 1978.  The films explored in this
chapter, as well as the critical discourses they engendered, challenged existing American
cultural memory of the war by “normalizing” it, translating it into terms acceptable to
American cultural production and foreign policy.  Through the act of cultural
appropriation constituted by making the war “about us,” as all these films do, the texts
reinforce the myopic and narcissistic tendencies of American policy toward Vietnam in
the 1970s.  All three of the texts examined here are part of the larger “normalization” of
the United States’ war on Vietnam, doing for the cultural sphere what the legislative and
policy discussions had accomplished in the political field.  These films helped to lift the
moral burden of the war off Americans, countering any collective sense of guilt with
indulgent appeals to self-vicitimization.
By the time of the 1979 Oscars, the familiar images of the American War in
Vietnam—of children being burned by napalm, of American allies executing their
enemies on the streets of Saigon, of a mass of bodies, executed by young American
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soldiers, lying in a ditch at My Lai—were being contested, if not entirely displaced, by
images of traumatized American veterans, fractured communities, and, importantly
sinister and cruel Vietnamese figures torturing Americans.  “Vietnam” had successfully
been brought into American cultural memory: it was no longer a war, and had long since
ceased being a country.  It was now an “experience,” something that happened to
America and Americans.
Peter Marin, whose work has been cited often in this chapter, still wondered in
1980 if any American representations of the war would ever consider the war “from the
Vietnamese point of view—in terms of their suffering rather than ours.”270  As I have
shown, however, the political and cultural work of normalization sought not simply to
ignore the Vietnamese, but to silence them.  By rendering what the war did to the nation
and people of Southeast Asia outside the realm of discussion, the cultural logic of mutual
destruction constructed and disseminated in the late 1970s laid the groundwork for the
resumption of the American imperial project in the region during the 1980s.  The inverted
historical representations of the war implicit in the constructions we have seen here
would provide the lens through which most Americans would view the Third Indochina
War.  The government and mainstream media, both agents of normalization in the late
1970s, had already chosen sides in that conflict by early 1979, letting China and their
Khmer Rouge clients off rather easily while condemning the Vietnamese as the
aggressors and transgressors.  But equally important is the way in which that conflict
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allowed the process of rewriting the American War in Vietnam to continue.  That is the




The United States and the Third Indochina War
In his 1976 National Address marking Tet, Le Duan, the long-time Secretary
General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, promised that every family in Vietnam
would have a radio, a television, and a refrigerator in their home within ten years.271
While these specific goals may not have been exactly what one might have expected from
one of the central figures of the Vietnamese Socialist revolution, Le Duan’s comments
reflected the sanguinity of Hanoi after the end of the Second Indochina War.  Having
defeated the Americans and their Southern Vietnamese clients, the Vietnamese leadership
was now seemingly free to confront the task of socialist economic transformation.
In 1976, optimism reigned supreme in Hanoi.  In July, Vietnam would be
officially reunited as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  In the fall, representatives from
the United States would visit and recommend the normalization of relations between the
two nations.  Later that year, the Party announced its incredibly ambitious Second Five
Year Plan (FYP), its first such plan since the DRV’s First FYP from 1961-1965.  In that
plan, the VCP announced that as part of its three ongoing revolutionary tracks (science
and technology, relations of production, and cultural-ideological), the Vietnamese
economy would exceed all expectations.272  The projected increases in agricultural
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production (8-10 percent), industrial output (16-18 percent), and national income (13-14
percent), would have been ambitious for any economy, let alone one still on the heels of
three decades of sustained warfare.273  Moreover, the Fourth Party Congress at which the
FYP was announced also provided a statement of economic independence.  Anticipating
a massive influx of foreign aid, especially from the United States, the Party angered the
Soviets by declaring their agenda for genuine economic independence.  Although
committed to international socialism, the Vietnamese leadership prized nothing more
than national sovereignty, which they knew would come only from a position of
economic strength and international multilateralism.  It certainly appeared to many at the
time that the Vietnamese would soon, as Ho Chi Minh had predicted years earlier, rebuild
their land “ten times more beautiful.”274
Ten years later, in early 1986, the dreams of Ho, Le Duan, and the Vietnamese
people, lay in tatters.  Le Duan had died the previous summer at the age of 79; many of
his former comrades, including Vo Nguyen Giap, had been forced out of power and
others, including Le Duc Tho and Pham Van Dong, would soon share a similar fate.  The
vanguard figures of the revolution were being replaced, and another transformation was
underway.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese economy would move
increasingly toward a capitalist, market-oriented approach.  The economy had continued
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to struggle throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As early as 1978 it became clear
that the goals for the Second FYP would not be met: the agricultural production
amounted to only two percent growth, industrial growth only six-tenths of a percent, and
national income, far from the double digit gains projected, remained at less than one half
of one percent.275  Although the economy would perform better in the Third FYP of
1981-1985, the goals for that period also fell considerably short of both the expectations
of the government and the needs of the people.  Far from economic independence,
Vietnam had been forced into a position of accepting membership in Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance, the Soviet-bloc common economy.  Most importantly, the
Vietnamese in 1986 found themselves mired in another long, bloody, and costly war.
Although the immediate conflict in this war was the result of long-standing border
disputes between the Vietnamese and their Cambodian neighbors, the Third Indochina
War, like the two wars before it, became a proxy battle being waged by the world’s
foremost military powers.
Far from becoming “a land ten times more beautiful,” Vietnam by the mid 1980s
was surrounded by unfriendly regimes, beset with serious economic woes, and remained
the target of an alternatively hostile and indifferent United States.  Without question, the
Vietnamese leadership must shoulder a good portion of the blame for this situation.  The
VCP poorly managed its economy and at times remained needlessly obstinate in the face
of world opinion during its occupation of Cambodia.  What has often been obscured in
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the rush to judgment against the failures of the Vietnamese, however, has been the role
played by the United States in the multiple tragedies of Southeast Asia during the 1980s.
In this chapter, I will argue that the United States, in concert with China and the ASEAN
nations276, followed a policy of “bleeding Vietnam white” during this period, needlessly
prolonging the devastating war in Cambodia while using the war as a justification for its
continued hostility toward Vietnam.  Far from a response to the Vietnamese invasion and
occupation of Cambodia, United States’ strategy toward Southeast Asia during the late
1970s and 1980s was a continuation and, in effect, an extension, of its previous policies
of continuing war by other means.
The Bleeding of Vietnam during the 1980s rested on three primary components:
political/diplomatic, military, and economic.  The political and diplomatic aspect was
played out largely at the United Nations in the early 1980s, when the United States and
China led the fight to retain the diplomatic credentials of the murderous Khmer Rouge
regime and isolate the Vietnamese.  The military phase of the policy grew largely out of
the failure of the diplomatic efforts to achieve the desired results.  Beginning in the early
Reagan administration, a variety of actors in Washington began to press for the
development of an “alternative” force in Cambodia, separate from the occupying
Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge.  Beginning in 1982, the United States began to funnel
aid to what it termed the “Non-Communist Resistance” in Cambodia.  In actuality, the
coalition was dominated by the Khmer Rouge, who thus found themselves the recipients
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of large amounts of American aid. The economic aspect of the U.S. strategy toward
Vietnam during the 1980s was to continue the economic sanctions program that had been
enacted years earlier and persuade its allies to follow suit.  By the end of the decade,
however, it was clear that the United States was again going it alone with unilateral
sanctions against Vietnam.  Japan, France, and the ASEAN nations all resumed trade and
even aid programs with Vietnam, leaving the U.S. with a confused policy.
To refer to the bleeding of Vietnam as a “policy,” however, is a misnomer.
Although the various components that constituted the strategy can be discerned with the
hindsight of history, they did not constitute a coherent policy stance at the time.  As we
will see in this chapter, the attitude of the United States government towards Vietnam
more often than not continued to be defined by a lack of policy, just as it had since 1975.
The de facto policy continued to be reactive, using whatever events developed in the
region, or whatever political sentiments arose in the United States, as a justification for
the ongoing hostile stance toward the Vietnamese.  During the Third Indochina War, U.S.
policies toward Vietnam also became more deferential to China and ASEAN, as the U.S.
remained reluctant to become overtly reengaged with the politics of Southeast Asia.
At the same time, the program of Bleeding Vietnam was loosely held together by
a cultural logic that continued to serve as the under girding for the larger American War
on Vietnam after 1975.  All of the components discussed in this chapter were wrought by
the theme of invisibility.  The military phase of the war—the covert supporting of the
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Khmer Rouge—cannot be considered apart from the other military actions undertaken by
the United States in the 1980s, particularly the wars in Central America.  These actions
were often described by using the signifier of “Vietnam.”  Thus the discussion of “new
Vietnams” in Central America helped to mask the ongoing war against the “real”
Vietnam in Southeast Asia.  The international extension of the economic sanctions
program that resulted from the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia also helped to render
invisible the origins of the American embargo on Vietnam.  Various government officials
and commentators at the time, and numerous scholars since, have mistakenly described
Vietnamese actions against Cambodia as the origins of the sanctions, obscuring the actual
imposition of the sanctions in 1975, discussed here in chapter three.  Moreover, the
failure of the United States to lift its sanctions upon the Vietnamese withdrawal from
Cambodia in the late 1980s further points to the deep roots of the American policy.  Both
of these components were also part of a larger trend in revisionism that took place in
American culture in the 1980s.  Building upon the groundwork laid by the processes of
“normalization,” as discussed in the previous chapters, the 1980s witnessed the triumph
of revisionism of the American War in Vietnam, with the United States fully established
as the primary victim of the war and the Vietnamese increasingly relegated to the margins
of historical narratives about the war.  Although this topic will be explored more fully in
the next chapter, the revisionist tendencies of the Reagan administration during this time
are also part and parcel of the larger project of bleeding Vietnam.
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Thus, we will see, the American War on Vietnam after 1975 was both continued
and extended during the 1980s, transitioning seamlessly from the Carter White House
through both Reagan administrations and into the presidency of George Bush.  By the
end of the 1980s, the Vietnamese would be out of Cambodia and the Third Indochina
War would finally be over, but the United States would continue to attempt to bleed
Vietnam, maintaining its sanctions program and continuing to isolate the Vietnamese
politically and diplomatically.  Before discussing the bleeding of Vietnam, some
background on the rise of the Third Indochina War is in order.
The Rise of the Third Indochina War
The suppression of long standing national disputes and coalescing of Asian
communist and nationalist factions that had been engendered by the American War in
Vietnam was quickly erased when the Americans left.  The seemingly close relationship
between the revolutionary forces of Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, both of
which had been supported by the Chinese during their wars to liberate their countries
from American-backed regimes, had exchanged messages of congratulations on their
victories in April of 1975.  Less than a month later, the two nations were battling over
disputed territories in the Gulf of Thailand.
The Khmer Rouge had come to power in a troubled nation wrought by decades of
war in the surrounding region and its own status as a “sideshow” in the American War on
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Vietnam.  After the anti-communist and fiercely anti-Vietnamese Lon Nol regime seized
power in a 1970 coup d’etat against longtime head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
the Northern Vietnamese troops led the assaults against the regime, building up the
Khmer Rouge forces in the process.  After 1972, the ethnic and national tensions between
the Vietnamese and Khmer forces began to grow, and the Khmer Rouge forces battled
increasingly alone against the forces of Lon Nol and the seemingly endless barrage of
bombs from American B-52s.277  After the ending of the American bombing campaign
the Khmer Rouge preceded toward Phnom Penh, securing the capitol two weeks prior to
the North Vietnamese victory in Saigon.
Combining a radical vision of a socialist utopia, a fanatical racial nationalism, and
a paranoia fueled by decades of foreign domination of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge
embarked on a sinister revolution the likes of which the world had never seen: the
immediate abolition of private property, the forced evacuation of millions from the cities
and towns around Phnom Penh to rural agricultural collectives, and, in short, the
complete domination of everyday life by the regime.  Elizabeth Becker, one of the first
journalists allowed in Khmer Rouge-led Cambodia, describes the secrecy and silence
with which the Khmer Rouge enacted their revolution:
Their silence was mysterious, even sinister.  The first stories about life under their
rule, told by Cambodians who managed to escape Thailand, were fantastic and
made the regime sound like a monstrous abomination.  Refugees said Cambodians
wearing eyeglasses were killed because the Khmer Rouge thought only
intellectuals wore eyeglasses.  They said beautiful young women were forced to
marry deformed Khmer Rouge veterans.  They said all toys were banned, that
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there were no more kites flying in the sky.  They said there were no more dogs in
the country because starving people had killed them all for food.278
Stories such as these, which as Becker explains were based on exaggerated version of
actual events, such as the forced labor of children and the banning of sex and marriage,
made it all the more difficult for some to believe the stories that began to surface months
later: widespread famine, mass executions, and a massive program of genocide against its
own people.  Within years, millions of Cambodians would lay dead from the policies and
actions of the Khmer Rouge.279
By the end of 1976, the Khmer Rouge had also become the major threat to the
stability of Southeast Asia.  The silence emanating from Cambodia was briefly shattered
by a series of military clashes with both Thailand and Vietnam.  Although almost no one
in the world had a firm grasp on the horrors that had been taking place within Cambodia
borders, the threat of conflict along its borders threatened to further destabilize the
region.  In January of 1977, Khmer Rouge forces led an incursion across the Thai border,
leaving behind dozens of dead civilians, including women and children.  Pictures of the
atrocities were widely carried in the Western press.280  As Shawcross relates the story,
however, what is most remarkable about the event is how little of a disturbance in Thai-
Khmer relations the executions caused.  Furthermore, according to Shawcross, the Khmer
Rouge not only took credit for the murders, but also claimed that they had taken place
within Cambodian borders.  Thus, the indignancy of the Khmer Rouge was not at the
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charges of murder, but with Thailand’s “interference in Cambodian affairs.”281  Thailand
had been among the first nations in the region to recognize the Khmer Rouge regime, a
decision that has normally attributed to Thai fears about the potential threat posed by the
military power of Vietnam. Thailand and the Khmer Rouge quickly restored normalized
relations after the January attacks, but Khmer atrocities against Thai civilians continued
throughout the remainder of 1977, culminating in a December 15 attack on several Thai
villages along the border.  Even then, the Thai government revealed only a muted
frustration with the Khmer Rouge, not wishing to complicate the relations between the
two nations.282  While the Thais refused to be provoked, Khmer Rouge attacks continued
throughout the 1978 as well, resulting in the killing and kidnapping of numerous Thai
citizens.283  As the Third Indochina War began, the Thai government stood firmly
alongside the Khmer Rouge, serving as both the conduit for Chinese and American Aid
to the “coalition” forces dominated by members of the genocidal regime and the base for
American covert action in Cambodia.
On its Eastern border with Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge also engaged in a series of
raids and attacks against Vietnamese villages.  While the Vietnamese, like the Thai
government, had largely ignored reports of the internal holocaust going on inside
Cambodia and had maintained a front of cordial relations with their former allies, the
long history of Vietnamese-Cambodian animosity made the Eastern front of the Khmer
Rouge attacks much more dangerous.  In April and May of 1977, Khmer Rouge forces
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attacked dozens of villages in the Parrot’s Beak region of Vietnam, killing hundreds of
Vietnamese citizens.  Unlike the Thais, the Vietnamese responded to the attacks with
force, clashing in several border skirmishes with the Cambodians throughout the summer.
Although Hanoi clearly wished to avoid a wider war, the increasing frequency of attacks
by the Khmer forces made it increasingly difficult to exercise patience.  In September of
1977, several hundred Vietnamese civilians, again including large numbers of women
and children, were killed in Tay Ninh Province at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.  Yet
several days later, the Vietnamese Communist Party sent a message of congratulations to
Pol Pot for his formal announcement of the Kampuchean Communist Party.
The tide turned again in the fall, when the Vietnamese began actively supporting
the formation of an insurgency to overthrow the Khmer Rouge leadership.  In December
of that year, the Vietnamese, after failing to make any progress in the border dispute,
launched their own major incursion into Cambodian territory.  Believing that a display of
their superiority of manpower and firepower would instill some fear into the Khmer
Rouge, the Vietnamese overpowered DK forces with tens of thousands of troops
supported by numerous air sorties and withdrew their forces several weeks later, after
stopping twenty miles short of taking Phnom Penh.284  Nayan Chanda later wrote that the
brief Vietnamese invasion marked the beginning of the Third Indochina War so many
had feared and tried to avoid.  It would be another full year however, until sustained, full-
scale war erupted in Southeast Asia.285
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In 1977, as Elizabeth Becker put it, Pol Pot and his regime “needed an active
enemy.”286  Thailand, clearly, was both unsuited and unwilling to play that role; Vietnam,
however, albeit somewhat reluctantly, obliged.  After the brief invasion of late 1977, the
Vietnamese began to publicize the Khmer Rouge atrocities committed in Cambodia and
along the Vietnamese border.  Yet the resulting publicity, combined with the Khmer
Rouge’s own program of propaganda against Vietnam, led to concerns more about the
outbreak of war in Indochina than about the Khmer Rouge’s crimes against humanity.
The rest of the world had been dreadfully slow in reacting to the reports slowly emerging
from Cambodia, although the secrecy of the Khmer Rouge was undoubtedly more to
blame for the speed of reaction than the apparent indifference of the world community,
particularly the United States.  Nevertheless, when the United States began to take the
Cambodian situation into account in its foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, beginning,
for all intents and purposes in 1977, it seemed inconceivable that the U.S. would come
down on the side of the Khmer Rouge, one of the most murderous regimes in history.
Within several years, however, the U.S. would be funneling aid into Cambodia, a good
portion of which would end up in the hands of the Khmer Rouge; it would vote on
numerous occasions to continue to seat Pol Pot’s regime at the United Nations; and
violate its own economic sanctions on Cambodia, all the while continuing to “bleed
Vietnam” by prolonging its occupation of Cambodia and refusing to support actively the
disarming of the Khmer Rouge.
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Coming to Terms with Cambodia
As the world began to take notice of the numerous crises consuming Southeast
Asia in 1978, the United States was forced to revisit its policies toward the region.
Normalization with Vietnam was no longer the only issue under consideration; the
security of close allies such as Thailand, relations with China (which the Carter
administration had been quietly working to normalize), and the question of military
and/or humanitarian intervention in Cambodia were all on the table in Washington, D.C.
When the stories of Khmer Rouge atrocities began to make their way into the
Western world, however, the initial response in American policymaking circles revolved
around the role of the United States in helping create the conditions that allowed the
regime to seize power in 1975.  In the summer of 1977, the House Subcommittee on
International Organizations held the first major government hearings on the situation in
Cambodia.  As William Shawcross would later write, the most remarkable thing about
these hearings was that they were the first hearings to be held on the matter, a full two
years after the Khmer Rouge assumed power and had begun their program of auto-
genocide.287
In the first of two sessions devoted to the situation, the committee heard testimony
from several academics who sparred with various representatives about the tension
between the moral responsibility of the United States for the existing situation in
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Cambodia and the moral obligation to help in righting that situation.  Two of the
witnesses in particular, David Chandler of Harvard and Gareth Porter, an Australian
academic working in Washington D.C., took their opportunity before the committee to
castigate the United States’ policy toward the region during the previous war.  Chandler,
while admitting that it was difficult to tell exactly what was happening in Cambodia at
the current moment, the roots of the crisis lie in the American attacks on Cambodia
during the Nixon administration.  “To a large extent, I think the American actions are to
blame” for the rise of the Khmer Rouge, Chandler told the committee.  “It is ironic, to use
a colorless word,” he continued, “for us to accuse the Cambodians of being indifferent to
life when, for so many years, Cambodian lives made so little difference to us.”288
Chandler had no concrete recommendations for what course the United States should
follow with regard to Cambodia, but he was adamant in his insistence that the United
States face the complicated reality of the situation in that nation: “We should accept the
fact, even if it might be a sad one, that Democratic Kampuchea is a sovereign
independent state, and we should formulate our policies toward it, in part, by
remembering rather than forgetting, what we have done.”289
Porter’s testimony was far more contentious.  Along with some other intellectuals
on the left, most notably Noam Chomsky (whose name arose in the course of Porter’s
testimony), Porter erred on the unfortunate side of caution in downplaying the possibility
of a Cambodian holocaust.  Pointing to previous exaggerations by Western powers of
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Communist atrocities, such as the land reform program in Northern Vietnam in the mid
1950s, Porter argued that the postwar policies of the Khmer Rouge, such as mass
evacuations and a return to collectivized agriculture were “rational” given the devastated
state of the country’s infrastructure.  In a lengthy and meticulously documented written
statement, he argued that reports of genocide were completely overblown.  Whatever
“mistakes” the Khmer Rouge committed, Porter claimed, were “dwarfed” by the
destruction previously caused by the United States.  “It is the worst kind of historical
myopia and hypocrisy,” he concluded, “to express more moral outrage at the
revolutionary government for its weaknesses than at the cause of overwhelmingly greater
suffering: the U.S. policy in Cambodia from 1970 to 1975.”290
The rest of the afternoon featured a series of vitriolic exchanges between Porter,
Chandler, and several members of the committee.  Before Porter arrived, several
members of the committee grilled Chandler about his stance on the moral quandary
facing the United States.  Donald Fraser of Minnesota, the Chair of the Subcommittee,
asked if Chandler thought the U.S. should refrain “for perpetuity,” because of “our own
conduct in Cambodia.”  Chandler rejected this simplification, drawing attention once
again to the “complicated” position facing the United States.  He reiterated his hope that,
at the very least, attitudes and policy toward Cambodia would be formulated “in a context
of memory,” rather than “in a vacuum, as if we had nothing to do with the situation
there.”291  The representative from Illinois, Edward Derwinski claimed one of the




statements should not be entitled “Human Rights in Cambodia,” but rather “Justification
for Slaughter.”292  William Goodling, from Pennsylvania, also refused to see Chandler’s
point about the complexity of the situation, calling his testimony “very annoying.”  Yet in
his muddled response, Dooling revealed the brutal nature of the American war on
Cambodia.  Comparing the United States’ bombing of Cambodia to the murderous
Khmer Rouge seemed specious to Dooling: “Our bombs didn’t single out certain
segments or certain peoples in Cambodia.  Our bombs hit them all.  And whether you
thought it was right or I thought it was right, the military at that time thought it was
right.”293  That such a statement could be couched as a defense of American policy
reveals the tangled and twisted nature of American relations with Southeast Asia.
A much more nuanced position on the Cambodian situation came from Stephen
Solarz, the Democratic Congressman from Long Island who came to Washington as part
of the Watergate class of 1974.  Jewish by his upbringing, Solarz took an early and
passionate interest in both the Cambodian holocaust and the refugee crisis facing
Southeast Asia.  At the May 3 hearing, Solarz battled with Porter about the conditions in
Cambodia, demonstrating the concern and the knowledge of the subject that went
completely unrivaled in the United States government during his tenure.  He ridiculed the
witnesses who seemed to defend the Khmer Rouge, compared Porter to those who
continued to deny the Jewish holocaust, and pressed them about their assumptions, their
evidence, and their politics.  Most impressively, he alone among the congressional




representatives acknowledged both the complexity of the situation in Southeast Asia and
the moral ambiguity inherent in the formulation of American foreign policy toward the
region.  “I hold no brief for what we did in Cambodia,” he told the witnesses and the
committee:
I fully agree that we bear a measure of the responsibility for setting in motion a
course of events which ultimately led to this most monstrous evil.  But how
anybody can suggest, by virtue of that fact, that we are morally absolved of any
obligation to attempt to deal with this crime seems to me an act of moral
insensitivity.294
Over the course of the hearing, and numerous subsequent hearings over which he would
preside as chair, Solarz demonstrated his unique grasp of the issues surrounding the
region.
For the most part, Solarz went back and forth with Porter and Chandler about the
conflicting evidence, mostly from Cambodian refugees in Thailand, about the extent of
Khmer Rouge atrocities.  Solarz played the role of prosecuting attorney, calling all of
Porter’s evidence into question.  At one point, Porter attempted to introduce into the
record an article by Ben Kiernan, the Australian academic who went on to become one of
the world’s foremost experts on Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge:
Solarz: Who is he? Do you know who this fellow is?
Chandler: He is a student of mine.
Solarz: Do you know him?
Porter: I do not know him personally, no sir.
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Solarz: Do you know anything about him?
Porter: I know that he is a specialist on Cambodia.
[Porter then proceeds to recount Kiernan’s article, which point out only
that there are discrepancies in the accounts provided by refugees.]
Solarz: Let me tell you something, Mr. Porter.  I don’t know anything about this
student of Dr. Chandler’s, whom the professor disbelieves…295
Such was the tone for most of the hearing, with Porter pressing Solarz for misreading
what was certainly a wealth of confusing and contradictory evidence, and Solarz arguing
that the logical, if not entirely supported, reading of the evidence would suggest that a
holocaust was taking place inside Cambodia.  At one point in the questioning, Solarz
responded to a defense of the Khmer Rouge evacuations of hospitals in Phnom Penh by
simply asking Porter, “Do you really believe what you are saying?”  Asked for
clarification by Porter, Solarz responded, “This isn’t some kind of put-on where you are
playing a role?  I mean you actually believe that what you have said is true?”296
The one item on which everyone in the hearing room appeared to agree is that
humanitarian aid should be sent to Cambodia.297  Ironically, of course, such aid was
prohibited under the sanctions placed on Cambodia under the auspices of the Trading
With the Enemy Act and the Export Administration Act in 1975.  The hearings did reveal
that U.S. made DDT, used to combat malaria, had been bought by Cambodia.  Any such
transaction was prohibited under the sanctions program.  Yet no one in the hearings was
disturbed by this development.  In his statement to the subcommittee, Deputy Secretary





of State Holbrooke noted, almost as an aside, “the United States has made exceptions to
the Export Administration controls on Cambodia to permit sales of DDT as a means of
easing the outbreak of malaria there.”298  It was clear to all those involved that malaria
infections had been at epidemic levels in Cambodia since at least the height of the
American bombing campaign.  Even the government experts who testified at related
hearings later in the summer of 1977 conceded that the number of deaths from malaria
under the Khmer Rouge was “even greater than those executed.”299
That the need for assistance in some form, even from the United States, was a
point of agreement in these hearings reveals as much about the state of lingering
animosity and indifference towards Vietnam as it does about the state of concern about
Cambodia.  Vietnam was mentioned overtly only once in the hearing, when Solarz
pointed out that the United States bombed Vietnam more heavily than Cambodia “and,
whatever the situation may be [in Vietnam], I don’t know that they are systematically
destroying their own people.”300
As I have shown in the previous chapters, during this same period—the spring
and summer of 1977—Congress was developing new and unprecedented regulations to
prevent direct aid to Vietnam, the Vietnamese receipt of aid through international
organizations, and the possibility of even discussing aid to Vietnam during normalization
negotiations.  While the famines plaguing Vietnam in 1977 and 1978 do not constitute
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horrors parallel to the suffering of the Cambodian people, it is nevertheless remarkable
that such proposals for aid were dropped so casually during the hearings.  Aid to
Cambodia, which would certainly have had to been provided via the Khmer Rouge,
clearly a murderous and possibly a genocidal regime in the eyes of most government
officials, was discussed as though the needs of the Cambodian people trumped the
possibility of further propping up the Khmer Rouge regime.  In and of itself, this is not a
radical sentiment; on the contrary, it is precisely the point, albeit an often-contested one,
of humanitarian aid.  The question is: what is the reason for the double standard on aid to
Vietnam and Cambodia?
During their rise to power, the Khmer Rouge had played upon the role of the
“U.S. imperialists,” in destroying their country and propping up the Lon Nol regime.
Long after the war, they continued to blame the United States for committing genocide
against the Cambodian people while denying their own genocidal practices.  Even well
into 1978, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary continued to accuse “the U.S. imperialists and their
lackeys” of killing well over a million Cambodians.  The number itself is not a matter of
dispute.  American officials at the July, 1977 hearings testified that the number of
Cambodians killed during the American campaign involvement in that country “is
probably close” to one million.301  Yet the number of Vietnamese who were killed during
the American War there is likely closer to three million.  Even a conservative estimate
would place it somewhere around two million, double the number of Cambodia.  In
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neither case do government officials in the United States speak of an American genocide
against the people of Southeast Asia, although the numbers are certainly comparable.
The Vietnamese, however, unlike the Khmer Rouge, entered the postwar era of
American-Vietnamese relations with an attitude of openness, speaking of healing the
wounds of war and developing a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.
They went to unprecedented ends in the face of unprecedented demands by the U.S. on
the POW/MIA question, only to be met with greater skepticism and more demands.  The
Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, refused all American attempts at contact.  The House
Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia took particular note of the
complete lack of assistance from the Khmer Rouge, and when the Woodcock
Commission attempted to schedule a visit to Phnom Penh during their tour of the region
in early 1977, they received no response from the Cambodian regime.302
Furthermore, the question of aid to Cambodia at the time was moot; the regime
was still completely closed to the outside world, had rejected previous offers of aid from
various countries, and certainly was not interested in any assistance from the United
States.  On the other hand, the Vietnamese had made clear that they both desired and
needed aid from the United States and the world community.  Although they initially
demanded such aid, which turned out to be a gross political and diplomatic
miscalculation with the United States, the Vietnamese grew increasingly flexible
regarding the scope, form, and substance of aid.  Yet Congress refused even to consider
                                                 
302 For more on the place of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge in the POW/MIA situation,
see Franklin, M.I.A., 105-108.
193
such a possibility.
As Bruce Franklin wrote of the double standard for the Vietnamese and
Cambodians with regard to the POW/MIA question: “Nowhere else does the hypocrisy
and cynicism of U.S. government policy on the MIA question stand so nakedly exposed.”
The same could be said of the more general policy of the United States, or, perhaps more
appropriately, the lack of policy, on aid to the nations of Southeast Asia.  The question of
aid to Cambodia would continue to be raised during the next several years, without ever
reaching an appropriate answer. The double standard to which the United States
government was holding the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese would also remain, and
would grow increasingly hypocritical as the years, and the war for Cambodia, dragged
on.303
Constructing a “Post-Vietnam” Policy: Choosing China
In June of 1978, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke addressed the
Western Governors’ Association in Honolulu, describing to the group what he labeled the
“Changing Perspectives” of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia.  Holbrooke at the
time was still leading the charge within the White House for normalizing relations with
Vietnam, but on this day he revealed the extent to which that goal had fallen in priority.
He spoke to the Governors of maintaining a strong military presence in the region,
keeping up good relations with Japan, increasing trade and investment with the ASEAN
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nations, and of “our commitment to normalizing relations with China.”  Holbrooke
labeled the overall shift in perspective “our post-Vietnam Asia policy.”  Certainly this
nomenclature reflects chronology, referring to a shift in American policy since the end of
the Second Indochina War, but in the context of the summer of 1978, it also foreshadows
the erasure of Vietnam from the visible American policy agenda.  Holbrooke told the
governors that “time will not permit” a discussion of Vietnamese-American relations, but
did not in closing that the United States had “made a reasonable offer to establish
diplomatic relations and to lift the trade embargo,” implying that the ball was in Hanoi’s
court. 304
Hanoi, however, had already made new overtures toward the United States in the
summer of 1978. As Hurst has shown, throughout May, June, and July, Vietnamese
officials made several public pronouncements revealing their willingness to drop outright
the demand for American economic aid as a precondition for normalization.  In July,
Deputy Foreign Minister told journalists, “even if the U.S. Congress rejects the
reconstruction aid, we look forward to establishing full diplomatic ties.”305  Hurst points
out that another statement from the press conference seemed to contradict this revelation,
but it was nevertheless made clear that the Vietnamese were open to the idea of
normalizing without prior aid commitments of any kind.306  Another Vietnamese official
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noted later that summer, “it is clear that in matters of normalization, the ball is on the
American side.”307
The United States, however, insisted that it had not received any “official”
proposal from the Vietnamese, thus had no official basis of its own upon which to
respond.    At a Senate hearing in August, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert
Oakley told the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “we are waiting for a
clarification of precisely what the Vietnamese have in mind.  We have not yet had a
direct, official explanation of their present position on establishing normal diplomatic
relations with the United States.”308  It is curious, given the amount of attention the
administration had devoted to the issue of normalization, why it was now “waiting” for
further Vietnamese clarification.  As Hurst puts it, “[t]he significant question is not ‘why
did the Vietnamese not officially drop the aid precondition,’” he asks, “but ‘why did the
United States not immediately kick the ball back?’”309  The answer, Hurst argues, has
primarily to do with the external developments of the period, including several Soviet-
related issues that had nothing to do with Southeast Asia but helped to reinforce the
Brzezenski worldview within the administration.310  When Vietnam became a full
member of CMEA in June, the view of Hanoi as a Soviet proxy power was only further
solidified in Washington.  Even when a CIA study demonstrated that the Soviets were not
actively involved in Vietnam at the time, the views continued to dominate White House
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policy making.311  Throughout the summer, the United States maintained its hostile
stance toward Vietnam in international organizations, casting the lone veto at the 1978
meeting of the Asian Development Bank, thus blocking new loans and grants to
Vietnam.312
In August, Sonny Montgomery led a Congressional delegation to Hanoi and met
with several members of the VCP, including Pham Van Dong.  The MIA/POW issue,
which had momentarily ceased to be a central issue in the normalization process, was still
the ostensible reason for the visit, but the Vietnamese used the occasion to claim,
“officially,” that they were willing to move forward without concrete aid commitments.313
“We are friends with you now, and we want to be even better friends,” Dong told
Montgomery.  “We had the wind against us in the past.  Now let it be at our backs.”314
Montgomery told reporters not only was he still “completely convinced that there are no
more Americans alive in Southeast Asia,” but also that he had become much more
sympathetic to the difficult position in which Vietnam found itself.  Although
Montgomery referred to his hosts as “the North Vietnamese,” he pointed out that if the
United States wished to combat the Soviet Presence in Southeast Asia, “it would be
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useful if we had some presence in this part of the world to see what the Russians are
trying to do.”315
The Vietnamese had for many years made clear their desire for bilateral trade and
aid agreements with many nations, as well as participation in multilateral agreements.  As
I argued in chapter one, the openness of the Vietnamese Communist Party to international
financial institutions in the years immediately following the end of the Second Indochina
War demonstrated their desire for genuine economic independence.  The decision to join
the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank had distanced Hanoi from both
Moscow and China, which at the time had refused to open their books to the
organizations.  The VCP continued to make efforts at economic autonomy under the
American embargo, gradually increasing trade with regional partners, and had rebuffed
Soviet pressure to join the CMEA on several occasions.  In December of 1976, for
instance, the VCP rejected a Russian proposal for further economic integration,
“confining themselves,” as Derek Davies later noted in the Far Eastern Economic
Review, “to conventional expression of thanks for Soviet aid—but asking the French to
build an integrated steel mill which Moscow had turned down.”316  In August, 1978,
shortly before Montgomery’s visit, Pham Van Dong restated the VCP’s position:
“Whenever in our four-thousand-year history Vietnam has been dependent on one large
friend, it has been a disaster for us.”317  Only as final resorts, facing severe economic
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crises, a potential famine, and the threat of a war with China, did the Vietnamese move
toward full membership in the CMEA.
In fact, even the American State Department acknowledged that Vietnam’s
primary motive was moving towards political and economic independence. Responding
to additional questions to a Senate committee in August, the State Department’s official
position on Soviet-Viet relations read as follows:
We doubt that Vietnam will seek too close ties to the Soviet Union if relations
with China continue to deteriorate unless actual military conflict appears certain.
Hanoi has traditionally cherished its independence and sovereignty and has sought
to avoid too close identification with any one nation.  Vietnam continues to
receive international support and advisers from the U.S.S.R.  However, we do not
anticipate that the Vietnamese will be willing to give the Soviets bases in
Vietnam, and allegations to date that this has occurred have been found to be
inaccurate.  Vietnam compensated for joining the Soviet Union’s economic zone
–COMECOM—by active wooing of western nations, Japan, Australia, and
ASEAN.318
There was still clearly a split between the State Department position and that of
Brzezinski throughout the fall and summer of 1978.  Nevertheless, the major point is that
while it is clear that it may not have been the intent of the Carter administration to push
the Vietnamese into the Russian camp and structure their own complicity in the ensuing
war in Southeast Asia, that is precisely the result of their foreign policy decisions of late
1978.  In “choosing” China, the United States entered what historian Michael Haas has
termed a “Faustian pact,” in which China and the U.S. would support the Khmer Rouge,
one of the most murderous regimes in history.319
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As Hurst makes clear, Brzezinski’s concern for thwarting Soviet influence in the
region was a crucial factor in the Carter administration’s decision to accelerate
normalization of relations with China while shelving the process with Vietnam.
Brzezinski’s echoing of the Chinese line about Soviet and Vietnamese “hegemonists”
during his May visit to Beijing may have helped clarify the administration’s preference
for improving Chinese relations at the expense of diplomacy with the Russians and
Vietnamese, but it obscures a larger question about American policy at the time: if the
United States wanted to combat Soviet influence in the region, why not move swiftly
toward better relations with Vietnam, the only nation in the region where the Soviets
were making inroads?  Clearly, the point was not to battle “regional hegemonists,” as the
Chinese were obviously as interested in dominating Southeast Asia as any other nation,
but rather to choose among those seeking greater regional influence: China, Vietnam, and
The Soviet Union.  Hurst may be right in arguing that The United States did not “choose”
China at the expense of Vietnam, but that choice nevertheless pushed Vietnam further
into the Soviet orbit, where it would stay for many years.320
The lines were thus drawn early in what would, within months, become the Third
Indochina War.  Throughout the fall, the Chinese had been moving tanks, artillery, and
aircraft toward the Northern border of Vietnam, poised for an attack or an invasion.
Vietnamese forces had also been active, securing the area north of Hanoi against a
possible Chinese attack and concentrating their troops along the Cambodian border for an
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invasion designed to oust the Pol Pot regime.321  United States intelligence had been
aware of all of these troop movements for some time, and was apparently less concerned
with the Chinese buildup than with that of the Vietnamese.  Even so, all available
evidence indicates that although Washington was concerned about the ongoing border
conflict and the possibility of a Vietnamese invasion, few in the United States thought
that events would result in a prolonged occupation of Cambodia.
In August of 1978, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held its “first
review of Indochina developments” since April of 1975.322  At that hearing, Robert
Oakley from the State Dept and Douglas Pike, a scholar in residence at the Congressional
Research Service testified that a full-scale Vietnamese invasion and occupation was
unlikely.  When several members of the committee, particularly former Presidential
candidate George McGovern inquired about the possibility of overthrowing the Khmer
Rouge and stopping the genocide, Oakley replied that there had been reports from the
region about “resistance movements” supported by Vietnam, but he was skeptical about
their chances for success.323  Pike concurred:
For the Vietnamese, or anybody, to change the governmental structure would
involve putting teams or military units into virtually every village in the country
in a kind of military occupation that would be an extraordinarily dangerous,
bleeding kind of operation which I cannot really believe the Vietnamese would
entertain.  So the Vietnamese, I think, would like to do the Socialist world a favor
by getting rid of Pol Pot and his associates, but there are intractable problems,
technical problems, involved in doing it, which are unique.  You would not find
them in any other country in the world.324
                                                 
321 On the Vietnamese decision to invade Cambodia, see Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall




McGovern pressed the witnesses, wondering if the Vietnamese were not up to the task,
perhaps the United States could do the job of ridding the world of Pol Pot.  Oakley
responded, “I don’t believe that this is an option that is being studied anywhere.”325
Toward the close of the hearing, a seemingly exasperated Senator John Glenn, then
chairman of the subcommittee, wondered if anyone in the government was “really
coordinating this whole picture… I don’t want to form another committee or another
study group.  But who is in charge of our policy here that is laying out the short term and
the long term?”326  Pike later offered an apparently unsatisfactory but nevertheless honest
reply: “You know, to plan ahead requires that you anticipate and that you predict.  Those
of us who have worked in Asia were burned early, and have long learned, that it is
extremely dangerous to try to predict anything.”327
As the in-house expert on Southeast Asia, however, Pike was asked several times
over the next several months to do precisely what he had advised against: predict.  In
early October of 1978, he delivered a report to the House Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs, entitled “The Vietnam-Cambodia Conflict.”328  Pike indicated that
although a protracted occupation was a possibility given the limited options available to
Vietnam, it was unlikely.  Echoing what he had told the Senate committee two months
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earlier, Pike concluded, “the most likely future of the war appears, as of this moment, to
be indeterminate.”  While a Vietnamese “client-state would be “an attractive prospect”
for Vietnam,” it was only slightly more likely than a negotiated settlement.329
Despite the ongoing American hostility and intransigence toward the Vietnamese,
and despite the concerns of the United States about recent developments in Southeast
Asia, when Holbrooke arranged for secretive meetings in New York with Nguyen Co
Thach in late September of 1978 normalization was still a possibility.  At those meetings,
Thach made a last-ditch effort to secure a promise of American aid, but none was
forthcoming.  According to Nayan Chanda, after another stalled session, Thach told
Holbrooke, “Okay, I’ll tell you what you want to hear.  We will defer other problems
until later.  Let’s normalize our relations without preconditions.”  He then pressed
Holbrooke to sign a memorandum of understanding immediately.  Although Holbrooke
refused to sign immediately, he felt assured leaving the meetings that normalization could
be accomplished in the near future.330  He passed along word of the breakthrough through
Vance to Carter.  Thach told Holbrooke he would be in New York for another month and
would await word of Carter’s approval.
Once thought to be a dead end, the long road to normalization seemed finally to
have lead to an agreement.  The United States would have a relationship with Vietnam, a
symbolic and a strategic victory.  Vietnam would not have the aid it had long needed, but
it would have a new relationship with Washington, the possibility of future aid, and,
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presumably sooner rather than later, an end to the American embargo.  Unfortunately,
1978 was an election year in the United States.  When Carter agreed in principle to
normalize with Vietnam, he did so with the caveat that it would have to wait until after
the midterm elections.331  Once again, the future of Vietnam would be subject to the
domestic considerations of American politics.
In late October, Pike delivered yet another report, this time to the Senate, entitled
“Vietnam’s Future Foreign Policy.”  This report was noticeably different in tone, if not
substance; if anything, much of the material was outdated given the developments in
normalization talks earlier that fall. Pike described the Vietnamese as being paranoid and
anti-American in their policy views. Hanoi perceived the United States “as a relentlessly
aggressive and eternally hostile force stalking the world,” he argued.332  Furthermore,
Vietnamese leaders continued to act “as if the war were still being fought.”  Those who
claimed that Vietnam has adopted a conciliatory approach to the United States were
wrong, Pike claimed.  The internal message being circulated by the Party was “the U.S. is
our enemy, the world’s enemy; and we will bury the U.S., or at least hope to do so.”333
Although the evidence offered for these sentiments as scant, referring to a few scattered
editorials in Nhan Dan, the official Party newspaper, more disturbing were Pike’s claims
that Hanoi was still solely focused on economic aid (“privately labeled war reparations”).
That Vietnam had dropped its precondition of aid since the previous spring is completely
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ignored in the report.  At the same time, Pike grossly minimized the ongoing American
hostility toward Vietnam; the only mention of the U.S. sanctions program was when he
noted, “certain legal prohibitions exist on U.S. money or goods going to Vietnam.”334
Despite the anti-Vietnamese tone of the report, however, Pike’s assessment of the
Cambodia situation remained unchanged: the most likely outcome of the border conflict
was “indeterminate,” a stalemate.335
In late 1978, this was the accepted wisdom and sentiment about Vietnam in
Congress: the Vietnamese, for a number of reasons, were still undeserving of American
aid and, although the border conflict with Cambodia was a source of concern, it was
unlikely that Vietnam would invade and begin a protracted occupation.  Furthermore,
Pike and the various Congressional committees recognized that the development most
likely to change the situation in Cambodia was a change of Cambodian leadership.  As
we have seen, few if any in Washington considered that a likely possibility.  The world
would find out soon enough how wrong these assumptions were.
When the United States made its choice, moving toward normalization with
China, Hanoi made its own, final decision.  On October 30, Holbrooke’s assistant, Robert
Oakley, informed the Vietnamese delegation in New York that the United States could
not proceed on normalization because of the situation in Cambodia, the refugee crisis,
and Vietnamese-Soviet ties.336  On November 1, Thach met Le Duan, Pham Van Dong,
and other Vietnamese leaders in Moscow.  The next day, the two nations signed a twenty-
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five year “Treaty of Friendship of Co-Operation,” which included provisions for military
assistance to Vietnam in the event of an attack or “the threat of an attack.” 337  That same
day, Carter’s proposal for normalization with China, still unbeknownst to the American
public, reached Deng Xiaoping, who had recently solidified control of the Chinese
Communist Party.  The terms of the agreement, as Nayan Chanda has observed, were
almost identical to those rejected a year earlier, including the delicate question of
American military support for Taiwan.  Faced with the prospect of a potential Soviet
military threat in the region, however, and poised for a confrontation with Vietnam, Deng
realized that normalization with the United States should happen quickly, making final
approval a mere formality.  China and the United States would normalize relations before
the end of the year.338
From December, 1978 to February of 1979, the entire landscape of Southeast Asia
was rapidly transformed.  On December 2, Hanoi announced the formation of the
“Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation,” working to remove the Pol
Pot regime from power.  On December 15, the United States and China announced their
normalization of relations.  By then, two Vietnamese divisions were already encamped
well into Cambodian territory.  On December 25, 1978, another eleven divisions poured
across the border and began to cut swiftly through the countryside as the Khmer Rouge
forces hastily retreated.339  As the Vietnamese forces closed in on the capital, they
discovered a wealth of unused Chinese-supplied military equipment, including a fleet of
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MiG aircraft; two more Chinese ships loaded with weapons and ammunition, it was later
revealed, were en route to Cambodia at the time of the invasion.  The Khmer Rouge’s
peasant army, Nayan Chanda later wrote, “knew how to kill with machetes but had not
had time to learn to fly fighter planes or man anti-aircraft guns.”340  On January 7,
Vietnamese forces consolidated control of an again-abandoned Phnom Penh; the Khmer
Rouge leaders and their Chinese advisers fled to the Thai border.  On January 14, Thai,
Chinese, and Khmer Rouge leaders agreed upon a plan to wage a guerilla war against the
Vietnamese.341  The invasion that no one had predicted and many had feared had come,
and another invasion was on the horizon as war once again threatened to engulf Southeast
Asia.
As Chinese President Deng Xioaping flew to Washington in January of 1979 to
celebrate the normalization of relations with the United States, American intelligence was
monitoring massive movements of Chinese troops to their Southern border.  By the end
of the month, well over 200,000 troops were poised along the border with Vietnam.342
Various members of the Carter administration reiterated several times in late 1978 that
the United States would “not take sides” in the burgeoning war between Cambodia and
Vietnam, anticipating the moral dilemma that would confront the administration if forced
to choose between accepting an aggressive Vietnamese incursion and backing the return
to power of the genocidal Khmer Rouge. That already difficult position was only
worsened with what appeared to be a likely Chinese invasion of Vietnam.  Rather than
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risk the fate of normalization, the Carter administration chose to “wink” at China’s
invasion plans.  The Chinese had been rather public in their statements denouncing the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, informing the world that they planned on “teaching
Vietnam a lesson.”  Deng repeated these statements during his visit, both in the Oval
office with Carter and at a press conference later that day.  Officially, Carter urged Deng
to exercise restraint with regard to Vietnam, but the recommendation was hollow at best.
Historians have differed on the extent to which the United States was complicit in
China’s “punitive” invasion of Vietnam.  Nayan Chanda and Elizabeth Becker have been
stern in their criticisms of the Carter administration, whereas Hurst has defended Carter’s
stance, arguing that Chanda in particular misread many of the administration’s
statements.343  Hurst argues that far from appeasing the Chinese, the U.S. sternly
denounced China’s actions, much to the surprise of Beijing.  In Becker’s account,
however, which Hurst largely ignores to focus on Chanda, even Brzezinski himself, in an
interview with the author, described American policy as a “semipublic wink” at the
Chinese plans.  This wink, Becker explains, helped to set the stage for future U.S. proxy
support of the Chinese and their Khmer Rouge clients.  “We could never support [Pol
Pot], Brzezinski told Becker, “but China could.”344
On February 17, 1979, the Chinese army swept across the Vietnamese border and
began its brief punitive action, a two-week invasion of Vietnam that was later described
by Chanda as a “pedagogical war,” designed to teach a stern “lesson” to an insolent
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nation.  The U.S. called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council and
publicly called for the removal of both Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Chinese
troops from Vietnam.345  It is clear from statements that situated the Chinese response as
a logical outcome of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, however, that the administration
continued to view Vietnam as the primary aggressor.  Carter stated that “in the last few
weeks, we have seen a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and, as a result, a Chinese
border penetration in Vietnam.”  Chanda situates this statement as part of the
rationalization of U.S. support for China’s actions, while Hurst argues that a “more
logical conclusion” is that “it is simply a statement of fact.”346  But Hurst’s own account
misquotes Chanda’s quotation from Carter.  In Hurst’s citation, Carter uses the term,
“Chinese border invasion,” rather than the correct language from Chanda: “Chinese
border penetration.”  Hurst’s claim of neutrality and balance on behalf of the
administration is thus suspect.  Clearly, an all out Vietnamese “invasion” is constructed
as more dire, and as a precursor to, the more benign “penetration” of the Chinese.  Hurst
also takes Chanda to task for misreading other statements by the White House, a result,
he claims, of Chanda “misunderstanding the dynamics” of the administration.347  While
Hurst focuses on the public statements of the administration, a function of his
methodology, he fails to pay sufficient attention to the actions, or lack thereof, of the U.S.
during the escalating war in Southeast Asia.  In the long run, Chanda’s version of events
is upheld, particularly when one moves beyond the limited scope of Hurst’s focus.  Like
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China and the Soviets, the United States expressed little interest in the actual situation in
Cambodia, continuing to use the nation, in Michael Haas’ analogy, as a superpower
“chessboard,” with the Vietnamese and Cambodian people as their pawns.
The Vietnamese Occupation
The Chinese forces withdrew from Northern Vietnam in March of 1979, leaving
in their wake a wide path of destruction, including tens of thousand dead on both sides.
The destruction in Vietnam went beyond casualties, however.  Government officials and
sources on the ground in the North estimated that close to a million people had been
“displaced” as a result of the attack, and 85,000 hectares of badly-needed rice fields had
been destroyed, along with several hundred thousand cattle and water-buffalo. Bridges,
factories, farms, and mineral mines were also destroyed and crippled by the invasion.
Although the destruction wrought by the Chinese dealt a severe blow to an already weak
Vietnamese infrastructure, it stopped short of dealing a fatal blow.  Attempting to
maintain the threat of another invasion, Beijing announced upon its withdrawal that it
“reserved the right” to “teach Vietnam another lesson.”348
If there was, indeed, a “lesson” taught to the Vietnamese by the Chinese invasion,
it remains unclear to this day what that lesson was. Although it caused further injury to an
already unstable Vietnamese economy and destroyed a large portion of the Northern
infrastructure, the invasion had absolutely no effect on the situation in Cambodia. If
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anything, it confirmed for the Vietnamese leadership what many already believed to be
true: that Vietnam was surrounded by hostile regimes and that China was bent on
destroying Vietnamese independence.  Nayan Chanda later wondered whether China had
not itself been the recipient of the lesson.  “Far from diverting troops from Cambodia,” he
wrote, “a cocky Vietnamese leadership did not even send regular troops to the border,
leaving the job instead to the militia and regional forces.”  Still, the Chinese were unable
to secure a victory, suffering similar losses and coming to the realization that its armed
forces were “not able to conduct a modern war.”349  Even so, the Vietnamese remained
convinced throughout the next several years that another round of military engagement
with China was inevitable.  The question in Hanoi was no longer if, but “how and when”
China would attack again.350
In Cambodia, the occupation continued unfettered by the events on Vietnam’s
northern border.  A United Nations report in 1979 acknowledged that although the
Cambodian people continued to suffer, given the horrors that preceded the occupation
“the Vietnamese army was and is still welcomed as the liberator of a nightmare.”351
While it was clearly not their primary goal invading Cambodia, the Vietnamese were
successful in halting the Cambodian genocide.  Unfortunately, this positive outcome
would be tempered by international concerns over Vietnamese designs on other
neighboring countries, particularly Thailand, and the ongoing suffering of the Cambodian
people.  There is little question that the majority of Cambodian citizens were better off
                                                 
349 Chanda, Brother Enemy, 361.
350 Heibert, “Waiting in Ruins for the Next Installment.”
351 Quoted in Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 116.
211
under Vietnamese rule than they had been under the previous regime, a host of new
problems quickly emerged.  When the Vietnamese removed Pol Pot from power, the
Cambodian people, who had suffered under the Khmer Rouge for nearly four years, were
suddenly freed from the forced agricultural collectives, allowed to return to their homes
and search for their families.  This newfound freedom, however, masked the harsh reality
that the occupation would bring.  With the almost instant abandonment of agricultural
production, the famine would only get worse.  Most of the entire 1979 crop was lost.352
Mass starvation, accompanied by death on an unfathomable scale was sadly nothing new
to Cambodians, but the Vietnamese invasion had ironically brought the suffering of the
Cambodian people to the attention of the western world, including the United States
government.
In the fall of 1979, a delegation from the U.S. Senate visited the vast refugee
camps along the Thai-Cambodian border to witness the devastation first-hand.  They
informed the governing authorities that their interests were purely humanitarian, stressing
that they “were not interested in political considerations.”353  The politics of food were
inextricably tied to the politics of regime recognition during the occupation, which meant
that the Cambodian people would once again be held hostage by geopolitical
considerations.  To provide food through Phnom Penh was seen by some as a boon to the
Vietnamese-backed regime; to run the food through Thailand into the refugee camps
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would also provide aid to the Khmer Rouge forces that had made the camps their base.354
The leadership in Hanoi and Phnom Penh were deeply suspicious of aid, and were
unwilling to have it funneled through the Thai border area.  They suspected—rightly, as it
turned out—that food-based aid would easily turn into financial and military aid to the
Khmer Rouge resistance.  In Cambodia in the late 1970s and 1980s, food was power, and
it was, as one U.S. Senator put it, “being used as a weapon by all factions.”355
Although rightly suspicious of some Western aid overtures, the Vietnamese
leadership did play a shameful role in obstructing humanitarian aid during the
occupation.  Aside from other abominable practices, such as the development of
Vietnamese settlements, much like the Israeli settlements on the West Bank, inside
Cambodian territory, the Vietnamese and Soviets alike regularly denied the possibility of
widespread starvation and famine in the initial years of occupation.356  Refugees,
reporters, and aid workers regularly accused the Vietnamese-led forces of using
starvation as a political and military tactic to consolidate their hold on the countryside.357
Moreover, while the Cambodian people starved, they were nevertheless forced to send
both rice and fish to feed Vietnamese citizens.358
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Policies such as these certainly did little to assuage criticism of Vietnam’s
occupation.  While one could certainly make the case that the invasion was partially
justified by the incessant provocations of the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese had once
again failed to accurately gauge the tide of opinion in the international arena.  As
Elizabeth Becker wrote, “While it is clear Cambodia started the border war with
Vietnam, it is less obvious why Vietnam interpreted that challenge as an invitation to
invade and occupy Cambodia.”  As her account, and others, make clear, a complex
mixture of socio-historical and political reasons can, in part, explain the invasion and
occupation, but the longer the Vietnamese occupation went on, the more obscured those
reasons became.  By the beginning of the 1980s, the cultural and historical memory about
Southeast Asia had been as radically altered as its real political situation.
Once the victims of a cruel and unjustified war of unprovoked aggression,
Vietnam was now derided as the aggressor, confirming to many long-time critics that
Hanoi was bent on dominating all of Southeast Asia.  Whereas a year earlier, Douglas
Pike testified to Congress that the Vietnamese were in a particularly difficult position
with few good options available, he was now ascribing blame to the Vietnamese for the
entire Third Indochina War.  “Vietnam’s war with Cambodia and takeover of Laos,” he
wrote in a June, 1979, report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “triggered
hostile Chinese behavior, which caused Vietnam and the U.S.S.R to move closer
together, which caused concern in Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States.”359  A
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year earlier, several members of Congress had largely agreed with Pike that ridding the
world of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge would, at least, be a beneficial outcome of a
Vietnamese-sponsored revolution in Cambodia.  A year into the Vietnamese occupation,
though, Congress debated largely as if the Khmer Rouge was no longer an issue and the
sole goal of policy should be to remove the Vietnamese from Cambodia.
The invasion and occupation also succeeded in obscuring the horrors of the
Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia.  In Southeast Asia, Vietnam was now viewed by its
neighbors “with revulsion,” “a country which has installed its own puppet regime, an
action which completely overshadows the fact that the Pol Pot regime was one of the
most despicable ever to reign in Asia.”360  Shortly after the Vietnamese invasion, the
same Thai government against which the Khmer Rouge had spent several years launching
unprovoked attacks offered the KR Foreign Minister Ieng Sary an armed escort to secure
his passage to a United Nations meeting.  William Shawcross offered a particularly vivid
description of the event:
In a first-class cabin, being plied with champagne, went the man who, until a few
days earlier had been reviled as a leader of one of the most vicious regimes in the
world—a regime, moreover, that prided itself on abjuring most of the world.
Until now the Khmer Rouge leadership had been mass murderers.  Now they were
also a government that had been overthrown by a regime seen as a surrogate of
the Soviet Union.361
This erasure of the Khmer Rouge’s program of auto-genocide spread across the globe as
the Vietnamese occupation lengthened.  “Much of the world—not just the Western World
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and ASEAN,” Shawcross wrote, “has chosen to see the Khmer Rouge first as the
defenders of national sovereignty rather than as the perpetuators of massive crimes
against man.”362
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam
had the effect of internationalizing what many nations, including the United States, had
wished to relegate to a regional conflict.  The United Nations became, in the 1980s, a
battleground for the future of Cambodia and, by extension, for Vietnam as well.  For
most of the world’s nations, nearly all of which had established relations with Vietnam
and many of whom had recognized the Khmer Rouge as well, the situation required a
new approach that recognized the complexity of the situation.  For the United States, the
Cambodian question was still framed through the lens established by the last several
years of relations and negotiations with Vietnam: whether or not, in order to get what it
wanted from Vietnam, it would be better for the United States to recognize Vietnam and
have a political and economic presence in Hanoi to exert leverage on Vietnamese policy,
or whether it was best to isolate Vietnam on all fronts, using normalization as a delayed
reward for Vietnamese actions and policies that pleased Washington.  Although the
situation in Southeast Asia had radically changed since the American withdrawal from
Vietnam, U.S. policy would remain the same: an aggressive, hostile program that sought
to isolate Vietnam politically, economically, and diplomatically.  The difference was that
throughout most of the 1970s, the United States was only prolonging its own private war
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against Vietnam.  In the 1980s, it would be contributing to the prolongation of a major
regional, and potentially global, conflict.  The bleeding of Vietnam in the 1980s did not
just drain Hanoi; it also contributed to the long, sad, and violent history of Cambodia,
adding more blood to what came to be known as “The Killing Fields.”
Bleeding Vietnam
The primary diplomatic battle over the Third Indochina War revolved around an
issue that was, at one level, largely symbolic, and, at another level, of the utmost political
significance: which regime would be seated as the Cambodian delegation to the United
Nations.  The United Nations had already spent time debating the situation in Cambodia
after the Vietnamese and Chinese invasions.  In the Security Council and the General
Assembly, the Vietnamese and their allies in the Soviet-led bloc initially argued for the
U.N. to leave the situation alone while the Chinese drafted a Security Council resolution
calling for United Nations intervention. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, however,
the Soviets drafted a new resolution calling for the withdrawal of Chinese troops and the
payment of reparations to Vietnam.  Deadlocked by mutual vetoes and a divided Security
Council, no progress was made in either direction.363
The issue of seating the Cambodian delegation was a far more complicated issue,
for it forced nations either to take sides in the war or remain staunchly neutral.  The
Vietnamese had been attempting to guide the international acceptance of the PRK since
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the fall of Phnom Penh, but only the Soviet Bloc and a few members of the non-aligned
movement had formally recognized the Heng Samrin regime.  In September of 1979, the
United Nations for the first time took up the issue of the seating the PRK regime in place
of the Khmer Rouge delegation.  The efforts were no more successful than previous
attempts at recognition in other arenas, such as ASEAN. The United Nation Credentials
Committee, on which a United States representative sat, would be the first to weigh in the
matter, by voting on a recommendation to the General Assembly for a vote later in the
month.
Thus the United States, still smarting a bit from the embarrassment of the Chinese
invasion that followed so closely upon the heels of normalization between the two
nations, was placed in yet another awkward situation, forced to choose, effectively,
between Vietnam, the nation it had spurned, ignored, and punished over the past several
years, and the Khmer Rouge, the group that over a year earlier President Carter labeled
“the worst violator of human rights in the world today.”364  The United States had four
voting options available: it could vote in favor of the Vietnamese-led PRK, which would
certainly anger the Chinese and the ASEAN nations, all of which had been vocal in their
opposition to the Vietnamese occupation; it could vote to seat the Khmer Rouge, which
would demonstrate support for the China/ASEAN position, but also signify support for
the murderous regime; it could vote to leave the seat empty until such time as the
situation in Cambodia was resolved, a stance seen by many as lending legitimacy to the
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Vietnamese occupation and leaving the Cambodian people without representation;
finally, the United States could abstain from the vote, which would have likely displeased
both ASEAN and China, but which would have lent credence to the Carter
administration’s supposed stance of neutrality on the issue.
Secretary of State Vance, as Nayan Chanda would later report, was “agonized” by
the decision, but ultimately joined Brzezinski in recommending that the U.S. vote to seat
the Pol Pot regime as the representative of the Cambodian people in the United
Nations.365  The Credentials Committee agreed, voting 6-3 to recommend to the General
Assembly that it accept the DK regime as the legitimate government of Cambodia, which
the assembly did on September 21 by a vote of 71-35 with 34 abstentions.  The United
States again cast its vote in favor of the Khmer Rouge, a vote, as Chanda wrote, that
“linked U.S. support to a murderous group with whom U.S. officials were forbidden to
shake hands.”366
A week after the U.N. vote, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke appeared at a
Senate hearing about the situation in Southeast Asia.  Although the hearings were
ostensibly about the refugee crisis, the subcommittee members inquired about other
matters, including the administration’s vote to support the Khmer Rouge delegation.
Chairman John Glenn asked why the U.S. did not abstain from the vote, inferring that
“we indicated by our vote that we supported Pol Pot at the United Nations, and that sort
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of flies in the face of our human rights emphasis around the rest of the world.”367
Holbrooke responded that an abstention would have meant
a public break with the policies of that we, the ASEAN countries, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, and the People’s Republic, have all followed in regard to
the representation question.  The costs of that would have been very great for our
foreign policy.  At the same time, we felt that any vote should not be
misunderstood as implying any sort of support for Pol Pot.  Therefore, our
delegates in New York were instructed to deliver what some people described as a
clothespin vote—you hold your nose and vote.  We were voting only for the claim
of this delegation to sit for Kampuchea at this time.  We made it clear again and
again that this regime is not acceptable to us or to the (Khmer) people, and that
we will not recognize it or have anything to do with it.368
A vote for abstention, Holbrooke concluded, “would have put us on the side of Moscow
and Vietnam.”369
The position of the Carter administration regarding the issue of U.N.
representation for Cambodia was thus not a departure of policy at all.  Having, for the
past four years, refused to “recognize” Vietnam in its own rights, the administration was
certainly not about to recognize what was clearly viewed as a Vietnamese puppet regime
in Cambodia.  Moreover, as it had for the past several years, the White House and
Congress refused to move toward policies that would, even at a secondary level, indicate
even the most minute acceptance of the Vietnamese.  Holbrooke’s statement that the
Khmer Rouge regime “is not acceptable to us,” and that “we will not recognize it or have
anything to do with it,” could easily be confused with the government’s stance toward
Vietnam.
                                                 




The following year, Holbrooke once again appeared before a congressional
committee to update them on the status of the Cambodian situation.  The focus of the
discussion remained on the refugee issue, but the hearings also dealt with military and
political developments.  The opening statement of the hearings, by Senator John Glenn,
indicated the U.S. government’s overriding perception of the situation: that Vietnam’s
invasion and occupation was one of three “separate but interrelated dangers” threatening
the region.  The second was “the turmoil and upheavals” the invasion had caused to the
agricultural system, which were leading to widespread famine.  The third danger was
“Vietnam’s harsh policies and conflict with China” that had led to the refugee crisis.370
Conspicuous in its absence from this list of dangers was the danger posed by the return to
power of the Khmer Rouge, who continued to use the refugee camps along the Thai
border as a base camp for much of their activity.
This view was essentially echoed by Holbrooke, who informed the committee that
the administration “would not oppose” a coalition government that included the Khmer
Rouge.  The problem, he pointed out, was that neither the Khmer Rouge regime nor the
Heng Samrin government were interested in a coalition government at the time. 371   The
administration’s belief, Holbrooke went on to explain, was that the DPK regime would
not survive without the maintenance of large numbers of occupying Vietnamese troops.
The Vietnamese-supported regime was only able to muster the support it had, he argued,
because of the lingering fear of the return of the Khmer Rouge; the “unifying symbol” of
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Pol Pot had been exploited by the Heng Samrin regime “to coalesce opposition to a
commonly hated foe.”372
The administration was arguing that the Vietnamese needed the Khmer Rouge as
an enemy to help consolidate their hold on Cambodia, the same way that the Khmer
Rouge had needed Vietnam as an external threat to help secure their revolutionary
program years earlier.  Ironically, the Vietnamese, although they had also issued
contradictory statements, had also stated on several occasions that their primary goal in
invading and occupying Cambodia was to remove their former allies, Pol Pot and his
regime, from power.  If any nation could be said to have “needed” the Khmer Rouge at
the time, it was China.  Certainly the United States was partially hamstrung by the moral
dilemma of de facto and overt support for the Khmer Rouge rather than what it would
later refer to as the “Non-Communist Resistance.”  Yet the United States, along with
China, ASEAN, and a large coalition of other nations, continued to view the Vietnamese,
not the Khmer Rouge as the primary threat to the stability of the region.  While the
presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops was certainly a continuation of the denial of
Cambodian self-determination that had been perpetuated by various superpowers and
client regimes, for several years, it was also at the beginning of the 1980s the only thing
standing between the Cambodian people and the return of the Khmer Rouge.
The rest of the hearings focused on the logistical difficulties of relief efforts in the
region, which was fairly appropriate given that such efforts would remain the only United
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States engagement with the Third Indochina War for the duration of the Carter
administration.  In fact, not much movement of any kind would take place in Cambodia,
as China and the Soviet Union continued to funnel millions of dollars into the region to
prolong the proxy war.  For the first several months of the Reagan administration, there
was little or no mention of the war at all.
In the summer of 1981, however, the administration was given its first
opportunity to confront the Cambodian question.  On the campaign trail the previous
year, Reagan had offered sharp criticisms of the Carter administration’s hypocrisy with
regard to the Khmer Rouge—decrying the regime as the “worst violator of human rights”
in the contemporary world while voting to seat its delegation at the United Nations.  In
July, at the first International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), the administration would
be forced to offer its own solution.  Instead, the conference demonstrated that Reagan
would simply continue the failed policies of the previous administration, attempting to
have it both ways, publicly offering empty denunciations of the same murderous regime
that it continued to support through its diplomacy.
The Khmer Rouge leadership had made for strange bedfellows with nearly any
government’s representatives, aside, perhaps, from the Chinese.  Certainly the spectacle
of even the strained alliance between DK representatives and Carter administration
officials, whose foreign policy rhetoric had been so consumed with issues of human
rights, was strange enough.  Perhaps the only thing stranger was the support of Reagan’s
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first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig who, a decade earlier had helped orchestrate the
American war on Cambodia from inside the Nixon White House.373  Nevertheless, when
the ICK came to New York that summer, Haig quietly helped to organize the
administration’s policy for Cambodia.
The conference had originally been proposed by the ASEAN nations, which had
begun to depart from the hard-line stance of China and the United States regarding
Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia.  China would not accede to the conference unless
the Khmer Rouge participated, however, and the Vietnamese remained unwilling to
negotiate that point, so the ICK began without three crucial nations and actors: The
Vietnamese, the Soviets, and Prince Nordoom Sihanouk, who viewed the event as a
“tribunal” aimed at condemning the Vietnamese rather than finding a political solution to
the war.374  Not to be deterred, the ASEAN delegates led the conference toward finding a
solution that would provide for the independence of Cambodia and the security of
Vietnam.  According to Nayan Chanda, the ASEAN declaration from the conference
noted that Vietnam had “legitimate concerns” about the stability of Cambodia and, in
Chanda’s words, “implicitly laid part of the blame for Vietnamese intervention on the
Khmer Rouge’s adventurism and China’s military presence in Cambodia.”375
The Chinese were unwilling to accept such language, and the conference
produced several sharp exchanges between the Chinese and various ASEAN contingents.
An ASEAN diplomat later told Chanda about one such encounter, between the United
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Nations ambassadors from Singapore and China.  The Cambodian ambassador, upset at
China’s defense of the Khmer Rouge, informed his Chinese counterpart that he knew “at
least as much of international law as you do, Mr. Ambassador, but law does not apply to
this barbarous bunch.”  “He then proceeded to detail the Khmer Rouge’s’ horrendous
record of four years,” Chanda recounted.  “Some of the Cambodians began to sob.”376
The ICK also helped clarify the significance of the decision to allow the Khmer Rouge to
retain the Cambodian seat at the United Nations.  At another session of the conference, a
Chinese representative asked an ASEAN representative, “How can you ask a legitimate
member of the United Nations to lay down its arms?  How can you impose an interim
government in the territory of a UN member that has been the victim of aggression?”377
Using the language of international law and cloaking their support of the Khmer
Rouge under the banner of the United Nations charter, the United States and China
succeeding in getting the ASEAN representatives to withdraw language that sought to
provide for the ultimate dismantling of the Khmer Rouge.  Gone, as a result of the
pressure from the U.S. and China, were provisions both for the disarming of the Khmer
Rouge and the establishment of an interim government following the Vietnamese
withdrawal.  The resulting declaration from the conference was a muddled, unclear call
for “appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order.”378
While it let China take the lead in supporting the Khmer Rouge, the United
States’ role in the conference was clear: in both word and deed, it had broken from its





stated position of supporting the ASEAN policy toward Cambodia and Vietnam in order
to placate the Chinese and vilify the Vietnamese.  The public gestures of the U.S.,
however, continued to express contempt for the Khmer Rouge, such as when Haig led a
walkout of the delegation when Ieng Sary addressed the conference.  “That bit of
theatrics made the front page of The New York Times,” an ASEAN delegate to the
conference later told Chanda, “but behind the scenes, they pressured us to accept the
Chinese position.”379  After the formal negotiations of the ICK wrapped up, the United
States delegation, including Haig, spent a good portion of that evening’s reception
dodging the advances of the Khmer Rouge delegates, who wished to thank the Americans
for supporting their cause.380
The United States’ support for the Khmer Rouge, first in the decision to support
their claim to the Cambodian seat at the United Nations and then in helping persuade
ASEAN representatives to the ICK that the regime should not be disarmed, was placed at
the center of several Congressional inquiries over the next several years.  Stephen Solarz,
a member of the U.S. delegation to the ICK, used his recent rise to Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs as an opportunity to probe and alter
American policy toward Cambodia.  His first hearing on the matter came only days after
the ICK had concluded.
In his opening statement, Solarz expressed his “disappointment” with the
American delegation’s “performance” at the conference, particularly its “acquiescence”
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to the final, muddled declaration.  “What is at stake,” he argued at the hearing,
is much more than simply getting Vietnam out of Cambodia.  What is at stake is
making it possible for the people of Cambodia to determine their own future
without fear that Pol Pot and his people will reimpose their authority over them by
force of arms… There can be little doubt that if the Khmer Rouge were not
disarmed, they would promptly march into Phnom Penh and undoubtedly proceed
to reimplement their policies of auto genocide.  That is something which I think
the United States cannot acquiesce in or permit.381
Over the course of this hearing and those that followed, Solarz continued his passionate
attempts to provide for the possibility of a Cambodia free from Vietnam and the Khmer
Rouge, a goal toward which the Reagan Administration, and most other members of
Congress, had little interest in actively working.  Yet, beginning with this hearing, the
positions of Solarz and the White House would begin to coalesce in their search for an
elusive, “ Non-Communist resistance” force to battle the Vietnamese and prevent the
return of the Khmer Rouge.
This July, 1981 hearing featured Son Sann, the leader of the Khmer People’s
National Liberation Front (KPNLF).  After assailing the Vietnamese for their invasion
and occupation, Sann pleaded with the committee to provide “sufficient and efficient
support for his movement.”382  He acknowledged that there would be nothing to stop the
return of a well-armed Khmer Rouge after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, but the
“real solution,” was not to disarm the various factions vying for control of Cambodia, but
rather “to give the nationalists the things necessary to stop the Khmer Rouge.”  “If, when
the Vietnamese troops withdraw, if the Khmer Rouge agree to disarm, we will disarm
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also,” Sann told the committee.  “If they do not want to disarm we will have the means to
stop them from coming back to power.”383
Several members of the committee took the opportunity to express their
discomfort at the recent U.S. actions in favor of the Khmer Rouge at the United Nations,
and asked Sann for his counsel on related future decisions.  Sann had little useful advice
for the committee, informing them that leaving the seat vacant would be “dangerous,”
even more so than continuing to support the Khmer Rouge delegation.  He left the
committee with the assurance that he was soon to meet with Prince Sihanouk in the hopes
of constructing at a unified nationalist front to serve as an alternative to both the Pol Pot
and Heng Samrin regimes.  Hopefully, he informed them, such an alternative would be in
place by that fall, when the next vote would take place on the Cambodian seat at the
United Nations.384  In September, however, the question was once again before the U.N.,
and no coalition was in place.  Once again, the majority of nations in the General
Assembly, including the United States, voted to seat the Khmer Rouge.
In the meantime, Solarz continued to troll for the possibility of a viable Non-
Communist Cambodian resistance force (NCR). In October of 1981, he held an
extensive, three-day set of hearings on “U.S. Policy Toward Indochina Since Vietnam’s
Occupation of Kampuchea.”385  The first round of hearings focused on the existence or
potential for the emergence of NCR forces in Vietnam or Cambodia.  Testifying were
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two Vietnamese expatriates—Truong Nhu Tang, a former member of the National
Liberation Front for South Vietnam, and Doan Van Thai, author of a book on “the
Vietnamese Gulag”—David Elliot, a Southeast Asian specialist formerly of the RAND
corporation, and Douglas Pike.  Tang and Thai attempted to convince the committee,
without a shred of evidence, that the vast majority of the Vietnamese people were ready
and willing to take up arms against their own government and “its master—the Soviet
Union.”  Tang, who went on to write a successful book, A Viet Cong Memoir, informed
representatives that as a former leader of “the present regime of Vietnam,” he was certain
“that over 90 percent of the Vietnamese people desire to fight against the present regime
and Soviet intervention.”386  Thai echoed both the sentiment and the statistic—ninety
percent of the Vietnamese people allied against their government—in his remarks.
There was, of course, no such level of support for another revolution in Vietnam,
which became clear as the hearing went on.  When Solarz queried Elliot and Pike on the
“prospects for a viable, non-Communist, indigenous resistance movement,” in either
Vietnam or Cambodia, both responded that the prospects were “bleak.”387  Returning to
Tang, Solarz once again asked for his assessment of the possibility for such forces to
develop.  Backing off from his earlier statements, Tang acknowledged that although there
was actually no current movement, he was “convinced that in time the people will rise to
overthrow the regime.”  “This passive resistance,” he argued, “is now turning into armed
political violence,” but offered no evidence of such a transformation.388  If Solarz was





hoping to uncover a viable Third Force in Southeast Asia, clearly he was going to be
disappointed.
As these hearings went on the following week, similar testimony emerged from
other witnesses who reinforce much of what the committee already knew: that Vietnam
would not invade Thailand, that the Soviet presence in Vietnam and Laos was growing,
and that there was no viable NCR in the region.  Aside from the occasional callous
remark, such as Representative Henry Hyde’s statement on October 21 that the United
States should be “pleased that the Soviets and the Chinese are glaring at each other” in a
proxy war in Southeast Asia rather than funneling those resources into “Western
Europe,” the hearings went off without much excitement or revelation until the final day,
when Solarz sparred with Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge.
Solarz began by pressing Holdridge on why the U.S. should not offer the
possibility of normalizing relations with Vietnam should Hanoi remove its troops from
Cambodia.  “[I]f the policy is ultimately going to work,” Solarz offered, “it has to include
carrots as well as sticks.”389  As Holdridge went on to explain, the position of the White
House was that “the Vietnamese have taken whatever carrots have been offered them and
then proceeded right along the same lines without any basic adjustments.”  This problem,
he argued, dated at least back to the failure of Hanoi to abide by the terms of the 1973
Paris Accords.390  Ignoring the number of gestures toward normalization by the
Vietnamese over the years and the far more notable intransigence of the United States,




Holdridge noted that the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was not the only
obstacle to normalization.  Along with the always at-the-ready MIA/POW issue, the
Reagan administration adopted the updated policy of withholding normalization as long
as Vietnam “generally remains a menace to other countries of the region.”391  Although
he insisted that this was not a new policy at all, it was clearly new language, and it serves
as useful evidence against later statements that normalization was far from a given
regardless of the situation in Cambodia.
The more immediate question was about United States assistance to indigenous
Cambodian resistance movements.  Although the White House had denied any
knowledge of funding of the NCR forces in the region, the increasing discussion of what
would come to be called the Reagan Doctrine—funding anti-communist “freedom
fighters” throughout the developing world—lent credence to the possibility of arming
various factions in the Third Indochina War.  Solarz, who was clearly interested in such a
proposal, was nevertheless concerned that the Reagan administration had already begun
planning covert operations to anti-Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia.
Solarz: Mr. Secretary, are we considering providing military assistance, directly
or indirectly, to any of the resistance movements in Indochina?
Holdridge: No.
Solarz: Not in Cambodia?
Holdridge: Not in Cambodia.
Solarz: In Laos?






Solarz: Then what did you mean in your statement on the trip with Secretary
Haig, that we had to put diplomatic, economic, and I think yes, even military
pressure on the Vietnamese?
Holdridge: That was a collective “we,” Mr. Chairman.  I wasn’t talking about the
United States… If there is military pressure being exerted, that is for others to
do.392
The issue of military aid to any nation of Southeast Asia had remained a loaded one since
the American withdrawal from Vietnam, as had the balance between the roles of the
Executive and Legislative branches of government in formulating and implementing
foreign policy.  Although many in Congress, Solarz included, were pressing for some
type of aid program for some type of Cambodian resistance, they were also apprehensive
about the White House acting on such issues without congressional approval.
A year later, in the fall of 1982, the situation in Cambodia had changed, if not
substantially.  The Vietnamese remained in occupation, and the war was still a stalemate,
but a coalition, which China and ASEAN had been increasingly pushing for, had finally
been established.  The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK),
announced in the spring of 1982, included Son Sann’s KPNLF and featured Sihanouk as
a cabinet leader and public face, but there was little question about which group was in
charge of the group.  The Khmer Rouge faction, by far the largest and best equipped of
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the three primary member movements, was the force behind the CGDK.393
Even with this understanding, the CGDK made an initial impact on Hanoi, who
ceased challenging the Cambodian delegation at the United Nations after 1982.  By the
time Solarz held his last hearing on the question of the U.N. seat, the focus of American
policymaking had clearly shifted to the question of supporting, and possibly arming, the
NCR.  In the October, 1982 hearings, Solarz and Holdridge again sparred over the
question of Cambodian representation at the United Nations, but saved most of their
discussion for the relative viability of the NCR in Cambodia and to what extent the
United States was supporting that coalition.  Holdridge testified that the United States
was not providing any military assistance to the KPNLF at that point, but was less clear
in response to Solarz’ question about more general economic assistance:
We are providing humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps along the border.
We are helping feed the Kampucheans who are in the camps whether astride the
border or on the Thai side.  We are also providing medical assistance, food,
clothing, and so on.  As I say, we are carefully watching ASEAN, we are
considering how we will be of further help.  This will not in any event be military
assistance.  We will not provide assistance of any kind to the Khmer Rouge.394
As Solarz well knew, however, the Khmer Rouge controlled many of the refugee camps,
so a significant amount of international aid flowing through the camps was, in effect,
helping to replenish those forces.  Solarz pushed Holdridge on this question, accusing
him of being unresponsive and avoiding difficult questions.
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Holdridge: I am trying to answer the question as best I can.  We do not have a
program of assisting the Khmer Rouge.  We make refugee supplies available to
the international organizations.  They in turn distribute them to women and
children, some of whom are in camps which are controlled by the Khmer Rouge.
Would you prefer the international organizations not to give any aid to women
and children?
Solarz: If they are in camps controlled by the Khmer Rouge, my answer would be
yes.395
Solarz went on to suggest that the United States encourage and, where possible, direct the
International relief organizations working in the camps to focus on providing aid to
camps controlled by the KPNLF, a recommendation that Holdridge rejected as “playing
life and death” with the refugees.396  The hearings went on to solicit opinions on these
matters from others, including a representative of the KPNLF and a member of an
American-based Christian relief organization working in Cambodia, but few offered any
evidence that would change Solarz’ mind about the current situation in Cambodia.
Solarz’ comments throughout the series of hearings he chaired in the early years
of the Reagan administration revealed not only his concern for the people of Southeast
Asia, but his growing concerns the direction of the Reagan administration’s foreign
policy.  As it turns out, Solarz was right to be suspicious of the activities of the White
House.  Although he was clearly not aware of it at the time, the Reagan administration
had already begun covert funding of the KPNLF to wage a war of resistance against the
Vietnamese occupation.  Quietly, invisible to the American public, the American War on




Vietnam had entered a more active phase.  Moving beyond the political and economic
warfare of the late 1970s, the United States thus began to actively wage a proxy war
against Vietnam during the 1980s.
The Reagan Doctrine and the Khmer Rouge
Unlike the Carter administration, which maintained a stance—in word if not in
deed—of neutrality toward the situation in Southeast Asia, the Reagan administration had
fewer qualms about providing aid to the Khmer Rouge-led “coalition” in Cambodia.  As
Christopher Brady argues in his study, United States Foreign Policy Toward Cambodia,
1977-1992, the administration’s vision of the Third Indochina War fit perfectly the
world-view promoted by the Reagan White House: an expansionist Soviet empire was
actively promoting revolution around the globe and had to be turned back.397
In spite of this world-view, for the first several years of his administration,
Reagan failed to articulate a clear vision of foreign policy, particularly with regard to
Southeast Asia.  While the White House continued to support the seating of the Khmer
Rouge delegation at the United Nations, it publicly refused to offer any aid commitment
aid—military or otherwise—to the KPNLF.  Behind the scenes, however, the United
States had already begun covert funding to the Khmer Rouge-dominated group.  In 1985,
as Congress was debating a substantial increase in foreign aid to anti-communist
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insurgencies around the world, The Washington Post revealed that the KPLNF had been
receiving American funds since at least 1982.  The story, by Charles Babcock and Bob
Woodward, revealed that “millions of dollars” over several years had been funneled to
the group through Thailand.398  On the day that the story ran, Stephen Solarz’ office
released a statement to the press saying that he would not comment on intelligence
matters, but that he remained “fully committed to [his] initiative to provide assistance for
the non-Communist Cambodian resistance groups… As is the case in Afghanistan, I am
convinced that such assistance… is in the American interests.”399  Later investigations,
including one conducted by Australian filmmaker and journalist John Pilger revealed that
U.S. aid to the Cambodian “resistance,” including the Khmer Rouge, actually predated
the Reagan administration, stretching back to 1980.400
CIA sources for the article insisted that the aid had not been reaching the Khmer
Rouge, but other anonymous sources acknowledged the hollowness of this claim, and the
larger dilemmas posed by the policy.  To begin with, they noted, any additional aid from
the United States freed up other sources for military aid, rendering the distinction
between “lethal” and “non-lethal” aid irrelevant.  Furthermore, several of those involved
in the program recognized that their attempt to strengthen the “non-Communist” elements
of the coalition was unlikely to succeed.  One “informed source” told the authors, “if the
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coalition wins, the Khmer Rouge will eat the others alive.”401  The goal of the United
States, however, was never a “victory” for the KPNLF.  Rather, as became clear during
the mid-1980s, the goal of the United States was to “bleed Vietnam white” on the fields
of Cambodia, much as it had bleeding Vietnam economically and diplomatically for the
decade since it withdrew its forces.
Supporters of this policy, from congressmen like Solarz to various administration
officials, reiterated this goal often.  Paul Wolfowitz, then a Deputy Secretary of State for
Asian and Pacific Affairs, told the House Appropriations Committee in 1985 that the goal
for the KPNLF was “definitely not a military victory and no one is deluded enough to
think the Vietnamese are going to be beaten militarily.”402  Solarz echoed these
statements months later in a response to a New York Times op-ed criticizing his support
of the Cambodian resistance.  The purpose in providing overt aid to the KPNLF, Solarz
wrote, was not “to win a war,” as the previous piece argued.  “Not even the non-
Communist resistance groups believe it is possible to achieve military victory…. But
there is unlikely to be progress at the negotiating table unless Vietnam faces greater
difficulty on the battlefield.”403  With a decent majority in Congress supporting the goal
of aiding the KPNLF, the bleeding of Vietnam thus became policy.  With the full backing
of the White House, it would become part of a doctrine.
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While implicitly a part of U.S. policy since 1975, the overt, military bleeding of
Vietnam found a voice and larger purpose in the formulation of the “Reagan Doctrine” in
1985.  First declared in the 1985 State of the Union address and further articulated in
several addresses by various administration officials that year, the Reagan Doctrine was
basically a policy of supporting proxy wars around the world. As Mark Lagon asserts in
his study of the doctrine, “the Reagan administration declared that it reserved the right to
aid insurgent ‘freedom fighters’ against pro-Soviet regimes recently established in the
Third World.”404  Lagon’s study focuses on the implementation of the Doctrine in four
scenarios: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia.  Unfortunately, like many
books concerned with international relations theory, Lagon’s study privileges theory over
the historical realities of those various conflicts.  Thus, the specificities of Southeast Asia,
for instance, are of far less concern for Lagon than the relationship between the Reagan
Doctrine and realism or idealism in foreign policy.  In discussing the situation in
Cambodia, Lagon argues that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia were “similar,” because they both involved “the overt invasion
and occupation of the country by a highly militarized neighbor,” ignoring the complex
differences between the situations, particularly the unprovoked attacks on Vietnam by the
Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1978.405  Other scholarly accounts replicate this
problem.  John Dumbrell’s study of U.S. foreign policy from the Carter to the Clinton
administrations argues that the policy “represented a commitment to a rather uncertain
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form of coercive diplomacy.”  The doctrine was rigidly applied in the form of “pure
militarism” in some areas, but was more “pragmatic” in others.406  When discussing
specific examples of the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine, however, Dumbrell
completely ignores Cambodia.  Only as an aside in his discussion of Afghanistan does
Dumbrell mention the “invidious position” taken by the United States, “helping to arm
the mass-murderous Khmer Rouge.”407
In these studies, as in U.S. Foreign Policy during the 1980s, Cambodia remained a
“sideshow,” just as it had during the American Wars in Southeast Asia a decade
earlier.408  Indeed, this was precisely the point of the Reagan Doctrine: to aid and abet
proxy insurgencies around the globe without the direct involvement of United States
forces; to bleed the target regimes slowly and painfully rather than a swift military
victory.  As a Newsweek article on the put it in late 1985, “ the Reagan doctrine is a
policy of harassing the Soviets on peripheral battlefields—and of doing it on the cheap,
without any commitment of U.S. forces.”409  Because of the lack of direct U.S.
involvement, the policy was acceptable to a wide audience and solicited little reaction,
positive or negative, from the American public.  The wars waged under the mantra of the
Reagan doctrine were not meant to be covert; they were publicly defended and justified
by the White House and its Congressional allies.  But neither were they meant to be
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public war.  Painless, cost effective, and invisible to the American public: They were
designed to be everything the American War in Vietnam was not.
The biggest problem with the government’s policy, however, was that it was still
embedded within the binary logic of the Cold War, imposing a Manichean “good and
evil” framework on a variety of nations, regions, and regimes, that often did not fit the
worldview of the Reagan Administration.  Under such a framework, it was possible for
many policymakers to turn a blind eye to the seedy coalitions within which the Reagan
Doctrine placed the United States.  Whether the formative elements of what would
become the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the murderous Khmer Rouge, the “allies” of the
United States during the 1980s were always of secondary interest to the struggle against
opposing, Soviet proxy forces.  Cambodia, in particular, was a place where simplistic
distinctions were exploded and where the lines were always blurred.  Whether between
humanitarian aid and development aid410, between the “non-Communist resistance” and
the Khmer Rouge, or between lethal and non-lethal aid, binary constructions of the issues
and actors involved could not explain away the exceedingly complex and muddled
alliances formed on the killing fields of Cambodia.  Also clearly on the periphery of
American foreign policy and public discourse, the situation in Cambodia would continue
to bear the footprint of the United States.
  In the summer of 1985, however, the revelation of American covert aid having
long been funneled to the Khmer Rouge cause little more than a brief distraction to
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foreign aid negotiations in Washington.  Whereas the revelations of covert funding being
directed to the Contra forces in Nicaragua would create a major scandal for the
administration the following year, the Cambodian aid situation was barely a blip on the
radar in 1985.  Although there are several reasons for the difference in reaction to the two
situations, the most significant was that Congressional leaders and the White House had
forged a relative consensus on the issue of aid to Cambodia by 1985, whereas most
Democrats in Congress, including Solarz, continued to oppose funding to anti-Sandinista
forces in Central America.  Solarz’ efforts were also bolstered by the 1984 release of The
Killing Fields, a film about the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge based on the real life
story of Dith Pran, a survivor of the Cambodian holocaust who had worked for the New
York Times during the American Wars in Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s.411  Pran
and Dr. Haing Ngor, the virulently anti-Communist actor who played Pran in the films,
became increasingly public figures in the United States, writing books, giving lectures,
and even testifying at Congressional hearings on the war in Cambodia.
Having long pushed for more funding to Cambodian resistance movements,
Solarz in the summer of 1985 won enough allies to secure funding to the KPNLF groups
during the appropriations for foreign aid for FY1986.  In the spring of 1985, Solarz began
a major lobbying effort for his amendment to the foreign aid bill that would provide
significant overt aid to the KPNLF.  In a letter to Dante Fascell, chair of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs
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William Ball informed the committee that the administration would support the
amendment, “as an important signal to Hanoi regarding Congressional and public
attitudes towards Vietnam’s illegal occupation of Cambodia and the threat it poses to its
neighbors.”412  Congress eventually passed the measure, including Solarz’ proposal.
Although the White House threatened to veto the final version of the bill because it did
not include enough military aid to other regions and countries, the funding was eventually
approved and the United States began overt funding of the Khmer Rouge-led KPNLF.
The Cambodian forces received $5 million, a third of the sum appropriated for the anti-
Soviet factions in Afghanistan.413  With triangulated support from all three major powers,
the war in Cambodia would remain mired in stalemate for several more years.
Stalemate by Proxy
Even by the remarkable standards of Cambodian-American relations, the extent to
which the Third Indochina War remained a sideshow in American society during the
1980s is remarkable.  Rendered invisible by the administration’s other wars, and by the
Iran-Contra scandal in particular, as well as the more general lack of concern about the
situation in Southeast Asia, the Third Indochina War dragged on and on in a proxy
stalemate.  By the end of the Reagan administration, the United States had been funding
the anti-Vietnamese forces, including the Khmer Rouge for the better part of a decade.
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The overt support for these forces, including the possibility that American aid was being
funneled to the Khmer Rouge, had been public knowledge since 1985, as was the
revelation that covert aid had been sent since 1982.  Neither the publicity surrounding
The Killing Fields nor the enormity of the Iran-Contra scandal succeeded in arousing the
American public’s ire over their government’s support of the Khmer Rouge.
Oddly, however, in the latter part of the decade, as the Vietnamese were finally
withdrawing their military forces from Cambodia, another round of hearings in Congress
and a series of news pieces focused on the problems encountered by the United States’
aid programs in Cambodia.  In fact, the attention given to the issue of U.S. aid in the
region received more attention from 1988-1990 than it had at any point since 1975.
In June and July of 1988, Solarz convened yet another round of hearings devoted
to the situation in Cambodia.  These hearings, more than any others discussed in this
chapter, demonstrate the deep contradictions of U.S. Policy toward Southeast Asia during
the 1980s.  The hearings were designed ostensibly to debate a joint resolution pending in
the House, authored by Chester Atkins of Massachusetts, calling for the United States,
“in cooperation with the international community,” to
use all means available to prevent a return to power of Pol Pot, the top echelon of
the Khmer Rouge, and their armed forces so that the Cambodian people might
genuinely be free to pursue self-determination without the specter of the coercion,
intimidation, and torture that are known elements of the Khmer Rouge
ideology.414
As the hearings made clear, however, the United States had no intention of backing up
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this sentiment.
Despite numerous statements to the contrary by representatives of the White
House as well as several congressional allies, it became clear during these sessions that a
lingering hostility toward the Vietnamese, rather than any concern for the nation or
people of Cambodia, was driving United States foreign relations.  After hearing
testimony from Dith Pran and Haing Ngor of Killing Fields fame, as well as Kitty
Dukakis, human rights activist and, at the time, wife of the Democratic Nominee for
President, Michael Dukakis, various administration officials appeared to discuss the
administration’s aims for Cambodia.  Deputy Secretary of State David Lambertson
expressed the administration’s “uncertainty” about the extent of the Vietnamese
withdrawal, arguing that the White House was simply following the ASEAN-led policy
of “isolating Vietnam economically and diplomatically.”  This was hardly ASEAN’s
policy, however.  Most ASEAN nations had resumed trade with Vietnam by the late
1980s, as had France and Japan, and all members of ASEAN had some scale of
diplomatic presence in Hanoi at the time.  Lambertson pressed his case, however,
claiming that the administration was determined to follow a policy of “’no trade, no aid,
and no normal relations’ except in the context of a political settlement and an end of
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia.”415  This policy, he continued, did not
reflect any lingering animus toward Vietnam resulting from the war.  They are not
a function of what Vietnam did in 1975, but of what it is doing right
now—occupying militarily a once sovereign neighbor.  The United States indeed
looks forward to the time when we will be able to resume normal relations with
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Vietnam.  We have made it clear that we in fact will be prepared to do so in the
context of an acceptable Cambodian settlement which provides for the withdrawal
of all Vietnamese forces.416
There is enough history rendered invisible by this statement that it is difficult to know
where to begin dissecting it.  Given the relations between the U.S. and Vietnam since
1975, it is difficult to accept the premise that the policy of “bleeding Vietnam white” is
not based on “lingering animus.”  As we have seen in previous chapters, the economic
and diplomatic war against Vietnam had begun long before the invasion and occupation
of Cambodia.  Rather, the invasion was simply the latest in a long series of justifications
used by various administrations to continue a hostile policy.  Furthermore, The United
States had never had, “normal relations” with Vietnam, so “resume” was at the very least
a poor choice of verb in that context.
What is most remarkable about Lambertson’s testimony, however, is that it all but
ignores the issue on which the hearings were supposed to focus: preventing the return to
power by the Khmer Rouge.  When Lambertson and other administration officials spoke
of an “acceptable settlement” in Cambodia, they focused their attention almost solely on
the issue of the Vietnamese withdrawal.   In his testimony, Karl Jackson, Deputy Defense
Secretary, argued even more strongly in favor of keeping the status quo policy toward
Vietnam.  Jackson claimed, without any evidence, that “the concerted Western diplomatic
and trade embargo” had been successful, and that the U.S. “should resist all moves to
normalize relations or to ease the trade embargo unless and until a satisfactory solution
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has been found to the Cambodian problem.”417  Like Lambertson, Jackson’s definition of
a “satisfactory” solution was unconcerned with the status of the Khmer Rouge forces.
Given the administration’s equivocations on the issue of the Khmer Rouge,
Solzarz pressed the witnesses under questioning.  It quickly became clear that the
administration was neither interested nor willing in pressing ASEAN nations or China to
take a stronger position on keeping the Khmer Rouge “controlled.”418  That the United
States was not particularly interested in the future of Cambodia was certainly not new,
but the degree of obstinacy on the administration’s part is worth noting, given the actual
situation in Cambodia.  Throughout the Third Indochina War, the administration had
made the argument that to take a hard line against the Khmer Rouge would be equivalent
to supporting the Vietnamese.  By the summer of 1988, however, the Vietnamese were
clearly in the process of ending their occupation.  Even if the some in Washington
remained “uncertain” about the scope and speed of the withdrawal, they admitted that the
process was well underway.  Thus, to push the international community, especially China
and U.S. allies in Southeastern Asia, for a more concrete stance on barring the Khmer
Rouge from returning to power or disrupting national elections, would not be seen in any
way as mollifying the Vietnamese.
The line from Hanoi had remained the same for several years: Vietnam would end
its occupation of Cambodia when the remnants of the Khmer Rouge had been eradicated
and there was no possibility of their return to power.  Although well along on their




withdrawal plans, the goal of eradicating the Khmer Rouge was not yet accomplished.
Largely because of aid from China and the United States, Pol Pot’s regime remained a
major force inside Cambodia.  Throughout the withdrawal, the Vietnamese continued to
demand that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from any political settlement, while China
continued to press strongly for the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge.  With the Vietnamese
clearly on their way out, all that remained was for the other players, particularly the
international superpowers that had been prolonging the bloody conflict for a decade, to
make a concerted effort to keep the Khmer Rouge from returning.
According to the testimony given at this hearing, both Congress and the White
House were in agreement that the Khmer Rouge should not be included in the political
settlement.  The representatives from the Reagan administration, however, told the
subcommittee that it was “very hard” to “describe certain scenarios” leading to the
exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from any negotiated settlement, even though a variety of
proposals had been made at the United Nations and by the Vietnamese.  This statement
was too much for Representative Atkins, the principal author of the resolution under
consideration, to take.  When it came time for his questions, he lambasted the
administration in an extended diatribe condemning the White House for failing to address
the moral dilemmas posed by U.S. involvement in Cambodia.  Christopher Brady
condensed and excerpted Atkins’ comments as follows:
I frankly want to express my anger at the policy which both of you [Lambertson
and Jackson] represent…. We have a policy that is obsessed with the Vietnamese
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withdrawal… But withdrawal is happening. We all know it… the real issue, the
fundamental issue is the Khmer Rouge and you both politely dance around what I
believe is one of the great fundamental moral questions of our time… And I think
we ought to look at our history in this region, because frankly, it is a history of not
wanting to know what was happening so that we could cover our moral backsides
after it happened.  It is a history of the strongest rhetoric accompanied by the most
timid actions… the U.S. is just not willing to go the distance on this issue.419
Atkins posed specific challenges and alternatives to the administration, arguing that there
were, in fact, concrete steps the U.S. could take to help prevent the return of the Khmer
Rouge.  To begin with, he argued, the administration should encourage the Thai
government to crack down on Khmer Rouge military operations originating within
Thailand’s borders. (Atkins stopped short of calling for an end to the U.S.’s own covert
operations in Thailand).  Furthermore, he claimed, the U.S. should step up pressure on
China and on Thailand to stop those nations’ aid programs to the Khmer Rouge.420  The
only response of the administration was that such pressures were “unrealistic,” and
unlikely to produce any real results.421
Despite the administration’s reluctance to take a strong stance against the return
of the Khmer Rouge, a law based on Atkins’ resolution was eventually passed by
Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in October of 1988.422  The law,
unsurprisingly, represented more of a symbolic gesture than a significant policy shift by
the United States with regard to Cambodia.  The administration continued to refuse calls
to pressure the Chinese and Thais to end their aid programs, and continued to ignore and
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isolate Vietnam.  From its decision to back the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, through the
International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981, and through a decade of warfare that
remained largely invisible to the American public and most of the Western world, the
United States substituted an absence of policy for a coherent approach to Southeast Asia.
In the fall of 1988, as yet another administration stood poised to take the reigns in
Washington, Vietnam and Cambodia continued to bleed.
The 1988 hearings about the situation in Cambodia did help to raise the public
profile of U.S. involvement in the region.  In October, The New York Times and The
Washington Post each ran a series of articles devoted to the role of the United States in
the Cambodian coalition.  At the center of much of this storm was the enigmatic Prince
Nordoom Sihanouk, whose complicated relationship with the United States stretched
back to the 1950s.  In Washington to visit the Reagan administration, Sihanouk told a
group at the Carnegie Endowment that reports of China’s recent decreases in aid to the
Prince’s forces and allies had not hurt the coalition, because they were still “getting some
weapons and ammunitions and equipment” from “some countries," although he initially
stopped short of claiming the United States was offering military assistance.  Later asked
to clarify his comments, however, Sihanouk said that administration officials has
promised political, diplomatic, and “material” aid to the non-Communist forces in
Cambodia, all of which, he insinuated, had already been long provided “via Thailand.”423
Two weeks later, the Post highlighted a serious scandal in the Cambodian aid
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program, revealing that over $3.5 million in covert funding to the anti-Vietnamese forces
has been embezzled by Thai military officers.  According to the reports, the 1988 budget
for the covert aid program—which it called “the least controversial and least known of
the Reagan administration’s secret operations—was around $12 million.  The Thai
scandal resulted in decrease in Congressional funding to the Cambodian program the
following year, from $12 to $8 million. 424  The Times ran a similar story a few days later,
echoing the claims made in the Post and reiterating similar claims about the popularity of
the program.  “Because the program is the least contentious of the Reagan
administration’s covert aid programs and compliments overt assistance of $3.5 million a
year approved by Congress in 1985, it has received little publicity over the years.”425
These articles are instructive for at least two reasons.  First, both stories maintain
the arbitrary distinction between “lethal” and “non-lethal” aid, relying on administration
assurances that it was only providing “non-lethal” aid to the coalition.  This distinction
has been a hallmark of policy debates about the Cambodian situation dating back to the
earliest Congressional hearings on the Khmer Rouge, and remained as hollow in 1988 as
it had in 1978.  Certainly when the coalition members were receiving non-lethal aid from
the United States, that freed up resources or allowed other allies and donors to provide
the weapons, or “lethal aid” that the forces required.  Secondly, the articles both mention
in passing that the covert aid program run by CIA operatives working on the Thailand-
Cambodia border was an uncontroversial program.  The Post’s claim that the Cambodian
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aid program was both the least controversial and the least known of the Reagan
Doctrine’s proxy wars begs the question of whether there is not some relationship
between the media’s complicity in silence about the situation in Cambodia and the
government’s role in prolonging that war as “uncontroversial.” The Times’ coverage goes
one step further in rendering that question irrelevant, claiming the program has received
such scant attention over the years because it was “the least contentious” of the many
proxy fights waged by the Reagan White House.  These statements defy logic as well as
the historical record; we know that even among the relative consensus that emerged
around U.S. policy toward Cambodia in the 1980s, there were significant differences in
the scope, scale, and target of aid to the anti-Vietnamese forces.  The circular logic
employed by these pieces seeks not only to justify the American role in prolonging the
Third Indochina War; it also implicitly exonerates the American press for their own role
in helping maintain the invisibility of that war and the American role in it.
Sideshow, Again
The contentiousness of U.S. policy towards Cambodia continued to be evident in
future hearings on the scope and style of American aid, particularly as the Bush
administration wavered on supporting a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge.  In a
series of Congressional hearings debating appropriations of overt and covert aid to the
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NCR, the same battles over indirect aid to the Khmer Rouge and their involvement in a
coalition government continued to be waged.426  In early 1990, these tensions came to a
head when ABC news aired a special news program, “From the Killing Fields.”  Hosted
by Peter Jennings, the report argued that the United States was aiding the return to power
of the Khmer Rouge by funneling aid to Sihanouk and his allies.  The special was
followed by a two hour “town meeting” on Cambodia, entitled “Beyond Vietnam.”  This
portion of the program included a live studio audience and a wide array of guests,
including important policymakers such as Richard Holbrooke and Stephen Solarz to
figures such as John McCain, William Westmoreland and Dith Pran.
The first segment of the program, the special report on U.S. aid to Cambodia,
featured interviews with Sihanouk, Deputy Secretary of State for the Bush administration
Richard Solomon, former CIA director William Colby, and Representative Chester
Atkins.  Sihanouk, as he had for several years, claimed that the United States was
supplying both lethal and non-lethal aid to his forces, an argument backed up by
interviews with aid workers on the ground in Cambodia.  When he confronted Solomon
with Sihanouk’s claims, Jennings asked the Secretary what the Bush administration
would do if they “found out” that the Non-Communist Resistance and the Khmer Rouge
were, as Sihanouk claimed, fighting “side by side” using American military aid.  In a
telling slip, Solomon responded that if the administration discovered “a violation of the
law, we would cut off arms,” although he had previously denied that the U.S. was
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supplying lethal aid to any forces in Cambodia.  Solomon quickly “corrected” himself,
saying, “I’m sorry.  I made a mistake there.  We do not supply any lethal assistance to the
non-Communists.”  Jennings was clearly not convinced of the administration’s line,
inferring throughout the program that the U.S. was simply turning a blind eye to what
was at the very least de facto acceptance aid being received by the Khmer Rouge.427
In the Town Hall segment of the program, the various figures assembled,
including several diplomats and politicians who were implicated by the ABC report,
responded.  Charles Pickering, the American representative to the U.N. said he was
“appalled” by the earlier program.  Solarz, equally offended, dismissed the charges,
noting that he “wrote the law” forbidding aid to the Khmer Rouge.428  Solarz, Pickering,
and others claimed that Sihanouk was simply “mistaken” or that he “misspoke” in his
statement about American military support.  The program gradually descended into chaos
from that point on, with various figures from the government brushing aside the charges
of complicity in Khmer Rouge designs on power and an array of other figures accusing
the U.S. of everything from direct military aid to Pol Pot to lending the Khmer Rouge
“moral legitimacy.”  Tellingly, despite Jennings’ best efforts to focus the debate on the
issues he framed in his report, the discussion shifted to questions of the United States’
relationship with Vietnam—whether or not to normalize relations and end the trade
embargo, and the status of American soldiers still listed as Missing in Action.  In the final
segment of the program, Jennings presented an aside about the legacies of U.S.
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involvement in Southeast Asia.  As the credits began to roll, a cacophony of shouting
voices continued to roar on the soundstage.  Lost in the chaos, the suffering of the
Cambodian people was once again quickly relegated to the background of the ongoing




 Redrawing the Terms of Battle, 1985-1989
Amid the ongoing tragedy in Cambodia and the decision of the United States to
maintain its policy of “bleeding” Vietnam, the spring of 1985 brought with it the ten-year
anniversary of the end of the Second Indochina War.  The occasion was marked in the
United States by official state department addresses, several academic symposia,
editorials and special sections in most major American papers, cover story retrospectives
in leading weekly news magazines, and numerous television reports.  In Vietnam, the
anniversary received less sustained attention.  Aside from a few official pronouncements
from the Party and the occasional flag-waving ceremony, the liberation of the South was
quietly commemorated in the North.  In the South itself, however, where the “ideological
and cultural” component of the Vietnamese revolution continued to lag, a major festival
was planned.
Although more than 1,000 Western journalists had applied for visas to cover the
events, the Vietnamese government was wary of allowing too much media coverage.429
The official reason for reticence was that the press corps might constitute a “security
risk.”  Hanoi, after all, was not on particularly good terms with the United States and
most of its allies at the time.  The Vietnamese government was also taken aback,
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however, at the interest in covering the events, particularly among the Americans whose
defeat they were celebrating.  “I’m not quite sure,” a media relations representative for
the government told Jonathan Alter of Newsweek, “why there is this great desire by you
Americans to relive this terrible defeat.”  Alter explained in his article that the reason, “of
course,” was “to learn from it.”430  As we will see, however, the occasion offered more of
an opportunity to contribute to rewriting the history of the war than to study it.  Even the
American media itself, Alter included, seemed surprised at the scope of the coverage.  All
three television networks devoted substantial airtime to the anniversary, with ABC and
NBC sending, at considerable cost, extensive crews to provide live satellite feeds from
Ho Chi Minh City.431
The coverage proved both difficult and disappointing.  ABC’s Nightline featured
a “debate” between Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger, the two men who once shared the
Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the shaky agreement to end the American involvement
in Vietnam.  Like that agreement, the 1985 broadcast that was a disaster, beset with
logistical and technical difficulties.  Mixed audio signals caused a cacophony of
overlapping voices, with host Ted Koppel, Tho, and his translator constantly speaking
over one another.  A frustrated Kissinger, who felt unable to break through the noise,
complained to the network, with which he had a consulting contract at the time, and
succeeded in extending the show ten minutes to allow him a proper “response.”432
NBC’s Today show had other problems.  Throughout the week, the morning show aired
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live segments from Ho Chi Minh City, where it was late in the evening.  During several
pieces, Vietnam’s legendary insects took aim at host Bryant Gumbel and his guests.  As
one review put it, “the huge TV lights attracted great hordes of winged creatures that
encircled and bombarded the anchorman.”433
Media critic Tom Shales reported in The Washington Post that most network
executives considered the coverage a complete technical and financial failure.  Many had
hoped for “a big story,” particularly “a break in the MIA story,” but decided midweek
that “no news” was being made.434  The fact that the anniversary itself turned out not to
be “newsworthy,” however, paled in comparison with the narrative constructed by Shales
in his review of the coverage.  After taking the networks to task for their shoddy reports,
he points out that the real problem with the entire effort was that the media missed “the
real” story:
One crucial thing that none of the network newsbobs seems willing to consider is
that by going to Vietnam, and with such a flurry, they missed the real Vietnam
story, which can be covered without leaving the United States.  This is where the
American soldiers who fought and survived are, this is where the government
officials who engineered the war are, and this is where the real scars are, as far as
American involvement is concerned.435
“The real Vietnam story,” as we will see shortly, was more than adequately covered by
the American press, which had no difficulty focusing its attention on the United States.
                                                 




Shales’ remarks, however, demonstrate the extent to which the boundaries of
narratives about the war and its legacies in American culture had already by 1985 been
drawn so as to exclude any consideration of Vietnam and the Vietnamese.  The “scars” of
“American involvement,” of course, are everywhere in Southeast Asia.  For every
American veteran of the war afflicted with cancer or other conditions related to the use of
chemical weapons by the United States during the war, there are thousands of
Vietnamese.  For every tragically amputated American veteran, there are thousands of
Vietnamese children left with deformities from the war itself, not to mention the ongoing
problem of unexploded ordinance throughout the Vietnamese countryside.  And certainly
in the spring of 1985, one needed look no further than Cambodia to see the most horrific
legacies of American involvement in the region.
The American War on Vietnam after 1975, however, rendered the Vietnamese
largely invisible, focusing attention instead on what Vietnam “did” to the United States
rather than on what the United States had done, and was continuing to do, to Southeast
Asia.  As we have seen in the previous chapters, the decade following the end of the war
was a period of considerable political and cultural work, with forces from diverse
segments of American culture battling the cultural memory of the war.  In this chapter, I
will continue to trace the cultural front of the American War on Vietnam, examining the
considerable success of the revisionist work done in American culture by the mid-1980s.
Whereas the first wave of Vietnam films, including The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse
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Now, examined here in chapter two, laid the groundwork for this revisionism of the early
1980s both by recasting the United States as the victim of a cruel and savage Asian nation
intent on holding America hostage and by erasing Vietnamese voices from the narrative
of the war, the second and third waves of films in the 1980s took a different tack.
Beginning with the POW/MIA films of the early 1980s, the terms of debate over
“Vietnam” in American culture, were completely redrawn.  The revenge fantasies of such
films as Uncommon Valor, MIA, and, most famously, Rambo, while lambasted by critics,
were embraced by American audiences.  Although the revisionism of films in this second
wave was far from harmless in its contributions to the solidification of the POW/MIA
myth and its further vilification of the Vietnamese, the real danger of these movies lay in
the way in which they altered the way in which many Americans thought, wrote, and
represented the war in Vietnam.  By creating their historically inverted view of the war,
the Rambo-style films of this period opened up the cultural space for the third wave of
American films about the war.  Critics and audiences alike praised this third wave,
defined by Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986), for its “realism.”  While undoubtedly more
“realistic” than Rambo, The Deer Hunter, or Apocalypse Now, Platoon in particular was
surrounded by a discourse of reality that moved beyond the conventions of American
films about the war.  The cultural transition in the United States from Rambo to Platoon,
which took place largely during the years 1985-1988, sparked a larger debate in
American culture about the history of the American war in Vietnam.  Against Rambo’s
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revisionism, Platoon’s “reality,” redrew the discursive boundaries about the cultural
memory of the war by focusing attention entirely on what “Vietnam did” to the United
States.
My goal in examining the construction of the “reality” of the American war in
Vietnam during the mid-1980s is not to argue that Platoon’s version of events, nor even
Rambo’s, is patently false or historically inaccurate.  Nor is it to argue that there is a
single historical reality to which these films, or their audiences, should subscribe.  Rather,
it is to reinforce the argument I am making throughout this project: that there is and has
been an ongoing battle in the United States over the cultural memory, and in that contest,
power matters.  The contest of stories in the public sphere436 is not played out on a level
field, but rather is structured by those with access to create and disseminate their stories.
Thus the 1980s witnessed a set of competing realities about the American War in
Vietnam, but in the debate structured by Oliver Stone’s Platoon and Sylvester Stallone’s
Rambo, any number of stories were left silent and invisible.  Most importantly for my
purposes here, any discussion of what the United States did, and was continuing to do, to
Vietnam and to all of Southeast Asia, was rendered outside debates about the reality of
the war.  In the last segment of this chapter, after discussing Rambo and Platoon, I show
how the fallout of the “reality” debate structured discussion of the war in another realm
of cultural production: comic books.  In The ‘Nam, a popular comic about the war, the
visions of Rambo and Platoon were combined to construct an even more problematic
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view of history.   By the end of the 1980s, I argue, discussions of the effects of the
American war on Vietnam had become focused exclusively on the United States.  The
texts of this period helped move American society from a sense of “mutual
destruction”—which at least implicitly acknowledged the existence of the
Vietnamese—to a “reality” in which the Vietnamese ceased to matter or, in some cases,
even exist.  After the restructuring of the debate by the texts examined here, it was not
uncommon to read or hear of the war in Vietnam that “in the end,” as the lead character
in Platoon put it, Americans “did not fight the enemy. We fought ourselves.”  Thus from
the ten-year anniversary of the end of the war, though Rambo, Platoon, and The ‘Nam,
the cultural front of the American war on Vietnam after achieved extraordinary success
after 1985, effectively erasing the Vietnamese from popular narratives of the war and
masking the ongoing effects of the war on the nations and people of Southeast Asia.
The Ten-Year Anniversary
In the United States, the anniversary of the “fall” of Saigon was an opportunity to
reflect on “the legacy of Vietnam,” as Newsweek put it, or, in the words of Time, “The
War That Went Wrong, The Lessons it Taught.”437  Like the other events marking the
period, these special issues, which appeared two weeks prior to the actual anniversary,
demonstrated the ongoing battle over the cultural memory of the war that had begun over
a decade earlier.  From the perspective of these news magazines, ten years removed from
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the end of the war, the focus of any retrospection would be on what the war did, and was
continuing to do to Americans.  When the Vietnamese were mentioned at all, they were
portrayed as corrupt ideologues and villains in the case of Party leaders, or as the helpless
victims of the “repressive” and “Stalinist” regime.
Newsweek’s take on the war from the vantage point of 1985 obsessed with what
Vietnam “did” to the United States, but began with an attack on the legacy of the
Vietnamese victory.  “The events of the past decade—the occupation of the boat people,
the dreary neo-Stalinist isolation of Vietnam today—have deflated the hopeful
expectations of those who saw Ho Chi Minh as the liberator of his country.”438  This
strategy of using the failures and shortcomings of the Vietnamese regime in support of a
revisionist history of the war, an increasingly common tactic in American culture by
1985, was normally coupled with the statement that unlike the Vietnamese, who were
clearly imperialists in disguise, the United States fought “a noble cause,” with “the best
intentions.” Newsweek was no exception:
A war fought with the best of intentions and the worst of results—a war in which,
unless one counts the hollow triumph of national liberation celebrated 10 years
ago this month in Saigon, there were no winners at all.439
While it is undoubtedly fair, as I argued in the previous chapter, to criticize the leadership
of Vietnam on a number of levels, only the most narrow-minded American view would
use such shortcomings in support of such a spurious argument.  Aside from the rubble of
history buried below any proclamation of American “good intentions” with regard to the
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war, the belief that the expulsion of the United States from Southeast Asia in 1975
constituted “the worst of results,” can only be sustained by the invisibility and silence of
the Vietnamese themselves.
Indeed, when, in a later piece, Newsweek’s reporters in Vietnam bothered to speak
with Vietnamese citizens, the editorial view was quickly destroyed.  Tony Clifton and
Ron Moreau, who traveled throughout the country during their visit, took note of the
roads paved by American intentions.  Praising the “benefits” of previous imperialists in
Vietnam, they wrote that, “The French left their language, their graceful colonial
architecture, even their excellent crusty bread.  The Chinese left their philosophy, their
tombs, their arts and their dragon temples.  But the Americans have left only rust.”440
When they spoke to the Vietnamese, however, they realized the legacies of the United
States occupation of the country consisted of more than the “rusty metal” once used by
the military and appropriated by the people of Vietnam as roofs for their homes.  A
professor at Can Tho University told them: “You gave us some very good roads, of
course, and you trained some of our best scientists and technicians.  But you also gave us
Agent Orange, social diseases, and more bombs than have been dropped on any other
country.”441
That piece, entitled, “A Wounded Land,” was a rare exception in the flood of
coverage that dominated the reporting of the anniversary in the American media.
Although it mistakenly noted that the “economic blockade” of Vietnam began only in
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1979 with the full-scale invasion of Cambodia, the essay stands out among the numerous
articles that focused on what the war did to American society.  By making the effort to
speak with a variety of Vietnamese citizens from around the country, the authors drew
praise from even as harsh a critic as Noam Chomsky.  Yet as Chomsky noted, the account
constituted only four of the magazine’s thirty-three devoted to the topic.442  For the most
part, he argued, the coverage of the anniversary ignored any discussion of the waging of
the war by the United States or the effects of the war on Southeast Asia.  “It is a classic
example of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark,” he wrote.
Time’s coverage was particularly myopic and reactionary.  “The war destroyed
many lives, American and Vietnamese.  But it did other damage: to American faith in
government and authority, for one thing.”  This lead article in the special issue did not
stop with equating the deaths of three million Vietnamese and 58,000 Americans, or the
actual, physical destruction of an entire nation with the symbolic trauma done to many
Americans’ “faith in government.”  The piece went on to place the blame for such
destruction to the United States squarely on Vietnam:
Charles de Gaulle called Vietnam “a rotten country,” and he was right in a
psychic as well as a physical sense.  Rotten, certainly for Americans.  Vietnam
took America’s energy and comparative innocence—a dangerous innocence,
perhaps—and bent it around so that the muzzle fired back in the nation’s face.
The war became America vs. America.443
In this confused construction, the prime mover of the war was not that the “muzzle” of
American “energy” and “innocence” was pointed at Vietnam in the first place, but rather
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that the Vietnamese caused the gun to backfire.  This view is reinforced by the title of the
special issue, “The War That Went Wrong;” no attention in this or other retrospectives
would focus on the origins of American involvement in Southeast Asia, leaving outside
the realm of acceptable debate whether or not the war was “wrong” in the first place.
Amazingly, in blaming the Vietnamese, Time denies the historical actors who expelled
the Americans from their country are denied the agency of their victory, as “the war
became America vs. America.”  In the end, Time argued, “Vietnam was a crisis of the
American identity,” and, even more offensive, “Vietnam may have been a
hallucination.”444   The erasure of the Vietnamese from the narrative of the war was thus
fully accomplished by the end of the essay, constructing the war as a completely
American event.  Whether dismissed as a “rotten country,” or a figment of the collective
American psyche, however, these constructions of Vietnam and the American War there
would pale in comparison to that offered by a film timed to coincide with the anniversary.
While Apocalypse Now had offered a vision of the war in Vietnam as a dark,
hallucinatory nightmare for the United States, the new vision of the war offered by
1985’s Rambo would provide a revenge fantasy that combined the view of Vietnam as a
rotten country with the desire to see the United States as the ongoing hostage of that war.
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Rewriting Reality: Rambo’s Revisionism
The early 1980s had witnessed the arrival of the second wave of American films
about the war.  These films, most notably First Blood (1982), Uncommon Valor (1983),
and Missing in Action (1984) looked and sounded completely different from the first
wave of films, discussed in chapter four.  These new films, which focused on the plight
of American veterans in the United States and those supposedly still being held in Hanoi,
were unapologetic in their revisionism.  They took the POW/MIA myth as fact, actually
returning to Southeast Asia in the case of Uncommon Valor and Missing in Action (which
produced several sequels), brandishing a hatred of the evil Asians who were holding their
buddies hostage alongside an equally virulent abhorrence of their own government,
which they felt continued to deny and cover-up the existence of the POWs.  The films
were also part of what several authors have referred to as a “neo-fascist aesthetic” in
American film, as evidenced in such other films as Red Dawn (1982), Conan the
Barbarian (1984), and Invasion U.S.A. (1985).445
The irony of the POW films is that they made, in part, the same argument that I
am making in this project: that the war with Vietnam continued after 1975, through the
1980s and 1990s.  Unfortunately, they, along with the entire POW/MIA industry,
inverted the roles of victim and aggressor, representing Americans as being held hostage
by the Vietnamese, rather than acknowledging that the Vietnamese people continued to
suffer as a result of the United States’ economic sanctions, diplomatic hostility, and
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military aid to the anti-Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia.  In fact, the films coincided
with several paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia undertaken in conjunction with the
Reagan administration.  As Bruce Franklin revealed in Mythmaking in America, the
strange alliance of Colonel Bo Gritz, a fervent believer in the POW cause, William
Shatner (of Star Trek fame), and Clint Eastwood, financed a 1982 covert mission into
Laos with the full knowledge of the President, who repeatedly told Eastwood that if the
team found one POW, he would “start World War Three” to get the rest out.446
The mission, as well as others supposedly directed by Gritz, turned up no
evidence of live American POW’s.  That task was left to Hollywood.  In both Uncommon
Valor and Missing in Action, the teams, led by Gene Hackman and Chuck Norris,
respectively, turn up dozens of POWs still being held in Southeast Asia.  Although
Uncommon Valor was more commercially successful, Missing in Action was more
influential in the genre, helping to pave the way for its own sequels and other POW
fantasies.  Central to the plot of Missing in Action and the films that would follow it was
the complete inversion of victimization, exonerating American soliders while
constructing the Vietnamese as cruel and savage criminals.  Franklin sums up this
strategy of historical inversion in M.I.A.:
Just as the POW issue was consciously created in 1969 amid shocking
revelations about U.S. conduct… Missing In Action uses the POW issue to
indoctrinate e audiences of the 1980s with the notions that American were not the
victimizers but the victims.  Those who have forgotten, or are too young to
remember, learn that all accusations of U.S. war crimes are merely insidious
Asian Communist propaganda designed to hide the crimes the Vietnamese are
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still perpetrating against innocent Americans.447
It may seem at first to be granting these action films too much power to suggest their
power as a force for historical revisionism.  As we will see, however, the inverted
discourse of victimization constructed in and through these films had implications far
beyond the movie screen.  Films such as Uncommon Valor and Missing in Action would
help to set the terms of debate for what types of stories about the American War in
Vietnam would be told to “post-Vietnam” generations of Americans.
None of these earlier films, though, would have the impact of 1985’s Rambo.
Timed to coincide with the ten-year anniversary of the end of the war, the pre-release
press for the film contained a video detailing the POW/MIA issue, hyping Rambo’s
connection to the myth of live prisoners being held in Hanoi.  A sequel to 1982’s First
Blood, a surprising box office success, Rambo revolves around the character of John
Rambo, a misunderstood and tortured American veteran of the war in Vietnam.  First
Blood had circulated for years in Hollywood, undergoing numerous plot changes and
casting characters.  In the body of rising superstar Sylvester Stallone, however, the
character became a veritable superhero in the 1980s, a cultural phenomenon that would
reshape the ways in which Americans told and discussed stories about the war in
Vietnam.448
The opening shot of Rambo reveals the prison labor camp in which Rambo
(Stallone) has spent the last several years since single-handedly destroying the town of
                                                 
447 Ibid., 149.
448 On the relationship of Stallone and his hypermasculine body to the politics of the
1980s, see Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America, and Jeffords, Hard Bodies.
268
Hope, Oregon, in First Blood.  Rambo’s former commander, Colonel Trautman arrives at
the prison, requesting that Rambo accompany him on a new mission: “Recon for POW’s
in ‘Nam.”  After hearing the details of the mission and agreeing to join Trautman, Rambo
asks the question for which the film became infamous: “Sir, do we get to win this time?”
“This time it’s up to you,” Trautman replies.
Unfortunately for Rambo, Trautman is not in charge of this mission.  Marshall
Murdoch, a Washington Bureaucrat working for a Congressional Committee, is leading
the team along with a group of mercenaries.  The Committee, Murdoch explains to
Rambo, is simply attempting to find evidence that will disprove any beliefs in live POWs
being held by the Vietnamese.  Rambo is only supposed to take photographs of the empty
camp, the very one in which he was held during the war.  “Under no circumstances,” he
is informed by Murdoch, “are you to engage the enemy.”
After being dropped in Vietnam from the base in Thailand, Rambo meets up with
Co Bao (played by Hawaiian actress Julia Nickson), his Vietnamese guide who speaks in
short choppy English.  As they move down the river toward the camp, escorted by
pirates, Rambo tells Co Bao his story about how when returned from Vietnam, he found
another war going on in the U.S., a “quiet war” against veterans.  Bao relates that she is
working against her own government because her father, an “intelligence officer” had
been killed.  When the mission is over, she tells Rambo, she would very much like to go
to America.
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When they arrive at the camp, Rambo defies his orders and, with Bao’s help,
infiltrates the camp, which is of course populated with a dozen American POWs.  He
easily kills and outmaneuvers several Vietnamese guards, all of whom appear even less
Vietnamese than Bao does.  He rescues one POW and brings him along to the extraction
point where he is to be picked up by Murdoch’s men.  Along the way, as they elude the
inept Vietnamese soldiers, the POW tells Rambo how timely his rescue was: “They move
us around a lot—to harvest crops.”  Thus the film’s first explanation for why the
Vietnamese would still be holding American soldiers: during a devastating famine and an
ongoing war with Cambodia, the Vietnamese need some help with their agricultural
production.  To help facilitate this, apparently, they repeatedly torture the men so that
they appear unwilling to do anything, much less harvest rice.
The plot thickens, however, when they reach the extraction point.  Rambo informs
Murdoch that he has an American POW with him, which leads Murdoch to abort the
mission, leaving Rambo and the man to be captured by the Vietnamese and returned to
the camp.  At the camp, the Vietnamese soldiers and their Russian “advisors” torture
Rambo.  The representation of the relationship between the Soviets and the Vietnamese
offers an accurate portrayal of the Reaganite, Cold Warrior worldview, in which the
incompetent and minute Asian subjects are merely the lackeys of the powerful and
forceful Russians.  The Soviets in Rambo seem to respect the Americans more than their
Vietnamese allies, whom they dismiss as “vulgar” and “lacking compassion.”  The film
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also refuses to move beyond Stallone’s, and Rambo’s own American-centric view,
refusing even to bother with such inconveniences as subtitles when languages other than
English are being spoken.  The leader of the Russian troops even gives his orders to the
Vietnamese in English.449  Clearly whatever the Vietnamese are saying is irrelevant, as
they are merely the Asian puppets of the Kremlin.
Rambo, however, is much less concerned with the Vietnamese as an enemy than it
is with the United States.  As the film argues, Rambo’s mission was never intended to
prove the existence of POWs.  The government, which the film ultimately shows to be
even more evil and corrupt than either the Russians or the Vietnamese, had no intention
of rescuing any POWs found by Rambo.  This is consistent both with the tone and
content of the POW/MIA myth, which strongly believed in a government-led cover up of
evidence confirming the existence of live POWs.  It is also consistent with domestic
Reaganism in general, which blamed government for the troubles of the country.
Trautman, angry at Murdoch for abandoning his man, tells him that he knows what the
cover up was really about: “Money.  In ’72, we were supposed to pay the Cong four and a
half billion dollars in war reparations.  We reneged. They kept the POWs.”  Murdoch
doesn’t dispute this story; he admits that the POWs were being held as ransom, but that
the alternatives to a cover-up were either “paying blackmail money,” that would end up
“financing the war effort against our [Cambodian] allies,” or, worse, “starting the war up
all over again” to save “a few forgotten ghosts.”  This is one version of the narrative of
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the war in Vietnam that seeks to erase the Vietnamese from the story.  The “Hand Behind
the Back Theory,” popularized during the war and canonized by authors such as Colonel
Harry Summers in his On Strategy, chalks up the United States’ loss at the hands of what
Henry Kissinger once called a “fourth rate power,” to a combination of failure of nerve
by bureaucrats or politicians, an unpatriotic antiwar movement, and a liberal media
establishment.  As we will see, the narrative of the war offered by Platoon, while distinct
from Rambo in many ways, offers its own version of a war in which the Vietnamese are,
at best, irrelevant and in which the United States actually fought, and defeated, itself.
Back at the POW camp, Rambo escapes with the help of Co Bao, who returned
disguised as a prostitute servicing the Vietnamese guards.  After their escape, Bao and
Rambo share a romantic encounter, during which he agrees to take her with him back to
the United States.  After the kiss, however, Bao is gunned down by a Vietnamese soldier,
which sets off Rambo on a killing rampage, leading him back to the camp to rescue the
remaining POWs rather than escape alone.  During this montage, Rambo becomes a one-
man death squad, a human B-52, destroying helicopters, entire villages, and sending
hordes of Vietnamese into a frenzied panic and, eventually, to their deaths.  After a final
face off with the Russians, Rambo returns to the base in Thailand, ready to confront his
betrayers.
Removing the large gun from the helicopter, Rambo completely destroys the huge
supercomputers lauded by Murdoch at the beginning of the film.  He then goes after
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Murdoch, stabbing his knife into a desk right next to Murdoch’s head, but allowing him
to live.  “You know there’s more men out there,” he tells Murdoch.  “Find them. Or I’ll
find you.”  On his way out of the camp, Trautman implores Rambo to stay with him
rather than wandering off.  “The war, everything that happened here may be wrong. But,
dammit, don’t hate your country for it,” he tells him.  “Hate?” Rambo responds.  “I’d die
for it.”  Rambo also goes on to offer a final statement on behalf of his men: “I want what
they want, what every guy who came over here and spilled his guts and gave everything
they had wants: for our country to love us as much as we love it.”  Here Rambo adds
another crucial element to the hand behind the back theory: that the soldiers were
betrayed not simply by sheepish politicians but by the American public.  Rambo is thus
the supreme patriot, whose escapades in and after the war are explained as his duty to the
nation he loves.
The initial critical response to Rambo suggested that critics did not love the film
as much as Stallone loved it, although many acknowledged, as one put it, “Rambo
works.”450  Jack Kroll of Newsweek was completely unconcerned with the Rambo’s
acceptance of the POW/MIA myth, the representation of the Vietnamese, or the anti-
government message of the film.  For Kroll, it was all about Stallone’s masochism and
narcissism.451  Richard Shickel of Time admitted feeling “shame” at being somewhat
amused by the action sequences and Rambo’s “superhero ploys,” because the film was
preying upon the “live moral issues” of the POW/MIA myth.  “Whether such victims are
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real or fiction,” he noted, “the films exploit and travesty emotions that a decent movie
would try to help us share more deeply.”452  The Washington Post and New York Times
were unique not for their criticisms of Rambo, but rather for their brief attention to the
dehumanized portrayal of the Vietnamese.  The Post assailed Stallone for its revisionist
approach to the war, comparing it to the Nazi led revisionism of the war during interwar
Germany, and noting that the Vietnamese in the film “are caricatures out of 1960s
anticommunist propaganda.  They are flunkies of the Russians, and their cause is neither
anti-colonialism, nationalism nor even imperialism, but raw evil.”453  The Times sounded
a similar note, focusing on the film’s “plausibility” problem:
Among other things, Rambo seems to believe the Vietnamese, apparently out of
sheer Asiatic crudeness, would waste the manpower represented by 50 to 60 of
their soldiers to guard a heavily armed jungle prison, which contains no more than
a dozen or so P.O.W.’s used as farm laborers.  If the Vietnamese are so hard up
for labor, why not just use the soldiers and get rid of the prisoners?  Are these
captors not only mean but also stupid? Well, you might ask, but answers are not
forthcoming.454
Unlike First Blood, the Times reviewer noted, the action in Rambo “is supported only
what appears to be the star’s ego and a large budget for special effects.”455
Were it simply another action film, or even another of the Missing in Action
series, Rambo may very well have faded quickly from screens.  But a variety of
circumstances converged to help create what would quickly become known as
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“Rambomania” in the summer of 1985.456  To begin with, in 1985 Sylvester Stallone was
one of the biggest box office draws in the United States.  Drawing on the success of First
Blood and the Rocky franchise, the makers of Rambo led a major publicity blitz to hype
the film.  Upon its release, Rambo opened in 2,165 theaters—at the time a record
number.457  Within three weeks, the film had grossed over $75 million; the original First
Blood had been considered successful when it grossed $15 over the same period.458
According to some scholars, Rambo also shaped and was shaped by other cultural
forces in society.  As Susan Jeffords demonstrates in her book, The Remasculinization of
America, the American War in Vietnam “provided the context in which American males
could most clearly be identified as victims of a wide range of factors.”459  Rambo and
other later representations of the war in American culture helped white American men to
recover and reassert the masculine identity that had been called into question after the
war.  Clearly, the spectacle of shirtless young men adorned with plastic rifles and bullets
entering Stallone look-alike contests, the winner of which would receive a job delivering
“Rambograms,” testifies to Jeffords’ assertions.460  Critical theorist and cultural critic
Douglas Kellner has also linked the success of Rambo to the film’s role as propaganda
for Ronald Reagan’s domestic and foreign policy.  For Kellner, Rambo is an articulation
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of much of Reaganism: unilateral military intervention, and a radical individualist as anti-
government activist.461
Reagan himself testified to the parallels between his worldview and that of
Stallone in the early summer of 1985. Preparing to address the nation to announce the
release of hostages being held in Beirut, Reagan announced, “Boy, I saw Rambo last
night.  Now I know what to do next time this happens.”462  Although The White House
claimed that the President was simply joking in a microphone test, the remark was picked
up and carried in every major newspaper the next day.463  Stephen Randall, the executive
vice president for marketing at Tri-Star pictures, the film’s distributor, told Business
Week that Reagan’s comments may have added as much as $50 million to the domestic
revenues of the film.464  In Congress, lawmakers also appropriated the image of Rambo
“over a dozen times” while debating a foreign aid bill that included aid to “insurgents in
Afghanistan and Cambodia,” the very forces with which Rambo was aligned in Rambo
III, and, implicitly, in Rambo.465
The virulent jingoism of Rambo, however, was immensely popular overseas as
well.  All three films in the series were financed by sales of the international distribution
rights.  First Blood, made for only $14 million, grossed over $50 million domestically
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and over $70 million abroad.  Rambo, which cost $44 million, made more than $180
million around the world, $30 million more than it grossed in the United States.466
Although very popular in areas ranging from Bolivia to Japan, the film did especially
well in the Middle East, breaking several marks in Israel and shattering every box office
record in Lebanon.467  One of the foreign distributors of Rambo speculated that because
of his lone-wolf style of violence, “maybe he’s a hero in the U.S. and a terrorist in other
parts of the world.”468  Even some aboriginal tribes in Australia were documented
appropriating Rambo’s insurgent identity to further their reclamation projects in that
nation.469
Not everyone outside the United States appreciated the film, however.  Rambo
was banned in places as diverse as India and Norway, and drew particular ire from the
Soviet Union.  The Soviet government decried what it termed the American “cult of
violence,” represented by attacks on Soviets in films such as Rambo and Red Dawn.  A
Russian film reviewer for Tass, the official government film agency wrote in December
of 1985:
To brainwash the public, primarily American youth, U.S. propaganda experts
urgently need a new ‘hero’ – a guy with muscles of iron who can deal with his
enemies alone.  Those who trampled on Grenada’s freedom, those who direct the
actions of hitmen and killers in Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan… eagerly
await such a hero.470
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It is worth noting that the Russians, who come off far better than the Vietnamese in the
film, did not come to the defense of their allies here, nor did they note the American
support of anti-Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia.  Clearly the United States was not
the only nation to whom the ongoing, stalemated Third Indochina War was merely a
sideshow.
The varied responses and appropriations of the Rambo image and identity in the
United States and around the world testifies to the need to explore texts less in search of
their “meaning” or their “code” than in how the texts circulate in particular contexts, how
they relate to other texts, and how different groups respond to and use texts in specific
historical moments.  Like the rest of the world, the film sent shockwaves through
American culture.  Along with the “Rambograms” mentioned earlier, the United States
and was also exposed to Rambo action figures, a Rambo cartoon series, Rambo toy guns
and video games, and even Rambo-themed adult films.471  The character also became
synonymous with individual acts of mass violence, particularly those connected to or
committed by veterans of the war.  On December 5, 1986, Campo Delgado, a Columbian
veteran of the American War in Vietnam went on a killing spree in Bogota, murdering 29
people, including his mother, before turning the gun on himself.  The press quickly
dubbed the killings a “Rambo-style bloodbath.”472
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A large number of Americans, including many veterans of the war, found the film
both offensive and ridiculous.  One veteran at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Washington told a reporter he thought the film was “fake.  It didn’t represent me a bit.”473
Some took issue with the film’s revisionism, while others blamed Stallone for
glamorizing combat.  Scholar Harry Haines, in his essay, “The Pride is Back,” described
a protest in Salt Lake City, in which American veterans of the war handed out
information describing the movie as a “lie,” and containing “An Open Letter to Sylvester
Stallone.”  The letter read:
First, we want to know where you were in 1968 when we needed you.
[Stallone, who was twenty-one in 1968, was teaching at a female secondary
school in Switzerland at the time.]  What right do you have to make this kind of
movie and allow people of this country who have never been to war to believe
that this is how wars are fought?
Many of our brothers went to their graves because they believed that you
fought wars the way John Wayne did in his movies.  Are you prepared to accept
responsibility for the deaths that may happen in future wars as a result of youths
who believe?474
Haines describes the protest not simply as a response to the film but to the rise of a
“teenage ‘Rambo’ cult” in the city.475  In early 1986, a similar scene developed in
Cambridge, where Harvard’s Hasty Pudding Society named Stallone its “Man of the
Year” for 1985.  Outside the club, a group of Veterans protested with signs that read
“Reality vs. Rambo,” and featured a silhouetted Rambo figure in a circle with a line
through it.  According to film scholar Kevin Bowen, a small group of teenagers outside
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the club waiting to get the actor’s autograph taunted the veterans, calling Stallone “a real
veteran.”476  Several members of the group were accosted by the teens, some of whom
even picked fights with the veterans.477
Some of the greatest damage done by Rambo, however, centered on its shameless
propagandizing of the POW/MIA myth.  Although it was neither the first nor last film to
do so, its popularity allowed the myth to further seep into American culture, bringing it
once again to the forefront of national affairs.  We saw earlier how the Reagan
administration approved and oversaw covert operations, not unlike the one portrayed in
Rambo.  With the release of the film however, the radical posturing of the POW/MIA
lobby gained prominence.  “We still have men over there who could be in prison camps
working in fields,” one veteran told The Washington Post in July of 1985.  “I still think
there’s people in there and in the government trying to hide it,” added another.478
In October of 1985, National Security Advisor Robert MacFarlane told a private
audience that “there have to be live Americans over there,” setting off a flurry of articles
and remarks by relevant constituencies.  Jeremiah Denton, a Republican Senator from
Alabama and former POW, affirmed MacFarlane’s beliefs, adding “the greatest
motivation for me to believe that there are Americans there is the Communists’ insistence
that they are not.”479  Throughout the year, articles appeared in numerous media outlets
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updating the MIA missions underway in Southeast Asia, noting that pressure had
increased for results since Rambo’s release.480  The Vietnamese, as they had done all
along, went above and beyond expectations, continuing to locate, excavate, and repatriate
the remains of unaccounted for American soldiers as if it were a standard practice in
international relations.  Yet every new discovery seemed to reinforce the paranoid
fantasies that the Vietnamese were still holding live American prisoners. This view was
only reinforced by the Regan Administration, who continued to blame Hanoi for the
missing soldiers, “insisting,” as one article put it, “that Hanoi must clear up the MIA
controversy.”481
In the final analysis, however, the real danger of Rambo consists not in the text
itself, nor even in the text’s role in the larger social, political, and cultural issues
described by Jeffords, Franklin, or Kellner.  To be sure the damage done by Rambo was
hardly insignificant in any of these cases: the remasculinization and remilitarization of
American society or the further ensconcing of the POW/MIA mythology; yet in 1986,
when Rambomania was finally dying down, the damage was only partially done.  One of
the most important and largely unnoticed long-term consequences of the Rambo
phenomenon is that it redrew the terms of debate over the cultural memory of the war.
As the standard bearer of the second wave, “revisionist” school of American films about
the war in Vietnam, Rambo constructed and established a new matrix of representations
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within and against which the next wave of films would be framed.  However ridiculous
the comic-book fantasy of Rambo may have appeared to some, it became the model
against which new versions of the war’s “reality” would be judged.
From Realism to Reality: Platoon as the Anti-Rambo
All but lost amid the rabid Rambomania was an antidote to the Reaganite
fantasies filling the screens of the mid 1980s.  Salvador, a dark view of American
interventions in Central America, centered on the real-life experiences of Richard Boyle,
a photojournalist who went to El Salvador “to reclaim his glory days from Vietnam.”482
Starring James Woods and Jim Belushi, both of whom took cuts in their normal salaries
to make the picture, Salvador was the first directorial success for an up-and-coming
filmmaker named Oliver Stone.  Describing the impetus for the film, Stone said that he
was “sick of happy endings.  The 1980s is the era of phony endings.  It’s time to cycle a
change.”  When asked if American filmgoers were ready “for such a heavy dose of
political reality,” Stone replied: “This will be a test case won’t it?”483
If Salvador was indeed the test case, the answer must have been “no.”  Although
it received some critical acclaim, the film performed poorly at the box office.  Not to be
deterred, Stone emerged from Salvador ready to deliver another dark film that would give
new meaning to the word “reality.”  Stone, who dropped out of Yale in 1965 to join the
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American War in Vietnam, had been shopping around a screenplay based on his
experiences in the war since the mid-1970s.  Finding no interest and without the capital to
make the film himself, he continued to write screenplays, breaking through with 1978’s
Midnight Express, for which he received an Academy Award.
Despite the increased attention that the Oscar brought him, Stone still found no
suitors for his Vietnam film.  In 1984, Stone struck a deal with Michael Cimino, of The
Deer Hunter fame, and Dino De Laurentiis of the De Laurentiis Entertainment Group in
Hollywood: if Stone would write the screenplay for Year of the Dragon, a Cimino project
for De Laurentiis, Cimino would produce Stone’s film. Year of the Dragon, in which a
Vietnam War veteran fights drug traffic in New York’s Chinatown, flopped, and the deal
to make Stone’s picture fell through because of a problem with the distribution rights.484
Finally, while Stone was making Salvador, a producer named Arnold Kopelson read
Stone’s screenplay and decided to make the film, the projected budget for which was
only $6 million.  A few months later, Stone brought his production to the Philippines and
began shooting Platoon.
Stone’s screenplay was based on his own experiences in combat, a point that he
and the studio never tired of promoting during the film’s run.  He also believed that his
film was a crucial historical intervention, a revision of revisionist texts such as Rambo
and Top Gun, two of the biggest films of the period, which Stone saw as “sinister”
attempts to romanticize and rewrite the realities of warfare.  “It’s like a video game,” he
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noted on an episode of 20/20, “There is no reality to it.”485  Stone’s concern was not just
with Rambomania, however.  Even earlier films admired by Stone, such as Apocalypse
Now and The Deer Hunter, “didn’t really fundamentally deal with the reality that I saw
over there as an infantryman.”  These films, Stone felt, had left a gaping hole in historical
and popular narratives of the war:  “I mean if we didn’t make that story, I felt we
wouldn’t be telling the truth, we would be denying history.  America would be a trasher
of history, blind to the past.”486
In an attempt to accurately recreate his experiences, he put his actors through a
month-long military training run by former Marine Captain Dale Dye.  Dye, who served
during the early years of direct American military involvement in Vietnam, set up a
consulting firm to provide technical advice to filmmakers about the military.  The firm,
Warriors, Inc., was created by Dye in 1985 for reasons that echoed Stone’s reasons for
making the film: “out of distaste for what he considered the metaphorical rambling of
such films as Apocalypse Now and The Deer Hunter and for the revenge fantasies of the
Rambo genre.”  Even though the politics of Stone and Dye differed (they reportedly
referred to each other as “John Wayne” and “the Bolshevik” on set), the two were both
determined to “set the record straight.”487
Certainly the experiences of Stone and the advice and training provided by Dye
lent themselves to the discourse of reality surrounding the film, but long before filming
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started, it was clear that not everyone shared Platoon’s view of reality.  Considering a
request for assistance from one of Stone’s earlier production companies, the military
responded, “the script presents an unfair and inaccurate view of the Army… The entire
script is rife with unrealistic and highly unfavorable depictions of the American solider.”
Such a response was not entirely uncommon; as Lawrence Suid points out in his detailed
study of the subject, even the unapologetically pro-war vehicle, The Green Berets, was
initially denied military assistance.488  Yet at the time of the letter, both Top Gun and
Rambo were set to have military aid provided.  Dye, who appeared on the 20/20 episode
with Stone, acknowledged that some of the specific complaints of the Army, including
images of American soldiers raping and murdering children were far from universal, but
remained adamant that the film was far more realistic than other films receiving aid:
It is not fair to say that every infantryman experienced those things and that every
infantry platoon carried those things out.  And we hastened to point that out.  But
is certainly fair to say those things happened.  They’re on the record, and if you
want to deny the record, then go do Rambo.489
As we will see, the “record” was hotly contested after audiences flocked to see Platoon
during the winter and spring of 1987.
The plot of Stone’s film centers on the autobiographical character of Chris
(Charlie Sheen), a college student who dropped out to join the war.  The audience arrives
in Vietnam with Chris in the opening scene, and remains with him until the film ends.  In
the first sequences of the film, we follow Chris on his first ambush mission.
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The heat, the bugs, and the jungle are all palpable to the viewer, as Chris passes out on
the hike from carrying too much.  Drawing, as he does throughout the film on his own
similar experiences, Stone’s Chris is paralyzed by fear on the ambush, allowing the Viet
Cong patrol to sneak up on the platoon.  In the ensuing firefight, one member of the unit
is killed, and Chris receives a minor injury.
After returning from his stint in the hospital, Chris returns to base camp, where
Stone introduces the divided platoon, composed primarily of the “regulars” and “lifers,”
who drink, play poker, and generally follow Sergeant Barnes (Tom Berenger), and “the
heads,” who smoke pot, dance together to Motown tunes, and follow Elias (Willem
Defoe).  The bulk of the film focuses on the internal conflict of the Platoon between
Barnes and Elias.  Although Chris immediately identifies with Elias, a Christ-like figure
who looks out for him, his ongoing conflict with the monstrous Barnes comes equally to
define the character.  As the film goes on, Chris rejects the most evil of Barnes’ actions,
but nevertheless becomes masculinized through combat, turning into a fighting and
killing machine as reminiscent of Barnes as he is Elias.
In the defining moment of Platoon, the unit discovers Manny, one of their own,
grotesquely killed by Vietnamese forces.  The camera follows the troops in a tracking
shot, showing close-ups of all the faces staring blankly ahead, ending with Barnes who
snarls, “the motherfuckers.”  As the troops march toward the nearby village, reportedly in
the hands of the National Liberation Front, Chris’ voiceover reveals:
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The village, which has stood for maybe a thousand years, didn’t know we were
coming that day.  If they would, they would have ran.  Barnes was the focus of
our rage. Through him, our Captain Ahab, we would get things right again.  That
day, we loved him.
In following the lead of Barnes, his “Ahab,” Chris at the same time attempts to justify the
events which are about to take place and points out the futility of the platoon’s efforts.
Like Ahab’s quest for the elusive white whale, the platoon’s search for “the enemy” will
ultimately be a journey of senseless self-destruction.  In the context of a narrative about
the American war in Vietnam, however, the voiceover betrays the inability of Stone to
represent the war from the point of view of a Vietnamese villager.  Although the ensuing
scene attempts to give a sense of the destruction wrought on similar villages during the
war, it ultimately serves as a backdrop for the larger plot device of the internal battle
between good and evil in the platoon.
As the platoon enters the village, pushing the residents with their guns, knocking
over rice and killing a pig, Barnes locates several villagers hiding in a bunker. When one
refuses to come out, he detonates a grenade inside the bunker.  In one of the homes, Chris
and Bunny (Kevin Dillon), a self-described “killer,” threaten an old woman and her son,
who appears to have developmental disabilities.  Chris screams at the young man,
remaining unrepentant, as another member of his squad (Corey Glover) attempts to calm
him: “Oh, they’re scared? They’re scared?  What about me?  I’m sick of this shit!”  Chris
fires his weapon at the feet of the man, but stops short of executing him, at which point
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Bunny calls him a “pussy” for not “doing the gook,” whom he charges with killing
Manny as well as Sal, an earlier casualty.  As they turn to leave the hut, Bunny turns
around and repeatedly rams the butt of his rifle into the boy’s face, beating him to death.
Outside, the villagers have been rounded up and Barnes interrogates them through
a translator.  The elder man of the village denies that they are “VC,” but tells him that the
NVA forces them to keep rice and weapons there.  Throughout the scene, the man’s wife
angrily yells and runs toward Barnes, held back by members of the squad.  Her voice get
louder and her rage more intense until Barnes walks up to her, draws his rifle and fires a
single shot through her head.  As the man holds his dead wife, Barnes instructs the
translator: “You tell them he starts talking, or I’ll waste more of them.”  Others in the
platoon cry out in agreement, “let’s do the whole fucking village,” as Barnes takes the
man’s young daughter and holds a gun to her head, still demanding information.  Elias,
who had remained behind at a bunker complex, shows up to stop Barnes, resulting in a
brawl between the two.  The village is burned, “suspected VC” rounded up and bound,
and the atrocities continue, as Chris breaks up a group of soldiers raping two young girls.
The scene is undoubtedly the most horrific sequence of any American film about the war
in Vietnam, and was the focal point, as we will see, of the public debate over the “reality”
of the film.   
As the film continues, Chris continues to negotiate the rift in the Platoon, noting
through a voiceover that he doesn’t “know what is right or wrong anymore… I can’t
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believe we’re fighting each other when we should be fighting them.”  Caught in a heated
firefight, Elias goes off on his own to outflank the enemy troops, but is left behind as the
platoon retreats.  When Barnes finds Elias in the jungle, he “frags” him, shooting him and
leaving him for dead.  When Chris returns to try and find Elias, Barnes orders him to
retreat from the area, telling him that Elias is dead.  As the platoon is choppered out of
the area, they see Elias being chased by what appears to be a full regiment of Vietnamese
troops.  He is shot several more times, and eventually succumbs to his pursuers.
Chris immediately suspects that Barnes murdered Elias, and back at the base plots
his own fragging of Barnes with some of the other heads.  Barnes can’t be killed, Rhah
tells Chris, “The only thing that can kill Barnes is Barnes.” Their plot is interrupted by a
half-drunken Barnes, who suddenly appears at the base of the bunker stairs, his face half-
shadowed to reinforce the Platoon’s struggle over the good and evil in their leader.
“Y’all talking ‘bout killin?” he asks.  “Whatdy’all know bout killin?”  As he stumbles
around the bunker, he chastises the heads for their idealism, their belief in Elias, and for
their cowardice. “You smoke this shit to escape from reality?” he asks them.  “Me, I
don’t need this shit.  I am reality.”
In that one short phrase, Barnes encapsulates the larger message of Platoon: that
this is the way the war in Vietnam “really was.”  Barnes might as well be speaking
directly to the audience, or, perhaps, to Rambo himself.  War is about killing, he tells the
troops.  It’s about death, and guts, and survival.  At first glance, this is perhaps a more
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suitable message than the glory-seeking fantasies offered by Rambo and the like.  It is
crucial, however, to see what is unspoken and invisible in Barnes’, and Platoon’s version
of reality.  The scene in the bunker revolves around the murder of Elias, whose final
demise is shown in excruciatingly slow motion as his troops watch helplessly from
above.  Although the atrocities in the village caused further divisions within the platoon,
Chris and the others only begin to contemplate action when Barnes murders one of their
own.  Platoon’s reality is clearly that of a dark, divisive, and devastating war, but
devastating for whom?  The village is quickly forgotten (although not as quickly, as we
will see, for American movie-goers, particularly veterans), rendered to the backdrop of
the internal conflict of the film: brother versus brother, American against American.  The
war, Platoon betrays, was about the United States and what “the war” did “to us.”  In this
sense, it is the culmination of the cinematic cultural productions that began with Coming
Home nearly a decade earlier.
In the final scene of the movie, a long battle sequence in which the North
Vietnamese troops overrun the American encampment, Chris demonstrates his full
transformation into a one-man fighting force.   In a Ramboesque moment, he kills over a
dozen Vietnamese soldiers single-handedly.  The Vietnamese troops overrun the
American perimeter and the local commander, played by Dale Dye, calls in an air strike
on his own troops.  Shortly after that order, a Vietnamese suicide-bomber detonates a
grenade in the command bunker.  Chris and Barnes find themselves face to face amidst
290
the chaos of the battle, but just as Barnes is ready to deliver a final blow to Chris, the air
strike bleeds the entire screen white.  In the aftermath of the battle, the next morning,
Chris awakes to find Barnes slithering around on the ground. Chris stares blankly at him
at Barnes orders him to call for help. Realizing what is about to take place, Barnes tells
Chris to “do it.” Without hesitation, Chris raises his weapon and fires two rounds into
Barnes chest, killing him.
As relief arrives, Chris is taken away on a stretcher, while hundreds of dead
Vietnamese bodies are tossed and bulldozed into a mass grave. As the helicopter carries
Chris toward the heavens, a final voiceover brings closure to the narrative:
I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy. We fought ourselves. And
the enemy was in us.  The war is over for me now, but it always will be there for
the rest of my days—as I’m sure Elias will be—fighting with Barnes for what Rah
called the possession of my soul.  There are times since when I feel like a child
born of those two fathers.  But be that as it may, those of us who did make it
home have an obligation to build again; to teach others what we know; and to try
with what’s left of our lives to find a goodness and meaning to this life.
If the United States did not fight the enemy, one wonders, who were the nameless,
faceless bodies being destroyed in the village or in the final battle scene?  Why were they
being killed?  Like nearly every other American film about the war, Platoon refuses to
deal with the larger historical and political questions explaining American involvement in
Vietnam.  Yet Platoon takes this dehistoricizing of the war a step further, seeking to erase
the Vietnamese from the narrative altogether.  To argue, as Platoon does, that the enemy
was “us,” is not simply to ignore why the United States became involved in Southeast
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Asia; it is also to render invisible the incredible devastation wrought on Vietnam at the
hands of the United States over several decades.
From the original screenplay, through the struggle to get it made, the production,
release, and ensuing cultural dialogues about the film, Platoon has been discursively
constructed almost exclusively around a single word: reality.  As I argue here, though, the
constructions of reality that accompany Platoon are, first, based as much on previous
representations of the war, particularly Rambo, as on the “reality” of the war itself and,
secondly, drawn upon a very narrow view of the war that reinforces the myopia of earlier
Hollywood representations of the war and continues to render the Vietnamese invisible.
Although it is not surprising, perhaps, that any American representations of the war
silence the voices or points of view of the Vietnamese, the absence of those voices is
nevertheless crucial to the constructions of the war offered by those representations,
particularly the victimization of American subjects at the hands of the Vietnamese.  Only
by marginalizing and silencing the voices of the Vietnamese are such representations able
to focus their attention entirely on the effects of the war on the United States.  As I will
argue below, however, the discourse surrounding the film is even more important than
the text itself.  It is by examining Platoon’s relationship to other texts and to other forms
of expression that we can see how its version of reality achieved hegemony over the
cultural memory of the war in the United States.
Released in December of 1986 in order to qualify for the Academy Awards,
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where it received the awards for Best Picture and Best Director, Platoon’s preview
trailers declared it “the first real movie about the war in Vietnam.” Stone, in interviews
for both print and television news, spoke about his own experiences testified to the reality
of the film.  And immediately upon its New York release it was hailed by most critics in
language indistinguishable from the studio’s marketing or Stone’s own media campaign.
David Ansen of Newsweek wrote that Stone’s “elegy” is different from other films about
the war.  For starters, he was there.” Ansen was particularly impressed with the way
Stone situated the audience “down in the muck with the grunts.”490  These sentiments
were echoed by The New York Times, in which Vincent Camby lauded Platoon for taking
as its subject, “the life of the infantryman, endured at ground level, in heat and muck,
with fatigue and ants and with fear as a constant, even during the druggy hours back in
the comparative safety of the base.”491  Fred Burning, writing in MacLean’s, claimed that
Platoon left audiences feeling that “they had served a tour of duty too.”  “Now,” he
concluded, “we know exactly how bad it was” for the American troops.492
The ultimate compliment for Platoon, however, came on January 26, 1987, when
the film appeared on the cover of Time, a rare honor for a contemporary Hollywood film.
Not even at the height of Rambomania, when the shirtless Stallone was a ubiquitous
presence in American, and even global culture, did his presence grace the weekly’s cover.
With a background of camouflaged fatigues, the Time cover featured a grim snapshot of
Elias, Barnes, and Chris, staring blankly ahead under the banner, “PLATOON: Viet Nam
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As It Really Was.”  Inside, a major feature by Richard Corliss, including sidebars on
Stone and Dye, highlights Stone’s experiences in the war and how he has “created a time-
capsule movie that explodes like a frag bomb in the consciousness of America, showing
how it was back then, over there.”  Stone, Corliss concludes, “has devised a drama of
palpable realism.”493
In these and other reviews, critics hail the film’s “realism,” and praise Stone,
clearly situated as an authority on the war, for telling it how it was.  But we can also see
from these reviews that the aesthetic realism of the film, the “palpable” landscape
representing Vietnam, is as central to the construction of reality offered by Platoon as any
attention to historical accuracy. The basic formula for these reviews can roughly be
summarized as saying: take Stone’s experience, add a dose of “muck,” and you have the
reality of the American war in Vietnam.  Gilbert Adair points to both these components
in his discussion of Platoon, arguing that “we are bullied into craven submission” by the
construction of “realness” in the film and the “certificate of authenticity,” offered by
Stone’s experiential justifications.494
But there is a more subtle factor at work in constructing Platoon as “the way it
was” as well, one which has been overlooked in other studies of films about the
American War in Vietnam.  Platoon, as film scholar Eben Muse later claimed,
“established the conventions of reality for Vietnam.”495  This is certainly true, although it
is significant that Muse chose to use “Vietnam” to stand in for “Hollywood
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representations of the American War in Vietnam.”  But Platoon did not simply conjure
up its reality from the muck of historical experience.  Rather, Stone’s film altered the
matrix of “reality” for American films about the war by working against the conventions
established by earlier representations.  In nearly every review of Platoon, the reviewer
begins by setting the film up against earlier Hollywood representations of the American
War in Vietnam, most commonly The Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now, and, especially,
Rambo.  This is not surprising, of course; it is common for films, particularly those
dealing with a specific historical topic, to be compared to one another.  But the
prevalence with which these three films are invoked in reviews and debates about
Platoon suggests something more than comparison at work here.  Platoon may look,
sound, and feel more like the actual combat experience of American infantrymen in
Vietnam, but it does so as much because Stone’s Chris is not Cimino’s Michael,
Coppala’s Willard, or Stallone’s Rambo.  Similarly, with the success of Platoon, those
films became increasingly less about Vietnam the nation or even Vietnam the war, and
more about “Vietnam,” the American “experience.”
We have already seen that both Stone and Dye brought to the project a desire to
produce an explicit reversal of “the metaphorical rambling of such films as Apocalypse
Now and The Deer Hunter and for the revenge fantasies of the Rambo.”  “There’s no
reality” to those pictures, Stone noted.  The entire project of Platoon thus began with a
particular view of reality framed as much by earlier filmic representations as historical
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experience.  In Ansen’s Newsweek review, he begins by noting that while watching
Platoon, “it dawns on you that most previous Hollywood movies about Vietnam weren’t
really about Vietnam.”   In the first film wave (discussed here in chapter four),
Vietnam was not so much an issue as an opportunity to create epic cinema; for the
makers of ‘Rambo’ and its comic-book ilk it was an opportunity to make money,
while winning the war in a cinematic rematch.496
Canby’s review in the Times concurred, arguing that Platoon “is not like any other
Vietnam film that’s yet been made, certainly not like those revisionist comic strips
‘Rambo’ and ‘Missing in Action.’”  The film was also unlike Coppala’s or Cimino’s, he
continued, which were “more about the mind of the America that fought the war than the
Vietnam War itself.497  Canby continued to press the point in a later piece, concluding
that, unlike Platoon, Apocalypse Now, and The Deer Hunter “floated above the concerns
of the American foot soldiers and saw the war in terms of mythology.”498
In March of 1987, when Platoon once again grabbed headlines as the Oscars
approached, no less a figure than David Halberstam, a legendary reporter during the war,
weighed in on the film, further cementing the film’s version of reality.  In contrast to the
films of the first wave, all of which Halberstam praises in some way, “Platoon is about
Vietnam… It is painfully realistic.” “What Mr. Stone has done,” he continues, in both a
medium given to fantasy and in a political age given to longing (if not fantasy) is to strike
an enormous blow for reality.”  But, he adds, “[o]ne cannot truly appreciate his
achievement without comparing it to the work of Sylvester Stallone… Because of
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Rambo, I am that much more in Oliver Stone’s debt.”  Halberstam could hardly fit
enough superlatives in his piece: “genuinely authentic,” “stunningly real” “the ultimate
work of witness.”499
What is most significant about Halberstam’s piece, however, is his testament of
the reality of the film from the “enemy” point of view.  Not only does Stone accurately
represent the American soldiers’ experience, but in his film “the other side gets to shoot
back;” they are shown as “professional and tough:”
From the very early scene when the Americans set a night ambush, we see the
N.V.A. regulars move into that ambush and we see how skillful and careful they
are.  In a World War II movie, all the N.V.A. soldiers would be blown away; in
this one, although surprised, they fight with considerable skill.500
Halberstam again points to Rambo, however, as crucial to the construction of the
Vietnamese offered by Platoon.  “Mr. Stallone,” he writes does an injustice to the
American veterans of the war “because he diminishes their opponents:
In Rambo we are told that where an American batallion would have failed, one
soldier-as-cowboy can do it all, wipe out hundreds of dinky little Vietnamese.
With the barely covert racism of the movie, Mr. Stallone would undo what few
lessons we have learned from Vietnam.501
Halberstam admits that the Vietnamese soldiers in the film are “more a shadow hovering
constantly in the background than a fleshed out reality,” but then how are they different
from the voices in the wilderness offered in Apocalypse Now?  Against the caricatured
Communist stooges in Rambo, would not any invisible enemy appear more realistic?
                                                 





Without Rambo, how realistic would Stone’s Vietnamese be?  How “tough” and
“professional” would the Vietnamese appear?
Halberstam, for instance, points to the early ambush scene, drawn from Stone’s
own experience.  In that scene, briefly recounted above, the platoon sets up their position
for the night.  Chris is awakened to take his shift, which he does nervously but without
incident, as a voiceover explains why he joined the war.  Chris then awakens Junior,
himself a fairly racist portrayal of a disgruntled, lazy black soldier, to take his shift.502
Later, Chris awakens to find that Junior has fallen asleep and notices shadowy figures in
the distance approaching the unit’s perimeter.  As they move closer, Chris remains
paralyzed by fear, watching the enemy forces move closer and closer.  They are almost
on top of him when one trips the wire protecting the perimeter, sending up flares and
awakening the platoon.  Chris then fumbles the activation of the claymore mines, further
hampering the American unit.  During and after the brief but intense fight, we see close
ups of the American wounded, one of whom dies, and Chris, who receives a minor
wound, but a great deal of attention from the unit and the camera.  The Vietnamese forces
scamper off into the night, retreating shadows back into the jungle.  Needless to say, the
audience never receives that unit’s casualty report.
Certainly a film need not give as much attention to the Vietnamese forces as it
does to the American troops to be considered fair, but what in this scene justifies
Halberstam’s claim of the Vietnamese being shown to fight with “considerable skill”?
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The Vietnamese walk right up on the American platoon, only to set off a tripwire and
announce their presence, they get in a shot or two, and then retreat just as quickly as they
came.  One could certainly argue that this is an improvement over Rambo, but there
seems little basis for Halberstam’s claim of the heroic and skillful representation of
Vietnamese soldiers.
The ambush scene is the only one specifically mentioned by Halberstam, but there
seems scant evidence in the film to support his argument.  In every encounter portrayed
by the film, the Vietnamese are merely a postscript.  During the atrocity sequence in the
village, Chris notes that if the villagers had known he and his platoon were coming, “they
would have run.”  Where, one is tempted to ask, would they have run?  Could the
villagers really have been surprised when the Americans showed up?  In the final battle
scene, Chris has matured into a killing machine and makes up for the supposed cowardice
of other members of the unit by staying to fight, taking out dozens of Vietnamese.
Although different in scale from John Rambo’s exploits, is Chris’ rampage all that
different, in terms of its representation of the enemy, from what Halberstam refers to as
“the soldier as cowboy” who “wipes out hundreds of dinky Vietnamese”?  After the
battle, the audience again sees agonizing close-ups of the wounded Americans, while the
faceless and nameless Vietnamese corpses are simply bulldozed into a mass grave.  Even
in Time, the only major piece on Platoon even to point out the potentially problematic
representation quickly explained it away:
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[T]he Vietnamese are either pathetic victims or the invisible, inhuman enemy.  In
the scheme of Platoon (and not just Platoon) they do not matter.  The nearly one
million Vietnamese casualties are deemed trivial compared with America’s loss of
innocence, of allies, of geopolitical face.  And the tragedy of Viet Nam is seen as
this: not that they died, but that we debased ourselves in killing them.  Of course,
Platoon need not be every possible Viet Nam film to be the best one so far.  It is
enough that Stone has devised a drama of palpable realism…503
Once again, any potential problems with the film, any contradictions in its construction of
reality, are justified by placing Platoon alongside more problematic, earlier
representations of the war.  What this review fails to acknowledge is that the invisible
enemy is not a casual by-product of the film’s focus on the United States.  Rather, it is a
crucial factor in allowing the American-centered narrative to continue.
In the end, the Vietnamese are clearly an afterthought to Platoon, which, as Time
pointed out, does not distinguish it from most other American films about the war. There
may be good reasons for such representations, which have little to do with the
commercial viability of a film more attentive or sympathetic to the Vietnamese people;
when discussing Salvador, Stone argued he could not “get inside the Salvadoran
peasant’s head.  That would be presumptuous of me.”504  It could very well be that a
representation that allows the Vietnamese subjects to remain invisible, rather than
attempting to speak for them, is an improvement over the racism of Rambo.  In the final
sequence, however, Stone’s allegorical screenplay proposes a further, revisionist erasure
of the Vietnamese.  As he rides away in the helicopter, Chris tells the audience, “we did
not fight the enemy.  We fought ourselves and the enemy was in us.”  Those shadowy
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figures in the jungle, the girls being raped in the village, and the mass grave full of
Vietnamese bodies— do not matter in the final analysis of Platoon. What matters, as with
Coming Home, The Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now, and even Rambo, is what the war did
to “us.”
My point here is not to discuss the film that Stone or others could have made;
rather, I have attempted to show that Platoon’s “reality,” to which the studio, filmmaker,
actors, critics, and reviewers testified, is necessarily incomplete.  For a film to be
constructed through self-promotion and critical discourse as “Vietnam: The Way it
Really Was,” with only the slightest regard for what the war did to the nation and people
of Vietnam is as problematic as the absurdities offered by Rambo and its progeny.  The
makers of Rambo or the Missing in Action films, while never apologetic about their film,
also never tried to pawn their movies off as portraying the reality of the American War in
Vietnam.  “I tried to make video games out of them,” said Joe Zito, director of Missing in
Action and Missing in Action II, “and audiences had to know that we weren’t playing
realistically… It’s not as if we set out to make a realistic war movie and failed.”505
The intentions of the films may have been different, but Platoon and Rambo will
always be intimately linked to one another in the battle over the cultural memory of the
American War in Vietnam.  We have already seen how critics and reviewers constructed
a discourse of Platoon’s reality against Rambo’s cartoonish fare, but other constituencies
weighed in during the “Platoon-Mania” of early 1987 as well.  On January 25, The Los
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Angeles Times devoted its “Calendar” section to Platoon, receiving an overwhelming
response to its proposed forum, “A Reason to Reflect on War.”506  Critics, veterans, and
members of the movie industry weighed in, discussing the film’s relation to the Rambo
films and belying Platoon’s claims of a monopoly on the reality of the war.  Chuck
Norris, star of the Missing in Action franchise, called Platoon a “slap in the face,” to
American veterans, adding, “my God, it’s making us look like the bad guys, and the VC
like the good guys.”507  Jane Fonda served as the counterweight to Norris on the same
page, calling the Ramboesque fantasies “revisionist cinema” that “obscures the truth.”
Taking particular issue with Stallone, Fonda noted that he was teaching school in
Switzerland during the war.508
More important than the Hollywood stars, however, were the more anonymous
figures quoted in the piece.  Radio talk show hosts remarked that they were being forced
to limit the amount of air time devoted to listeners’ comments on Platoon, because the
film was “all they wanted to talk about.” “A woman called to say her husband, who was a
former Marine, didn’t find it (“Platoon”) realistic,” noted a Chicago host. “The phones
rang off the hook after that from people defending it.”509  Several veterans are cited in the
article as finding the film too difficult to sit through; they ended up in the lobby weeping.
Yet for every veteran who found the film all too realistic, there seems to be one who finds
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Platoon an affront to their experience.  “I was insulted by it,” claimed Al Santoli, a
combat veteran and author. “In my division, we didn’t burn down any villages, we didn’t
slaughter villagers.  It says no more about the war than The Deer Hunter or any of the
others.  It’s just one person’s view of it.”510
The most intriguing part of the LA Times forum is a brief side story devoted to
responses to the film from Vietnamese refugees.  The piece is entitled, “Viet Refugees
Give Platoon Good Reviews,” but once again the reaction to the film is altered by the
lense of Rambo and other films.  To many Vietnamese refugees, the story begins, “the
best that can be said for Platoon” is that it “isn’t just another Rambo.”  “We have never
taken the earlier films seriously,” noted an Orange County resident, because they “are so
unreal, the situations so preposterous.”  A student at UC Irvine called Platoon “very real.
It is not make believe.  It is not a lot of Stallone or Chuck Norris.”  As with American
veterans, however, the reality of the film remains sharply contested for many
Vietnamese-Americans. Yen Do, editor of a Vietnamese paper in California, accepted
that an American film that did justice to a Vietnamese view of the war was unlikely, but
wanted to make clear that Platoon “was no more about Vietnam and its people than was
Deer Hunter or any of the others.  This is to be expected.  They were made by Americans
for Americans.”  Yet in the end, Do conceded, “Yes, it is better than Rambo. We can be
glad for that can’t we?”511
Do was not the only one grateful for Platoon, however.  Early in January of 1987,
                                                 
510 Ibid., 6.
511 “Viet Refugeess Give Platoon Good Reviews,” LA Times, January 25, 1987. Calendar
Section, 5.
303
a father wrote to the New York Times praised Platoon as antidote to Rambo.  His son, the
man wrote, had become “enthralled” with Rambo’s escapades as a lone warrior Movies
such as Rambo and Clint Eastwood’s Heartbreak Ridge, which portrays the invasion of
Grenada as an antidote to the Vietnam “syndrome,” “reinforced my son’s plans to join
[the Marines].” Platoon, by contrast, “worked a dramatic cure;” its images of “filth and
blood,” and of war in which “death wasn’t clean,” led his son to rethink his enlistment
plans and his Rambo fantasies.  “Platoon is rated R for good reasons,” the man
concluded.”  “For the sake of the Rambo generation, it ought to be PG-13.”512
Was Platoon an improvement over Rambo?  Would the “Rambo generation” be
better off with the stark realism of Stone than with the cartoonish fare of Stallone?  As I
have argued here, the question itself obscures the significant similarities of the two films.
As I have also argued, however, the answer to that question lies not in a reading of the
texts themselves, but to examine how they interact with other fields and other form of
cultural production.
The ‘NAM – Comic Book Battleground
As Platoon’s version of reality was ensconced in American culture, its trickle-
down effects were seen not simply in other films, but in other media and contexts as well.
Inevitably, however, as Platoon was emulated in a medium such as television, an already
questionable and problematic representation of the war was further sanitized in
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accordance with the commercial and political precepts of cultural production.  All the
major networks were contemplating Vietnam War-related projects in the summer of
1987; NBC reportedly had in the works a Vietnam version of M*A*S*H, and ABC was
developing a similar project that would eventually become the very successful China
Beach series.513  When CBS launched Tour of Duty in the fall of 1987, alongside HBO’s
Vietnam War Story, it quickly became clear that network television would not be able to
reproduce Platoon without significant concessions.  Although HBO’s series was allowed
at least some latitude in its use of salty language and violence, CBS’s show was roundly
criticized by critics for its oversimplifications and overly sanitized portrayal of war.  As
one critic wrote:
Nary a single GI is shown puffing a joint.  Breakdowns in military discipline—the
atrocities committed against Vietnamese civilians and the “fragging” of U.S.
officers—are as absent as references to the war’s political divisiveness or
depictions of its gory cost.
These problems, however, were explained away largely by the limitations of network
programming:
Still, it’s hard to imagine any filmmaker obliged to answer to affiliates, sponsors,
and government overseers doing this subject much differently.  And just the fact
that CBS decided to take on Vietnam merits a commendation.514
This, in the final analysis, is the most dangerous aspect of Platoon: not that in and of
itself it was “unrealistic,” but that by recasting the lines of what was considered the
reality of the war, its progeny, working within the confines, histories, and modes of
production in other media, could come up far short of Platoon’s realism and still be
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accepted as working within the new matrix of reality.
Some of the concern with having these representations reach a wider audience
revolved around how to teach a new generation of “post-Vietnam” Americans about the
war.  One article in U.S News and World Report even credited Stone’s film with helping
to instill in young people a new curiosity about the American War in Vietnam:  “Until
now, the views of the young have been shaped more often by Hollywood in films such as
The Deer Hunter and Rambo than by history books,” but new curricula and movies such
as Platoon “are casting Vietnam in a more realistic light.”515  As that article pointed out,
however, because of the way history classes are taught, the war often comes late in the
year and thus receives scant attention.  Thus, even with the most innovative curriculum,
students might not even discuss the war in their history classes.  Left with such a void,
many would continue to learn about the war through films and other representations.516
If students and others were to learn about the war outside of the classroom, many
no doubt continued to take refuge in their belief that Platoon had replaced the “comic
book ilk” of Rambo as the primary popular historical referent for the war in American
culture.  As we have seen, of course, the two films actually share a great deal in common.
And at least in one medium, the seemingly opposed modes of Platoon’s realism and
Rambo’s comic-book fantasies came together to constitute a new front in the cultural
inversion of the history of the war.
In December of 1986, Marvel Comics released the first issue of its new Vietnam
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War comic, The ‘NAM.  Within a year, the book and its creators would be featured on the
CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, receive an award from the Vietnam Veterans of
America, and become one of the hottest selling comics in the Marvel family.  The ‘NAM,
however, was not meant to be just another war comic; it was designed to play Platoon to
G.I. Joe’s Rambo.  In the first issue, “’Nam: First Patrol,” after following PFC Ed Marks
on a journey that replicates Chris Taylor’s initial story in Platoon, the series editors
described their goals for the book:
The ‘NAM is the real thing—or at least as close to the real thing as we can
get—in a newsstand comic bearing the Comics Code seal.  Every action, every
firefight is based on fact… Furthermore, the events in the ‘Nam happen in real
time. When thirty days pass for the reader, thirty days also pass for the characters
in the story… Now, I can’t promise that we will show everything, every action
that everyone’s father or brother ever took part in during the Viet Nam war.  But I
will promise that we will show, in basic terms, what the War was really like for
those who fought in it.517
That disclaimer is followed by a section called “’Nam Notes,” a glossary of “grunt
jargon” that appeared in very issue.  “To give a true feel of the real Viet Nam, we will use
this jargon whenever we can,” explained the editors.  For example, in the first issue, the
glossary included “LZ” (landing zone), M-16, R&R, and “Victor Charlie;” “(or
sometimes just CHARLIE): the Viet Cong, in short, the enemy.518  The next issue offered
a diagram of military hierarchies, a few additional phrases, and an updated definition for
“Charlie”: “The Viet Cong, Charlie Cong, the VC, the enemy, the bad guys.”519  Like
Platoon, although “enemy” will be relegated almost entirely to the background of the
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story, The ‘Nam makes no secret of its allegiances.  Not only are the “Viet Cong,” who
are never referred to by the more proper and sympathetic “National Liberation Front,”
described as “the enemy,” without any justification of why they are contesting the
American presence in Vietnam, they are also clearly labeled “the bad guys.”  No guesses
are thus needed to determine who “the good guys” were in the American War in
Vietnam.
In its limited, structured realism, working within the confines of the Comics
Code, which regulates violence, sexuality and language for comic books much in the
same way as film ratings, The ‘NAM quickly became hailed by readers, many of them
first-time comic readers according to their letters, as a “realistic” comic, one committed,
like Platoon, to showing the war “how it really was.”  More importantly, however, the
comic became a site of struggle over the cultural memory of the war, a space for debates
over the form and substance of memories of war and a means of transmitting knowledge
to future generations.  As readers responded to The ‘Nam, they also claimed the text as a
pedagogical site, and, as such, a crucial point of inquiry for cultural studies scholars and
historians of the relationship between Vietnam and American Culture after 1975.
Despite claims of realism from its creators, the comic offers many troubling
representations of the war, the Vietnamese, and the antiwar movement.  It also offers a
very limited and sanitized portrayal of the American “grunt’s” combat experience.
Although much of this is to be expected given the history and mode of production of the
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medium and genre within which the comic operated, the images and ideas laying claim to
the “reality” of the war need to be understood as part of the larger, troubling construction
of the “reality” of the war taking place in American culture in the mid to late 1980s.  As
with the previous discussion of Rambo and Platoon, the point here is not to dismiss one
set of texts as “false,” but rather to demonstrate that far from a singular historical reality,
texts, especially popular texts, necessarily offer competing versions of the same events.
Texts such as Platoon and The ‘Nam, however, which use the tropes of experience and
“historical accuracy” to claim their version of reality as the reality, further demonstrate
the need to identify and dissect the contradictions and silences embedded in those stories.
For the most part, The’ Nam worked within the established matrix of
representations defined by films about the American War in Vietnam, rendering
Vietnamese subjects almost entirely invisible and focusing attention on what the war did
to Americans.  It was particularly similar to Platoon in its focus on portraying the war
from the “grunt’s point of view.”  As with the other, more sanitized progeny of Platoon
in other media, however, The Nam reinforced a view of the war in which American
soldiers play the role of the good guys to the marginalized Vietnamese enemy.  Unlike
Platoon, there is little mention of drugs in The ‘Nam; there are no atrocity scenes or
rapings of young girls.  When it comes to representations of the enemy, however, the
comic follows Platoon closely.  With a few exceptions, the Vietnamese in The’ Nam do
not speak.  We do not see their faces and they do not shoot back, although they always
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instigate the fighting.  The bombing and napalming of villages is always justified by
showing that village was controlled by the National Liberation Front.  Vietnamese deaths
occur in bunches, with nameless and faceless piles of bodies, while American deaths, few
and far between, are drawn out, anguishing scenes. As we will see, the creators of the
comics did this not only based on the codes, formal and informal,  of comic production,
but because of their own views of the war and other popular representations of the war.
In the fifth issue, “Humpin the Boonies,” readers are shown the first close view of
the Vietnamese.  After the unit stumbles upon a massive pile of bodies, murdered by the
NLF, one of the troops hears a squad of soldiers, who turn out to be the executioners of
the villagers, drunkenly stumbling down the road. “They get careless when they think
they’re safe,” one of the Americans says.  “Must be a pretty big camp nearby.  Let’s find
it!”520  In the next pane, the American unit shows up, completely undetected, a few yards
away from the base.  “See the livestock.  They must have ‘liberated’ it from the village.
These are the boys that like to play with machetes.”  After calling for reinforcements, the
V.C. base is shelled, and we see fearful Vietnamese soldiers being exploded by artillery;
the entire base is wiped out without a fight.  As in other representations discussed in this
and previous chapters, when the Vietnamese forces are shown at all, they are often shown
as incompetent or corrupt.
Similar images appear with incredible regularity in the comic.  In the next issue,
“Monsoon,” the racist caricatures of Vietnamese villagers go well beyond comic book
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simplifications.  Aside from the crude artwork, the villagers in this issue grin menacingly
throughout the following “realistic” dialogue:
Vietnamese Villager:Hello Joe! Welcome to our old poor village.
American Soldier: Thank you.  We are just passing through, looking for numbah
ten guerillas. Have you seen any?
Villager: (now surrounded by four other grinning locals): Guerillas! Here? This is
just a peaceful village.
Soldier: I am glad it is so peaceful.  We will not disturb you, but surely you won’t
mind if we walk through and avoid the mud of the fields?
Villager: We would be proud to have our American friends visit.  Just follow this
dike for another two or three clicks.  We will go ahead to prepare a welcome.
Unsurprisingly, the Americans see through the villagers’ charade, and ambush the
villagers “welcome,” which consists of a few dozen members of the NLF, heavily armed
and idly waiting for the approaching Americans.  All of the Vietnamese are killed in the
American counter-attack.
In two issues, however, the creators of The ‘Nam, stretch the limits of
representations by attempting to present a view of the war from the “enemy’s point of
view.”  In Number Seven, for instance, entitled “Good Old Days,” the cover shows an
old, run down Vietnamese soldier against a backdrop of two rifles, a silhouetted map of
Vietnam, and a pastiche of flags related to the occupation and liberation of the country.
Ed Marks, the “star” of the first year’s series, asks Duong, a former NLF soldier, “why he
switched.”  The entire strip offers a condensed history of Vietnamese from 1940 to 1967,
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reinscribed within a narrative that “explains” the American war.  In case readers
questioned the accuracy of the story, Doug Murray, the strip’s author, attached a note to
the second page:
The elements of this story are completely true.  Duong’s story is actually a
composite of the stories of three different VC… By using these stories, I think
we’ve given a clear picture of the roots of the war—the reason Charlie fought as
long and hard as he did.521
Duong narrates the story, which begins with French Vichy officials executing his wife,
who resisted the Japanese-French occupation.  After attending college in France and
being exposed to Vietnamese nationalist thought, Doung returned to join the Viet Minh in
their fight against the occupying powers.  As the Viet Minh unit liberated his village,
Duong began to be suspicious of the revolutionaries, and returned to his life as “a simple
farmer.”  In 1954, “it all came apart again… war had come again,” and Duong again
joined the Viet Minh to fight the French.  “Finally, at Dienbienphu, the war was over,” he
continued, “but that wasn’t the end of it.  The diplomats talked and my country still
wasn’t free.  It was split in two.  And the South was still under the hand of the
colonialists.”522  Describing the repression of Diem’s regime in the South and land reform
in the North, Duong noted that “there seemed no justice anywhere.”
Then, with the arrival of large numbers of troops, the story notes, “the Americans
came:”
They began to build great bases, where they could feel secure.  Then they went in
to our cities, and tried to buy everything [including, the image instructs,
Vietnamese women].  But they were never really secure.  Not in their bases. Not
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in our cities.  They were never safe. [images of Americans having their throats slit
and being gunned down by Vietnamese]. But the Americans got better, and more
confident. Meanwhile I kept fighting. But it was not the same.  You Americans
wanted to help [American soldiers assisting Vietnamese children], while my
people—I do not know what my people were trying to do! [a young Vietnamese
boy attacks American soldiers with a grenade, killing them both.]  As time passed,
I became more and more unsure that I was on the right side [Viet Minh gunning
down unarmed students, women, and children].  Finally, I made my decision. I
came to your people, where I have been accepted.523
This attempt at the “enemy’s” point of view, far from showing “why Charlie fought as
long and hard as he did,” works entirely within the pattern of historical inversion
whereby the Americans are entirely different from the imperial powers that previously
sought to colonize Vietnam.  The story completely masks the long history of American
involvement that began long before 1965, and completely ignores the role of American
atrocities and war crimes in Vietnam.  In contrast, although the strip does attempt to show
the nationalist roots of the Vietnamese revolutionary forces, it makes them out to be little
more than murderers and tyrants, while the American servicemen are cast as the innocent
victims of young urban terrorists on motorbikes.  Thus, whether the revolutionary forces
of Vietnam were primarily Communist or Nationalist is irrelevant to the story; they were
simply terrorists who attacked the friendly Americans—in acts that this seasoned
nationalist fighter is unable to comprehend.
Less troubling is number twenty-two, “Thanks for Thanksgiving,” which offers a
surprisingly dignified representation of Vietnamese forces, if only for a few pages.  In an
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underground tunnel complex, Vietnamese subjects, far from the racist caricatures seen in
other issues escape American fire, treat their wounded, and speak in full sentences (which
were “translated from the Vietnamese”).  For the rest of the book, action reverts back to
the American unit, which cooks up a large Thanksgiving feast while in the field.  As they
leave their field location to return the base, the Americans leave several cases of food
behind, which the Vietnamese forces take into the bunkers to feed their wounded.  “You
see, Doctor.  You see?,” one of the wounded says.  “It is as I said!  The Americans have
much!  So much!  And it just slips through their fingers.  So it will be with our country!
With all their might!  It will slip though their fingers.” “I hope you are right, my friend,”
the doctor replies.  “I just hope you are right.”524
The issue is fairly remarkable for a comic-book representation of the American
war in Vietnam, but needs to be placed in the context of the rest of the issues.  This is the
only issue among the first fifty that offers a representation of the Vietnamese as
something other than invisible, silent enemies, racist dehumanized caricatures, or
helpless, fearful villagers.  Overall, the comic not only follows these previous patterns of
representing the “Other,” but works within the larger pattern of cultural inversion we
have seen in other media and texts so far.
The ‘Nam also regularly inverted the history of the war though the distortion of
particular incidents and images.  In number twenty-four, “The Beginning of the End,” set
during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the strip follows the troops through their battle at the
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American Embassy in Saigon, after which they meet up with General Loan, the head of
the brutal and repressive South Vietnamese police forces.  The cover of the book offers a
different take on the famous image of General Loan executing a Vietnamese prisoner,
showing the image from behind the prisoner, with the cameraman who took the picture in
the center of the frame.  As a photographer and his Vietnamese guide survey the streets,
the American unit discovers that Loan’s family and one of his assistants have been killed
by the NLF.  In the next frames, the famous image of Loan executing a Vietnamese
prisoner is inverted, showing it from a different view: the strip shows a close shot on the
photographer’s camera lens, which reflects the image of Loan firing a bullet into the head
of the prisoner.  The prisoner, however, is mostly obscured by the frame.  The image thus
focuses attention on the camera, making its focus the media’s coverage of the event
rather than the illegal execution itself.  In the scene that follows, the American soldiers
looking on are concerned not with the barbarous act, but by the fact that the images shot
by the photographer will be on the “front page of every newspaper” in the United States.
Bruce Franklin, in his Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, placed The ‘Nam’s
inversion of this image within the larger process of cultural inversion begun by The Deer
Hunter a decade earlier:
The prisoner appears merely as an arm, a shoulder, and a sliver of a body on the
left.  The only face shown belongs to the chief of the security police, who displays
the righteous—even heroic—indignation that has led him to carry out this
justifiable revenge against the treacherous “Viet Cong” pictured in the story.  The
climactic image is a full page in which the execution scene appears as a reflection
in the gigantic lens of the camera above the leering mouth of the photographer,
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from which comes a bubble with his greedy words, “Keep Shooting! Just keep
shooting!”  “Shooting” a picture here had become synonymous with murder and
treason.525
Franklin goes on to critique the strip’s indictment of the media, preaching a dangerous
but often quoted “lesson” of the American War in Vietnam.  “The logic of this comic
book militarism is inescapable,” he writes.  “[P]hotographers should be allowed to show
the public only what the military deems suitable.”526
The process of inversion does not end with the strip, however.  Readers of the
strip are free to examine the representations, weigh them against their own knowledge
and experience them, and construct their own meanings.  Unfortunately, however, a large
segment of The Nam’s audience seems to have learned the inverted lesson offered by the
strip.  In future issues, several readers wrote in to praise the issue, for both its artistic and
educational value.  In the February edition, three issues later, one reader lauded the
“magnificent” cover and the writer’s attention to the “context” of the photo: “it is always
easy so easy to forget that the photo doesn’t exist by itself, in some sort of historical
limbo.”  “Thank you for taking the mystique away from the enemy,” he concluded.527  A
more disturbing letter comes from a young reader of the comic:
Thanks for the truth about the Vietnam War.  I’m 14, so this comic is the only
way to see THE NAM without sneaking into movie theaters.  My history classes
ignore the war  Our education on Vietnam consists of being told there was a war
and seeing a documentary about the invasion of the embassy.  I learned more in
issue #24 than I did in two weeks of edited documentaries that show the V.C. as
heroes and the grunts as child killers.528
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The readers of The ‘Nam, however, were not all young, “post-Vietnam” schoolchildren
learning their first lessons about the war.  Many were veterans and amateur historians,
who did write in from time to time to discuss the “reality” presented in the comic.
Almost invariably, however, these discussions focused on the details of military symbols
and command structures invoked in the text.  One of these figures took issue with
Number 24, not with the portrayal of the image, but with details about the timing of the
attack on the embassy, a man in the embassy to whom an American soldier threw a pistol,
and the NLF takeover of the local radio station tower.  The author responded by invoking
dramatic license.  “The events are correct,” he claimed. “The people are ficticious.”529
In other instances, however, the strip completely rewrites events themselves,
offering a revisionist approach to the war that goes far beyond the symbolic inversion
offered in the Tet issue.  In number nine, for instance, the story opens with Ed reading an
issue of Stars and Stripes, the official military newspaper.  Above Ed, the strip notes that,
in keeping with the “real time” narrative, the story takes place in October of 1966.  The
image on the front of the paper is of a seated figure engulfed by flames.  The ensuing
dialogue confirms that this is indeed an allusion to the infamous self-immolation of
Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, who took his own life on a crowded Saigon street to
protest the Diem regime’s repression of religious freedom in Southern Vietnam—in June
of 1963.530
The anachronism of the representation is not the only misrepresentation here.  Far
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more disturbing was the explanation given for the photo in the Incoming Section of the
book several issues later.  In response to a letter from a young reader of the comic, Doug
allows the following historical inversion to take place:
I am writing to you to ask about the picture on the cover of the STARS AND
STRIPES in Ed Marks’ hands on page 1 of issue # 9.  Is this supposed to be a
photo of the time when a Buddhist monk set himself on fire in the street to protest
communism?… Maybe you should have let the readers understand more clearly
exactly  what it was in the photo.  Maybe Ed could have read the headline out
loud, or you could have made the headline visible to the reader.531
Doug responded:
Yes, that was a photo of a Buddhist monk immolating himself in a protest.  Such
things happened many times in the course of the Vietnam war and became so
near-common that people didn’t even mention it most of the time.  We don’t
really feel it necessary to call attention to such things because they are part of the
background… It’s there for readers like you, who care enough to pay attention to
the whole story, not just the combat sequences.532
The historical reality of the act, a protest against the repressive, anti-Buddhist actions of
the American-supported Diem regime in Southern Vietnam is clearly inverted here.
Doug allows the assertion in Joe’s letter, that the monk sacrificed himself to protest
Communism, to stand unchallenged.  He does further injustice to the legacy of Duc by
arguing that such acts were so commonplace as to become simply “part of the
background.”  Overtly relegating such actions to the backdrop of the comic’s “action”
further demonstrates the extent to which the effects of the war on Vietnam and the
Vietnamese are marginalized by the text.  Bringing Duc’s story into the fold in any
truthful way would force the narrative to acknowledge the repressive nature of the
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American-backed regime in the South.  Having clearly explained at the outset of the strip
that “The V.C.” were “the bad guys” in the war, such complications are left outside the
realm of normative discourse in the text.
As with the problematic representations of the Vietnamese and sanitized version
of the war presented throughout the strip, there is little worth criticism in and of itself,
given the medium and genre.  However, given the strip’s claims of historical accuracy,
realism, and attention to detail, such misrepresentations are both discouraging and
dangerous.  Were these images and versions of the past simply standing on their own,
they might be dismissed as subtle, if precarious distortions of the past.  But The ‘Nam
also offers evidence, through its “Incoming” section, that its representations of the war
were reaching and connecting with readers.  Indeed, the Incoming page is a much more
interesting and important site for the battle over the cultural memory of the war.  Over the
course of the first fifty issues, from December of 1986 through November of 1990, The
‘Nam printed close to two hundred letters from readers including American, Australian,
and Canadian Veterans of the war, children of American soldiers who fought in the war,
students attempting to learn more about the war, and comic book fans who seemed to
have little interest in the war at all.  The Incoming pages of The ‘Nam are the space in
which an inverted reality of the war is accomplished for a specific audience, with readers
staking a claim for both the accuracy and educational value of the strip, and the creators
further ensconcing their own version of reality of the war, the updated version of “the
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way it really was.”
Out of the two hundred printed letters, roughly one third of the total praised the
comic for its realism.  For some, this distinction was drawn clearly in reference to other
comics, primarily G.I. Joe, or films, such as Rambo.  Many also commented on the
similarities of the strip to Platoon.  (About fourteen percent of the letters mentioned
Stone’s film by name; almost the identical number referenced Rambo, Missing In Action,
or G.I. Joe.)  The space was also used to debate issues related to the war, such as the
treatment of veterans, the anti-war movement, and the POW/MIA issue.  In most
instances, backed by the authority of his creator’s voice and his status as a veteran, Doug
Murray framed and allowed the framing of the page to purport his views on these and
other issues, all the while holding up his view as the reality of the war.
On the first Incoming page, in February of 1987, five of the seven letters used the
word “real,” or some derivative thereof to describe the first issues of The ‘Nam.  “I hope
to see this magazine continue to tell the true story,” wrote one veteran.  “War is not a
game, it is not ‘RAMBO’ or ‘G.I. JOE.’  A younger reader concurred:  “THE NAM isn’t
super heroes, it’s not ‘GI JOE,’ it’s not RAMBO… It bears a closer relationship to some
recent war films than it does to ‘Sgt. Rock’ [another war comic].  For this reader, the fact
that the “enemy” was largely invisible was a bonus:
The enemy is never portrayed as evil or monstrous, in fact, they remain unseen
throughout the whole story—a literary tactic, which when employed in
propoganda is designed to dehumanize the enemy and make them easier to hate
and kill, but here actually serve to make war more baffling.533
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Others added praise for the “rugged realism,” or “honest and insightful” message of the
book.
Throughout its run, letters such as these continued to pour in, continuing the
redefinition of reality.  “I envisioned four-color adaptations of such travesties as RAMBO
or MISSING IN ACTION,” wrote a European reader.  “I feel it is a pernicious tendency
in the popular media today to trivialize what was a very traumatic experience, not only
for the U.S. but also for the rest of the Western world.”534  “GI Joe and Rambo are okay
for fantasy,” wrote a longtime comics fan, “but this real life depiction of war is great.”
Another gushed, “THE NAM is probably the most realistic and fabulous comic I have
ever read.”535  “I am glad to see a comic that deals with the reality of this war,” added a
reader who was “too young to remember much about the Vietnam era:”
I hope that kids do read THE NAM.  We have to be reminded that war is not GI
JOE, that people die and lives are torn.  We need to know just what happened in
Vietnam.  I intend to be with THE NAM throughout the entire war.  I don’t want
to place blame for what happened in Vietnam—I only want to understand.536
Clearly, for these and other readers, The ‘Nam fit the mold of the new reality for
the American War in Vietnam.  Just as Platoon was upheld as “the way it was,” largely
because Rambo had shown the way it wasn’t, The ‘Nam must have been the way it was
because it was working within a different mode of representation than both Rambo and
G.I. Joe.  As one reader described the book, “The people who were there can say, ‘Yeah,
that’s the way it really was,’ the people who were never there can look at it and say,
                                                 
534 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 6 (May, 1987); emphasis added.
535 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 8 (July, 1987).
536 Ibid.
321
‘Yeah, that’s the way it really must have been.’”537
By contrast, only a token few of the letters criticized the comic’s lack of realism,
and most of these, as with the Tet issue described above, focused on items such as the
correct order of battle, or the correct spelling of an Air Force Base.538  Most of these
letters were more concerned with the dictates of the comics code than with the content of
The ‘Nam per se, but even in these letters, the influence of Platoon was made clear.  In
issue eleven, for instance, one letter argued that
adhering to the code has done more than inhibit the language—it has totally ruled
out a realistic portrayal of the war.  I’m sure we won’t see any of the rape, drug
use, or fragging of superior officers that was so prevalent among the troops in
Vietnam… PLATOON catches the reality, THE NAM is nothing more than a
watered-down kiddie version.539
Murray’s response to this letter is intriguing.  He cited several other letters from
readers who had also seen Platoon, but came to different conclusions:
Platoon is a very realistic looking movie; however, it is not a totally realistic
portrayal of the Vietnam War!  Fraggings, rape, destruction of villages, all of the
stuff the TV and newspaper reporters of the late 60’s and 70’s made such a big
thing out of were not, I repeat, not the everyday affairs of life in the Vietnam war.
Atrocities did happen, officers and NCO’s were fragged, but this was the
exception, not the rule.  Reality may not be exciting and titillating as
entertainment—but it does exist.540
In the space of a brief paragraph, the author accomplishes a number of things, all
of which demonstrate a great deal about the tone of his comic.  First, as he did with the
                                                 
537 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 3.
538 See, for instance, “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 9 (August, 1987) and No. 20 (July,
1988).
539 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 11 (October, 1987).
540 Ibid.  Emphasis in original.
322
Tet issue, he blames the media for misrepresenting the “everyday affairs” of the
American war, “making big things” out of the occasional rape or atrocity.  Secondly, he
demonstrates the extent to which the comic focuses on the American experience.  Even if
such events were not “everyday” occurrences, the destruction of villages and the deaths
of civilians in particular must have seemed far from “the exception” to Vietnamese
citizens.  Most importantly for our purposes, however, he betrays how the matrix
constructed by and around Platoon defined the terms of debate over the historical
realities of the war.  Any attention to American war crimes in Vietnam would begin to
focus attention on the effects of the war on the Vietnamese people, and such attention
would greatly complicate The ‘Nam’s sanitized version of the war.
More common than these debates, however, was the issue of whether or not
young people should be the target of a war comic.  Few were concerned with exposing
children to graphic images, but many wanted more salty, violent, and gory stories for
themselves.  In number five, a reader praised the artwork but took Murray to task for
oversanitizing and oversimplifying.  “I was hoping we could have a real account of the
Vietnam War,” he wrote.  “Why do we have to gear the book toward the twelve-year-old
market?”  But Doug defended his decision to produce a “code” book, specifically
focusing on the educational value he saw in the book: “THE NAM is not just aimed at
people like you and the vets, it’s meant as a sort of primer on the Vietnam War to anyone
that will read it.”541
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It was precisely this use of the strip as a supplement, answer, or antidote to one’s
historical knowledge, or lack thereof, of the war that drew a number of readers to The
‘Nam.  One reader acknowledged that he would rather see The ‘Nam as a non-code book,
but did not want the creators to “forego a golden opportunity to do something genuinely
worthwhile in the comic medium.”  “I think you should aim at not only entertaining your
readers but also educating them about the true nature of war.”542  For many young
readers, this was exactly what they believed they were getting.  “Before this came out I
never knew much about Vietnam,” wrote a young fan.  “I like this book because it tells
me what adults won’t.  I hope that this lasts a long time and I hope all the other kids out
there are learning as much as I am.”543  Another issue features a young reader who
wanted to express his “feelings of joy” that “the world of comics is being lifted from its
station as an entertainment form to become a tool of education and enlightenment.”  He
noted that he had his interest in the war piqued in school, but “saw the need to learn about
[the war] and to spread that learning to other young people.  Movies like Platoon and
Full Metal Jacket are a start, but can only reach so many people.”544  For some, the comic
was even a substitute for school: “THE NAM gives us superior insight into the war as
opposed to the films and books (particularly history texts) on the subject,” commented
one reader.545
                                                 
542 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 6 (May, 1987).
543 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 7 (June, 1987).
544 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 14 (January, 1988).
545 “Incoming,” The ‘Nam, No. 15 (February, 1988).
324
These testaments should not be surprising.  Cultural studies scholars have long
made the claim that popular culture can be both a site of contested hegemony and a space
of pedagogical value.  What is surprising and problematic about the Incoming section of
The ‘Nam are the testaments offered to the reality of the war presented by the strip: not
that the books offer a history of the war, alternative, revisionist, or otherwise, but that,
like Platoon, it offers the history – “the way it really was.”  We have already seen how
the creators of the comic perpetuate historical myths and other revisionist inversions of
issues central to the cultural inversions of the war chronicled by Bruce Franklin546, the
POW/MIA myth and the denigration of the anti-war movement, reared their ugly heads
on the Incoming pages as well, imbued with the claims of authenticity and historical
accuracy constructed by the comic and its readers.
The POW/MIA issue first appeared in number thirteen, when a twenty-eight year
old reader wrote in to congratulate the creators on a “worthy project.”  After the
obligatory contrasts with GI JOE and Rambo, this fan asked several worthy questions
about issues related to the war, including the frequency of American atrocities (“Yes, I
am aware that the VC/NVA did things several times worse, but…) and the existence of
American MIAs being held in Vietnam.  Like many of the other historical questions
recounted above, this reader had good questions to ask about the issue, and clearly felt
Doug Murray to be a qualified person to query.  The man admitted that he was skeptical
about the myth, largely because he was “suspicious of any cause that’s made so much
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money for Sylvester Stallone and Chuck Norris.”  But, he continued, “there is some very
compelling, credible evidence.  Just because photos can be faked, and witnesses can lie,
doesn’t mean they are and they do… I would hate to reject facts just because they are
unpleasant.”547  In response to these questions, Murray noted that the strip would show an
American being taken captive in a future issue, but also offered his personal opinion,
which had been solicited by the reader: “I personally believe that there are still American
MIA’s in the ‘Nam, possibly being held against the U.S. paying the reparations agreed to
provisionally in Paris in ’72.  I doubt whether they’ll ever be released, however.”548
Murray continued to perpetuate this myth in future issues.  In number twenty-
four, a teenage reader wrote in, appealing for a special issue related the POW/MIAs he
believed to exist.  “No Rambo rescue missions,” he requested, “just cold, hard facts.”
“There are still (approximately) 2500 missing and unaccounted-for men in Vietnam,” he
added.  “ I wear an MIA/POW bracelet in hopes that SSG Elbert Bush will return home
alive.  Those that are still living need the U.S.’s support.”549  Doug praised the young
man in his response: “The M.I.A. issue is one of the most frustrating and shameful sides
of the whole war.  Anything that can be done to help is both vital and noteworthy.”550  In
another issue, another reader asked Doug if he thought any of his friends from the war
were still being held in Hanoi.  Murray’s response began with an affirmation of his faith
in the myth: “I personally believe that are still Americans in Vietnam—whether you want
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to call them POW’s or MIA’s is unimportant.  I also believe that they will never come
back, simply because of the political outrage that would result.  On the personal side… I
really don’t know if friends I left behind are still there.”551
The perpetuation of the POW/MIA myth is certainly disturbing, but it seems more
benign when compared with the manner in which the anti-war movement was raked over
the coals in The ‘Nam.  The furor over this issue began with number fifteen, when PFC
Ed Marks returned to “the world,” after his tour in the war.  The cover of that issue
featured Marks standing in line at the airport between two “hippies,” one skinny and
scowling, another obese an apparently yelling something at the returning soldier.  In the
story, Marks comes home to feel unappreciated, misunderstood, amazed at the antiwar
movement, and angry about the media’s coverage of the war.  In a letter to his buddies
still in Vietnam, he writes of seeing a major protest on television:  “There were college
students in Wisconsin… trying to do… I don’t know what, something about a
representative for Dow Chemcials and them trying to stop Dow from making napalm.”
In the next scene, a shocked Marks continues, “Napalm! How many times did a napalm
drop save our butts?”  Rather than trying to understand the protestors, whose side his
father tries to explain to him, Marks reenlists and becomes a drill instructor for a short
time, after which he returns to college because “someone who understood what it’s really
like in the Nam had to tell its story.” 552
Immediately, the letters poured in from readers upset with the representation of
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the antiwar movement offered by The ‘Nam.  Two especially angry letters appeared in
number eighteen.  The first defended the antiwar movement, calling number fifteen a
“gross insult to those of us who gave so much to try to bring an end to this war,” and
defending the right of dissent in wartime.  The second, written by someone from the
Comics Industry, was less tempered and more insensitive than the first, taking issue with
the defense of Dow Chemical, but also chiding at the notion that “we’re supposed to feel
sorry for Ed Marks because he didn’t get a ticker tape parade,” and arguing that the
portrayal of the war through individual, sympathetic soldiers was “something like doing a
book called AUSCHWITZ and presenting the Nazi guards as people too.”553  Doug
Murray’s lengthy response began with a defense of those “who had fought a dirty and
unpleasant war because their government had asked us to,” and then launched into a
diatribe against “those who reviled returning troops simply because they felt those young
men should not have fought,” even though neither the strip nor the letters dealt with any
specific ill treatment of returning veterans.  Murray then took on the writer of the second
letter, which he labeled “unreasoning elitist tripe,” directly:
     As for you, Mr. Karter, do you believe that each individual American must
make his own choice on when and where to fight and what is and is not a “just”
war?  There is a word for that—the word is anarchy, and that way lies the death
and obliteration of everything we (even you) hold dear.”554
Your contention that napalm was bad because Dow Chemical made money on
it is downright imbecilic.  Do you try and make money with your “Dreamwell
Comics?”  If so, does that automatically make them bad?  Making money is part
of the American way.  If, while making that money, you do some good (and I feel
that saving American troops’ lives is good), then it is all the better.555
                                                 




Aside from the absurdity of some positions in both the letter and the response,
what is particularly intriguing is how once again the Vietnamese have been positioned
completely outside the terms of the debate here.  Neither of the antiwar letters, aside from
the implied reference of Auschwitz, mention the effects of the war on the Vietnamese,
and the entire discussion of Dow Chemical, from both sides, fails to mention why so
much anger was directed at that firms’ profiteering from the production and employment
of napalm: that, “in saving the butts” of American servicemen, Dow’s chemical
weaponry savagely burned, killed, and maimed innocent Vietnamese, and destroyed
millions of acres of Vietnamese land.
Several fans wrote in to echo Murray’s response to the letters, and others added
their own responses as well, most of which continued to center on the treatment of
veterans at the hands of an ungrateful antiwar movement.  One letter went so far as to
proclaim that “the only real tragedy of the ‘Nam war [was that] no one, absolutely no one
ever went up to a Nam vet and said: “You did a good job.”556  In a later issue, a veteran
wrote in to note that he and his fellow veterans” have made our peace with our
treatment.”  But this peace was conditional; this reader was only willing to grant
forgiveness for the past sins of the antiwar in exchange for deference to those “who were
there:”
If THE ‘NAM is not a realistic portrayal of the war, I wish someone would tell
me what I was in.  Yes, “Platoon” and “A Rumor of War: may be an example of
one facet of the war, but they are not the be all and end all of Vietnam.  If this is
your memory of your time there, then please see a counselor to help you handle
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the problems you will face in the not too distant future.  If, on the other hand, you
were not there, then keep your bleepin mouth SHUT!557
In one fail swoop, this veteran summarizes the cultural work done by the reconstruction
of the reality of the American War in Vietnam during the mid to late 1980s: The
recuperation of the American veterans of the war as the center of the historical narrative;
the claim of reality for the narrow version of history presented and defended by Platoon
and, then, The ‘Nam; the silencing of voices and stories that cannot be contained by those
narratives of reality, including the antiwar movement, the Vietnamese, and anyone “who
wasn’t there.”
By 1988, the Third Indochina War was nearing an end as Vietnam continued to
remove its troops from Cambodia.  As we saw in chapter five, the events in Southeast
Asia received little attention in the American press, certainly nothing that bordered on the
consecutive cultural phenomena of Rambomania and Platoonmania from 1985 to 1987.
For an indication of the depths of ignorance of the situation in Southeast Asia and the
state of American-Vietnamese relations toward the end of the 1980s, consider the essay,
“No Hard Feelings?” in the December 1988 issue of The Atlantic Monthly.  Penned by
the accomplished James Fallows, who some years earlier had written one of the most
eloquent pieces about the gross inequities in the American draft, “No Hard Feelings” was
based in part on Fallow’s trip to Southeast Asia in 1987.  The author mentions the war
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with Cambodia only once, in passing, yet at the same time, expresses surprise that the
Vietnamese are seemingly not as interested in the American war on their country as the
United States is.  That sentiment, Fallows noted, was shared by several other Southeast
nations he visited, which led him to make the following astonishing statement:
The Vietnamese obviously care more about their war than their neighbors do, but
what I saw reinforced the conclusion I had reached in the neighboring countries:
The Vietnam War will be important only for what it did internally to the United
States.  What it did internally is immense, but the effects may be easier to deal
with if we recognize that we are talking about something Americans did to one
another, not an event that changed world history.558
Again, we can see the pervasive effects of the Platoon syndrome in American society.  In
the space of little more than a decade, “Vietnam” had gone from something “we” did to
the Vietnamese to something Vietnam did to “us,” to, finally, something “we” did to
ourselves.  By the end of the 1980s, the Vietnamese astonishingly had ceased even to be a
required component of the matrix of representations for the American War in Vietnam.
Fallows ended his article by arguing that the Vietnamese wanted to normalize
relations with the United States solely for financial reasons, as if there were another,
more fitting reason for them to do so.  In the end, he argues, the United States should
treat Vietnam as “just another bad country,” much like Burma, and there is no real harm
in having a relationship with bad countries.559  With the end of the war in Cambodia and
the historical inversion of the American War in Vietnam essentially complete by the end
of the 1980s, there was seemingly little standing in the way of normalizing relations with
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this “bad country.”  As the United States and Vietnam entered the 1990s, the possibility
of reconciliation between the two nations was, once again, at hand.  As we will see in the
following chapter, however, peace continued to be an elusive goal.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Peace is at Hand:
Roadmaps, Roadblocks and One Way Streets, 1990-1995
Throughout the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Bush administration made clear that
the United States was not simply at war with Iraq; it was at war with the memory of
Vietnam. While much of this rhetoric was to be expected—all U.S. military adventures
since 1975 had been viewed though the lens of the Vietnam War—the Bush White House
seemed almost singularly obsessed with “curing” what had become knows as America’s
Vietnam “syndrome.”560  In his inaugural address three years earlier, Bush became only
the second U.S. President ever to use the word “Vietnam” in that forum, declaring, “the
final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a
memory.”561   On November 30, with over 300,000 American troops already assembled
in the Persian Gulf region, Bush assured the nation that this war would “not be another
Vietnam.”  After the end of hostilities, the President infamously declared, “By God,
we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”562 In his testimony to a Senate
panel the following month, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon opened by
telling the committee, “Let me begin by saying the war is over.  As the President has said,
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our Vietnam syndrome is behind us.”563  It was unclear to which war the Secretary was
referring; for the White House, the war with Vietnam and the war with Iraq had become
one and the same.
Mary McGrory pointed out in her Washington Post column shortly after the end
of the Gulf War, if Bush wished to “formalize the defeat of the ‘Vietnam syndrome,” he
could begin by normalizing relations with the nation of Vietnam, and certainly by lifting
the trade embargo that was nearing its fifteenth anniversary.  As McGrory noted, the time
was ripe for such a step forward.  The President was enjoying a ninety-percent approval
rating at the time, and polls showed that although Americans were less inclined to
support full recognition of Vietnam, seventy percent favored lifting the embargo.564  With
the syndrome apparently “kicked,” nearly all of the Vietnamese troops gone from
Cambodia (an estimated 5,000 “advisors” remained at the time), continued progress
being made on the POW/MIA issue as a result of the Vessey Mission565, and American
business interests clamoring for access to the Vietnamese market, the time certainly
appeared right to end the sanctions program.
In this chapter, I trace the final stages of the American War on Vietnam from the
beginning of the “Roadmap” phase of the Bush administration in 1991 through the
normalization of diplomatic relations under the Clinton Administration.  Although, as I
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have alluded to above, the time was ripe for an end to the sanctions program in 1991,
hostile relations with Vietnam would drag on for several years.  The primary reason for
this delay, as I demonstrate here, is a continued tension between the two primary lobby
groups affecting U.S. policy toward Vietnam, the POW/MIA lobby and American
business interests.  Throughout the Roadmap phase, the POW/MIA lobby continued to
construct roadblocks to normalization—a series of bizarre and unfortunate hoaxes
designed to persuade policymakers and the public that Americans had been, and
continued to be, held prisoner in Southeast Asia.  Meanwhile, U.S. corporations found
themselves shut out of the rapidly expanding Vietnamese market.  As Japanese, French
companies, as well as firms from the ASEAN allies (whose policies the U.S. was
ostensibly supporting by maintaining the embargo), streamed into Vietnam, American
businesses grew increasingly frustrated by the legal barriers that remained in place under
the U.S. sanctions program.
Throughout a length policy debate, another round of Select Committee Hearings
on the POW/MIA issue, and the domestic political entanglements of the Clinton
administration, the tension between these two lobby groups continued to manifest itself
around two key phrases: leverage and, more importantly, access.  POW/MIA groups
argued that if the United States lifted the embargo, it would lose its only source of
leverage over Hanoi and would thus be helpless to force Vietnam to return the remains of
American service personnel.  Business interests took the opposite approach, arguing not
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only that they desired entrance to the Vietnamese market, but that increased access by the
United States in the region would also facilitate the goals of the POW/MIA efforts.
Indeed, as we will see, only when “access” becomes the dominant argument for both
groups does the embargo get lifted and normalization proceed.  The discursive
construction of Vietnam around the term access during this final stage of the war is
appropriate, given the larger shift in American society in this period.  Although many
policymakers are fond of describing the transition of “Vietnam” in American culture
from a “war” to a “nation,” this only masks the construction most important to the shift in
policy: Vietnam as “market.”  Ironically, this final shift in the way in which Americans
talk, wrote, and debated “Vietnam,” returned U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia to where
it had been fifty years earlier at the dawn of the Cold War, when the American architects
of the postwar world sought to develop the region as a market for the raw materials, labor
needs, and finished consumer goods of Japan.  By the end of the twentieth century
Vietnam had come nearly full circle in the designs of the United States: from market to
nation to war to movie and back, finally, to market.
The “Roadmap”
On the heels of its victory in the Gulf, the Bush Administration was moving
forward with normalization plans in the spring of 1991.  At the United Nations on April
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9, Solomon met with Vietnamese diplomat Trinh Xuan Lang, presenting him with the
Bush administration’s “Roadmap” to normalized relations.  The document laid out a four-
step plan to phase in normalization gradually.  The steps all revolved around a final
settlement in Cambodia and Vietnamese “cooperation” on the POW/MIA issue.  Once
again, official U.S. government policy created a linkage, this time overtly, between
Vietnamese efforts to produce the remains of U.S. personnel and an end to the sanctions
programs. As had been the case for close to two decades, that same policy would
regularly be turned against the Vietnamese in coming years, with various constituencies
accusing Hanoi of holding remains, if not prisoners, “hostage” in exchange for American
trade.  What the POW/MIA lobby and its allies would never come to recognize is how
much of a one-way street the roadmap really was.  The gradual easing of the embargo
would do little for Vietnam.  It would, however, drastically increase the “progress” and
results sought by the POW community.  It would also create new opportunities for
American business interests, even if at a slower pace than corporations sought.
Throughout the process, however, and even after the completion of the roadmap
framework, the Vietnamese remained at a gross disadvantage in their relationship with
the United States.
Specifically, phase one of the roadmap called for a final peace agreement in
Cambodia and increased progress on the POW/MIA issue in exchange for the easing of
travel restrictions on American citizens by the U.S.  Phase two called for a lasting
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Cambodian ceasefire and more progress on POW/MIAs in exchange for a partial lifting
of the American trade embargo.   Phase three was to be completed after the United
Nations peacekeeping force had been in Cambodia for at least six months, continued
progress on the POW/MIA issue, a full end to the American embargo, the establishment
of diplomatic offices in each country and an easing of restrictions on international
lending.  Finally, phase four was called for U.N.-supervised elections in Cambodia,
continued progress on POW/MIAs, support for international loans, and full normalization
of political and economic relations.566
Despite a luke-warm reception to the plan by Hanoi, which was understandably
frustrated by this ongoing linkage between the embargo and the POW/MIA issue as well
as the fact that the Cambodian peace plan being supported and brokered by the U.S.
continued to include representatives of the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese had little
choice but to accept the American framework.  That year, aid from the Soviet Union had
been cut in half, from $2 billion to $1 billion.  Before the end of the summer, the Soviet
Union would collapse, leaving Vietnam without its principal source of aid.  Even with
increased trade from the ASEAN nations, Japan, and Europe since its withdrawal from
Cambodia, Vietnam was in need of access to large amounts capital to finance its most
pressing need: renovating the infrastructure, much of it neglected and still in tatters from
the end of the American war.
There were several possible solutions to this problem, but all of them were limited
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to some degree by the American sanctions program.  Most corporations were unwilling or
unable to invest in or engage in such programs themselves, and many of the firms best
suited to the size and scale required were American companies, still banned even from
the bidding process.  The projects could also be funded by bilateral aid, but likely
candidates such as France and Japan were still nominally supporting the U.S. embargo.
Although they both had begun to resume trade with Vietnam, both nations remained
unwilling to provide the levels of direct aid necessary for large infrastructure projects.
Finally, the most plausible, if not the most ideal scenario for funding the projects was to
secure loans from an IFI.  Because of the American-led ban on loans to Vietnam,
however, the IMF, World Bank, and ADB were all prohibited from making such
arrangements with Hanoi.  While France and other nations had pushed for an end to the
policy since the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia in 1989, the United States
and Japan had lobbied to keep the ban in place.  By the end of 1991, Japan would join
France in leading the charge for a resumption of lending and a restructuring of Vietnam’s
existing debt, but would still face stiff opposition from the U.S.567
The intransigence of the Bush administration on the issue of IFI lending is, at first
glance, the most glaring oddity of the Roadmap: Why would the administration set the
resumption of international lending to Vietnam, a relatively minor step compared with
full normalization, for the final step of the roadmap, after an end to the American trade
embargo?  Why would it actively prevent Vietnam from financing its own projects or
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other nations from helping to finance those projects through IFIs?  The petty resentment
of U.S. policymakers toward Vietnam is likely part of an explanation, as is the ongoing
desire by Washington to use the IMF and World Bank as tools to enforce American
foreign policy.  A fuller answer would become obvious in later hearings: Under the terms
of the U.S. sanctions regime, American firms would be barred from bidding on or
participating in any IFI-sponsored programs should lending to Vietnam resume.  The
Bush administration thus designed the Roadmap to prolong unnecessarily the already
blatant politicization of the IFIs so that American firms would not lose further business
opportunities to their international counterparts.  As a result of such policies, as well as
the regularly scheduled speed bumps provided by the POW/MIA community, Vietnam
would have to wait several more years to reach the end of the road to normalization.
In the spring of 1991, though, many in the administration claimed normalization
could happen sooner rather than later.  On April 11, Solomon told Congress that if the
Vietnamese cooperated fully with the plan, full normalization would occur “in short
order.”568  On April 20, after two days of negotiations between General Vessey and
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach, the State administration announced that a U.S.
office designed to facilitate progress on the POW/MIA would be established in Hanoi.
Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs again on
April 25, Solomon announced that as a positive gesture toward recent progress on the
POW/MIA issue, the U.S. would make its first aid donation to Vietnam since 1975: one
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million dollars, distributed by private agencies and NGOs for the production of prosthetic
devices to help amputees from the American war.569  From the view of the White House,
the Roadmap initiative was already ahead of schedule and yielding results.
Claims of progress were met with skepticism on Capitol Hill, however.  Members
of Congress with wildly differing views on the situation in Cambodia and relations with
Vietnam were quick to criticize the administration’s policy from all sides.  Senators and
Vietnam veterans John Kerry and John McCain, for instance, argued that as long as the
Chinese continued to back the Khmer Rouge forces, a lasting peace in Cambodia would
remain a distant hope.  Thus, they reasoned, it seemed unfair to hold the Vietnamese
accountable for Khmer Rouge actions when they had for the past decade been the only
nation to actively fight against the former genocidal regime.  “If we were applying as
much pressure to the Chinese as we are on the Vietnamese,” McCain told The
Washington Post, “I’d be more optimistic.”570  Kerry was more pointed in his criticisms.
Sparring with Secretary Solomon at the April 11 hearings, the Senator from
Massachusetts pointed to the inconsistencies with American policy.  The U.S., he pointed
out, had been at the very least complicit in the rebuilding of the Khmer Rouge, and had a
long record of open and often friendly relationships with other repressive and murderous
regimes.
You know what Vietnam did?  They did what nobody else was willing to do.
They went into Cambodia and kicked the Khmer Rouge out and nobody in the
world said thank you.  We responded with an embargo…  Why is it that we are
driven to treat Vietnam differently from Iraq, from China, from Chile and
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Pinochet, from other countless other governments?571
In fact, the Vietnamese continued to be the only force actively resisting the return to
power of the Khmer Rouge.  Earlier in that week, some of the remaining Vietnamese
military personnel remaining in Cambodia helped put down an uprising by members of
the former genocidal regime.572  The United States, meanwhile, continued to support the
inclusion of Khmer Rouge members in the transitional Cambodian government.573
Another group of Senators was attacking administration policy from a different
angle point, arguing that far from accelerating progress on the POW/MIA issue, as Kerry
and McCain argued, “accommodating” Vietnam by gradually easing the embargo would
mean abandoning the only leverage the U.S. continued to hold over Vietnam.  Leading
this charge were Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Bob Smith of New
Hampshire.  Ironically, although these rigidly anti-Communist Senators held no brief for
Vietnam, they continued to see the U.S. Government as the primary obstacle to a full
accounting of American personnel from the war in Vietnam.  Smith in particular was an
open supporter of various conspiracy theories purporting that the American government
was actively suppressing knowledge of American servicemen being held in Southeast
Asia.  Helms agreed with Smith, taking a page out of the Rambo script in his dissent from
the Roadmap policy, “I’m not criticizing Vietnam as much as I am our own
government.”574  In May, less than a month after the formal proclamation of the
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Roadmap, they took up the most controversial aspect of the policy—“satisfactory
progress” toward a “full accounting” by Vietnam of all unaccounted for American
servicemen—by producing a wildly inaccurate report on the history of the POW/MIA
issue. 575
Led by Smith and Helms, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee as well as committed devotees to the POW mythology, the POW/MIA
activists built on this latest “report” and began to lobby for the creation of yet another
Senate Select Committee to resolve the fate of the unaccounted-for soldiers.  Many years
had passed since the height of Rambomania, however.  Those in Congress and the White
House who still assumed the worst about Vietnam were by 1991 more likely to believe
that rapprochement with Vietnam, rather than isolation, was the best course of action.
The roadmap and the growing power of the pro-Vietnam business lobby were steering
American-Vietnamese relations toward a path where “access” trumped “leverage.”
1991 Embargo Hearings
With the Vietnamese troops gone from Cambodia and ongoing cooperation with
body recovery placating all but the most radical elements of the POW/MIA true
believers, there was little basis for arguing in favor of keeping the embargo in place.  The
first Congressional hearing in fifteen years dedicated solely to the embargo on Vietnam,
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the June sessions marked a significant turning point in public discourse about American-
Vietnamese relations.
Indicative of the new direction of policy, the hearings were a joint meeting of
Solarz’ Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade, chaired by Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut.
Gejdenson and others in favor of lifting the embargo were not concerned with the effects
of the embargo on Vietnam, but rather focused the embargo’s ineffectiveness as a policy
tool and its negative effects on American business interests.  The diplomatic,
internationalist approach long-favored by Solarz was, particularly after the fall of the
Berlin wall, increasingly open to challenges from a more corporatized free-trade
approach which argued that “market forces” would ultimately work to minimize
differences between nations and thus be more conducive to cooperation on matters such
as human rights. The opening statements of the two chairmen revealed this increasing
divergence in approaches to Vietnam in the 1990s.  Whereas Solarz pressed to keep the
embargo in place to ensure “Vietnamese cooperation” with the political settlement in
Cambodia, Gejdenson argued, “[t]he U.S. embargo no longer makes sense:”
We have only to look for examples of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union to know
that exposures to Americans and American ideas of freedom and democracy and
free enterprise is what will be most successful in pressuring the Vietnamese to
change.  Sixteen years of a U.S. economic embargo on Vietnam has only
succeeded in denying Americans their rights and in sheltering the Vietnamese
from Americans and American ideals that would threaten their totalitarian
government. 576
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A number of corporate lobbyists and witnesses would testify in support of Gejdenson’s
position, arguing that the way to end the war and foster a lasting peace between the
countries was to bring capitalism to Vietnam as it had been brought to the rest of
Southeast Asia.  With trade barriers removed, ideological barriers would easily break
down, they argued; with unfettered access to Vietnam’s markets, resources, and its cheap,
abundant labor force, would come the answers sought by the families of unaccounted for
American personnel.
The question of access was brought into striking relief at the hearings by Frank
Murkowski, then a Senator from Alaska, who was called to testify on a piece of
legislation he had recently introduced to the Senate: “The Vietnam Access of 1991.” The
bill called for lifting only the most stringent aspects of the embargo, effectively lifting
Vietnam out of category “Z” into a less-restricted classification for export controls.  This
easing of the embargo, Murkowski argued, would “lead to greater access within
Vietnam.”577   The Senator noted that there was substantial support in his chamber for an
easing of the sanctions.  The Foreign Relations Committee on which he sat had recently
passed, by a twelve-to-one margin, a resolution declaring, “the goals of U.S. foreign
policy would be advanced by increased access to Vietnam and by a lifting of the trade
embargo against Vietnam.”578
When Solarz questioned Murkowski about the bill, he took pains to point out that
a number of groups, including the National League of Families, opposed any easing of




the embargo.  Murkowski countered by noting that the isolationist approach supported by
the NLOF had failed to produce satisfactory results, adding that the Vietnam Veterans of
America, the largest group representing American veterans of the war, supported his
position.579  The POW/MIA issue continued to be a palpable political threat to anyone in
the hearing room who appeared to put business interests ahead of “concern for the
families.”  In a brief exchange with Murkowski about the U.S. missing out on “a piece of
the action” in places like Vietnam and Cuba, committee member Eni Faleomavaega of
American Samoa quickly made his priority clear.  When Murkowski noted that trade
opportunities should “obviously” wait to be initiated until after the POA/MIA issue is
resolved, the representative hastily added,  “Please do not misunderstand me.  I have the
highest regard for the various organizations and government agencies that are trying very
hard to account for the 2,300 POW/MIA’s from the Vietnam conflict.”580
The hearing, however, ultimately had less to do with Murkowski’s legislation
than with providing the increasingly organized business community a chance to weigh in
on the embargo.  Led by Virginia Foote, Director of the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council, a
parade of corporate executives testified and submitted written statements for the record
arguing that the embargo was outdated, ineffective, and harmful to American interests.
Dwight Jasmann, Managing Director of AT&T’s Pacific operations, explained to the
committee how the ban on providing direct phone service to Vietnam—one of only three
countries, along with Cambodia and North Korea, on which such a ban existed—was not




only ineffective in isolating Vietnam, but ironically worked directly against American
policy goals.  Because the ban was easily subverted by connecting through a conference
call based in, say, Canada, Jasmann told the committee, the Vietnamese government not
only could easily provide means of communication to the United States but also received
payment from the Canadian carrier, the type of “hard-currency” programs the ban was
designed to prevent.  Giving American communication companies control over the phone
lines, he argued, was the only plausible way to enforce the ban.581  Other witnesses,
primarily from the petroleum and communications industries, testified that they were
missing out on precious market shares to their European counterparts.  If the American-
embargo was designed to isolate Vietnam from international capital, they pointed out, the
policy was failing miserably.  Despite the administration’s claims that the embargo was
part of an international reaction to Vietnam’s lingering presence in Cambodia, the
hearings helped magnify the fact that other nations, including the closest U.S. allies in the
region, had long since abandoned their own bilateral sanctions.  While Japan had not yet
restored its regular aid program to Vietnam, by the summer of 1991 it was trading with
Vietnam to the tune of close to $1 billion, including $400 million worth of crude oil.582
Throughout the 1980s the Reagan and Bush administrations, along with a cohort
of supporters in congress that included Solarz, justified the embargo by claiming that it
was simply adding muscle to the ASEAN policy of isolating Vietnam.  As we saw in
chapter three, however, the ASEAN nations all had substantial trade programs with
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Vietnam; by 1991 the United States was the only nation still pursuing a policy of total
isolation with Vietnam.  Even China and Vietnam had normalized relations the previous
year, and had begun substantial trade.  Nevertheless, Solarz pressed all the witnesses to
explain how the United States could continue to exert leverage on Vietnam, particularly
with regard to Cambodia, without the embargo in place.  In particular, he trumpeted the
need to show support for the Cambodian settlement plan proposed by the P-5, or
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, Great Britain,
France, the United States and the Soviet Union).  As Virginia Foote made clear in her
testimony, however, all four other members of the P-5 maintained bilateral trade with
Vietnam.583  Thus although the Vietnamese had long expressed their desire for American
trade, it was far from the necessity implied by Solarz and others.  By the summer of 1991,
any harm that the lack of trade with the U.S. was having on Vietnam was more than
offset by the increases in foreign investment by America’s allies.
The 1993 Final Senate Select Committee
Whatever progress was being made on the roadmap framework by the early
summer of 1991 was shattered in July, when three separate series of photos, supposedly
depicting American “POW’s” took the U.S. media by storm.   Newspapers, magazines
and nightly newscasts focused intensely on the pictures, furthering the claims made by
Smith, Helms, and the POW/MIA lobby that the men in the pictures were American
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servicemen still being held against their will in Southeast Asia.584  In the furor over the
images, including the call from the Wall Street Journal to “Bring on Rambo,” the worst
fears of policymakers and the most extreme claims of conspiracy theorists were
seemingly realized.585  As Bruce Franklin noted in his 2000 update of the POW/MIA
myth, on the same day as the Journal’s piece appeared, a “stampeded” Senate voted
unanimously to create the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.  The pictures,
unsurprisingly, were eventually discredited, but the Select Committee would spend much
of the next year, and millions of dollars, working once again, to follow these and other
charges.
Not to be outdone by the more high-profile Senate committee, Stephen Solarz and
the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs also seized the opportunity to hold
hearings on this “new evidence,” and the implications on the path to normalized relations.
In late July, Solzarz’ committee held the first hearings on the photographs.  At the time of
the hearings, a team from the Defense Department was already on the ground in Vietnam
and Laos, working with the Vietnamese to investigate the photos, and the Sandia
Laboratories in New Mexico had already completed their analysis of the first photo,
which depicted three men holding a sign.  The team on the ground found nothing to
corroborate the identity of the men in the picture, and the lab, along with the Defense
Intelligence Agency, ruled that the photo was almost certainly a hoax.  The image in
question had actually been doctored, the report claimed, from a 1923 picture in a Soviet
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magazine.586  Although the other pictures would also be exposed as fabrications,
Congressional committees would still be debating the images two years later.
As the Select Committee was convening its first of many hearings in November
of 1991, members of the Solarz House Subcommittee met once again, pursuing many of
the same questions and concerns of their senate counterparts. Although each committee
contained a representative sample from the ideological spectrum, it became clear over the
course of the hearings that even previously more detached figures such as Solarz had
moved closer in position on the POW/MIA issue to their conspiracy-minded Republican
colleagues, such as Representatives Robert Dornan and Robert Lagomarsino of
California, and Bob Smith, who was appointed John Kerry’s co-chair on the Senate
Select committee.  Solarz, who had passionately advocated for a negotiated settlement in
Cambodia, became increasingly convinced throughout the 1980s and early 1990s that
Vietnam was deliberately withholding evidence about American military personnel, some
of whom may have been held alive at some point.587  Kerry, while he remained more
moderate in his stance on the issue than his co-chair Smith or Solarz, was instrumental in
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constructing the hearings to represent only the two narrowly defined “sides” of debate
that achieved hegemony during the 1980s: One, that the government was actively looking
for POW/MIA’s it believed might be alive, and, two, that the government was actively
covering up the existence of the prisoners.588  Bruce Franklin, the most well known
advocate of the “third” side of the debate—that the entire idea of “POW/MIA’s” being
held in Southeast Asia was a pernicious and pervasive myth—was denied the opportunity
to testify.589
Despite these problems, John Kerry was more often than not a force of relative
reason in the hearings.  While he failed to construct the Select Committee hearings in
such a way that a more diverse range of opinion and testimony would be presented, he
did at times relate personal stories from his representations being presented by other
factions. At one point, Kerry made what would appear to be a fairly basic, yet important
point: that during the 1980s, it was extremely rare to see “a Caucasian” in Vietnam,
particularly outside of the major cities.  He spoke of the “significant curiosity” aroused
by his own visits, when he would walk into a village and immediately cause a major stir.
“It is very hard to understand” Kerry argued, “how Americans could be moved or moving
without a community noticing it in a way that would create ripples of information at
some point.”590  Furthermore, he pointed out, although Americans working on body
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recovery continued to be somewhat restricted in their movement, diplomats and aid
workers from other nations and NGOs enjoyed the unfettered access to Vietnam sought
by the U.S.  On the one hand, this points to the failure of an aggressive and hostile
foreign policy, a major point of debate during the hearings.  Equally important, Kerry
noted that if these various groups, including representatives of many close U.S. allies,
had not seen or heard any evidence of American prisoners during their travels, it would
bolster the case against live prisoners.591
On another occasion, more indicative of his overall, equivocating position on the
issue, Kerry related the story of when he became the first U.S. citizen to meet with the
General Secretary of Vietnam’s Politburo. The Vietnamese delegation could not
understand why, in 1991, the issue of unaccounted for U.S. personnel was being
discussed, when it was hardly mentioned during the normalization talks of 1978.  In
response, Kerry offered a fairly concise and interesting summary of how the issue gained
such currency:
So I, frankly, went through this long explanation to him of what happened with
the problems of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and what happened in the desert in
Iran and the sense of lack of power in the country and along came Ronald Reagan
and he made this a big issue, to his credit, and raised the consciousness, and then
movies appeared and books appeared, and Sly Stallone made a cult, and off we
went, and it entered the American consciousness and body politic.592
The Congressional delegation left a large collection of articles and information about the
issue from the American media to demonstrate the prominence of the issue in the U.S.
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The Vietnamese, according to Kerry, were somewhat taken aback that the issue was
indeed “real” and “serious.”  “He had no idea that this was anything but an American
trick in the 1980s and nineties to sort of find a different way to prosecute the war against
Vietnam.”593  Despite his skepticism about the issue, Kerry’s insistence that Reagan
should receive “credit” for exacerbating the issue reveals that within the confines
constructed by the Select Committee, even the more reasonable positions were trapped by
the powerful POW/MIA mythology.
As a result, the committee spent endless hours discussing the limitless gamut of
POW/MIA hoaxes, from the already discredited photos to the “warehouse” myth.  One of
the most enduring tales of this phase of the POW/MIA drama, this particular myth held
that there existed a “warehouse” deep in the jungles of Southeast Asia, where the
Vietnamese were secretly keeping the remains of hundreds of American service
personnel.  The basis for this myth came from a lone intelligence source, mysteriously
nicknamed “The Mortician,” who claimed that Vietnam, in the early 1980s, had at least
400 sets of remains locked away in storage.  This shadowy figure was an ethnic Chinese
who fled Vietnam shortly after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and was
debriefed by American intelligence after his defection.  Supporters of the Mortician’s
statements were never able to produce any evidence to support his claims, nor could they
even claim that the alleged remains were American, but those who believed his story,
including high-level figures in the Bush administration’s defense department, used it to
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add fuel to the live prisoner fire.594   Bob Smith would help keep this myth alive with a
new twist when, on several occasions during hearings of the Select Committee, he
claimed that a holding cell of live prisoners was located under Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum
in Hanoi.595  A new hybrid of the warehouse story and the more popular stories of secret
Laotian prison camps, similar to the one depicted in Rambo, Smith’s theory was quickly
dismissed.
Driven by such outlandish stories, the POW/MIA hearings of 1991 and 1992
illuminate the standard operating assumptions of the United States Government with
regard to Vietnam during the “Roadmap” period.  To begin with, the hearings reveal that
despite the claims of conspiracy theorists in the POW/MIA community, the classification
of the issue as a “matter of the highest national priority,” was not simply lip service.  The
Department of Defense was spending over $20 million a year just for the POW/MIA
work being done by U.S. Pacific Command in 1990, and close to $100 million over all.596
Before the Solarz committee on November 6, 1991, Deputy Defense Secretary Carl Ford
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told the committee that the Bush administration, under the direction of Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney, had created the special position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for POW/MIA Affairs and had increased the Pentagon Staff directly responsible solely
for POW/MIA related issues from three to fourteen.  At that same hearing, and as the
Senate Select Committee helped to make clear over the next year, however, it was not
simply the POW/MIA issue in general, but the resolution of the “live prisoner” issue that
was the primary focus of U.S. Government policy with respect to Vietnam.  Ford told the
Solarz committee,
Our most urgent priority is investigating whether or not live Americans are held
again their will in Southeast Asia.  The live prisoner issue has been at the
forefront of our investigations.  While the governments of Indochina have
consistently denied that they are still holding American prisoners, their denials
have not deterred us from pursuing the live prisoner issue directly on each and
every occasion, and at all levels, with them for several years.  We intend to keep
the pressure on.  Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans
are still detained against their will, information available precludes ruling out that
possibility.  Our assumption is that at least some Americans are still held
captive.597
This emphasis is important for several reasons.  First, it makes plain that the fundamental
assumption of the United States government even in 1991—the starting point for all
official inquiries into the issue—was that the Vietnamese and/or the Laotian governments
were, in fact, keeping American prisoners alive, and had been for at least sixteen years.
Starting from this assumption would make it nearly impossible to prove that there were
no Americans being held.  Rather than starting from the more logical position that there
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were no American prisoners alive in Southeast Asia, a position supported by the complete
absence of evidence to the contrary, the government’s official position continued to place
the onus on Hanoi to “prove" the nonexistence of these figures.
Most importantly, however, the focus placed on the live prisoner issue obscured
and delayed the more important work of locating, repatriating, and identifying remains.
Particularly useful in illuminating this problem was the testimony of Ted Schweitzer.
Appearing before the Select Committee on December 4, 1992, Schweitzer, who had been
working closely with Vietnamese authorities in archives throughout the country, noted
that the POW/MIA community’s focus on live prisoners had been among the biggest
obstacles to obtaining the “full accounting” that the U.S. continued to demand of
Vietnam.  Alongside the larger hostile policies of the United States, the “unsound
methods” being employed by American body recovery teams, and “the almost religious
resistance among the official and unofficial POW/MIA community and the United States
against any serious scholarly research on dead MIAs,” Schweitzer told the committee, the
live prisoner issue has cost us years in the search for answers.”598
I personally spent tens of thousands of dollars, and nearly 3 years of my life,
trying to get someone, anyone, to believe me that there was a mountain of
information on dead Americans in Hanoi.  I even showed pictures of dead MIAs
to dozens of influential people, and still no one was interested, not even Ross
Perot.599
Schweitzer’s mention of Perot is especially significant, given the Texas billionaire’s
central role in financing and publicizing many of the more roguish elements in the
                                                 




POW/MIA campaigns, not to mention his significant role in the previous month’s
Presidential election, where President Bush’s policies toward Vietnam were called into
question.  Schweitzer noted that he had personally implored Perot and others to focus on
the “treasure-trove of American war artifacts in Hanoi.”  Yet, “Ross Perot and the others
all replied that those men are dead, and I’m not interested in dead men.”600  Rather than
commit to the work that would most likely result in the resolution of discrepancy cases,
the government continued to press the live prisoner issues, offending and confounding
the Vietnamese, lending credence to the conspiracy theorists, and prolonging the agony
of American families.
The live prisoner issue was also complicating matters on the ground in the region,
wasting the time and energy of everyone involved.  One particular concern of the United
States was the desire for “unfettered access” to the Vietnamese countryside so that teams
could react immediately to any live sighting reports.  Because of the ongoing hostile
relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, delegations from one nation to the other were
closely monitored and placed under stringent travel restrictions.  Compared to the twenty-
five mile restriction placed on Vietnamese representatives to the United Nations, which
remained in place until late 1991, the American body recovery teams had wide access to
the Vietnamese countryside.  And although bilateral cooperation on the issue had
increased dramatically since the Vessey mission and since the announcement of the
Roadmap, the Vietnamese understandably maintained some restrictions on the movement
                                                 
600 Ibid., 1188.
357
of American military personnel in their country.  Those restrictions, however, continued
to be a source of great acrimony for the military, members of congress, and the
POW/MIA lobby.  The specific concern of the U.S. teams, predicated on the belief that
live prisoners were still being held, was that in order to investigate a live sighting report,
American personnel had to apply for and receive official clearance to examine the site,
which often took several days.  If the Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian government
was holding American prisoners in secret camps, the argument went, they could easily
relocate those camps with a few days notice.  For instance, when a U.S. team was
investigating the case of Donald Carr—believed to be the figure in the third set of photos
to surface in the summer of 1991—they received word that Carr was being held in a
prison camp near the Laotian Plain of Jars region.  When the camp could not be located
after several attempts, rather than conclude that they had received bad information, the
team kept insisting that the camp had been repeatedly moved. At the Select Committee
Hearings, this case was used as evidence in support of the argument for increased
access.601
Based on examples of this sort, the military personnel in charge of POW/MIA
recovery in Southeast Asia reported to Congress that they required “full and unfettered
access” to any location in the region, so that they could, on a moment’s notice,
investigate any live sighting reports.  Testifying in November of 1991, Major General
George Christmas, Director of Operations for the U.S. Pacific Command, argued that the
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best solution to the live sighting investigation problem was for the Vietnamese to allow
the U.S. recovery teams to use American military helicopters to patrol the countryside.602
Currently, the teams were being shuttled in Russian-made helicopters operated by
Vietnamese pilots.  Eventually, the governments agreed on a plan that would allow the
U.S. to use rented helicopters, but the suggestion that the Vietnamese should allow the
use of American military helicopters is remarkable, given the state of relations between
the two countries in the fall of 1991.  Only the day before the General’s testimony,
President Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had pledged “decisive action”
should any confirmation of live prisoners be made, continuing at the highest and most
public level the implication that Hanoi had been holding American prisoners for two
decades while at the same time threatening immediate military action against Vietnam.603
Regardless of the fact that the Vietnamese were, of course, not keeping prisoners,
the belligerence of Washington was hardly the type of demonstration that would cause
Hanoi to rethink their stance on the increased presence of American military.
Furthermore, despite the slight easing of restrictions under the embargo, the United States
continued officially to categorize Vietnam as an “enemy” nation under the Trading With
the Enemy Act.  In the fall of 1991, the only other countries classified as such were Cuba,
Libya, and North Korea.  It is difficult to imagine these nations allowing the presence of
American military personnel permitted by Vietnam at the time, let alone the request for
unfettered access to search the countryside and classified military records.  For the
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previous decade, the United States had funded the forces fighting Vietnam in Cambodia;
only two years earlier it denied a license to a private group seeking to donate wheelchairs
to Vietnamese amputees from the American War, and the United States; at the time of the
request, the U.S. continued to exercise its veto power to prohibit international loans to
Vietnam.604  In nearly every manner, the United States continued to treat Vietnam as an
enemy nation, yet there was no sense of irony present when seeking to dictate to Hanoi
terms that would be difficult for many American allies to accept.
Most importantly, however, the helicopter request is indicative of the fundamental
inability for anyone involved in these hearings even to begin to view the issue from a
Vietnamese perspective.  At no point in any of the testimony did anyone raise the issue of
how the remote villages throughout the country would react to the reappearance of
American helicopters that for years had terrorized Vietnamese civilians from the sky.
Similarly, only Ted Schweitzer, in his testimony to the Select Committee, pointed out
that if it wished greater enthusiasm and cooperation from Hanoi in accounting for the
small number of “discrepancy cases,” the U.S. might express a greater concern for the
estimated 300,000 Vietnamese soldiers, not to mention countless civilians, still
unaccounted for.  As Schweitzer pointed out to the committee, this would not only be an
appropriate gesture, but would actually assist in the recovery of American remains:
Many cases of American missing are closely intertwined in the archives with
cases of Vietnamese missing.  Had we shown real interest in helping Vietnam
with its missing, we would certainly have come upon this correlation sooner, and
been able to resolve many of our own MIA cases earlier.605
                                                 




The U.S. disregard for Vietnamese MIAs was also present in the way in which it dealt
with recovered remains.  When American teams shipped a large set of remains to its labs
in Hawaii, more often than not a large percentage of the remains were not American.606
Instead of using the opportunity to use their findings to assist in the search for
unaccounted-for Vietnamese soldiers and civilians, the lack of correlation to American
servicemen’s records was regularly turned back on the Vietnamese, with groups like the
National League accusing Vietnam of stalling or deceiving the American public by using
phony remains.  This tactic would continue through 1993, with the NLoF and others
blaming the Vietnamese when their “archives,” which naturally focused on Vietnamese
military records, failed to produce documents that matched the needs of the POW/MIA
lobby.  As is the case with so many aspects of the ongoing war on Vietnam after 1975,
the United States failed to take into account the Vietnamese perspective, revealing the
callousness of the policy while at the same time working directly against the interests of
American citizens.
The inability of U.S. policymakers to put themselves in Vietnamese shoes,
however, went far beyond insensitivity.  More commonly, the failure to grasp Hanoi’s
approach to the American POW/MIA issue led to fundamental misconceptions about the
Vietnamese government’s level of cooperation.  Whereas the United States, since early in
the Reagan Administration, had designated the issue under the “highest national priority,”
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the Vietnamese understandably had very different priorities, from recovering their own
missing, to wars with Cambodia and China, to a radical transformation of their economic
system, itself still recovering from the effects of the American War and the ongoing
economic sanctions program.  Yet when the Vietnamese failed to mobilize resources in
the manner demanded by the POW/MIA lobby and policymakers in the U.S., they were
portrayed as intransigent or, worse, actively engaged in deceiving the American
government and the families of the service personnel in question. In this sense, the
hearings once again revealed the heavy burden being placed on the Vietnamese to dig
themselves out of the hole dug for them by the POW/MIA lobby.
Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of American
Families and a seemingly ubiquitous presence at any hearing connected to Vietnam or the
POW/MIA issue, offered an example of this in her testimony during one of the Select
Committee hearings.  In order to satisfy the conditions laid out in U.S. policy, the
Vietnamese government had to provide either the “live prisoner,” the remains of the
person in question, or “convincing evidence” of why it cannot provide the remains.  Only
by one of those three scenarios could U.S. personnel be considered “accounted for,” and
thus taken off of the official POW/MIA list.  As Mills testified in December of 1992,
even in a case where the family of the person in question had publicly acknowledged that
he was dead, and had obtained a photograph apparently showing his corpse, the person
remained on the POW/MIA list, and, as such, unaccounted for.  This paradox has its root
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in the decision of the Nixon administration to blur the distinction between different
military categories of POW, MIA, and KIA/BNR, but remained a powerful force in U.S.
policy in the 1990s.607  Responding to questions about why the man was still listed as
POW/MIA, Griffiths responded, “Because he isn’t accounted for:”
Kerry: What do you mean, he is not accounted for?
Griffiths: Because there’s no convincing—
Kerry: What do you mean he is not accounted for?  He is dead.
Griffiths: No. His death has been confirmed.  He’s not accounted for unless—
Kerry: But he is not—
Griffiths: Excuse me, let me finish.
Kerry: He is not a POW.
Griffiths: No, no.
Kerry: He is not a live person.
Griffiths: He’s dead.
Kerry:  He is not an MIA.
Griffiths: He is killed in action, body not recovered.
Kerry: Correct.
Griffiths: But they have not provided convincing evidence as to why they cannot
repatriate his remains.608
Griffiths later added, “what we’re talking about here is the unilateral repatriation of
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remains that are already recovered or easily recoverable,” although she admitted under
further questioning that she had no evidence to support the allegation that the Vietnamese
had the remains in question nor that they were “easily recoverable.”609
Perhaps no issue in the entire history of the POW/MIA myth is so misunderstood
as the belief, perpetuated at every opportunity by Griffiths and the POW/MIA lobby, that
the Vietnamese had “easy” access to remains of U.S. personnel scattered throughout the
country.  In this sense, the testimony of Ted Schweitzer, noted above, was perhaps the
most significant in the voluminous proceedings of the Select Committee.  Along with his
important contribution to dispelling the “warehouse” myth and his damning indictment of
the focus on live prisoners, Schweitzer was alone in the myriad witnesses before the
committee in describing the situation on the ground in Vietnam.  In his descriptions,
Schweitzer dispelled several pernicious myths about the Vietnamese.  To begin with, he
pointed out, the Vietnamese did indeed have a stockpile of information relevant to U.S.
concerns.  Contrary to the claims of the POW/MIA lobby, however, the “archive” in
question was neither secretive nor centralized.  Rather, it was a massive “collection” of
memorabilia, documents, “souvenirs,” and other residue from airplane and helicopter
crashes, battles and missions over the past half-century of warfare in Vietnam, involving
not simply the United States, but the French, British, Japanese, Chinese, and various
incarnations of Vietnamese resistance forces.  Moreover, this “collection,” described by
Schweitzer as a “mountain of information,” was literally scattered throughout Vietnam,
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and most of it was in possession of Vietnamese citizens at the village and province level:
“In the first place, really, the Vietnamese don’t know exactly what they’ve got.  It is not a
system, a computerized system with an index to everything that’s held in the central
government’s archive files.”610
The people of Vietnam, Schweitzer noted, were thus the most important resource
in the elusive quest for a full accounting.  Given the circumstances, it would be up to the
United States, not the Vietnamese government, to seek out the information.  “The
leadership of Vietnam cannot simply order 70 million Vietnamese citizens to bring this
mountain of material to Hanoi.”  In perhaps the most significant testimony of the entire
proceedings, Schweitzer continued:
[assisting the U.S. search program] has to be something that the Vietnamese, the
common Vietnamese citizen, feels in his heart he wants to do for America.  If he
has a souvenir, war memorabilia, something that he has picked up from a crash or
a war site in the highlands in 1967 or from a crash up in the mountains someplace,
say a piece of an airplane that he’s been using as a side of his house or a little
package of things he picked up somehow, maybe the man who picked it up is
dead and his children have it and have no idea what it is even.  But they’re not
going to make—the common person of Vietnam just isn’t going to come forward
with all that mountain of information unless they really have the feeling in their
heart that they want to do this for America.  It can’t be dictated on high that you
will bring forward everything that you possess on America.  It just won’t happen
that way.611
Later Schwetizer reinforced the point: “Even with the fullest cooperation from the
Vietnamese government, it will take an enormous amount of goodwill, time, and work to
locate the materials, collect them, and catalog them.”612
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The need to engage with the scattered villagers throughout Vietnam was driven
home by several examples offered by Schweitzer and others working in the country.  In
one case, from an area outside of Da Nang, in central Vietnam, a U.S. recovery team was
presented with five sets of remains that local Vietnamese citizens had personally
discovered several years earlier.  When asked, “’why did you wait five years to turn these
remains into us,’” they replied, “’because you never came to our village.’”613  In another
case, Schweitzer related the story of a Navy pilot who had been shot down over the
Vietnamese coast.  Local villagers took their boat out, dragged the plane to shore, and
buried the remains of the pilot near the beach. The next day, an American bombing raid
carpeted the area, destroying the grave.  “Even though they had the remains and
pictures,” Schweitzer told the committee, “the remains are now completely
unrecoverable.” 614  This was not the only confirmed report of recoverable remains being
destroyed by U.S. bombings.  In another case uncovered through conversations with
locals, a North Vietnamese army team returning to Hanoi with reports of soldiers from
both sides who had been captured or killed was struck by American bombs, killing all
members of the team and destroying the report.615
More than any other witness, Schweitzer outlined the ironies and inconsistencies
of the POW/MIA issue.  That is what makes it strange that his testimony was not
included in the Final Report Issued by the Select Committee on January 13, 1993.
Schweitzer’s work in Hanoi had been publicly hailed by President Bush as a





“breakthrough” in October of 1992.  While Bush’s comments had as much to do with his
final push for the November election, the press took note of the importance of
Schweitzer’s efforts in their reports, leading to Schweitzer’s testimony before the
Committee in December.616  Because of the tone of the reports, however, it appeared as
though Hanoi had been withholding the information.  As discussed above, this was far
from the case; the Vietnamese were only too happy to allow access the documents and
photographs, much of which they were previously unaware they possessed.  When the
Final Report was being assembled in late December and early January, however, all
references to Schweitzer’s testimony were left out.  His name does not even appear on the
list of witnesses.
Sixteen years and one month to the day after the 1976 Select Committee on
POW/MIAs released its report, the 1993 incarnation renounced the earlier findings.
While “previous committees” determined that no American personnel remained alive in
Southeast Asia, the report noted,
This committee has uncovered evidence that precludes it from taking the same
view.  We acknowledge that there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, but
neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died.  There is
evidence, moreover, that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small
number, after Operation Homecoming.617
The “evidence” “uncovered” by the committee amounted to little more than specious
claims gathered by questionable intelligence sources and practices:
First, there are the Americans known or thought possibly to have been alive in
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captivity who did not come back; we cannot dismiss the chance that some of these
known prisoners remained captive past Operation Homecoming.
Second, leaders of the Pathet Lao claimed throughout the war that they were
holding American prisoners in Laos. Those claims were believed--and, up to a point,
validated--at the time; they cannot be dismissed summarily today.
Third, U.S. defense and intelligence officials hoped that forty or forty-one
prisoners captured in Laos would be released at Operation Homecoming, instead of
the twelve who were actually repatriated. These reports were taken seriously enough at
the time to prompt recommendations by some officials for military action aimed at
gaining the release of the additional prisoners thought to be held.
Fourth, information collected by U.S. intelligence agencies during the last
years, in the form of live-sighting, hearsay, and other intelligence reports, raises
questions about the possibility that a small number of unidentified U.S. POWs who
did not return may have survived in captivity.
Finally, even after Operation Homecoming and returnee debriefs, more than 70
Americans were officially listed as POWs based on information gathered prior to the
signing of the peace agreement; while the remains of many of these Americans have
been repatriated, the fates of some continue unknown to this day.618
Reading these findings raises the question of what, if anything the hearings accomplished
other than the transmogrification of the faint hopes of families and the spurious
assumptions of the POW/MIA lobby into “fact.”  All of this supposed evidence rests on
the fundamental assumption that Americans must have been held after 1973.  Ironically,
much of the confusion over the unresolved cases is traceable to the most significant
finding of the 1976 Report so disparaged by the 1993 Committee: that the United States
military was deficient in its record-keeping of soldiers classified as MIA, KIA/BNR, or
POW.  Unlike the 1976 report, which attempted to clear the way for normalization, the
1993 report overtly declared that the issue was far from resolved.  “We want to make
clear,” the introduction noted, “that this report is not intended to close the door on this
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issue.  It is meant to open it.”619
The one issue on which the Committee did attempt to provide a sense of finality
was the belief that the U.S. Government was actively covering up the existence of live
POWs.  While implying that Americans were still being held by the Vietnamese or
Laotians, the committee took pains to argue that as to the question of whether “American
POWs were knowingly abandoned in Southeast Asia,” the answer “is clearly no.”620
Thus, if it suggests anything, the Final Report indicates that the primary goal of the
document was not to resolve the POW/MIA, nor to exonerate the Vietnamese, but rather
to refocus attention on Vietnam by disproving the conspiracy theories directed at the
United States.   This is reflected not only by the unsubstantiated “evidence” of live
prisoners but by the failure to include in the Final Report the testimony by Schweitzer
and others who demonstrated the cooperation of the Vietnamese and the general lack of
care put into the sections of the report dedicated to discussions of relations with Vietnam.
The Final Report contains to several references to “North Vietnam” in the present tense,
such as: “The U.S. has long suspected that the North Vietnamese have been holding a
considerable amount of information bearing on the fate of missing Americans.”621  As we
have seen throughout the post-1975 period, the occasional slip of referring to “North” or
“South” Vietnam during a congressional hearing or a statement to the press was not
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entirely uncommon.  For such phrasing to be included in an official Senate report of such
magnitude twenty years after the American military withdrawal from Vietnam, however,
only testifies to the decidedly anti-Vietnamese tone of the Senate Select Committee.
The Clinton Years
In the face of ongoing accusations by the more radical elements of the hearings,
Vietnamese officials were quick to point out that they were providing the U.S. with
highly classified military records, even when American officials would refuse to provide
them with relevant classified materials from the U.S.622  In addition to very public
cooperation with U.S. demands, another step in the roadmap had been met when over the
summer, when the Cambodian Ceasefire Agreement had entered its second phase,
preparing for U.N.-supervised elections, albeit without the support of the Khmer Rouge.
At the same time he had praised the “breakthough” made by Schweitzer, Bush told
reporters on the campaign trail that he thought he was ready “to begin writing the last
chapter of the Vietnam War.”623
As the Select Committee was wrapping up its hearings and readying its report,
American businesses were gearing up for what they assumed would be a relatively swift
end to the sanctions in early 1993.  Pharmaceutical representatives, investors, and
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members of the airline industry began to flock to Vietnam, following the lead of their
colleagues in the oil and telecommunications industry who had been actively working to
develop bases of operations in the country since late 1991.  The Australian-based
Vietnam Investment Review playfully noted that there had been a dramatic upsurge in
“live sightings” of Americans toward the end of the 1992, including representatives of
Proctor and Gamble, Coca-Cola, Boeing, and Eastman-Kodak.624  It is likely that the
Bush administration was waiting for the Final Report of the Select Committee to be
released in 1993 to announce further easing of the sanctions, if not an outright end to the
embargo.
By the time the Select Committee had wrapped up its hearings in December,
however, the political landscape of Washington had been altered.  After twelve years of
Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Bill Clinton and Al Gore swept into the White House
in the fall of 1992.  The specter of the war in Vietnam was once again raised in the
campaign, with conservative Bush supporters charging Clinton, who had been active in
the antiwar movement, particularly during his days as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford, with
being a “draft-dodger.”  If Clinton were to follow the Roadmap to normalization with
Vietnam, he would have to navigate rough political waters by fending off charges of
“selling out” the families of unaccounted for servicemen from some veteran groups and
the National League of American Families. It certainly helped that the Bush
administration continued along its slow path to normalization by further easing the
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embargo in December, allowing American companies to sign tentative contracts to do
business in Vietnam.  The contracts would not be allowed to be finalized until the
sanctions were lifted, but American companies could at least enter the Vietnamese
market and compete with European and Asian firms.625  The most restrictive measures of
the sanctions program, however remained in place, including the ban on access to IFI
funds.  Despite the snail’s pace of progress, it did finally appear that the pieces were in
place for normalization to occur.  As Frederick Brown put it in a paper for the Overseas
Development Council, the United States was finally in a position to “win” in Vietnam.  It
would be up to the new administration to finish the job of allowing Vietnam to fully
integrate with the regional and global economies.626  Even the Wall Street Journal, which
only a year earlier had continued to oppose any normalization of relations as long as
Vietnam retained any remnants of a “centrally-planned” economy, was ready to lift the
embargo by the spring of 1993.627  “President Clinton,” the Journal pleaded in its lead
editorial of March 8, “Normalize Ties With Vietnam.”628
Although it remains unclear if Clinton was ready for full normalization by the
spring, an April 28 IMF meeting in Washington lurked on the near horizon.  The White
House was prepared to offer a slight detour from the roadmap at the meeting by ending
its opposition to loans to Vietnam and the Franco-Japanese plan to restructure Vietnam’s
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existing debt.  At the very least, the plan suggested that the full embargo would be lifted
by September, when the Trading With Enemy Act provisions would have to be renewed
for the sanctions to continue. On April 12, The Wall Street Journal again weighed in
favor of the move, but warned of what it called “an orchestrated campaign” to prevent
progress on normalization.  “As if on cue,” Bruce Franklin wrote at the time, another
cruel and fraudulent campaign from anti-Vietnamese forces appeared on the same day as
the Journal’s warning.629
Working in the Moscow archives of the former Soviet Communist Party,
Australian scholar Stephen Morris, then a fellow at Harvard University, unearthed a
document purporting to show that the Vietnamese held hundreds of American prisoners
back after the Paris accords. The New York Times, which first reported Morris’ claim,
was quickest to jump to conclusions, adding fuel to the fire by seeking out Carter
Administration National Security Advisor Zbiginew Brzezinski to assess the claim.
Brzezinski told the Times, in a statement picked up by newspapers and television stations
across the country, “the great likelihood” was not that the Vietnamese continued to hold
those prisoners, but rather “that the Vietnamese took hundreds of American officers out
and shot them in cold blood.”630
The news media went into an immediate frenzy, drawing the same narrow
discursive boundaries of the issue that had become commonplace in American culture.
The initial news cycle, following Brzezinski’s comments, was not about the accuracy of
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the document or its claims, but whether or not the prisoners were more likely executed in
the late 1970s or continued to be held captive in Southeast Asia.  As Bruce Franklin
recounts the fallout:
In a replay of the phony photo gambits of 1991, the “smoking gun” now exploded
as the lead story on every TV network, including PBS, whose balanced coverage
showcased a MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour panel on April 13, consisting of three
disinterested “experts”—Brzezinski, Kissinger, and Morris himself.  Brzezinski’s
massacre scenario was repeated in editorials across the country.  Headlines blared
“North Vietnam Kept 700 POWs After War: ‘Smoking Gun File Exposes 20
Years of Duplicity’”; “POWs” The Awful Truth?”; and “We Can’t Set Up Ties
with Killers of Our POWs.”631
Although neither the document, Morris’ claims, nor Brzezinski’s wild allegation held up
under investigation, the damage had been done in the first round of coverage, as the press
did not nearly go to the same ends to disprove the claims as it had to spread them.
Franklin, Nayan Chanda, the U.S. Defense Department, and others familiar with
the issues quickly found the document to be inaccurate on a number of points.  Writing in
The Nation, and Far Eastern Economic Review, respectively, Franklin and Chanda
pointed out several flaws with the document, ranging from terminology never used by the
Vietnamese to the wrong names of significant Vietnamese leaders to the segregation of
POWs by rank (which was not the normal practice) and other wildly inaccurate numbers
given for known prisoners being held at the time.632  Chanda’s article quoted military
officials investigating the claim who further confirmed the report was likely a
“fabrication.”  “The more textual analysis you make,” one of the investigators told
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Chanda, “the more ridiculous it is… It is illiterate.”633  Chanda’s scathing piece drew an
angry response from Morris, who was unable to refute any of the direct claims made by
Chanda, Franklin, or other investigators, arguing at best that the obvious inaccuracies in
the report were the result of a faulty translation from Vietnamese to Russian.  More
commonly, however, Morris’ response was to assume the de facto position of the
POW/MIA lobby and the likes of Kissinger and Brzezinski: that any discrepancies related
to American prisoners were the result of the lying and deceitful leaders in Hanoi; The
Vietnamese were never to be trusted on their word, even when it conformed precisely to
the historical records in question.634
When Morris remained adamant about the accuracy of the document, some in the
press began to question his personal motives.  Morris, The Washington Post pointed out,
had long been a public critic of Vietnamese leaders and a staunch supporter of Henry
Kissinger.  Moreover, as Morris freely admitted in the Post piece, “If I find out the
Soviets had poor intelligence, all my research has been in vain… I’m basing the whole
credibility of what I’m doing on the validity of their intelligence.”635  Morris shrugged off
those who disagreed with him, including General Vessey, who flew to Vietnam to
investigate the document.  Those sympathetic to Morris tried to deflect criticism of him
by pointing out that while the document may have been “authentic,” and while the
Soviets may have believed the document at the time, it did not follow that the information
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was accurate.  Morris speciously rejected this distinction, once again asserting “it cannot
be true” that the basis for his entire research project was so flawed.636
Although the document was clearly inaccurate, the damage to Vietnamese-
American relations was already done, once again putting the POW/MIA myth at the
center of national attention and forcing the Clinton administration to postpone the lifting
of its IMF veto.  By summer, however, after the initial furor over the Morris incident had
been quelled, progress slowly resumed.  The Cambodian-related aspects of Phase Three
of the roadmap had been fulfilled when U.N.-supervised elections in Cambodia were held
in May.  After massive turnout, the newly elected national assembly named Sihanouk
head of state and approved a coalition government, without the Khmer Rouge, who had
announced earlier in the year that they would not participate in the elections.  Despite
sporadic violence from the Khmer Forces, a constitution and government, which included
Hun Sen, would be in place by the fall.637  The official Interagency report on the Morris
document was also released, concluding that it was totally unreliable; and on the night of
July 2, after the daily news cycle had already ended, the administration quietly
announced it was lifting the ban on IFI lending.638  The Administration’s decision was
supported by a bipartisan letter from several members of Congress stating that further
Vietnamese cooperation would be “in jeopardy if our nation does not make a gesture to
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acknowledge the contributions of the Vietnamese.”639  The move was promptly criticized
from the POW/MIA community for abandoning “leverage” on the Vietnamese, and,
equally predictably, disparaged by corporate interests who, under the remaining aspects
of the embargo, were not permitted to bid on projects that would presumably result from
the resumption of lending to Vietnam.  More clearly than ever, the tension between
“leverage” and “access” was driving American policy.
The tension between the POW/MIA lobby and the forces of the American
business community continued to define the course of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, as a
series of Congressional hearings resulting from the decision to lift the restrictions
demonstrated.  The first of these, “POW’s/MIA’s: Missing Pieces of the Puzzle,” was
convened on July 14, 1993, with another session on July 22.  As with all previous
Government hearings on the issue, these hearings drew the terms of debate around
specious assumptions and featured a conspicuous dearth of informed scholarly opinion.
The first session featured four “experts” to speak to the Morris document: Morris himself,
Al Santoli, Jim Sanders, and George Carver, Jr.  All four men were on the record as
believing that Vietnam had kept American prisoners after the Paris agreements of
1973.640  None of the witnesses were able to refute the claims of inaccuracy made by
others who had investigated the document; rather, they criticized the government for not
adequately exploring the report and speculated about why neither the U.S. government
nor the Vietnamese were to be believed.  Morris’ statements to the Committee were full
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of the misrepresentation and hyperbole about Hanoi for which he gained a reputation
over the years.  Morris insinuated that the document must be accurate because
we have abundant evidence of other massive violations of the Paris Peace
Agreement, and in fact of every other peace agreement the Vietnamese
communist leaders have ever signed—most notably the Geneva agreement of
1954 ending hostilities in Indochina and the Geneva agreement of 1962 on
Laos.641
This outrageous statement, ascribing to Vietnam actions actually taken by the United
States, offers a near-total inversion of history (particularly with regard to the Geneva
accords), a stretch even for the likes of Morris, Brzezinski, or Kissinger.  Against such
scholarly objectivity, Morris argued that many within the State and Defense Departments,
including General Vessey, “have pursued their assignment [of determining the accuracy
of the information in the document] with inappropriate prejudice.”642  The official
government representatives at the hearings refused to give prominence to the Morris
document, which had been termed the “1205 Report,” after the number of prisoners it
alleged the Vietnamese had held.  Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA
Affairs Ed Ross noted briefly in his opening statement only that, “While portions of the
document are plausible, evidence in support of its accuracy is far outweighed by errors,
omissions, and propaganda that detract from its credibility.”643
The Senate hearing of that summer was a far more balanced and productive affair,
exploring many the ironies and inconsistencies of American policy toward Vietnam.  The
hearing would be the last significant appraisal of the policy before the embargo was lifted





early in 1994.  In a prepared statement to the committee, Senator John Kerry
acknowledged the ongoing war against Vietnam, if not the ramifications:
Since 1975, the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship had remained essentially frozen,
like a still photograph from that traumatic day when the last Americans left
Saigon by helicopter from the U.S. embassy roof.  Diplomatic relations have
remained severed; Vietnamese assets have been frozen; trade has been
embargoed.  The war has gone on in another form, less bloody, but still damaging
to our national psyche.644
Although Kerry’s portrayal of this phase war remained focused on the damage done to
Americans, the acknowledgement of an ongoing warlike state of relations between the
two nations was a rarity in congressional debates on the topic.  Other familiar faces from
the Senate appeared to testify at the hearings, including Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, who
spoke passionately about incorporating human rights considerations to discussions of
relations with Vietnam, an issue that was absent from the Roadmap plan but had been
vigorously debated in Congress with regard to the China trade agreement.  Frank
Murkowski of Alaska was also back, armed with a new version of his “Vietnam Access
Bill,” which had been derailed in previous years by the reemergence of various
POW/MIA claims.645
The hearings also featured John Terzano, President of Vietnam Veterans of
America, the leading Veterans organization for American veterans of the war and a
strong supporter of normalizing relations with Vietnam.  Terzano provided an eloquent
argument about the many reasons to move forward on normalization with Vietnam, but
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his testimony was significant for one reason in particular: for the first time since 1975, a
congressional hearing featured a witness decrying the American embargo on Vietnam
because of its effects on the people of Vietnam.646  If the U.S. government planned to
incorporate the human rights issues of other nations into its foreign policy, he argued, it
should begin with as reconsideration of its own impact on rights around the world:
I believe this policy [the embargo] was always wrong and immoral, but it now
violates increasingly accepted principles of human rights.  This June, the World
Conference on Human Right upheld “the right to development” as a basic human
right.  And, for the first time, the U.S. recognized it by signing on to the
declaration.  How do we continue to justify our attempt to cause suffering to the
Vietnamese people, former allies and enemies alike, over policies over which they
have no control?  Twenty years after the last American soldier left Vietnam, why
are we still punishing these people?647
That last remark, about “the last American” leaving Vietnam, also offered a subtle jab at
the POW/MIA lobby and Ann Mills Griffiths of the NLOF, who was to testify shortly
after Terzano.  Griffiths and the rest of the POW lobby must have begun to realize by this
time that their efforts to prevent normalization were beginning to seem desperate.  As
new live sighting reports or secret declassified documents continued to appear, only to be
dismissed and discredited, and as actual remains of American soldiers continued to be
returned home from the jungles of Southeast Asia because of the help of the Vietnamese
people, there was no legitimate argument left to make for upholding the embargo.  Over
the course of the past several years, most hearings related to Vietnam featured at least one
new document or report about a particular unresolved case in Defense Department files.
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The best Griffiths could muster at these hearings was the submission of remarks by
former Reagan National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, who had criticized the
Clinton administration’s approach at the recently concluded 24th Annual Meeting of the
NLoF.648  Aside from that, Griffiths took time to criticize members of the Clinton’s
administration for not giving her prior notice when it made the IMF arrears decision,
something to which she had grown accustomed during prior administrations.
Finally, Griffiths insinuated that the White House press release accompanying the
IMF announcement was misleading:  “The summary also stated that 18,000 documents
have been reviewed by U.S. specialists.  It did not clarify that less than 100 of the
documents, so I am told, even remotely correlate to missing Americans.”649  The majority
of the documents, of course, focused on Vietnamese military records.  For years, Griffiths
had pressured the Vietnamese to open up their “archives,” so that American investigators
could pour over the documents.  The Vietnamese repeatedly denied that they had the
types of records described by their American critics.  With Hanoi now providing nearly
unfettered access, even to highly classified military records, the National League of
Families was reduced to criticizing the Vietnamese for not having what it never professed
to have in the first place.  Clearly, there was little ammunition in the NLoF arsenal left to
battle the forces of normalization.  And with the POW/MIA myth seemingly discredited
once and for all, the corporate forces clamoring for a full end to the embargo were
gaining widespread acceptance in the halls of the U.S. government.
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In addition to the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council, other pro-business lobbying
groups were beginning to coalesce around the effort to end the embargo.  At the July
Senate hearings, Al Baker, CEO of Halliburton testified on behalf of the National Foreign
Trade Council, a coalition of over 500 large U.S. firms engaged in trade and investments
around the world. The American Chamber of Commerce was also lined up in favor of
lifting the embargo, submitting a detailed prepared statement describing the “lost
opportunities” of American businesses in Vietnam.  Baker pointed to the combination of
Vietnam’s growing economy and the large market shares of various
industries—particularly petroleum exploration and development, one of Halliburton’s
specialties—arguing that the embargo was only harming United States interests.  While
Baker and the NFTC supported the administration’s decision to lift the IMF restrictions,
they criticized the President for not going far enough.  Under the embargo, U.S. firms
were still banned from bidding on or participating in the many infrastructure projects
likely to result from the new IMF loans.  Thus, Baker pointed out, American businesses
found themselves “in the unusual position of having its own government use U.S. tax
dollars directly or indirectly to fund economic activity from which they are legally
barred.”650
Perhaps no issue sums up the central tension of American policy—“access”
versus “leverage”—better than the question of opposing loans from the IMF.   As we saw
in chapter one, during the normalization debates of the late 1970s, one of the major
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concerns among policymakers was the “politicization” of IFIs.  The Carter
Administration and representatives from the IFIs, such as World Bank President Robert
McNamara, opposed using the institutions to serve as a means of enforcing U.S. policy
with developing countries.  A decade later, such concerns were absent from the debate
over lifting the embargo.  The institutions were, by 1991, clearly under the thumb of the
United States, which continued to exercise its veto power over lending policies to ensure
that no loans to Vietnam were approved by the IMF, World Bank, or Asian Development
Bank.  Absent any discussion of whether or not it was legitimate for the United States to
use the institutions to punish the Vietnamese, the only issue was how long to continue the
ban.    The standard assumption of various anti-Vietnamese constituencies, particularly
the POW/MIA lobby, was that the Vietnamese not only wanted but needed the loans.
The reality was far more complex.
Although it was barred from direct lending to Vietnam, the IMF was never
entirely absent from Hanoi.  Representatives of the fund were not barred by U.S. policy
from advising Vietnam, which they continued to do throughout the 1980s, peddling to
Hanoi the neoliberal “reform” measures of privatizing state-controlled resources and
programs (including health care and education), liberalization of investment codes
(particularly with foreign ownership regulations), and ending subsidies for agriculture
and industry.  By the end of 1987, as part of its doi moi program, Hanoi had agreed to, as
historian Gabriel Kolko put it, “the entire IMF package, one that many countries are
383
reluctant to accept, much less implement.”651  As Kolko persuasively demonstrates in his
close study of the transformation of Vietnam’s political economy after 1975, the role of
the IMF is not to be discounted in Vietnam’s “reforms” of the 1980s:
Whatever the Communist Party’s rhetoric of its pretensions, Vietnam’s economic
and social direction since 1986 is comprehensible only in the context of the IMF’s
central influence.  The party’s ideologues still evoke Marx, Lenin, and Ho Chi
Minh devoutly but the IMF’s inspiration has been far more decisive, and it has
determined the nation’s crucial priorities.652
Had Vietnam not followed the IMF’s advice for its economic program in the 1980s, the
question of the resumption of lending in the early 1990s would have been a moot point,
as the fund would likely have denied both requests for new funding and any proposals to
restructure the Vietnamese arrears.  The Vietnamese did, as Kolko suggests, follow the
IMF program, helping make the country ripe, and vulnerable, for foreign investment.
Although Vietnam maintained a liberal foreign investment code, many firms were
reluctant to do business there based on bureaucratic and legal problems.  In that sense, the
resumption of IMF projects would have been an important sign of security for investors.
As the fund’s representatives in Hanoi put it, “It would help reassure investors that the
country was on the right economic path.”653  That the resumption of lending would be
good for investors in the U.S. and elsewhere was only part of the question, however.  The
more pressing question is what the impact of further IMF dictates would have on the
Vietnamese economy and the Vietnamese people, as the sanctions of the 1980s had all
but disappeared and bilateral trade with nations in the region and around the globe was
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increasing.
The Vietnamese Politburo, as it was frequently throughout the 1980s, remained in
1993 divided on the question of whether the significant injection of capital that the
resumption of multilateral aid would provide was necessary.  Those who favored a major
influx of foreign capital pointed to the still neglected infrastructure and the drastic drops
in aid since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Others argued that finally gaining
economic independence from the Soviets had forced Vietnam to become more self-
sufficient.  As a member of the Party told Nayan Chanda in 1995, “We started to develop
only in 1991, when the Soviet aid stopped and the U.S. still had its embargo.  We were
like babies who stopped drinking milk and were starting to eat on their own.”654  While
the record of progress of under IMF based-reforms is checkered at best, there is some
evidence to recommend the position by Chanda’s source.  Even with the massive
amounts of Soviet aid in the late 1980s, the Vietnamese economy was largely stagnant.
In 1992, when the well of foreign aid had completely dried up, the Vietnamese economy
still grew by 8.3%, almost doubling in size from 1991.  Inflation, historically one of
Vietnam’s biggest problems, was held to 18%, extremely low by Vietnamese standards.
Perhaps most significantly, Vietnam’s trade deficit was all but erased in 1992, despite the
ongoing trade embargo by the United States and the dissolution of bilateral aid and trade
with the Soviet Union.655
Citing this level of progress, many in Vietnam questioned whether a massive
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influx of aid would be beneficial to the Vietnamese people.  While there were any
number of projects that needed major financing—roads, bridges and electrical
infrastructure—some wondered if the Party had the knowledge or the priorities to lead
the rebuilding effort.  “We’re desperately short of capital,” a Vietnamese representative
of the Institute for Scientific and Technological Forecasting acknowledged, “but in my
opinion our biggest difficulty is the lack of economic know-how.”  The bulk of training
over the past several decades, he pointed out, had been dedicated to the military, not to
economic planning, let alone market-based economics.656  Even one American working
for the World Bank was quoted as saying that perhaps the resumption of loans was not in
Vietnam’s interest: “the World Bank is always looking for new clients and trying to push
money on them.  But Vietnam can push domestic reform further without multilateral aid.
It might even be good for Vietnam not to have access to aid.”657
Economists and historians remain sharply divided over whether the IMF-based
reform measures have benefited the Vietnamese people as a whole658; only after more
time has passed and a generation as come of age under the Vietnamese “market
socialism” will we really have enough information to form useful conclusions on that
issue.   The crucial point for the present study is how the debate between those
advocating “leverage” or “access” as the focal point of American policy toward Vietnam
continued to render the Vietnamese people invisible.  While those advocating “access”
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were unquestionably correct in their assumptions that increased contact with the
Vietnamese people would lead to greater success for American businesses and increased
progress in the search for remains of American servicemen, there was little consideration
in the debates given to what the effects of either course would be on the people of
Vietnam.
As discussions of “lost opportunities” for peace, so common in the histories of the
war in Vietnam, were replaced with talk of lost opportunities for market shares and
competitive bids for business projects in Vietnam, “Vietnam as Market” had begun to
trump “Vietnam as war” or even “Vietnam as nation” as the most common representation
of Vietnam in American culture.  Unfortunately, this latest construction did nothing to
make the Vietnamese people more visible in policy discussion or in American culture.
As the September deadline for renewing the Trading With the Enemy Act approached the
administration signaled it was not prepared to unilaterally lift the sanctions, although it
did indicate that it did eventually submit to the disgruntled business community by
allowing American businesses to bid on IMF projects “pending the lifting of the
embargo.”659  While the larger economic war gradually wound down, the battle for access
was over.  On September 14, 1993, the American embargo of Vietnam entered its
eighteenth year; it would not see a nineteenth.
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Trading with the Enemy, 1994-1995
When the 103rd Congress of the United States returned to Washington for its
second session, nearly all of the pieces were finally in place for the White House to lift
the embargo.  As Time magazine put it in early 1994, “the issue of normalizing relations
with Vietnam no longer hinges on the unanswered—or unanswerable—questions of what
happened to America’s missing soldiers; instead it has become a debate about whether
the war is finally, conclusively over.”660  The only consideration left for Clinton was
purely political: could the White House survive the inevitable onslaught of criticism from
the POW/MIA lobby.   The last-gasp “leverage” argument of the National League of
Families and its allies in Congress—that the embargo was the last “bargaining chip” left
on the table with Vietnam—was no longer sustainable in the face of ever-increasing
progress in body recovery since the U.S. had steadily eased the embargo. While the basis
for moving forward was obviously economic at this point, the decision to end the
sanctions would still have to be couched in terms of ongoing commitments to the
POW/MIA mission.  A New York Times/CBS News poll conducted in mid-January
revealed that although a small plurality of those questioned favored lifting the embargo
(46 percent in favor versus 40 against), a far greater number, 56 percent, believed that
some Americans were still being held prisoner in Southeast Asia.  In the face of such
numbers and public perceptions of his record on the war, to lift the embargo once and for
all Clinton needed what the news media at the time termed “political cover.”661
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On January 27, 1993, the Senate held a lengthy and contentious debate over
whether to give the President that cover.  The floor fight for a resolution recommending
the President end the embargo once and for all, led by John Kerry and John McCain,
brought out the expected animosity from anti-Vietnamese forces inside and outside of the
Senate chambers.  Against the claims of Kerry and McCain that it was “time to put the
war behind us,” Bob Smith voiced the reaction of groups like the VFW and National
League of Families, calling an end to the sanctions “immoral and incomprehensible.”662
Even in the face of such rhetoric, those opposed to any movement toward normalization
were far outweighed by pro-business forces and those who saw the embargo as an
impediment to progress on the POW/MIA issue.  In the early hours of the 28th, the non-
binding resolution calling on the President to lift the embargo passed by a vote of 62-38.
Although the administration tried to downplay its role in pushing for the
resolution, it had, by all accounts, orchestrated the passage closely with Kerry and other
supporters.  Although Kerry toed the administration’s line by placing himself at the
center of the story, McCain was more honest in his statements to the press, telling The
Washington Post, “The White House staff felt it was very important to pass this
[resolution], given the problems that the President’s lack of military background gives
him on this sort of issue.”  Three days later, the administration removed the final political
roadblock when it received word that the Justice Department was prepared to clear
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown of charges that he accepted a large payoff from
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Vietnamese-American businessmen in exchange for helping lift the sanctions.663
On the morning of February 3, The Washington Post ran a story describing the
“last bitter days of the personal Vietnam war” still being fought by “a handful of
distressed and angry Americans.”664  Murmurs from the White House indicating the end
of the embargo was imminent led members of the National League and the VFW to
huddle in the Capitol for a last-minute “strategy session” with Bob Smith and Ross Perot.
According to the story, Smith and Perot “pleaded” with the groups for any suggestions on
how to “head off” the White House plans.  Unable to come up with any serious proposals,
the group declared defeat.  One member told the Post that all in attendance had come to
recognize “that the handwriting was on the wall.”665  The POW/MIA lobby, at long last,
had no more tricks up its sleeve, yet even they likely did not realize how soon the
announcement would come.
Later that day, armed with the presence of several veterans from Congress, Bill
Clinton lifted the American embargo on Vietnam, telling the assembled guests and media
he was “absolutely convinced that it offers the best way to resolve the fate of those who
remain missing and about whom we are not sure.”666  Most clearly, the President
indicated that although the embargo was lifted, full normalization of political and
economic relations could still take some time.  After detailing the progress that had been
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made resolving outstanding cases, he made his case to the various groups opposing the
move: “I want to be clear: These actions do not constitute a normalization of our
relationships.  Before that happens, we must have more progress, more cooperation, and
more answers.”667
The end of the embargo, however, moved a new set of questions to the forefront.
Clinton’s fervent rhetoric about the ongoing commitment to the POW/MIA issue only
served to mask the new economic focus of American-Vietnamese relations.  After his
remarks, the first barrage of questions from the press was telling:  “Mr. President, aren’t
you giving up some leverage, though?  Could we ask about that?  And what do you
anticipate in terms of American trade?  What’s the size of the market?  What do you
think the opportunities are?”668  As he had for the past year, Clinton assured the public
that economics played no role in his decision, insisting that he had not even received
briefings on the benefits that lifting the embargo would provide for American business.
“I thought it was very important,” he responded, “that that not be a part of this
decision.”669  Even so, American corporations had no need for Clinton’s prognostications.
They had long been aware of the opportunities available to them in the Vietnamese
market, and were ready to seize their chance the moment the embargo was officially
lifted.
The announcement from the White House set off a frenzy of contract signing,
announcements of new services, and distribution of free samples from New York to
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Hanoi.  Within an hour of Clinton’s remarks, representatives of Pepsi set up an inflatable
soda can and began handing out 40,000 free bottles of the soft drink in Ho Chi Minh
City.  A few hours later, about the time American Express signed a contract to be the first
credit card accepted in Vietnam, United Airlines announced that it was ready to begin
service from Los Angeles to Ho Chi Minh City, pending final approval from Hanoi.  Not
to be outdone by its rival, Coca-Cola later that day unveiled a billboard in Ho Chi Minh
City with the phrase, “Nice to see you again.” Coke, which spent $250,000 on marketing
in advertising the first ten days after the embargo was lifted, proclaimed that it would
spend $45 million on production in Vietnam over the next five years.670   Pepsi responded
a few days later, unleashing a new advertising campaign featuring the current Miss
Vietnam.671
The headlines in the United States were unanimous in their predictions:  The war
was finally over; a long, bitter relationship would soon be thawed by the prospect of
trade.  The contents of Time magazine featured a cartoon of Ho Chi Minh holding up an
order of French fries sporting the likeness of Colonel Sanders, the mascot of Kentucky
Fried Chicken.  “’Vietnam,’” William Branigin declared, “can finally become for
America a country instead of a war, a place of real people with a history and a future
instead of U.S. national nightmare.” 672  Yet the American media seemed unable to
describe the new nation without the trope of warfare.  The marketplace of Saigon, papers
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declared, was the site of “the new Vietnam war,” the latest “campaign between for the
hearts and minds of Vietnam’s 71 million people.” “Vietnam Braces For a New
Invasion,” declared Newsweek.673  In particular, the American “Cola Wars” were seen as
opening a new front in Vietnam.  The New York Times proclaimed Coke versus Pepsi
“the new Vietnam Combat,” and elsewhere the “battle” between the two soft drink giants
was being followed closely, with Pepsi winning “the opening skirmish,” but Coke
“fighting back” strongly.  The Times admitted to the irony of the situation, noting that
fighting the cola wars on the streets of Hanoi was likely “the realization of the worst
nightmare of a generation of dedicated Vietnamese Communists.”674
While an accurate representation of the seemingly unbridled enthusiasm of
American business interests breaking into the new market, the clever headlines and
playful anecdotes were not indicative of the more cautious tone in Vietnam.  Were it not
for the spectacle-laden antics of Pepsi and Coke, many Vietnamese may not have even
been aware that the embargo had been lifted.  The state television station ran the embargo
story seventh on its morning broadcast.  “The Vietnam issue has created many emotions
in the United States,” Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai offered.  “We Vietnamese have
less emotions.”675  Official statements from Hanoi expressed cautious optimism to the
long-awaited end to the sanctions, hailing “a new page in U.S.-Vietnam relations.”676
Accompanying such reactions, however, were calls for full diplomatic normalization and
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the establishment of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for Vietnam.  Vietnamese
leaders were acutely aware that they remained at a major disadvantage in the global
economy without a full trade agreement with the United States.  Ending the Trading With
the Enemy Act “only allows American companies to sell in Vietnam,” Le Van Bang,
Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations, told the Far Eastern Economic Review
the night before Clinton’s announcement.  “It is not both ways because without MFN, we
cannot compete and sell in the U.S.”677  Although the end of the sanctions was praised as
a step in the right direction and, in the short term, a stimulus for American investments
and capital, without MFN status Vietnam would be unable to develop a balanced trade
program.
This disjuncture was apparent in the case of Vietnam’s negotiations with Boeing.
The American based aerospace giant had agreed in principle with the Vietnamese
government to a sale of four 737 aircraft only a few months earlier.  When the White
House failed to lift the embargo, however, Boeing lost its chance at the $160 million
contract, passed over for the French firm, Airbus.  Ironically, Airbus could only lease the
aircraft to Vietnam, because they had sufficient American “content” to be prohibited by
the embargo.678  Both Boeing and Hanoi were thus happy to be able to revive their deal in
1994.  After the lifting of the embargo, Boeing announced that it expected Vietnam to
buy at least 60 aircraft over the next decade, to the tune of around $4 billion.  The
Vietnamese were not as optimistic.  While they needed the planes, the Vietnamese
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economist Le Dan Doanh argued, Hanoi would be unable to purchase such a fleet without
a reduction in American tariffs on Vietnamese goods to the U.S.  “Now Vietnam can buy
Boeings,” Doanh noted, “but it can’t sell textiles in the U.S.  A one-way street can’t be
maintained for a long time.  Vietnam needs to pay for its imports.”679
Despite the claims of the POW/MIA lobby, the Vietnamese were far from
emboldened by the lifting of the sanctions.  If anything, the reaction from Hanoi should
have reinforced the view that the United States was clearly still in a position of power
relative to Vietnam.  In Washington, however, the various anti-Vietnamese constituencies
were not prepared to go quietly.  Exactly one week after Clinton announced the end of
the embargo, the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a hearing
appropriately entitled, “POW/MIA: Where Do We Go From Here.” The last hearing of
its type before the United States and Vietnam normalized diplomatic relations, the
discussions in front of the committee demonstrate the tatters in which the POW/MIA
lobby found itself and the extent to which it continued to misread the power dynamics of
American relations with Vietnam.
Gary Ackerman, the representative from New York who had taken over as chair
of the subcommittee after the departure of Solarz, opened by stating that in light of the
lifting the embargo, the U.S. “must immediately move to ensure that Hanoi does not
interpret this action to mean that it is off the hook on providing a full accounting of our
missing Vietnam war heroes.”680  Other members of the committee made similarly
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worded opening remarks, calling for diligence on the POW/MIA issue while assuring the
many members of the POW/MIA lobby in attendance that the end of the embargo did not
constitute normalized relations or a commitment of United States aid.  The statements of
the committee and witnesses only served to confirm how out of step they were with the
direction of relations with Vietnam.  Representative Dana Rohrabacher claimed that the
administration had “just given up the tremendous leverage that we had on South Vietnam
by lifting the embargo.”681  Luis Gutierrez of Illinois argued that the final chapter of the
war in fact had not yet been written, contrary to all accounts in the news media.  That
would be accomplished only when the U.S. could “find out all of the information of those
who went to Vietnam, but did not return.”682
A member of the “POW/MIA Grassroots Organization” dug up the issue of the
1973 Nixon reparations letter, arguing that it continued to serve as Hanoi’s basis for
withholding live American prisoners.  “Can we not for once, just once,” she pleaded, “put
aside all other considerations except for to secure the release of any Americans being
held against their will?”683  Former POW Michael Benege provided perhaps the most
outrageous comments of the hearings, stating matter-of-factly: “Hanoi knows where the
bodies are buried.  Why would Hanoi hold POWs?  The Vietnamese Communists are not
born again Christians. They are not Mr. Nice Guy.”  Benege went on to accuse Hanoi of
continuing to hold prisoners from the end of the First Indochina War as well.  “This is
documented, that they hold French POWs.”  “By lifting the trade embargo,” Benege
                                                 




concluded, “President Clinton lost a unique opportunity to heal the wounds of the
Vietnam War.”684
If the purpose of the hearings was, in part, to determine the future direction of the
POW/MIA lobby, prospects  for the movement were not bright.  The rigidly anti-
Vietnamese sentiments expressed by Benege and others were clearly in the minority
among the American public and among American policy makers after the lifting of the
embargo.  Images of an America held hostage by devilish Asian communists had long
disappeared, replaced by a triumphant Cold War victory and the demise of the Soviet
Union.  Once the centerpiece and driving force behind American policy toward Vietnam,
the POW/MIA lobby by 1994 was largely reduced to an afterthought.  Policymakers
continued to pledge their ongoing commitment to the mission of obtaining a “full
accounting” from the Vietnamese, but the direction of American-Vietnamese relations
was now being driven largely by the forces of the global economy and the Vietnamese
market.
The issue of settling outstanding corporate claims against Vietnam was given only
a brief moment in the spotlight at the hearings. Robert Torricelli, designated spokesman
in Congress for the corporate claimants made a brief appearance at the outset of the
session, asserting that the corporate victims of the war should not be abandoned in the
push for normalization.  Like the POW/MIA activists, Torricelli wanted “to continue
pressure on the Vietnamese,” but it was the pressure provided by the economic dynamics
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of American-Vietnamese relations that would drive normalization.  In the year ahead, it
would be Torricelli’s corporate claims, not the claims of the POW/MIA lobby that would
be the basis of the bilateral negotiations between Washington and Hanoi.
The Final Step: Reverse Reparations and Normalization
As 1995 began, the pieces of a new era of relations between Vietnam and the
United States were seemingly in hand.  With the embargo lifted and international lending
fully restored, American trade and investment with Vietnam increased significantly, as
did other forms of bilateral and multilateral aid to Vietnam.  In 1993, the Vietnamese
government reported $500 million in foreign assistance, up from an average of less than
$100 million during the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the fall 1993 IMF and World
Bank meetings, with U.S. opposition out of the way, Hanoi received aid pledges of nearly
$2 billion.  Under the limited waiver opportunities permitted under the embargo during
1993, American companies exported about $7 million worth of products to Vietnam.  In
1994, the exports reached $160 million.685  The prospects were for aid and trade only to
increase in the final five years of the century, but there remained several obstacles to
increased U.S. business activity in Vietnam and even more obstacles to full economic
normalization for the Vietnamese.
Although the end of the embargo created a long-awaited groundswell of foreign
investment, many of the legal safeguards to which American firms working overseas had
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grown accustomed could not be put in place without further measures.  The Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), both of
which provided support for American businesses operating internationally, continued to
be prohibited from working with Vietnam because of “a complex set of statutory
constraints,” most of which stemmed from Vietnam’s status as a “non-market”
economy.686  Many of these restraints were odd relics of the Cold War that seemed
particularly ill-suited to dealing the most central aspects of American policy toward Asia
in 1995: promoting trade among ASEAN, Japan, and the U.S., and recognizing Vietnam
while relations with China were slowly deteriorating.  Section 620(f) of the Foreign
Assistance Act, for instance, required the President to issue a waiver in order for OPIC or
the Trade and Development Agency to assist American firms doing business with any
Communist countries.  The Presidential determination was required to substantiate that
“(a) the assistance is vital to U.S. security, (b) the country is not controlled by the
international Communist conspiracy and (c) the assistance will promote independence
from International communism.”687  Less severe was the Jackson-Vanik waiver, required
by the Trade Act of 1974, which required an annual Presidential waiver asserting that the
governments of nonmarket-economy countries either allow their citizens to emigrate
freely or that the waiver will help promote reform and progress on emigration issues.688
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The Foreign Assistance Act also prohibited the U.S. government from trading or
providing aid to countries that had illegally expropriated American property—private or
government—or had defaulted on previous loans from the United States.689  Vietnam fit
both these categories: the property seized in 1975 was taken in violation of international
law, and the collapse of the Saigon regime in April of that year left the United States with
around $150 million unpaid loans from the defunct Republic of South Vietnam.  Given
the enormous economic—let alone human—costs that the United States inflicted on
Vietnam both during and after the military phase of the war, it might have been
reasonable for the United States to make exceptions in order to “heal the wounds of war,”
as the normalization process was avowedly designed to do.  Furthermore, given the
questionable legality of the American war in Vietnam, the claims issue was a rather
ironic and extremely selective invocation of international law by the United States.  As
we have seen throughout this chapter, however, Vietnam remained at a distinct
disadvantage throughout the normalization process, with no real leverage to speak of.  If
the settlement of outstanding claims was the final obstacle to normalization—which it
clearly was for the United States—the Vietnamese would again acquiesce to American
demands.
For several years, the claims issue arose sporadically at government hearings on
policies toward Vietnam or Cambodia, with the most significant point of contention
being whether or not to include the claims of private American companies and
                                                                                                                                                  
Republic of Vietnam,” Report of the Senate Finance Committee to Accompanary S.J.
Res. 16, 107th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2001 (Washigton: GPO, 2001)
689 “U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Issues and Implications,” 15-16.
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individuals simultaneously with those of the U.S. Government.  The issue was first
openly debated in 1979, when the claims on Vietnam were formally referred to the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) and the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949 was amended to include Vietnam.690 After a six-year investigation, the
Commission ruled in 1986 that 192 of the 534 claims met the requirements for
compensation.  Over half (58%) of the 192 successful claims were to a handful of
petroleum companies.  The total amount of the claims awarded was just under $100
million dollars.691  Ironically, when the commission for Vietnam was created in 1980, the
Vietnam assets frozen by the U.S. in 1975 were worth almost exactly this amount.692
The assets, of course, had appreciated considerably since 1975.  By 1983, the
Vietnamese assets were estimated to be worth $150 million; by 1989, they were valued at
$245 million; and by 1994 they were worth approximately $290 million and, by some
estimates well over $300 million.693  As Robert Torricelli told a House Committee at the
time the embargo was lifted, this amount was “far more than necessary to pay the
claims.”694  The claims, however, were also subject to appreciation.  According to the
terms provided by the settlement legislation, all approved claims were adjusted for simple
interest calculations, at a rate of six percent per year, retroactive to 1975.  Thus the
awards were worth $99 million in 1986, $200 million in 1989, and nearly $220 million
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by 1995.695  This amount was only for private claims, though, and did not include the
$150 million in outstanding loans claimed by the U.S. Government.  Combining the
Government and private claims, the amount reached approximately $370 million, well
over the estimated $300 million value of the frozen Vietnamese assets.  In effect, the U.S.
was negotiating political and economic normalization with the Vietnamese claiming that
it was owed tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars.
Further stretching the absurd, some in Congress had for years been trying to pay
out claims from the frozen assets without reaching a full agreement with the Vietnamese
government.  Since the bulk of the assets held in the United States were formerly
property of the Republic of Vietnam, which had ceased to exist in 1975, some in
Congress responded positively to legislation authored by lawyers representing the
corporate claimants asserting that the current government of Vietnam had no legal right
to the frozen funds.  The case was only bolstered by the fact that the United States had
not yet legally recognized the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.696  The
SRV had formally accepted the international responsibilities of both “North” and “South”
Vietnam during 1975-1976, and it was a commonplace of international law that a new
government was entitled and obligated to assume both the rights and liabilities of the
previous regime.  In the eyes of the United States, however, as one litigator argued in
1989: “Vietnam is not, however, the normal case, and the normal rule does not
automatically apply.”697
                                                 




As it consistently had since 1975, the United States proved that it was willing to
go above and beyond its own precedents and the norms of international relations to
punish Vietnam.  Thus it was that on January 28, 1995, the United States and Vietnam
signed an historic “Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims.”
The agreement arranged for Vietnam to pay private claims of United States nationals
(“both natural and juridical persons”), in the amount of $208,510,481.698  The claims of
the United States government for the RVN loans were not covered by this arrangement.
Only in 1997 did the two governments reach an agreement on this issue, when U.S.
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Vietnamese Finance Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung
agreed that the SRV would repay $145 million in loans from the former Saigon regime.
The agreement also called for a “down payment” of $8.5 to cover the interest on the
loans.  The down payment was due within 30 days; the full loan was to be paid off
through “regular payments” until 2019.699
“Binding our Wounds”
With the corporate claims issue settled, there was no longer anything standing of
the way of normalization between the United States and Vietnam.  Although the White
House would still have to fend off criticisms from the insatiable demands of the
POW/MIA lobby, even the American media was beginning to reject the increasingly
desperate antics of the groups.  In June, as speculation that normalization was imminent
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spread quickly through the U.S., former North Carolina Congressman Billy Hendon, a
longtime advocate of various POW conspiracy theories, repeatedly chained himself to the
headquarters of the U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi.  Hendon, who appeared several
times at various Congressional hearings and was responsible for some of the most
outrageous claims about live prisoners, claimed that he knew the location in Vietnam
where American prisoners were being held.  Refusing to divulge the location, he
informed authorities that he would lead them to the men.  Eventually, the American team
investigated Hendon’s claim about a supposed underground prison fifty miles outside of
Hanoi.  The spot turned out to be a depot for military vehicles.  Absolutely no evidence
of anything related to American prisoners was found.700
Around the same time as Hendon’s antics, an American team received permission
to do a massive excavation at a series of Vietnamese military cemeteries, unearthing
hundreds of Vietnamese corpses with the vague hopes of finding a few isolated remains
from American servicemen.  No American remains were found.  “Imagine,” Jonathan
Alter wrote in Newsweek the following week, “if the Government of Vietnam believed
that one of its estimated 300,000 MIAs had been mistakenly buried in Arlington national
cemetery.  Would the United States allow the Vietnamese to go into Arlington in the
middle of the night and dig up old bones?  Be serious.” Yet the Vietnamese continued to
cooperate and assist the American teams with their efforts.  The younger Vietnamese in
particular, Alter pointed out, were “sympathetic to all this but a bit perplexed by the
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American obsession with the war. 701  The obsessions of the POW/MIA believers were
given one last moment in the spotlight, as Bob Smith, joined now by Bob Dole, attempted
a last ditch effort to derail diplomatic recognition of Vietnam by preventing the approval
of funds for an American embassy.  With or without the measure, however, it was clear
by late June that the White House was prepared to announce normalization.
On July 11, 1995, in a brief, solemn, and understated ceremony in the East Room
of the White House, President Bill Clinton announced that the United States was
establishing normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam.  Couching the announcement,
as ever, in the language of continued progress on a full accounting of those listed as
POW/MIA, Clinton noted that only 55 “discrepancy cases” remained.   Normalization
would help the United States “move forward on an issue that has separated Americans
from one another for too long now,” Clinton remarked.
This moment offers us the opportunity to bind up our own wounds.  They have
resisted time for too long.  We can now move on to common ground.  Whatever
divided us before, let us consign to the past.  Let this moment, in the words of
Scripture, “Be a time to heal, and a time to build.702
The “wounds” to be healed were American, but try as he might Clinton could not
consign them to the past.   Angered by the administration’s decision, the Republican
controlled Congress seized the opportunity, reviving the Smith-Dole legislation denying
funding to the American embassy in Vietnam.  “A slap in the face” to the “friends and
families of American MIAs,” one member of the House International Affairs Committee
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labeled normalization.  “A blot, a stain on our government,” cried another.703  There was
little support among the public to sustain the punitive proposals.  In a New York Times
survey immediately after the normalization announcement, nearly all the respondents
supported rapprochement with Vietnam.  Even some who believed that Americans were
still being held in prison camps in Hanoi recognized that the time had come.  “The
question should be, can Vietnam forgive us,” said one respondent.  “If we had won,”
argued another, “this wouldn’t be an issue.”  Not every one was convinced, of course.
“It’s the same Vietnam that took our sons and brothers,” said a woman who lost family in
the war.  “I could never forgive them for that.”704  As usual, the Vietnamese took the high
road in the face of ongoing American hostility.  Shortly after the normalization
announcement, the government officially renamed the Museum of American War
Atrocities in Ho Chi Minh City the “Museum of War Evidence.”
That August, in a large public ceremony, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
and Foreign Minister Nguyen Canh Cam signed the official papers on normalization,
opening the American embassy in Hanoi.  The ceremony was upbeat, including a
champagne toast.  Cam told the assembled guests that a new era in American-Vietnamese
relations had, at long last, arrived.  “We want Americans to view Vietnam was a country,
and not as a war,” he noted.  As the American flag was raised over the embassy, it
seemed that the U.S. was finally prepared to do just that.  Yet for twenty years the
American War in Vietnam had resisted attempts at closure, denying any solid “ending” to
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the multiple narratives it had produced.  The period after 1995 would not be all that
different, bringing unresolved issues and new battles to the ongoing American war with




Searching for Vietnam at The Wall(s)
I didn't want a monument,
 not even one as sober as that
 vast black wall of broken lives.
 I didn't want a road beside the Delaware
 River with a sign proclaiming:
 "Vietnam Veterans Memorial Highway."
What I wanted was a simple recognition
 of the limits of our power as a nation
 to inflict our will on others.
 What I wanted was an understanding
 that the world is neither black-and-white
 nor ours.
 What I wanted was an end to monuments.
But no one
 ever asked me what I wanted.
-W.D. Erhardt, “The Invasion of Greneda,”
Nothing more aptly sums up the American War on Vietnam after 1975 than the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.  From its proposal in 1979 and initial
construction in the early 1980s through the passage of legislation in late 2003 to add an
“Education Center” to the site, “The Wall,” as the memorial is more commonly called in
the United States, has spanned nearly the entire period of the post-military phase of the
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war.  Over that time, The Wall has been a central battleground in the contest over cultural
memories of the war: a powerful symbol for various veterans’ constituencies including
the POW/MIA lobby; a trope of sorts in works of fiction and nonfiction about the war;
and a symbol used by legislators to defend and publicize an array of policy positions.
Like the larger cultural front in the ongoing war in Vietnam, The Wall has consistently
rendered the nation and people of Vietnam invisible, demonstrating once and for all how
central that absence is to the reconstruction of American nationalism and American
imperialism after 1975.   Yet The Wall consistently has resisted providing closure, kept
alive by the very contest for public memory it helps to engender.  What makes the
absence of the Vietnamese all the more significant is that in the twenty-five years since
its inception The Wall has consistently been challenged to become a more “inclusive”
site of public history and memory.
Over the past two decades, various groups and individuals, feeling that the site
could not contain or represent their stories and memories, have sought to mark the
limitations of the memorial.  The Wall has shaped and, in turn, been profoundly shaped
by the additions of, first, Frederick Hart’s “Three Fightingmen Statue,” and the American
flag which accompanies it, and, second, Glenda Goodacre’s tribute to the American
Women who served in Vietnam.  All the while, families of those Americans who died as
a result of the war but were not included in the criteria for listing on The Wall have
lobbied to have more names added to the black granite face of the memorial.  More
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recently, Congress approved the addition of the “In Memory Plaque,” which now
commemorates American Veterans who have died since their return from the war, and
the development of the Education Center to “educate young Americans about the
Vietnam War and The Wall.”705  Throughout the often bitter political and cultural battles
over these changes, the absence of any mention of Vietnam or the Vietnamese has
become more conspicuous.
In this final chapter, I want to explore The Wall as a site where competing
narratives of the American War in Vietnam have been constructed and contested.  In
particular, I will focus on what I call the narrative structure of memorial. By narrative
structure, I mean the ways in which the material, spatial, and contextual elements of the
memorials structure visitors’ bodies and experiences in particular ways706.  I do not have
in mind here a determinist model, in which the structures predict the stories that will be
told at the different sites, but rather a dynamic situation in which these structures shape
and in turn are shaped by the experiences of visitors.  The narrative structure does not
determine, then, but rather serves as a boundary or limit of normative and accepted
practices for users who bring a seemingly infinite number of stories with them when they
visit these sites.  As I have argued throughout this work, these normative boundaries are
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important not because they actively silence some narratives at the expense of others, but
because of how the structural limitations of dominant discourses render some forms of
stories outside the “possible field of action,” in Foucault’s words.707  As with the
narratives of histories, films, journalism, and foreign policy debates that I have explored
throughout these pages, the discursive boundaries set by the narrative structure of The
Wall have worked to render invisible the nation and people of Vietnam most directly and
direly effected by the war.  In doing so, The Wall has been the site of some of the most
extraordinary cultural work of the American War on Vietnam.  More than any other
component part of the American war on Vietnam since 1975, The Wall, demonstrates
how the persistent invisibility of the Vietnamese in discussions of the war has been
central to the recuperation of American nationalism and the reestablishment of American
imperialism.
In exploring these themes, I will draw on a number of previous works about The
Wall, although two in particular are central to my analysis.  Marita Sturken’s Tangled
Memories, which has provided the basis for much of this project’s framework, offers one
of the best overall readings of The Wall, discussing the site as a “screen” for
“innumerable projections of memory and history,” a major battleground in the struggle
for cultural memories of the war.  While Sturken focuses on the larger cultural and
mental landscapes of the site, Kristin Ann Haas’ Carried to the Wall discusses how
Americans have used the site over time, participating in the battles described by
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Sturken.708  Unfortunately, since these works came out only a year apart, they did not
benefit from each other’s analysis.  While I will make use of the valuable discussions of
The Wall and American memory offered by both Sturken and Haas, I will also
distinguish my contribution from theirs.  Most importantly, I will attempt to complicate
the binary constructions present in both works.  For Sturken, The Wall
lies at the center of a struggle between narratives.  It has spawned two very
different kinds of remembrance: one a retrenched historical narrative that attempts
to rewrite the Vietnam war in a way that reinscribes U.S. imperialism and the
masculinity of the American soldier, the other a textured and complex
remembrance that allows the Americans affected by this war—the veterans, their
families, and the families and friends of the war dead—to speak of loss, pain, and
futility.  The memorial thus stands in a precarious space between these opposing
interpretations of the war.709
While it is likely that more than two different kinds of remembrance are negotiated at
The Wall, Sturken does make a strong case that the two dominant forms of narratives
produced are the personal and the national.  I will argue, drawing from Sturken, that the
disjuncture between these two narratives has been the driving force in the efforts of
different groups and individuals to further alter the space of the memorial itself and to
pursue alternative forms of memorial online at the Virtual Walls.  At the same time,
however, the two narratives do not consistently oppose each other in the manner Sturken
suggests.  Rather than seeing the personal and the national as two narratives locked in
struggle, I will suggest that the personal acts of memory performed at and around the wall
are rather easily reconciled with the larger project of the national narrative: the
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reinscription of American imperialism into the grand narrative of American history.  The
more important point, I will argue is that as the personal/national tension is played out at
the site, it further erases the ghostly, invisible presence of the Vietnamese.  Most
significantly, however, I will extend Sturken’s argument, examining how her model
applied to the movement of The Wall into cyberspace.
Haas constructs a different and more troubling binary in her study.  Focusing on
the acts of memory performed at the wall, she argues that The Wall has “opened up a
public space for debate about what it meant to fight in and come home from, this war.”710
People who leave items at the Wall, she asserts, are attempting to participate in the
negotiation of the public meaning of the war.  While there is certainly a degree of
negotiation going on at The Walls, Haas’ reliance on the term “public” when describing
the space of the site and the type of discourse taking place at The Wall conceals the
actual complexity of that interaction.  Haas is not clear on whether the term applies to the
type of negotiation going on, the goals of that negotiation, or simply to the space in which
that negotiation takes place?  For my purposes, I propose that “public discourse” about
the war must have at least a marginal connection to the larger meanings of the war in
Vietnam for the United States.  To complicate Haas idea of “the public,” I will show that
acts of memorialization at The Wall and its various progeny, have little to do with any
sort of public discourse about the meaning of the war in Vietnam for the United States as
a nation or, of course, for Southeast Asia, but everything to do with coming to terms with
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private, localized, personal loss and in reconciling personal narratives with national
narratives.
By exploring the battles for cultural memory waged at and around The Wall, I
will trace the pliability and permeability of the narrative structure of The Wall, through
the various additions to the site mentioned above and, most significantly, through the
evolution of the memorial into cyberspace.  In decade since the United States and
Vietnam have normalized relations, The Wall has gone digital.  Several “Virtual Walls”
have sprung up on the web, allowing for visitors and users to remember the American
War in Vietnam, their nation, and their loved ones, in new ways.  Yet what at first glance
seems to be a completely new direction in public remembrance of the war is just another
step in an ongoing process of cultural negotiation.  Although the narrative structures of
the “Real” Wall and digital sites are very different, allowing in some ways for very
different types of memorial to occur, the Virtual Walls are remarkably successful in their
attempts to “reflect the environment” of the Real Wall.  While the Virtual Walls offer a
resolution of some of the limitations of the Real Wall, they simply reinforce others.
Ultimately, while users of the sites have developed new and interesting forms of
remembrance, a recuperative nationalist narrative is still the dominant cultural force at
the cybermemorials.  As with The Wall, this narrative is successful because of the
pervasive invisibility of the Vietnamese.  Thus, in closing, I will explore a transnational
war memorial, The Widows of War Memorial, as an alternative to the Virtual Walls’
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model.  By moving beyond the discursive boundaries and of The Walls—real and
virtual—the widows of war memorial offers a powerful antidote to nationalist discourses
seeking to reinscribe, or erase, various forms of violence imperialism.  As we will
ultimately see, however, at the dawn of the Twenty-First century, The Vietnam Veterans
Memorial is more susceptible than ever to forces wishing to impose a nationalist
narrative on the site.  As such, the contested cultural memory of the American War in
Vietnam is more vulnerable than ever to an imposition of consensus.
The Wall711
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial began as an idea in the head of Jan Scruggs, an
American veteran of the war in Vietnam.  As recounted in To Heal A Nation, which he
co-authored, Scruggs, after seeing The Deer Hunter in the spring of 1979, awoke from a
difficult night of traumatic flashbacks to tell his wife, “I’m going to build a memorial to
all the guys who served in Vietnam.  It’ll have the name of everyone killed.”712
Unspoken by Scruggs in that passage, an invisible inference that would eventually be
transferred to the memorial itself, was that by “everyone,” he meant Americans.
Scruggs and his fellow veterans embarked on a remarkable campaign, raising
awareness of veterans issues as they raised millions of dollars from individuals, private
organizations, and American corporations to fund the memorial.  After battling members
of Congress and enduring the first of many battles with the National Park Service,
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legislation designating a two acre spot on the National Mall for the memorial was signed
into law by President Carter in June of 1980.
When the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF), the organization set up by
Scruggs to finance the building of the memorial, announced the design competition for
the memorial, it offered the first series of structures that would come to define the
narrative boundaries of the site.  Only two explicit rules were laid out for the contest:
entries were to incorporate the names of American soldiers who died in Vietnam, and
they were not to be “political” in nature.  Specifically, the mission statement of the design
competition released by the VVMF detailed a theme of reconciliation that the Fund saw
as apolitical in nature: “The Memorial will make no political statement about the war or
its conduct.  It will transcend those issues.  The hope is that the creation of the Memorial
will begin a healing process.”713  As Scruggs and his partners were soon to find out, both
of the requirements would prove to be points of contention.  The question of whose name
would be allowed to be included on The Wall would provide the driving tension for
several additions to the site in the ensuing years.  More to the point, it was impossible for
anything related to the American war in Vietnam to be apolitical.
At the end of the contest, the largest in American history at the time, the unlikely
winner emerged: Maya Ying Lin, a 21 year-old undergraduate architecture student at
Yale.  Lin, born in Ohio, was a particular surprise to many because of her Asian-
American heritage.  She would later write that at the time of the contest she had been
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“naïve” about her “racial identity.”  When her design was announced as the winner, a
reporter asked her, “Isn’t it ironic that the war in Vietnam was fought in Asia and you are
of Asian descent?”  Lin dismissed the question as “completely racist—and completely
irrelevant.”  When she saw the story in the Washington Post the following day, however,
she realized that “we were going to have problems.”  The article, which focused on
elements of Taoism and Zen present in the design, labeled Lin “an Asian artist for an
Asian war.”
Eventually, though, it occurred to me to ask the veterans if my race mattered.
They seemed embarrassed—and it was then that I realized that people were
having problems with the fact that a “gook” had designed the memorial.  It left me
chilled.714
Although the public unease of some over Lin’s identity would subside somewhat over the
course of the site’s development, her design would prove to be the real controversy.
Although the design would endure the various alterations that would be imposed on the
site, Lin herself would be overtly marginalized in the process.  Over the course of the
negotiations over the site, Lin who represented the Other to so many involved in the
memorial, was nearly rendered as invisible as the ghostly Vietnamese presence at The
Wall.
Lin’s design had been praised by the jury for its simplicity and minimalism: two
long, black granite walls descending into the earth, with the names of the dead listed in
chronological order of their death.  As Lin described her memorial years later:
At the intersection of these walls, on the right side, at the wall’s top, is carved the
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date of the first death.  It is followed by the names of those who have died in the
war in chronological order.  These names continue on this wall, appearing to
recede into the earth at the wall’s end.  The names resume on the left wall as the
wall emerges from the earth back to the origin where the date is carved at the
bottom of this well.  Thus, the war’s beginning and end meet.  The war is
complete, coming full circle yet broken by the earth that bounds the angle’s open
side and contained within the earth itself.  As we turn to leave, we see these walls
stretching into the distances, directing us to the Washington Monument to the left,
and the Lincoln Memorial to the right, thus bringing the Vietnam memorial into
historical context.  We the living are brought to a concrete realization of these
deaths.  Brought to a sharp awareness of such a loss, it is up to each individual to
resolve or come to terms with this loss.715
The unique, non-linear chronological listing of the names carved on the wall was a point
of contention for some of the veterans groups associated with the construction of the
memorial, but they eventually agreed that the “narrative framework,” as Sturken puts it,
“provides a spatial reference for their experience of the war, a kind of memory map.”
Significantly, she adds, “the refusal of linearity” in Lin’s design, “is appropriate to a
conflict that has on narrative closure.”716  Rejecting the traditional role of the war
memorial, Lin’s memorial refuses to allow the war in Vietnam to be contained “within
the particular master narratives” of history.  Rather, The Wall “refuses to sanction the
closure of the conflict.”717
Indeed, the lack of “closure” provided by the design is the single most important
factor in its narrative structure.  The Wall is inherently open-ended and, thus
participatory.  The listing of the names in an of itself, as Haas suggests, requires “a
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certain amount of participation” by visitors.718  Even more generally, however, the
memorial’s narrative structure was designed to leave the task of interpretation to the
individual visitors.  One of the jury member said of the design, “People can bring to it
whatever they want.”719  Although the “historical context” described by Lin was a key
component in the design and does situate the memorial, and thus the war in Vietnam, in
relation to the larger narrative space of the Mall, that relationship is, at best, ambiguous.
In the end the historical referents of the monument were less important to Lin than the
cathartic potential of the site.  “Death is in the end a personal and private matter,” she
wrote of her design, “and the area contained within this memorial is a quiet place, meant
for personal reflection and private reckoning.”720  The original discursive structure of The
Wall, then, was centered around personal narratives and private acts of memory, leaving
the larger questions “about the war or its conduct” appropriately unresolved.
Not everyone shared the jury’s reading of the design, however.  For many, the
ambiguity of the proposal and the open-ended narrative structure, although seemingly in
line with the competition’s guidelines, was threatening.  Many disparaged Lin’s design
for not being sufficiently upbeat and patriotic.  A group of Republicans in Congress sent
a letter to President Reagan, labeling the design “a political statement of shame and
dishonor.”721  Author Tom Wolfe called it “a tribute to Jane Fonda.”722  Tom Cahart, a
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veteran and member of the VVMF who had offered his own design in the competition,
labeled The Wall “a black gash of shame.”  Cahart, whose own proposal featured an
officer offering a dead GI up to heaven while standing in a large purple heart, went on to
lead the public relations battle against accepting Lin’s design.723  The conservative
magazine National Review provided yet another scathing critique of the proposal,
labeling it “an Orwellian Glop.”  The Review even went after for Lin for following the
most basic criteria of the competition, listing the names of all the Americans who died in
the war: “The mode of listing the names make them individual deaths, not deaths in a
cause: they might as well have been traffic accidents.”724   Lin later claimed, as did
supporters at the time, that the names, “seemingly infinite in number, convey the
overwhelming numbers while unifying the individuals as a whole.  For this memorial is
meant not as a monument to the individual, but rather as a memorial to the men and
women who died in the war as a whole.”725  Such arguments were no use, however.  In
the face of the small but vocal outcry, the White House to direct Secretary of Interior
James Watt to delay the planned groundbreaking of the memorial, scheduled for that
spring, until a “compromise” could be reached.
Despite a raft of defenders on the jury and among the veterans groups sponsoring
the memorial, Lin was abandoned by many key players, including Scruggs, who favored
a quick resolution to the flap and feared losing the site altogether.  The VVMF chose to
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work out a deal with opposing forces so that the construction of the memorial could
proceed on schedule.  The original compromise called for a flagpole to be placed on top
of the apex of the two walls and a statue, defined as “a strong commanding figure
symbolizing all who served in Vietnam,” placed directly in front of The Wall.726  Reports
also circulated that inscriptions would also be added, including one that read: “For those
who fought for it, freedom has a flavor,” and another, quoting former POW Jeremiah
Denton: “We are honored to have had the opportunity to serve our country under difficult
circumstances.  God Bless America!”727  Lin was understandably upset at the proposed
changes to her design, although she attempted throughout the ordeal to accommodate the
disparate demands of various groups. Although the flag and statue would later be moved
away from the proposed location of The Wall’s apex and the proposed inscriptions would
be dropped, for Lin the damage was already done.  When the groundbreaking ceremony
was held on March 27, 1982, she was noticeably absent, as she was in November, when
The Wall was officially opened.
Although it was not in place for either the groundbreaking or the dedication in
1982, the disputed statue continued to be a source of controversy. By July, Lin broke her
silence and offered public criticism of the addition.  When the addition of the statue was
finalized Lin accused the sculptor of “drawing mustaches on other people’s portraits.”728
The statue, sculpted by Frederick Hart, portrays three stoic American soldiers of diverse
ethnic backgrounds staring across to The Wall.  Haas describes the figures as “strong,
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masculine, and heroic,” the prescribed antidote for many to Lin’s more ambiguous
Wall.729  When finally unveiled, Lin said of the statue: “Three men standing there before
the world—it’s trite.  It’s a generalization a simplification.  Hart gives you an
image—he’s illustrating a book.”730  Other critics weighed in on the statue as well.  The
art critic for the Boston Globe called Hart’s piece a “Starsky and Hutch pose.731  Scruggs
defended the statue, claiming that far from detracting from Lin’s vision, Hart’s piece
“makes it 100 percent better, much more beautiful.”732  Others from the selection
committee, including Architect Harry Weise, sympathized with Lin: “It’s as if
Michelangelo had the Secretary of the Interior climb onto the scaffold and muck around
with his work.”733  Perhaps The Economist put it most aptly, however, when it opined,
“This ‘improvement’ would make the V-shaped memorial more like other memorials, but
it cannot make Vietnam more like other wars.”734
When the statue was officially added to the site on Veterans Day in 1984, two
years after the “first” dedication of The Wall, Lin was again absent; her name was not
even mentioned during the proceedings that day.  Unlike the 1982 dedication, when
President Reagan stayed away due to “security concerns,” in 1984 he lent credence to the
addition of the statue by showing up to accept, on behalf of the federal government, the
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memorial as a gift from the VVMF.735  With the statue in place, keeping watch over The
Wall from across the knoll, many at the ceremony felt the memorial was finally prepared
to begin its avowed mission of promoting healing and reconciliation among Americans.
The New York Times, writing of the dedication ceremony, claimed that the statue finally
“completed” the memorial.736
The battle to include the statue and its flagpole was the first of many battles over
the narrative structure of the memorial.  The imposition of the more overtly political,
patriotic, and heroic statue was intended to situate visitors to the site in a less ambiguous
discursive framework.  Despite the manner in which the additions were handled and the
way in which Lin was personally treated during the ordeal, Hart’s addition proved to be a
fairly benign addition to the site.  Lin’s more open-ended structure was designed to allow
visitors to come to their own conclusions and interpretations, but Hart’s sculpture did not
impose closure on the memorial.  Rather, it provided a useful and appropriate tension to
the site, representing a different vision of the war in Vietnam and its legacies for the
American soldiers who fought and died there.  Even Lin would later admit, “In a funny
sense, the compromise brings the memorial closer to the truth.  What is also
memorialized is that people still cannot resolve that war, nor can they separate the issues,
the politics, from it.”737
As would be the case with future battles, various groups and figures attempted to
provide closure to such campaigns by declaring, as the Times did in 1984, that the
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memorial was “finished,” or “completed.”  But The Wall, like the larger signifier of
“Vietnam” in American culture, steadily and stubbornly resisted attempts to pronounce it
finished.  Although her design had been disrupted by political negotiations, Lin’s vision
of The Wall persevered.  Visitors began to flock to the memorial, immediately making it
the most visited monument in Washington.  Regardless of the changes made at the site,
the powerful tension between the creation of “a quiet place, meant for personal reflection
and private reckoning,” and the profoundly national space created by the insertion of The
Wall in the National Mall, would continue to exert a powerful force on the established
narrative boundaries of the site.
As Sturken points out, The Wall “functions in opposition to the codes of
remembrance evidenced on the Washington Mall.”738  Rather than the traditional,
elevated white structures, The Wall, with its lowered, reflective black face, is designed
both to be partially hidden from the larger narrative of the mall, as guided by the
Washington Monument and Lincoln Memorial, and to stand out and be different, to mark
an interruption in the grand narrative sweep of American history. That tension extends to
the personal interactions and remembrances that take place in this most national of
spaces.  Uncertain of how exactly the war in Vietnam fits into United States history, most
visitors to The Wall are similarly dealing with how the war has effected them personally,
be it in the image they have of their nation or what the war did to themselves and their
families.  Users of the site are thus, as a result of the narrative structure of the memorial,
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placed in a situation where cultural memory and national history come together and in
which visitors are forced to confront conflicting frameworks and interpretations of the
past. As David Thelen describes it, “Maya Lin designed a memorial that brilliantly
allowed those with large political agendas and those with intimate private memories to
come together.”739
More than anything else, however, The Wall was designed to be interactive.
Although no one imagined the scope or degree that the interaction would eventually take,
the reflective face of the memorial in itself forced a degree of interaction not present at
other structures on the mall.  Visitors see themselves in the shiny granite face of The
Wall, and, at many angles, they can also witness the reflections of the Washington and
Lincoln memorials and the additional statues at the site.  All of this reflection, of course,
takes place over the façade of the engraved names of the dead.  Furthermore, in order to
truly interact with the memorial, visitors must allow their body to be taken in by the site,
to walk down into the depths of The Wall, guided by the structure of the site, bounded by
ropes on one side of the path and The Wall itself on the other.  Visitors are at the same
time structured in the narrative design of the memorial’s space and also invited, indeed
encouraged, to act as their own narrator and guide, constantly remaking the always
unfinished memorial.  This is precisely the type of terrain that Sturken describes as
cultural memory, an always fluctuating and contested battleground for the meaning of the
past.
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The most telling form of interaction at The Wall, of course, results from the
tradition of visitors leaving artifacts at the memorial.  This practice, which began almost
immediately in 1982, forms the focus of Haas’ book.  By leaving these items, visitors to
the site have actively performed acts of memory, bringing their own personal narratives
of the war to The Wall, and negotiating those memories within the narrative structure
provided by the memorial.  The structure of the site prohibits making permanent these
additional markers of memory, which everyday are added to the National Park Service’s
archive.  Yet the objects continue to appear, left at the base of the Wall as a form of
participatory memorialization.  But what exactly do these objects represent?
As Haas argues in Carried to The Wall, the artifacts do offer some insights, most
notably a marking of the limitations of the monument not unlike those represented by the
flag, the added statues, and the In Memory plaque.  “The restive memory of the war
changed American public commemoration,” she writes,
because the memory “could not be expressed or contained by Lin’ powerful and
suggestive design alone.  The deep need to remember the war and the challenges
that it presented to the idea of the nation, the soldier, and the citizen met in Lin’s
design and inspired hundreds of thousands of Americans to bring their own
memorials to the Wall.  These intensely individuated public memorials forge a
richly textured memory of the war and its legacies.740
That the objects mark a limitation in the narrative structure of the memorial is clear; the
question has to do with whether these “intensely individuated” memorials are, at the same
time, “public.”
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Most of the estimated 4 million annual visitors to The Wall do not leave artifacts,
letters, or flowers.  Yet even those who do offer little more context for their acts than
those who simply pass by.  What is clear is that they understand the temporary nature of
their memorial.  Sturken claims that the artifacts represent “messages for the dead that are
intended to be shared as cultural memory,”741 but how are we to understand the intentions
of those who leave the objects?  How do we know that they are intended to be “shared” at
all?  The objects themselves, as both Sturken and Haas acknowledge, remain for the most
part a mystery.  According to Haas, “It is nearly impossible to know anything about the
donors other than they felt strongly enough to leave their things.  It is often impossible to
know even for whom an object was left.”  It is clear, however, that visitors understand the
temporary nature of their memorial.  People who visit the Real Wall are well aware by
now that items left there are collected regularly, as evidenced by one letter cited by Haas:
“I’m bringing ‘Teddy Bear’ and your loved race car.  I realize they can’t stay here long,
but they are yours and I want them to be with you.”742
Note that this letter, the style of which is indicative of the majority of those left at
the Real Wall, is not only aware of the temporary nature of the artifact, but also addresses
it to the person who is being remembered.  This note is clearly designed neither to be read
nor to elicit any sort of response.  The act described here is, personal, idiosyncratic, likely
cathartic and, ultimately, private.  The fact that it takes place in a very public space does
not alter this.  Yet to label this note as “private” seems equally reductionist as calling it
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“public.”  Regardless of the original intentions of the author, which we will never know,
the note has been made public, included in books and, perhaps like so many artifacts,
included in the public display of items left at The Wall in the Smithsonian Exhibit.
Rather than rely on the false binary of public and private, why not examine the letters and
artifacts as occupying the middle ground between public and private?
While Haas offers a fascinating description of the collection of items left at The
Wall over time, noting that there are multiple memories being made at the site, her
assertion of this constituting a public debate over the meaning of the war is ultimately
unconvincing.  The memory being negotiated, or even contested at the Real Wall, may be
the result of a divisive and devastating war, but the acts of memory performed at The
Wall offer little, if any, public debate about the larger, public meaning of the war.  They
are acts concerned primarily with the memories of American individuals, families and
friends.  While these memories are often negotiated in the context of their conflict with
the larger national narrative structured by the memorial, the proliferation of individual
forms of remembrance does little to challenge the dominance of the national narrative at
the site.
Occasionally, as we have seen, the battle over cultural memory becomes more
inclusive and more “public,” resulting in actual physical changes to the memorial.  Yet in
most of these cases, the driving force in the battle has been the tension implicit in
resolving a group of individual narratives with the national narrative of the site.  This was
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particularly evident in the 1993 addition of Glenda Goodacre’s Vietnam Women’s
Memorial.  As Sturken argues, the decision to allow the addition of this statue, which
features three nurses caring for a fallen soldier, was about “inclusion and recognition.”
The service of American women in the war was not represented by The Wall, save for the
few female names on memorial.  This absence, as Haas points to, is part of a long
tradition in American society of rendering “women’s war work” invisible.743  The
sculpture was widely criticized, including by Maya Lin, for setting a disturbing precedent
of adding “special interest memorials.”  “One monument too many,” claimed The
Washington Post.”744  But the addition clearly represented a rupture in the existing
narrative structure of the site, a tension between personal and national narratives that
could not be privately negotiated.  It would not be the last battle to resolve such a tension.
The most noted intersections of the personal and the national at the memorial
have focused on the issue of whose names are, can, and cannot be represented on The
Wall.  Most recently, the battle has been over the addition of the “In Memory Plaque,”
commemorating those who have died since their return from the war.  The plaque reads,
“In Memory of the men and women who served in the Vietnam War and later died as a
result of their service. We honor and remember their sacrifice.” The bill supporting the
addition of the plaque was sponsored by over 104 representatives and eventually passed,
unanimously, on May 9, 2000. President Clinton signed it into law on June 15.  The
plaque was finally put in place April 15, 2002.
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The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund has received numerous suggestions for
additions over the years. Why was this one accepted?  Unlike other proposals, such as
Branch-Specific military additions for the Army or Marines, the In Memory plaque
clearly demonstrates a disjuncture in the narrative structure of the memorial.  Unable to
reconcile their narratives of personal loss with the fact that those they lost are not
included in the arbitrary chronological narrative imposed by The Wall, those who have
lost loved ones have, since the first days after The Wall’s dedication, challenged
Department of Defense rules for which names could be added to The Wall.  “Each day
we receive inquiries from family members asking how can they get the name of their
father, brother, or sister included on The Wall,” notes Jim Doyle of Vietnam Veterans of
America in his testimony before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic
Preservation, and Recreation.  “We must tell them that there is no memorial to the
sacrifice of their father, mother, husband, or mother.”745
Robert Doubek, an advisor to Vietnam War in Memory Memorial Inc. and an
advisor to the VVMF in the original design contest, gives in his testimony some
indication of the sentiment involved in the decision to add the plaque.  Although he
opposed the addition of the Three Fightingmen and Women’s Memorial, Doubek now
offers:
With the hindsight of two decades, it is now clear that the casualties of Vietnam
were not only those named on The Wall. The casualties include thousands who
returned home to family and friends but who have died prematurely as an indirect
result of their Vietnam service. These include those exposed to Agent Orange, and
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those subject to severe post traumatic stress syndrome. The "In Memory" plaque
will honor them. It will provide a special tribute to their unique sacrifice. It will
comfort their loved ones by providing a societal acknowledgment of their loss.746
What is most striking about Doubek’s testimony, however, is that he goes on to note that
he further supports the In Memory plaque because rather than setting precedent for
further additions, the addition “closes the book and completes the memorial.”747  Just as
with the addition of Hart’s statue, when the memorial was declared “finished,” this
assertion of finishing the memorial is premature.   We have seen that the narrative
structure of the memorial refuses linearity and closure, allowing spaces for a variety of
individual memories to interact with the national context of the memorial and its location
on the mall. The inability of The Wall to contain so many stories and contradictions
would continue to serve as a roadblock to those wishing to “end” the memorial.
There are still stories that cannot be contained by or represented at The Wall.
Although the narrative structure has now seemingly been altered so that the stories of
most Americans can be represented, there still remains the question of those who died in
their efforts to stop the American War in Vietnam.  Are they not part of the narrative of
that war, and of the national space in which the memorial stands?  And of course, most
glaringly, there are still the names of those who many would consider to be the greatest
victims of the war, the millions of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians who died in
the conflict, not to mention those Vietnamese who, even more so than American veterans,
continue to suffer from the effects of Agent Orange and other forms of chemical and





Although it seems likely that the book will never be closed on the memorial as
firmly as Mr. Doubek would have liked, it does seem unlikely the above stories will ever
be represented at The Wall.  The reason, I believe, is that these stories pose a far greater
threat to the national narrative represented by the site and the mall than the previous
additions.  The other additions to the memorial are all fairly easily subsumed under the
larger nationalist project of the mall, particularly under the already somewhat
conspicuous sign of The Wall.  The memorial still does not, as the VVMF originally
prescribed, endorse any particular view of the war.  Yet, just as there can never be an
apolitical statement about the American War in Vietnam, there can similarly be no
apolitical structure on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.
Again, Marita Sturken has been especially eloquent on this point.  First, she notes,
as with any memorial or representation of memory, certain things must be forgotten so
that others might be remembered.  In the case of a national monument, this is often a
political decision.  “Framed within the context of the Washington Mall,” she writes, “the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial must necessarily ‘forget’ the Vietnamese and cast the
Vietnam veterans as the primary victims of the war.”748  Later, in describing Chris
Burden’s alternative memorial-sculpture, “The Other Vietnam Memorial,” which
contains three million Vietnamese names, Sturken asks the fundamental question, “Why
must a national memorial reenact conflict by showing only one side of the conflict?”749
                                                 




Searching for “Vietnam” on the Internet immediately alerts one to the heavy use
of the medium made by American veterans of the war.  A Google search for “Vietnam”
will provide anywhere between 10-15 million hits, with the top returns regularly going,
first, to Vietnam’s official tourism site and, secondly, to the Vietnam Veterans of
America, www.vietvet.org. The Real Wall has its own official website, maintained by the
National Park Service, which offers its own description of The Wall, which intriguingly
described the three component pieces of the site as “distinct sections”:
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial serves as a testament to the sacrifice of
American military personnel during one of this nation's least popular wars. The
memorial consists of three distinct sections. "The Wall," the three service men
statue and flagpole and the women in service to the Vietnam war statue. The
purpose of this memorial is to separate the issue of the sacrifices of the veterans
from the U.S. policy in the war, thereby creating a venue for reconciliation.750
Hundreds of course syllabi devoted to the American War in Vietnam will also appear, as
will chronologies of the war, and links to various American television shows and exhibits
about the war.  American veterans of the war were among the first organized groups to
make use of the web, launching vietvet.org on Veterans Day in 1994.  Since then, sites
devoted to veterans’ issues have expanded exponentially.
The most common form of sites devoted to American veterans of the war are what
I call cybermemorials, online, interactive sites devoted to the memorialization of those
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who died as a result of their service in the war.  Started in 1996, Thewall-usa.com claims
to be the “the first Internet site dedicated to honoring those who died in the Vietnam
War.”  The site, which also goes by the title, “The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Web
Page,” started and maintained by members of the Fourth Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment, has collected over 20,000 “remembrances” since it went online.  The title of
“first” virtual wall, however, more accurately rests with vietvet.org, which contains
sections devoted to remembrance that date back to the site’s 1994 inception. Vietvet has
“The Wall on the Web,” a page dedicated to the Real Wall, which lists all the names from
The Wall and links to noquarter.org, the searchable “Vietnam Casualty Search Engine”
that provides standard background information about those listed on The Wall.751
Vietvet.org also has its own “Remembrance” section, “Reflections, Memories, and
Images of Vietnam Past,” that contains stories, poems and memoirs written by veterans
as well as remembrances left in memory of Americans who died in the war.752  Most
notably, however, the site features the “Taps Gallery,” which developed the format used
by later cybermemorials.753  The Taps Gallery features images, text, and links dedicated
to those who served and died in Vietnam.  For example:
PFC Frank Fettuccia
US Army medic
D. Co., 2nd. BN,35th. INF RGT, 4th. INF Div.
KIA 1 March, 1968
He was there for less than 1 year.
I would like to get in contact with his former teammates from that div.;





anyone who knew him well. I'd like to hear the stories and fotos; I have 2 old
ones to exchange.
Every year, on his date of death in March, I try to have a Mass said for his
soul.
I miss him so much. He was a good and true friend.
Please contact: Maureen Cawley Monteiro754
The people who constructed these memorials to their loved ones performed acts of
memory not possible within the confines of The Wall.  Using the applications of the
medium available to them, they expanded the narrative possibilities of the site to create
memorials that were, at once, both public and private, individuated acts of memory yet
lasting additions to the public space of the memorial.
For Vietvet.org and the visitors who constructed its remembrance sections, the
Taps Gallery was not only a place to move beyond the structural narrative constraints of
The Wall, it was also a space to tell and share stories whose content was limited by The
Wall.  While it remained—and remains—a source of tension at the Real Wall, the
American veterans who died after their return as a result of their service were for many
years not explicitly acknowledged at The Wall.  The Taps Gallery and its format
provided a forum for many of these stories to be told publicly:
My father did three tours to Vietnam earning the Bronze Star twice and he thought
what he was doing was right; for his family, his parents and his country. He was a
huey technician inspector.
 He committed suicide last month and I believe in the way that he did it he truly
never left Vietnam. My father did not have a high tolerance for pain and so I think
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that his guilt hurt him so deep inside because he loved his baby girl with every
ounce of his being, but he couldn't tolerate the pain anymore. The only hell story I
ever heard was when they went down to pick up people and everyone was shot and
he had to fly the helicopter out himself. But he left behind his heart along with
many wounded.
The only thing anyone ever got from Vietnam was pain and sorrow. Vietnam took
my dad. His Grandchildren are beautiful gifts he will never treasure.
And I hope to see him someday to smell his Old Spice aftershave and tell him that I
love him.
His Baby Girl, Erin755
Others told of the deadly legacies of American chemical warfare:
Johnny Ingram Streater
United States Army
Vietnam Veteran - 1969 –1970
 Johnny was my husband who passed away on November 16, 2003 of liver disease.
He was 100% service connected for PTSD and lived with the haunting memories of
Vietnam and several medical conditions related to his service for 33 years. Of
course the VA would never admit he was even exposed to agent orange eventhough
he told me that he would radio the planes where to drop and then wade through the
chemical afterward.
There were times when I wondered if he might take his own life but thank God his
family meant so much to him that he never did. Immediately after he passed three
people whose lives he saved since Vietnam contacted me to tell me their stories. He
was a true hero in every sense of the word. I'm sure the angels in heaven are
singing "Welcome Home" to their brother.
 Until we meet again dear Husband.
 Your wife,
Shirlean756









BJ was the most wonderful brother. BJ suffered terribly from PTSD and he died of
cancer caused by Agent Orange after a long and hard struggle.
God only knows how he is missed by all of us each and everyday. You can view
his memorial site at this link.757
For these users, the Taps Gallery was a separate site, distinctly and intentionally
separated from “The Wall on the Web” section of the site and lacking many explicit
references to the Real Wall.  However, Vietvet.org, along with Thewall-usa.com
demonstrated the possibilities offered by the Internet to move beyond the structural and
content-based limits placed on memorial practices at The Wall.  Two future sites, both
known as “The Virtual Wall” would build on these frameworks to reconstruct,
powerfully and convincingly, both the national context of The Wall and the more flexible
and permeable personal narrative structure provided by web-based technologies of
memory.758
The first Virtual Wall (VW1) was put online in March of 1997759.  Run by a small
group of American veterans of the war in Vietnam, VW1 is a completely non-profit
endeavor, which rejects even donations, aside from the free web space provided by a
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local Internet Service Provider.  The Virtual Wall describes itself as
an interactive World Wide Web site that attempts to take portions of the
experience and emotions of a visit to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (The Wall)
into homes and schools of internet visitors.  The Virtual Wall endeavors to
duplicate and convey the dignity and solemnity of the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial and to maintain the tradition of care and compassion of National Park
Service volunteers at The Wall.  The Virtual Wall reflects an environment like
The Wall itself: a memorial  created and maintained by volunteers, with no
commercials, no noisy or flashy distractions, and no hands held out for
donations.760
The Virtual Wall appears as a list of names of those who died or were listed as MIA in
the war, the same group of names eligible to be placed on the Real Wall.  The names are
listed alphabetically, not chronologically as on the Real Wall, although visitors can
choose to view the names chronologically, by state, or by the panel number on which the
name appears on the Real Wall.  Unlike the Real Wall, however, each name here is a link
which, when clicked on, reveals information about that person.  This information
includes such things as name, date of birth, rank, and date of death, but the pages also
include images and words left by those who have visited the page.  Sometimes these
messages are from members of the deceased’s unit, sometimes from family and friends,
and occasionally from anonymous visitors.  When first put online, VW1 contained the
names of 27 of the webmaster’s friends: some from high school, some from flight school
class, and some from his unit in Vietnam.  Due to staff and time restraints, VW1 does not
have a page for all of the names on the Real Wall, only those requested by visitors.
The Second Virtual Wall (VW2) went online in November of 1998 as a joint
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venture between Winstar Communications and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, the
same group that funded the Real Wall.  This site seems more intent on highlighting the
importance of the personal, stating on its home page: “The Virtual Wall creates a unique
experience for each visitor… Create your own personal journey.”761   Although the gist of
the site, names as links to pages about that person, is similar to VW1, the appearance is
very different.  Obviously maintained by a professional, full time staff, VW2 doesn’t just
seek to reflect or duplicate the purpose or the experience of the Real Wall, it attempts a
“virtual replica” of the Real Wall itself.  VW2 has a name and a linked page for every
name listed on the Real Wall, although most pages do not have messages or images left
there.  Since its launch, VW2 has expanded to become the home page for the entire
VVMF, a center for educational programs related to the war and The Wall, and a media
clearinghouse for information related to the various memorials.
“Thevirtualwall.org,” will thus now bring users to the home page of the VVMF.
When users click on the Virtual Wall section of the site, they can read about the history
of the site and search for an individual name on the virtual wall.  By clicking on
“Experience The Wall,” users are taken through an elaborate Flash software program that
conjures the words “Sacrifice” and “Honor” against a backdrop image of The Wall,
before the primary message scrolls across the screen: “58,220 gave their lives in
Vietnam--Millions Remember.”  The screen then dissolves into a digital graphic
representation of The Wall: a v-shaped black wall surrounded by digital green grass.  As
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was the case with Hart’s “Three Fightingmen” statue, and as would become clear in the
debate over the proposed Visitors Center at The Wall, the language of “sacrifice,”
“honor,” and “patriotism,” became increasingly central to the discursive construction of
the memorials over time.  These ideas and phrases, indeed, offer the primary means of
reconciling the often-conflicting personal and national narratives while further placing
questions of American imperialism outside the realm of normative conversation.
Offering a navigation tool to the visitor that remains onscreen, the panels appear
similar to the way they do at The Wall.  Users can navigate, panel by panel, simulating to
some degree a walk past the Real Wall.  We can “enter” the memorial, encountering at
the base of The Wall, as we would at the Real Wall, the name of the first American killed
in Vietnam. Unlike at the Real Wall, however, we click on the name to learn that
         MAURICE FLOURNOY was born on July 7, 1929.  He
                     became a member of the Air Force while in El
                     Camdo, Texas and attained the rank of SSGT (E5).
                     On February 21, 1960 at the age of 30, MAURICE
                     FLOURNOY gave his life in the service of our country
                     in South Vietnam, Quang Tri Province.
                     You can find MAURICE FLOURNOY honored on the
                     Vietnam Memorial Wall on Panel 1E, Row 1.762
The second Virtual Wall once contained a discussion area, which allowed users to discuss
the war and its legacies, recent events, and American foreign policy.  Mostly, however,
visitors used the space to try to connect with former buddies or family members, much as
they still do, as we will see, on the pages of the Virtual Walls.  The discussion area was
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taken down due to lack of interest, although the site still features occasional live “chats”
with public figures, journalists, authors, and veterans.
Although the memorial pages of the two Virtual Walls differ slightly in
appearance, the stories told on those pages are remarkably similar.  It is in the stories on
these pages that we can glimpse at the everyday negotiation of personal and national
narratives.  While most pages do not have images or messages left there, those that do
generally fall into three categories.  The first are messages left to the person being
remembered, very much like letters left at the Real Wall, except for the difference that
these are more public messages, left to be read by anyone.  The brother of Edward
Cannon offers the simple remembrance:
My Brother, you’ll always be in our hearts forever, God be with you and all our
brothers who gave there "All" we miss you dearly. Your Twin Brother-Robert. 763
Far more common at the Virtual Walls, however, are messages written about those who
died in Vietnam.  The most prominent of these types of stories are those dealing with
POW/MIA issues.  One such page, dedicated to Richard Cole, not only tells the story of
Cole, but also a story of frustration with a government that “has been lying to us for 27
years about our loved ones, and continues to lie.”764  As with the larger POW/MIA myth,
these pages are often the most glaring example of the tension between personal memories
seeking inclusion in the larger national narrative of loss, healing, and recuperative
nationalism.  Less dramatic, perhaps, but equally moving are the stories which simply
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give the visitor a little more information about the name on The Wall.  Patrick O’
Shaughnessy’s page offers the following story from a high school friend:
Pat was a fine young man and a very good athlete.  We attended high school
together... I felt his loss and think our community was robbed of someone who
would leave his mark in life.  I never watch a ball game without thinking of Pat.765
Finally, the most intriguing of the Virtual Wall pages, are those seeking connections with
the families and friends of those they lost.  On the page for Harold Cumings, we see the
following message:  “I would like to contact the widow or the other family of Harold
Cumings, Jr..  I was with Harold when he was taken in Ambush and must fulfill his last
request,” followed by the contact information.766  Similarly, the widow of Edward
Birmingham provides this request on his page:
I am Edward’s Widow
He left three children: 2 sons and 1 daughter
I am sure they would love to learn more about the father they never got to know.
Please send mail... Sallie Birmingham.767
Interestingly, neither of the pages for Cumings and Birmingham at VW2 have any
remembrances or messages posted.
While we do not see the outcomes of such attempts at communication, it is clear
that people use these sites in ways for which the Real Wall was not designed.  The stories
told on these pages are more communal in nature, designed for public eyes with the goal
of telling and sharing stories and information.  The vast majority of messages are about
the dead and those they left behind, not letters written to or objects left for those lost in





the war.  Users of the Virtual Walls take advantage the sites, which are more conducive
to communication, to create and pursue these different types of stories that they cannot
share at the Real Wall.  Although we may not understand the depth of intentions of the
authors of these acts of memory, we can be sure, unlike those left at The Wall, that the
bulk of these messages were meant to be shared, part of ongoing conversations about the
war.  Yet at the same time, the questions about the “public” nature of these acts must be
questioned.  What type of public spaces are the Virtual Walls?
The most important aspect of the Virtual Walls, of course, is their ability to act as
both an archive and medium for the stories visitors wish to tell.  The acts of memory
manifested on the pages of the Virtual Walls, as we have seen, are different in style from
those performed at the Real Wall.  They are largely designed for public viewing and are
often explicit attempts at communication with others.  But it is important to note that the
attempts at communication provided by the Virtual Walls are largely private also.
Edward Birmingham’s widow does not post the responses she receives from her message,
nor does Harold Cumings’ buddy offer the visitors any update on whether or not he has
fulfilled Harold’s wish.  In fact, we do not know if there have any connections made at
all.  Perhaps we are not supposed to.  While the structure of the Virtual Walls provides
the potential for a more public-oriented discourse, what we see are visitors using the
space for personal communication.  Although connections are sought out, these acts of
memory remain focused on individual, localized stories.  As such, they reflect the larger
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political and cultural environment of the Real Wall, which does not offer a public space
for public debate about the war and its legacies, but rather a liminal space for personal,
private acts of memory.
The Virtual Walls have a decidedly different narrative structure and offer a space
more conducive to the resolution of the personal and the national than the Real Wall.
Most importantly, the Virtual Walls are ostensibly removed from the physical, public
context of the National Mall.  While clearly one must have access to and the knowledge
to manipulate a computer and internet service in order to visit the Virtual Walls, once
these prerequisites have been filled, users can visit as often as they like, not constrained
by travel as with the Real Wall.  The digital state of The Walls, existing only in the flow
of information rather than in a finite space, provides opportunities for those who cannot
otherwise make it to Washington D.C.  As such, “The Wall That Heals” a scaled-down
replica of the Real Wall that travels around the United States, offers many users a more
accurate analogy.  One veteran who served in Vietnam in 1968-69 wrote that
I spend time adding things on [the Virtual Wall] for members of our unit lost in
VietNam.  I have been to the moving wall three times in three states, but never got
to Washington DC yet. Matter of money to go --not choice - or feelings about
wall or war. The Virtual Wall gives each of us a chance to say special things
about people, not names in rock.768
Even the construction of the first Virtual Wall was determined by the spatial constraints
of the Real Wall.  The webmaster, Jim, had worked for years as a NPS volunteer at the
Real Wall, but the nine hour drive from upstate New York meant that he could only get
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there a few times a year.769  Instead, Jim and his staff have constructed a space that can be
more easily accessed.  As such, the public/private dynamics of the sites are rather
complex.  On the one hand, they are removed from the imposing, hypervisible national
context provided by the Mall, removing a key element of the Real Wall’s narrative
structure.  At the same time, however, the Virtual Walls are much more accessible to a
range of users than the Real Wall.  The decentered nature of the virtual memorial has
made the Virtual Walls more conducive to personalized acts of memory than the Real
Wall, but this has had little effect on the influence of the national narrative at the sites,
particularly at VW2, where the use of the red, white, and blue VVMF logo and other
images featuring the American flag have helped to recontextualize the national narrative.
The national narrative is also reconstructed actively at the Virtual Walls by users
who invoke the themes of “duty,” “sacrifice,” “heroism,” and “patriotism” on the pages.
Some of these are similar to the types of messages discussed above; one veteran posted a
message about a fallen friend, invoking both the American flag and the POW/MIA flag to
speak of the honor and duty his friend represented to him:
In front of my house is a flag pole on which fly two flags, the Stars and Stripes, of
course, and a POW/MIA flag. The first honors this country and all who have or
will defend it, the second flies for William Tamm Arnold and all who never
returned. It flies 24/7 and will remain there as long as there is life in these tired
old bones. God Bless You.770
A less personal but similar message came from another fellow veteran:
I want to thank you Earl Lee Wilson, for your courageous and valiant service, your
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years of faithfully contributing, and your most holy sacrifice given to this great
country of ours!
Your Spirit is alive--and strong, therefore Marine, you shall never be forgotten, nor
has your death been in vain! It's Heroes like you, that made it possible for others
like myself to return home and lead free and full lives! Again, although we never
met personally, thank you SSGT Earl Lee Wilson, for a job well done! REST IN
ETERNAL PEACE MY MARINE FRIEND771
More telling of the latent impulse to reconstruct the national narrative at the Virtual Walls
are the messages posted by users who have no connection at all to the person
memorialized on the page.  Several teachers, apparently, have assigned their students to
post remembrances on VW2, which has contributed to the volume of these types of
remembrances:
In my history class at my high school, we are currently carrying out the Gridley
High School posting project to ensure that no soldier who died in Vietnam is
forgotten. You have paid a price. That price was death, but by paying that terrible
cost, you gave to those still living freedom, and an example. Your example of
sacrifice and patriotism will live on, inspiring others to act courageously and
bravely to serve and better their country. For that service, that sacrifice, I thank
you. You will not be forgotten.772
My teacher served in the Vietnam War and was shocked at the few number of
remembrances there were for all these people who gave their lives. I felt this
assignment to be uplifting to the family members of those who lost their lives. The
men/women are honorable and so selflessly fought for the country they believed in
and saw potential in. These amazing people served their country in a time of need
and I wanted to express my gratitude and admiration.773
One entire sixth grade class posted the following message to several pages, with the
subject, “Remembering a serviceman from our country:”
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We would like to say thank you for serving your country and sacrificing your life.
We appreciate you very much!774
Yet students are not the only ones participating in such projects.  It is increasingly
common to find these more spontaneous and anonymous postings on the pages of VW2:
Although we never met personally, I want to thank you Bobby Lynn Weathers, for
your courageous and valiant service, faithful contribution, and your most holy
sacrifice given to this great country of ours! 775
Dear Joe,
I want to tell you that I greatly appreciate all the time and effort you took to
support our country. It takes a lot to do what you did. It takes a lot of
courageousness to go fight for your country. We need more soldiers like you today.
Thank you and God Bless. 776
As with the objects and letters left at the Real Wall, we do not know the intentions of
such messages, although most users post their email addresses to allow for further contact
to take place.  Nevertheless, it is striking how similar these postings, taken from a wide
array of dates and pages, are to one another.  The language of duty, honor, patriotism and
sacrifice, so central to the reinscription of the war in Vietnam into the national narrative
has clearly been absorbed by a variety of users.  Regardless of their intentions, by posting
these messages on the pages of anonymous veterans, they have recreated and reimposed
the national context from which the Virtual Walls were originally removed.
Thus, while users have taken advantage of the discursive possibilities provided by
the Virtual Walls to expand the narrative structure of the memorials, the acts of memory
performed on the pages of these sites only serve to reinforce the triumph of the
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recuperative national narrative described by Sturken.  The end results of both the Virtual
and Real Walls are sites that focus attention on what the war did to individual Americans,
their friends and their families.  The unstated assumption behind this is that the memory
of the American war in Vietnam should be about Americans, not about U.S. policy, and
not about the millions of non-American lives destroyed in Southeast Asia.
Just as with the Real Wall, the focus on America and Americans at the Virtual
Walls is largely due to the absence of any mention of what the war did to the nation and
people of Vietnam. While this absence is certainly not surprising given the overt national
presence at the Real Wall, its absence at the Virtual Wall reinforces the success with
which the virtual sites “reflect” the environment of the Real Wall by reconstructing and
reimposing the national narrative.  The improbable scenario of adding a plaque to the
space of the Real Wall commemorating the lives lost even among the supposed South
Vietnamese allies of the United States could be accomplished rather easily on the pages
of the Virtual Walls, but I have yet to run across such a page.  Sturken writes of the
ghostly presence of the Vietnamese dead at The Real Wall:
It is rarely mentioned that the discussion surrounding the memorial never
mentions the Vietnamese people.  This is not a memorial to their loss; they cannot
even be mentioned in the context of the mall.  Nor does the memorial itself allow
for their mention; though it allows for an outpouring of grief, it does not speak to
the intricate reasons why the lives represented by the inscribed names were lost in
vain.777
Note how Sturken indicates that the Vietnamese are rendered outside the narrative
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structure of the site: “they cannot even be mentioned” at the Real Wall.  In contrast, any
user could post a page that signifies the unfortunate loss of life on all sides of this war
with only a few clicks of a mouse and a few strokes on the keyboard.  Yet, as we have
seen, the pages instead are filled with messages that speak of the honor, sacrifice, and
duty of American soldiers.
The point of this discussion is not to diminish the importance of the loss of
American lives in Vietnam or marginalize the very real sacrifices made by American
veterans of the war.  Rather, it is to show how these decentered technologies of memory
have succeeded in maintaining the power dynamics of the narratives structure of the Real
wall.  Even freed from the overt nationalist context of the Real Wall, the Virtual Walls
allow a nationalist narrative to redouble its hegemony.  Just as with the Real Wall, this is
accomplished at the Virtual Walls not because of what is said or represented, but because
of what is not said or represented; not because of who or what is remembered, but
because of who or what is forgotten. Nationalism is reinscribed while imperialism is
erased and silenced, rendered outside the narrative structures of the cultural memory
being constructed at the memorials.  In the face of such a powerful cultural force, it
becomes all the important to return to Sturken’s question: “Why must a national
memorial reenact conflict by showing only one side of the conflict?”
449
The Widows of War Memorial as Transnational Cybermemorial
Since the inception of the Virtual Walls in the late 1990s, a veritable industry of
cybermemorials has developed in the United States.  The University of California-
Berkeley now hosts a page where visitors can “view and create memorials online for
faculty, staff, students, retirees, emeriti, and volunteers who have died. 778  Virtual-
Memorials.com offers personalized service to those who desire their own cybermemorial,
creating “memorials that celebrate the lives and personalities of those we have lost.”779
Other Vietnam-related memorials have also arisen; Vietworld.com offered a virtual
memorial to those who died while in Vietnam’s “Re-education Camps” after the demise
of the Republic of South Vietnam.  Although the site has since been taken down, it once
offered link to hundreds who died in what the site refers to as the “Vietnamese
Holocaust.” 780  The majority of cybermemorials, however, remain centered around the
nation-state.
One of the great strengths of cyberspace as a medium is its ability to facilitate and
expedite transnational cultural and political flows.  An example of a project that takes
advantage of this possibility to move beyond the limitations of the Virtual Walls is the
Widows of War Living Memorial, a result of Barbara Sonneborn’s documentary film,
Regret to Inform.  Following the lead of the film, the site is “a place where widows of all
wars can record and share their stories with people throughout the world.”781
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This site in many ways reproduces the same types of stories seen on the pages of
the Virtual Walls, those of individual families coping with personal losses, but by
expanding the discussion to include widows of soldiers from places other than the United
States and from wars other than Vietnam, the dynamics and implications of the site
change considerably.  Growing out of Sonneborn’s film, which traces her journey back to
Vietnam to learn more about the war which took her husband, the postings of the site
were initially mostly by American women who lost their husbands in Vietnam, but
quickly grew to include stories from women who lost loved ones in battles in Armenia,
Guatemala, Tibet, and Rwanda, to name a few.  The site also has numerous stories from
Vietnamese widows.
After telling the stories of watching her village burn to the ground and the
execution of her cousin, Juan Ngoc Nguyen’s page recounts the story of her husband’s
death.
I was only 14 years old when my South Vietnamese village was burned to the
ground. It was 1968, and my five year-old cousin was killed by a soldier in front
of me. You can’t comprehend the loss, you just try to go on.782
Nancy Le’s page tells another story that takes her from the years of the American War
and into the postwar era, when other Southern Vietnamese like she and her family fled
from the Communists.
So in February 1981, I took my husband and my two oldest sons to the South
China Sea. I watched them climb into a boat with 72 people and go into the water.
I planned to join them later that year, but that day I cried all the way back to
Saigon... After nine days, we landed on a beach in Malaysia. My sons and I




looked for my husband and my other sons. We didn’t hear about them ever again.
After two years, we got permission to go to the United States.783
The site also includes the writings of widows from World War Two, The Third Indochina
War, and the American War on Iraq.
Including the stories of widows from Cambodia and Vietnam displaces much of
the American-centered focus of the Virtual Walls and puts a very human face on the
object of the American War.  The “victims” of this site are not just Americans, but
Southeast Asian men, women, and children as well.  Furthermore, by focusing on the
stories of widows from numerous conflicts and wars, the Widows’ memorial creates the
possibilities for larger stories to be told which transcend the often confining narrative
grasp of the American war in Vietnam.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the ensuing United States war in
Afghanistan, and the increased violence in Israel and Palestine, the Widows of War
Memorial became a clearinghouse for stories of widows from those areas.  One widow
from Israel offered her contribution to the site, claiming the space as a memorial not to
wars, but in the name of peace:
And yet, without peace, I see no future in this region. The price of war is so high
we must do everything to prevent it. The new weapons make war all the more
devastating. All efforts must be made to create peace. Never mind the risks–we
must take the risks of peace.784
The site as a whole offered a “statement” after September 11 that accurately summed up
the larger cultural work of the project:




Our thoughts and prayers are with all those who have suffered or lost loved ones
in this tragedy. Terrorism has been called a new kind of war. Our goal at the
WarWidows International Peace Alliance is to end violence and war in all its
incarnations.785
As a truly transnational memorial not to war but to peace, the Widows of War Living
Memorial offers an opportunity for forms of remembrance that the Real and Virtual
Walls cannot.  Freed from nationalistic narratives and from narrow definitions of
“victims,” the site moves beyond the narrative structure of the Walls, transcending the
gendered space of those memorials to create a space in which war itself can be
memorialized.  As such, it offers a powerful example of the type of memorial the Virtual
Walls might have been and still could be, and further demonstrates the power of the
national narrative to hold sway over those sites.
An End to Monuments? The Future of Remembrance at The Wall    
We have seen that users of the Virtual Walls have used the tools provided them
by the medium to challenge and expand the narrative boundaries of the memorials by
telling stories whose form and content is circumscribed by the boundaries of the real
wall.  We have also seen, however, how those sites have become another site of the
dominance of the nationalist narrative that seeks to marginalize the significance of the
American War in Vietnam by simply reinscribing that conflict into the sweep of United
States history as an aberration rather than an important chapter in American imperialism.
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Although the basic narrative structure of the Real Wall has been kept in place, having
become more flexible and inclusive over time, it remains subject to forces seeking to
further limit the structure of the site by imposing a more monolithic vision of the war.  A
quarter century removed from the end of the military phase of the American War in
Vietnam, Lin’s design maintained sufficient liminality and ambiguity to provoke a new
proposal for a major addition to the memorial.
In September, 2000, Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, a Veteran of the war in
Vietnam introduced legislation calling for an “Education Center” to be placed at The
Wall.  The proposal originated earlier that year in discussions related to the addition of
the “In Memory” plaque.  The “primary reason” for the Education Center, according to
the VVMF, who spearheaded the drive, “would be to educate young Americans about the
Vietnam War and The Wall.”786  The proposed center would include historical
information about the war, rotate different museum-style exhibits, and contain a photo
gallery featuring pictures of all those listed on the wall.  In this sense, the center would in
part mirror the Virtual Walls, allowing for more individualized and personalized forms of
remembrance.  But the focal point of the proposal was to pass the “lessons of Vietnam”
on to future generations of Vietnam.  Throughout the next three years, as the battle over
the center continued, several constituencies expressed their concern that these “young
Americans” had little knowledge of the war and, as such, would not learn the lessons
offered by the war.  While few disagreed with this assessment, the question of what
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exactly these lessons were would continue to be a sticking point.
The Education Center proposal hit its first snag almost immediately.  The
National Park Service had for several years resisted a number of proposed additions to
the mall, including the Franklin Roosevelt Memorial, the Korean War Memorial, and the
World War Two Memorial.  The NPS worried that the Center would take away from the
experience of The Wall, further clutter the mall as a whole, and set a precedent for similar
centers at other monuments.787  The Park Service was supported by several
environmental groups, including The National Coalition to Save Our Mall, which offered
a counter-proposal suggesting instead that “pamphlets” be handed to visitors.788  For
several legislative sessions, the proposed Center at The Wall was attached to legislation
supported by these groups that would have placed strict limitations on any further
additions to the Mall.  A more surprising source of opposition came from Phil Gramm.
The Republican Senator from Texas had by 2001 twice taken the Education Center off of
the Senate’s unanimous consent calendar, dooming the measure to die in committee.789
Gramm’s reason for opposing the Center had nothing to do with environmental concerns
or with the war and its legacies; he was opposed to building any more memorials, or
banning any more memorials until a monument to Ronald Reagan was accepted.  Though
his stalwart opposition, Gramm almost single-handedly blocked not only the Center but
also the ban on future additions to the Mall.  Ironically, Reagan himself had signed the
original legislation to which the ban was being amended: The 1986 Commemorative
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Works Act, which specified that no monument to an individual could be built on the Mall
until twenty-five years after the person’s death.  The irony was not lost on the Bush
administration, which supported the ban and reminded Gramm that Reagan, in his early
nineties at the time of the proposal, had not only signed the legislation, but also that the
famously anti-federal government President already had the Washington, D.C. airport
and another Federal building named after him.790
When Gramm retired in 2002, the proposal was cleared to move forward,
although not without continued opposition from the NPS.  In May, 2003, the
Congressional Subcommittee charged with marking up the legislation held hearings at
The Wall to determine the impact of the Center on the site and the Mall.  What is most
intriguing about these hearings, for my purposes, is not the environmental opposition to
the addition, but the concern over the tone, content, and pedagogical style of the Center.
While apprehension over the environmental and aesthetic impact of the Center remained
fairly consistent over the years, the concerns over the educational style of the Center took
on new meaning with the American War on Iraq in 2003.
Against the lack of “historical context” provided by the Wall itself, a diverse
groups of witnesses, including actor Robert Duvall and author Stanley Karnow, took an
opportunity at the May hearings to weigh in on what “lessons of Vietnam” should be
conveyed at the Center.  Duvall invoked a line from his role in Apocalypse Now, “You
know, someday this war’s going to end,” to introduce his testimony that the “societal
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impact of the war is not over.”  Calling on Congress to allow the Center to go forward,
Duvall claimed that the educational mission of the center was a logical outgrowth of the
Wall and the Wall That Heals: “America’s youth must have the opportunity to learn
patriotism and sacrifice at the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial.” 791  Alone among the
witnesses, and certainly unique among those who have engaged in public discourse about
the Wall, Stanley Karnow took a moment to remind those in attendance about the damage
done to Vietnam and the Vietnamese during the war.  Yet in making even this comment
in passing, Karnow acknowledged that the issue was essentially irrelevant:
If I could just inject one more point, when we talk about the number of Americans
who died in Vietnam—I know it is not within the purview of this—I want to
remind people that something like 2 to 3 million Vietnamese also died in the war,
and I am talking about Vietnamese on both sides.792
The Vietnamese, as Karnow well knew, were always outside “the purview” of American
policy.  His comments were especially telling when compared with his formal comments
inserted for the record, which contain no mention of the Vietnamese.  Yet Karnow, a
member of the Center’s Advisory Council, had in mind a Center with a different
educational mission than Duvall and others at the hearings.  Rather than “patriotism” and
“sacrifice,” Karnow envisioned a Center that would move beyond commemorating the
dead to “become an instrument of goodwill and that elusive dream—peace on earth.”793
John Peterson, a Republican committee member from Pennsylvania, offered a
strikingly different vision of the Center.  Peterson claimed that the Center would be a
                                                 




valuable addition to the site because it would help “personalize” the war for Americans.
He was less concerned about the lessons of the war; as he stated in the hearings, the
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that those “lessons had been learned.”
Nevertheless, he offered the Visitors Center as a way to make sure those lessons were
passed on, asserting that it was “vital to this country to understand the intricacies of the
Vietnam War, the mistakes that were made there so that we don’t repeat them.”  As to
what specific lessons the Center might provide, Peterson offered:
I think as we watch [the Bush] administration as it came into some involvements,
they didn’t make some of the mistakes that were made in Vietnam.  Because
when we decide to have a conflict, we win, we get it over with.  We don’t do it in
stages.  We don’t do it in degrees.  We don’t decide whether we should turn it
over.  When we make a decision, we win.  And if we don’t remember history,  we
have the likeliness to repeat it.794
Others went on to testify about the importance of the Center as a pedagogical site that
could help instill the values of “service,” “sacrifice,” and “patriotism,” but perhaps the
most telling testimony came from Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee.  Hunter described with disdain the negative image of the American
War in Vietnam in American culture, especially American films about the war (except
We Were Soldiers and The Green Berets, which he approved of).  Hunter also railed
against the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian that had caused such an uproar years
earlier by discussing questions of the use of the nuclear weapons and offering what some
viewed as too sympathetic a view of the Japanese victims of the bombs.795  Like
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Peterson, Hunter saw the recent Iraq war as a step in the right direction, claiming that the
media coverage of the invasion sent the “message” to the American people that “GIs are
pretty good people.  They had never seen that before.”  Along these lines, he continued,
“visitors centers are darn good if they carry the right message.”  As for the specific
Center being proposed for The Wall, Hunter concluded that he was
all for this exhibit if it shows the honor and goodness of American GIs, and, I
think, Mr. Chairman—and I speak for myself—the honor of the cause.  The only
time when Vietnam had any freedom, any modicum of freedom—and if anybody
thinks that they have got a modicum of freedom over today, please go on over and
take a look—was when the Americans were there.796
In the end, the Center, in the words of Hunter, would tell the stories of “honor and
determination” that were at the heart of the American War in Vietnam—a useful
corrective to the “distorted view” of the war, and the soldiers who fought it, in American
culture.
The bill was eventually passed by the House as well as the Senate, and was signed
into law by President Bush in November 2003.  The final version of the bill focused
almost exclusively on limits to future building on the Mall, devoting only a few pages to
the addition of the “Vietnam Veterans Memorial Visitors Center.”  The law did not lay
out specific guidelines for the content of the center, stating only that it was to provide
“appropriate educational and interpretive functions.”797  The design of the center is far
from complete, let alone the content, but the response of the VVMF was telling.
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Trumpeting the final approval of the authorizing legislation, the press release posted on
the Virtual Wall’s website claimed that the center would “not only honor the memory of
Vietnam veterans, but most importantly will educate visitors of the sacrifices our veterans
have made in the name of freedom.”  Jan Scruggs, who had begun his quest for a
Vietnam Veterans Memorial nearly twenty-five years earlier, added his thanks to Bush
for approving the Center, “guaranteeing,” as Scruggs put it, “that future generations will
better understand the principles of service, sacrifice, and patriotism.”798  These ideas,
then, are the true “lessons of Vietnam” that The Wall would now pass on.  As with the
Virtual Walls, the discourse of  the duty, honor, sacrifice of American service personnel
has become the trope for the reinscription of the national narrative, further rendering
outside the realm of discussion any sense of what the war did to the nation and people of
Vietnam.  The Center thus stands as possibly the final strand in the reimposition of a
grand national narrative at The Wall, reintegrating Vietnam, through the lenses of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and a narrow brand of “patriotism,” into the once endangered story of
America’s long march to Freedom at home and abroad.
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial stood for over two decades as a complex,
liminal space.  Situated in the most national of contexts, The Wall also offered a
remarkably personal space for those touched by the war to perform individual acts of
memory, reconciling and challenging their personal narratives with the National narrative
constructed at the memorial.  I have argued here that, since its inception, the ambiguity so
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centrally built into The Wall has been constantly under attack by those seeking a more
cohesive, and more inclusive (to a point) narrative.  The additions of two statues, a
flagpole, a commemorative plaque, and, now, an Educational Visitors Center have been
shaped by that ambiguity and have all shaped and will continue to shape the narrative
structure of the site.
There will always be those who speak and write “back” at such displays of power,
but it does seem safe to assume that if the Center’s narrative of the war is constructed
around the ideas described by Scruggs, the question of American imperialism will be all
but erased as a point of entry into the debate at The Wall.  While critical narratives of the
war—new and old—may continue to be constructed against such triumphant revisionism,
one must ask where such stories will be told.  It is very unlikely that they will be told at
The Wall.
In his testimony about the center in May of 2003, Robert Duvall claimed that
“education is never dangerous.”799  Certainly it is far too early in the process to see what
the Visitors Center will have to say about the American War in Vietnam, and it would be
troubling to imply, without knowing those details, that an exhibit that focuses almost
exclusively on “service, sacrifice, and patriotism,” is in itself “dangerous.”  The real
danger of the Center is not that it will provide a particular narrative of the American War
in Vietnam; it is that it will make the narrative structure of the overall site so rigid as to
further exclude a greater range of stories, further imposing coherence, uniformity, and
                                                 
799 “Legislative Field Hearing,” 9.
461
consensus on a fractured, divisive, heterogeneity of stories.  The more stories that are
rendered outside the narrative structure of the memorial, the more likely it is that we will
never see, in W.D. Erhardt’s memorable phrase, “an end to monuments.”
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EPILOGUE
The Uneasy Peace and the Flags That Still Fly
Although I have situated the 1995 normalization and diplomatic recognition of
Vietnam as the “end” of the American War on Vietnam, the period since normalization
has been marked by a series of ongoing battles between the two nations, on trade, human
rights issues, and the ongoing contestation for the meaning of “Vietnam” in American
Society.  Nevertheless, 1995 did mark, as Secretary of State Christopher put it at the time,
“an end to a decade of war and two decades of estrangement.”800  Normalization also
offered the opportunity for some in the United States to rethink the long war against
Vietnam, and to see what lessons might be drawn from it.  In 1995, the message was
clear.  Thomas Friedman of the New York Times declared victory in Vietnam, “if winning
is measured by a Vietnam that is economically, politically, and strategically pro-
Western.”  “It’s time that we declare victory,” he added, “and go back to Vietnam and
reap it.”801  The lesson of Vietnam, argued the Washington Post, “is that it makes a lot
more sense to make markets than to make war.”802  By 1995, Vietnam the market was
attracting a lot of attention from American corporations; what effect the new relationship
would have on Vietnam the nation remains to be seen.
After diplomatic normalization was completed in 1995, the economic windfall
predicted by many was slow to develop. American corporations were finally free to set
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up operations in Vietnam, taking advantage of a skilled, hard-working, and cheap labor
force.  Within a year, however, stories of abusive labor practices and unsafe working
conditions began to surface.  Nike, Disney, and McDonalds were among the well-known
companies implicated in various stories of sweatshops in Vietnam.  In one example, labor
monitoring groups found factories producing toys for McDonald’s “Happy Meals” where
many young Vietnamese women were being paid only six cents per hour.  As one news
report of the situation noted, however, “low wages are not the workers’ worst problem.”
In February of 1996, more 200 workers in the plant were forced to stop working as a
result of acetone poisoning.803  Later that year, in response to cases such as these as well
as the more high-profile Nike situation, Vietnam Labor Watch was founded to monitor
labor practices in the country.
As Vietnamese leaders made clear after the lifting of the embargo, the new era of
relations would mean little economically without a trade agreement extending normal
trade relations to Vietnam.  Negotiations over the agreement proceeded at a snail’s pace
however, which meant that Vietnamese exports to the United States were still subject to
high tariff rates. By the end of the twentieth century, the United States remained the only
industrialized nation not to grant MFN to Vietnam, and Vietnam remained one of only
six countries not to receive that status from the United States.804  From 1997 to 2000, the
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Clinton administration granted Jackson-Vanik waivers to Vietnam, lessening the effects
of the tariffs by granting temporary most favored nation (MFN) status to some
Vietnamese goods.
On each occasion, Congress was required to approve the waiver, and many
members took the opportunity to criticize Vietnam for what some considered human
rights violations, for lack of transparency in economic matters, and, of course, for not
producing the remains of American service personnel. Although these hearings tended to
focus more on issues of international trade than those held prior to normalization, the
same cast of characters could often be found at the witness table.  In hearings on relations
with Vietnam in the late 1990s, those who clung to the need for “leverage” on Vietnam,
whether for political or economic reasons, maintained that the promise of NTR and, later,
accession to the WTO, continued to provide the United States with the required leverage
over Hanoi.805  And, without fail, every major hearing would feature a presentation by
Ann Mills Griffiths and other members of the POW/MIA lobby, who continued to
lambast the Vietnamese for not doing enough to assist in the recovery of American
remains.806  Despite such criticisms, and despite the determined efforts of many
representatives in the House, the Jackson-Vanik waivers were upheld every year.
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Not until the summer of 2000, however, did the two nations agree to the terms of
the bilateral trade agreement (BTA).  That document, too, was subject to the approval of
legislatures in both countries, and the United States Congress would not receive the
measure for over a year, after George W. Bush had assumed the Presidency.  In
September of 2001, the United States Senate passed the measure by a vote of 88-12,
while the House required only a voice vote.  President Bush signed the BTA into law on
October 16.  In Vietnam, the National Assembly approved the agreement 278-85, and
President Tran Duc Luong signed the BTA into law. After a mutual exchange of letters
acknowledging the accord, the BTA between Vietnam and the United States went into
effect on December 10.  Under the agreement, Vietnam does receive MFN—or Normal
Trade Relations—status, although that status is not permanent.807  Thus, Vietnam remains
subject to annual “reviews” by the White House and Congress, both of which must still
sign off on Vietnam’s adherence to American conditions on immigration, human rights,
and a number of other issues as laid out in the BTA.
While the BTA has opened many doors into the American market for Vietnamese
goods—imports to the U.S. reached $1.05 billion in 2001—it has, like the IMF/World
Bank structural adjustment programs and the influx of foreign investment into produced
mixed results for Vietnam.  Consider the case of catfish.  After the terms of the BTA
were agreed upon in 2000, Vietnamese exports of catfish to the U.S. jumped from five
million pounds to thirty-four million pounds.  Under the terms of the agreement,
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American catfish farmers filed suit with the Commerce department in 2002 charging the
Vietnamese with a number of complaints: that Vietnamese catfish were not really catfish;
that the Vietnamese were “dumping” their “catfish” in the U.S. market; and, most
ironically, that the Vietnamese fish might be unsafe for American consumers because
they might be contaminated with dioxin from Agent Orange.808  In July 2003, the U.S.
International Trade Commission ruled unanimously in favor of the American catfish
industry, clearing the way for the government to impose import duties of 37 to 64 percent
on Vietnamese catfish fillets. While the catfish case was pending, the American shrimp
industry filed a similar suit, which is still pending at the time of this writing. 809  In an
equally ironic protest, U.S. rice growers and numerous members of Congress from across
the political spectrum expressed their displeasure when a contract for 70,000 metric tons
of rice to be shipped to American-occupied Iraq was denied to American farmers.
Instead the contract, along with a U.N.-based contract for 152,000 metric tons, was
awarded to Vietnam.810
Vietnam may join the WTO as early as 2005, in which case U.S. sanctions would
be subject to WTO adjudication811; until then, the U.S. and Vietnam will remain locked
in such trade wars.  To be sure, such skirmishes are preferable to the types of wars
endured in the thirty years prior; yet these conflicts indicate a remaining source of tension
                                                 
808 “Free Trade’s Muddy Waters,” WP, July 13, 2003; “Vietnam Shuns U.S. Sanctions on
Catfish,” WP, June 18, 2003.
809 “Trade Ruling Favors U.S. Catfish Farmers Over Vietnamese,” WP, July 24, 2003.
“Vietnam Worried About Shrimp Sanctions,” WP, July 24, 2003.
810 “U.S. Rice Growers Want to Sell to Iraq,” WP, March 14, 2004.
811 On Vietnam and the WTO, see Kym Anderson, Vietnam’s Transforming Economy
and WTO Accession (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
467
and hostility toward Vietnam on the part of some Americans, as well as Vietnamese
distrust of the United States.  They also indicate the extent to which major political and
economic developments in Vietnam remain subject to the domestic politics of the United
States.
“Vietnam” in Twenty-First Century American Culture
At the time of this writing, it has been over a decade since the American embargo
on Vietnam was lifted, and nearly a decade since the normalization of diplomatic
relations between the two nations. As we approach the thirtieth anniversary of the end of
the military phase of the American War in Vietnam, it is worth reflecting on how much
has changed in relations between United States and Vietnam—and how much has stayed
the same.
Since 1975, a generation has come of age in Vietnam and in the United States.  In
Vietnam, more than half of the current population was born after the end of the American
War.  While many of these Vietnamese have known the horrors of war experienced by
previous generations, they have also experienced the greatest period of economic
expansion in that nation’s history.  This latest generation in Vietnam is marked more by
the items they consume and the market ideology they expound than by their adherence to
socialist policies or the imperialists they have expelled.
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When President Clinton made his historic visit to Vietnam in November 2000, he
received an extraordinarily warm welcome.  Although his flight landed after 11 p.m. in
Hanoi, well after most the country is normally asleep, thousands of Vietnamese lined the
streets and congregated in front of the hotel where the Clintons were staying.  Many
Vietnamese, according to various press accounts, thought well of Clinton not only
because he had lifted the sanctions and normalized relations, but because they knew he
had opposed the war in the 1960s and 1970s.812  In an unprecedented move, Vietnamese
officials allowed Clinton’s address from Hanoi’s National University to be carried live on
national television.  In the speech, Clinton made reference to the ongoing efforts of the
Vietnamese to recover the remains of American servicemen.
Your cooperation in that mission over these last eight years has made it possible
for America to support international lending to Vietnam, to resume trade between
our countries, to establish formal diplomatic relations and, this year, to sign a
pivotal trade agreement. Finally, America is coming to see  Vietnam as your
people have asked for years -- as a country, not a war.813
It is not clear, however, that this has been the case.
In the United States, Vietnam has become an important trading partner, the
leading supplier of coffee and a major source of textiles.  “Vietnam,” however, remains a
free-floating signifier in American Society, more commonly used as an analogy for
various American military misadventures.  The recent invasion and occupation of Iraq, in
particular, has led to a sharp resurgence of “Vietnam” as a means of debate, which makes
it all the more ironic when seemingly significant stories about Vietnam the nation, or
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even Vietnam the war, receive little if any attention in the American press.
For example, in October 2003, the Toledo Blade ran a major exclusive, revealing
the previously undocumented story of Tiger Force, an elite American military unit that
waged a violent and murderous reign of terror in the Vietnamese Central highlands in
1967.  The story, which ran in multiple sections over several days, detailed how members
of Tiger Force murdered, dismembered, decapitated, and mutilated hundreds of unarmed
villagers, including women and children, over a period of several months. Most of the
killings, reporters Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss reported, took place within less than
fifty miles of My Lai, the site of the massacre previously thought to be the worst of
American War crimes in Vietnam.  While investigating the My Lai murders, the Army
learned of the Tiger Force crimes, and promptly covered them up.   Although the
Pentagon’s investigation found that several members of the platoon were guilty of war
crimes, none were prosecuted.814  As the Blade editorialized at the end of the story’s run,
“Tiger Force’s Assaults Should Horrify the Nation.”815  Instead, the story was largely
ignored.  In the spring of 2004, however, it was awarded a Pulitzer Prize.
A few weeks after the story appeared, Seymour Hersh, who first uncovered the
My Lai massacre, noted, “the Blade’s extraordinary investigation of Tiger Force,
however, remains all but invisible.”  None of the major news networks had picked up the
story, and hardly any other newspapers had even mentioned the account.816  Hersh’s
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critique led ABC News to run a feature on the Tiger Force story, but no other major
outlets followed suit.  Writing about the media’s coverage (or lack thereof) of the story in
The Nation in March of 2004, Scott Sherman noted that at the time, the “list of major
news organizations that has yet to acknowledge the Blade series includes NBC, CBS,
CNN, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and the Wall Street Journal.”817
The New York Times, while acknowledging the story with a summary on page A24 eight
weeks later, admitted that if its own staff had discovered the story, “it would have been
on the front page.”818  More than journalistic chauvinism, however, both Sherman and
Hersh speculated that the reluctance to reprint, follow-up on, or further investigate the
story came from an unwillingness among the media to bring up such issues while the
United States was at war in Iraq.  In an interview on National Public Radio, Blade
reporter Sallah stated, “there is a sense that we should not be too openly critical and
evoke these painful memories of Vietnam when we’re already in a conflict.”819
Yet while the Tiger Force story was being ignored, “Vietnam,” was seemingly
everywhere.  Countless stories compared the war in Iraq to the war in Vietnam, speeches
in Congress labeled Iraq “Bush’s Vietnam,” and the press poured over the wartime
records of the two candidates for President in 2004, Bush and Senator John Kerry.  In one
form or another, the cover of Newsweek featured several prominent stories related to the
American War.  The first featured wartime-era pictures of the two Presidential
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candidates, Bush in Alabama while a member of the National Guard, and Kerry on a
gunboat in the Mekong Delta.820  Only a few weeks later, the cover featured a picture of a
young American soldier next to the headline, “Crisis in Iraq: The Vietnam Factor.”  In
that week’s issue, several stories and columns compared the wars in Iraq and Vietnam.821
And, as the fighting in Iraq raged on, the magazine also featured a cover story on “The
New Science of Strokes,” but also teased a story on “John Kerry & Agent Orange.”
Inside, a five-page story expressed concerns over Kerry’s health, pointing out that he had
been exposed to the cancer-causing chemical agent while serving in Vietnam.  That
concern was especially noteworthy, given how the story addressed the obvious point: that
millions of Vietnamese had been exposed to the agent as well:
Agent Orange was one of the many tragedies of Vietnam.  It may have killed or
sickened, via long-incubating cancers and nerve disorders, thousands of American
soldiers and sailors (not to mention many more Vietnamese).822
In the space of a few thousand words detailing the deadly effects of the chemical warfare
waged on Vietnam at the hands of the United States, the primary victims of the attacks
drew barely a parenthetical reminder.  Even a brief paragraph could have mentioned that
Vietnamese victims had recently initiated legal action against the manufacturers of Agent
Orange, following a path similar to that which led to the 1984 case in which American
veterans of the war won a $180 million settlement from Monsanto and Dow Chemical; or
that recent studies found both that dioxin from Agent Orange was still contaminating
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Vietnam’s food and water supplies at extremely high levels and that previous statistics on
dioxin levels per liter of Agent Orange were underestimated.823  Instead, Vietnam is
relegated to its traditional role in American public discourse: readily available to
highlight the meaning of the war for the United States, and conspicuously invisible
whenever a story raises the specter of American imperialism or dares address the legacies
of the war for the Vietnamese.  Vietnam continues to operate as a ghostly presence
haunting American society, everywhere and nowhere at the same time.  As ever, the
Vietnamese remain invisible enemies, and invisible victims of the United States.
 I have attempted to show in this dissertation how this came to be.  We have seen
that immediately after the victory of the revolutionary forces in Vietnam, the United
States launched an unprecedented political, economic, and cultural attack, a new phase in
its ongoing war on Vietnam.  Beginning with the imposition of a draconian program of
economic sanctions, the United States in the twenty years after the fall of Saigon
continued to shape the contours of Vietnam’s economy, drawing the boundaries within
which the nation’s economic transformation would take place.  The United States during
the late 1970s working within the cultural logic of “normalizing” the cultural memory of
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the war in Vietnam constructing representations of the war in Congress and in American
films about the war that portrayed a sense of mutual destruction.  Within this framework,
the United States began to be recast as the victims of the war, held hostage, under the
trope of the POW/MIA myth, by cruel and inhuman Vietnamese.
In the 1980s, I have argued, this normalization project continued, as the United
States worked to “Bleed Vietnam White” on the battlefields of Cambodia by arming the
Vietnamese opposition, including the Khmer Rouge; isolating Vietnam politically and
diplomatically; and extending its sanctions program to include key allies such as Japan,
France, and the ASEAN nations.  Meanwhile, representations of the war in American
culture moved from the mutual destruction phase, which ended with the revenge fantasies
of Rambo, and into a moment in which the Vietnamese were actually erased from
narratives of the war altogether.  Surrounded by a cultural discourse that testified to its
“reality,” Oliver Stone’s Platoon led the way in constructing a narrative of the American
War in Vietnam in which the United States fought, and lost, only to itself.
Finally, I have shown how the final stages of the American War in Vietnam
developed, with the lifting of the sanctions and diplomatic normalization being
accomplished through a discourse of “access,” which mollified both American business
interests clamoring for a share of the Vietnamese market, and the POW/MIA lobby,
which sought greater cooperation in their efforts to recover the remains of United States
soldiers.  As I have mentioned briefly here, however, the period since 1975 has belied
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any true, lasting peaceful relations between the two countries.  Rather, relations between
Vietnam and the United States, while on better footing than at any time in recent history,
continue to be marked by hostility and distrust in the political, cultural, and economic
fields.
Much more work needs to be done in these and other areas before we can begin to
develop a better sense of this period in the history of American-Vietnamese relations.  To
begin with, we need more comparative work that explores how the war has been
remembered and contested in various aspects of Vietnamese society.824  We also need to
consider the implications of this study for the larger history of the United States,
Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole.  In particular we need studies that examine the
effects of globalization on the nation and people of Vietnam, work that looks beyond the
confines of traditional economic models to place the changes in sociological and
historical perspectives. Toward that end, I am working with several colleagues to develop
an international and interdisciplinary anthology that addresses these issues.
In another area, one of the central tasks of this project was to disrupt, transgress,
and transcend traditional chronologies of the American War in Vietnam by moving the
period after 1975 to the center of the narrative. Admittedly, this dissertation has only
scratched the surface of a number of important issues of the post-1975 period;
nevertheless, this period now needs to be integrated with larger narratives of the war,
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particularly when we see how closely the current relationships between the United States,
Japan, and Southeast Asia match the original designs of the American architects of the
Cold War.
We know, for instance, that United States policy at the dawn of the Cold War
envisioned a large segment of Asia, known at the time as the “great crescent,” serving the
dual, complimentary functions of a bulwark against Communism and the hinge upon
which Japan’s economic revival would rest.  National Security Memos from the late
1940s through the early 1950s repeatedly note the strategic value of Southeast Asia, both
in terms of raw materials, and as a trading partner for Japan.  The entire region was to be
defended at any cost according to these documents--a policy stance which eventually led
to American intervention in Korea and later in Indochina, which, as a 1952 NSC Memo
states, “is of far greater strategic importance than Korea.”825  By 1952, of course, the
United States’ interest in Japan’s integration into the global capitalist economy was even
greater, given the recent revolution in China.  Another NSC memo from the same year
notes that in addition to Indochina, the “loss” of “Malaysia and Indonesia in particular
could result in such economic and political pressure on Japan as to make it extremely
difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to Communism.”826  In short, then,
the United States envisioned a Southeast Asia that would serve as a source of raw
materials, particularly for Japan, and as a market for the finished consumer goods of
Japan and its trading partners.
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While the path from 1945 to 2005 has been far from direct, we can now look at
the region of Southeast Asia, its economic integration, and its relationships to Japan, the
United States, and the global economy and see that things have turned out largely the way
that these original U.S. policies had hoped for.  How did this come to be?  What role did
the United States have in these developments?  What effect did the American War in
Vietnam have on the region?  What effects, if any, did American policy toward Vietnam,
Cambodia, and the ASEAN nations after 1975? Some of these questions have been
addressed by scholars and former policymakers debating the revisionist “Buying Time”
argument, in which the United States is declared the victor in the larger battle for an
integrated, capitalist Southeast Asia despite the loss of the “battle” in Vietnam.827
I believe that this dissertation may shed new light onto this issue, however.
Although the transformation in which I am interested appears at this point to be the result
of the unintended consequences of American policy rather than coordinated, developed,
and sustained actions by any nation or actors, there are still a number of questions that
beg to be asked and answered.  Toward that end, my next major project, tentatively
entitled “Nations, Wars, and Markets: America, Vietnam, and the Making of the Global
Economy, 1945-2005,” will place American-Vietnamese relations from 1945-2005
within the context of the larger political and economic transformations of Southeast Asia
during that period.
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The Flags That Still Fly
By way of concluding, I want to mention the stories of three flags that symbolize
the ambiguous and contested place of Vietnam in American Society, in American cultural
memory, and in the world.  To begin with, there is the POW/MIA flag, a symbol can be
found seemingly everywhere in American society  In 1997, Congress passed a law,
redundant for many states with similar laws already on the book, requiring Post Offices
and other Federal buildings to fly the flag several times a year.828  This “second national
flag,” as Bruce Franklin has labeled it, serves as a powerful reminder of the hold the war
has on American cultural memory, a reminder that the American war on Vietnam may
never end, but also that it will be remembered—and forgotten—in particular ways.829
Another signal of the American desire to constantly contest, revise and erase
particular memories of the war, arose in a more unlikely place in early 2003.  In January,
State delegate Robert Hull—who represents the Northern suburb Fairfax, home to one of
the largest Vietnamese-American communities in the United States—introduced a bill to
the state legislature requiring that the flag of the former Republic of South Vietnam,
rather than the official flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—be displayed at all
public functions and all state institutions, including public schools.830  The flag has long
been a popular symbol for many of Virginia’s 30,000 Vietnamese-American citizens, and
was called “an eternal symbol of hope and love of freedom,” by Governor Mark Warner
                                                 
828 Franklin, “Missing in Action in the 21st Century,” in Vietnam and Other American
Fantasies, 173.
829 Ibid., 174.
830 “Bid to Honor South Vietnamese Elicits Anger,” WP, January 29, 2003.
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when he declared June 19, 2002 “Vietnamese American Freedom Fighter Day.”831
Clearly, Vietnam took great offense at the proposal, calling it “insolent,” and lodging
formal complaints with the United States Department of State.  The State Department
successfully lobbied for the State Senate to kill the bill, but the Vietnamese-Americans in
Virginia remained firm in their desire to raise the issue at a later date.  One Arlington
resident told the Washington Post that hanging the Vietnamese flag was “just like
displaying the swastika in a community with a lot of people of Jewish background.”832
While the feelings of some refugees from Southern Vietnam are understandable, the
gesture of banning the flag of an existing nation in favor of one representing a former
American client state—which was in existence for less than twenty years—surely stands
as one of most remarkable displays of the desire to erase and rewrite the American War
in Vietnam.
The final flag that symbolizes so much about the always transforming relationship
between the United States and Vietnam can be found in the central region of Vietnam, in
what was once the demilitarized zone separating Northern and Southern sections of the
country.  In that war-torn area, still recovering from the environmental devastation of the
war, there now stands a large, American-owned automobile factory.  Outside the factory
stand three flagpoles, flying three different flags at the exact same height.  The first is the
flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; the second is the flag of the United States of
America; the third flag belongs to the Ford Motor Company.
                                                 
831 Ibid.
832 “Va. Bill Promoting South Vietnamese Flag Dies,” WP, February 17, 2003.
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From Richmond to Hanoi, each of these flags serve as symbols of the ongoing
contest for cultural memory in American society.  And each of the flags, in their own
way, echo back to the final line of the admittedly tongue-in-cheek Calvin Trillin poem
that served as an epigraph for this project:
“Remind me please, why did we fight that war?”
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APPENDIX A
Selected Chronology of American-Vietnamese Relations
1973-2001
1973
January 23 – Kissinger and Le Duc Tho initial Paris accords, ending the military
phase of the American War in Vietnam.  Although the agreement
acknowledges the existence of two regimes in Southern Vietnam, the
Republic of Vietnam and the revolutionary Provisional Revolutionary
Government (PRG), when Nixon announces the agreement that night on
television, he notes that the United States continues to recognize the
Republic of Vietnam as “the only legitimate government in Vietnam.”
January 27 – Peace agreement signed by representatives from the United States,
North and South Vietnam, and the PRG.
February – Nixon sends a private letter to Pham Van Dong promising close to $4
billion in postwar reconstruction aid to Vietnam.  The letter would surface during
normalization negotiations between Vietnam and the United States in 1977-1978.
The letter is eventually deemed irrelevant by American lawmakers because the
1973 Peace Accords failed.  Vietnam never receives any reconstruction aid from
the United States.
February – April – American POWs are returned and US Combat Troops are
Withdrawn from Vietnam.
- Violations of the agreement continue throughout the countryside, as
ARVN and PLAF troops continue to extend their areas of control.  The
United States, also in clear violation of the accords, sends thousands of
millions of tons of military equipment throughout the year.
June – At the national convention of the League of American families, the
Victory in Vietnam Association attempts to get members of Congress to sign a
pledge to deny “any economic assistance, trade, or technological aid” to the
nations of Indochina.
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July – Congress forbids further use of United States funds for military action in
Southeast Asia.
November – Overriding Ford’s veto, Congress passes the War Powers Act,
limiting the President’s power to wage war without legislative approval.
1975
January-April – A major offensive by North Vietnamese and NLF troops meets
surprisingly little resistance, capturing the northernmost provinces and cities of
Southern Vietnam.
March 30-31 – Da Nang is captured by North Vietnamese forces; The “Ho Chi
Minh Campaign” begins to move toward Saigon.
April – Congress rejects the Ford Administration’s request for emergency
military aid to South Vietnam.
April 17 –The Khmer Rouge take Phnom Penh, renaming Cambodia “Democratic
Kampuchea.”  The regime, led by Pol Pot, begins a mass evacuation of the cities,
forcing Cambodians into agricultural labor camps. Over the next several years,
over two million Cambodians will die from disease, starvation, and execution at
the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
April 30
- The final United States personnel are evacuated from the American
embassy in Saigon.
- Representatives of The Revolutionary Forces of Vietnam accept the
surrender of South Vietnam.
- The Treasury Department bans all financial and commercial interactions
with South Vietnam, extending part of the wartime embargo on
“Communist controlled areas of Vietnam” and freezing $70 million in
Vietnamese assets
May 12 – A United States ship, the SS Mayaguez is intercepted and seized by
Khmer Rouge forces.
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May 13 – The Ford Administration launches military action to recover the crew
of the Mayaguez.
May 14 - The crew of forty is eventually released unharmed, but forty-three
military personnel are killed in the process.
- Amid constant meetings and negotiations regarding the Mayaguez,
Kissinger directs the Commerce Department to extend the trade embargo
of North Vietnam to all of “communist controlled Vietnam”
May 15 – Seven hours after Ford announces the safe recovery of the crew, a
15,000 ton is detonated on the island where the crew had previously been held.
May 16 – Under directions from the Secretary of State given on May 14, the
Commerce Department announces a total trade embargo, previously restricted to
the DRV to Southern Vietnam.  Vietnam is placed in the “Z” category of Export
Controls, along with Cuba and North Korea, rather than the “Y” category applied
to the Soviet Union and China.  This distinction makes it illegal even for private
humanitarian shipments to be sent to Vietnam without specific licenses from the
United States.
June 3 – Pham Van Dong makes a speech calling for normalized relations with
the United States if the U.S. would maintain its pledge of reconstruction aid to
Vietnam.
Summer- Vietnamese hold several negotiations requesting increases in aid from
China, which has gradually reduced its aid programs since 1973.  No increases are
granted.
August 6 – The United Nations Security Council denies a hearing to South
Korea’s application for membership.
August 11 – Claiming a double standard of “selective universality” in its decision
on the South Korean application, the Ford Administration instructs U.N.
ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan to veto the North and South Vietnamese
applications.  The lone veto is sufficient to deny membership.
August – The DRV becomes a member of the non-aligned movement at the
conference of non-aligned nations in Peru.
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September 11 – The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia is established.  “Sonny” Montgomery, long an advocate of the view that the
Vietnamese were keeping live American soldiers as prisoners, is selected as
Chair.
September 29 – After a unanimous U.N. General Assembly mandate to
“reconsider” the Vietnamese applications, the United States again casts the lone
veto denying membership.
December – The House Select Committee on Missing Persons meets with
Vietnamese delegation in Paris, and, later, Hanoi.  Although the Committee
attempts to make contact with Khmer Rouge officials in Phnom Penh, they
receive no response.
1976
February – ASEAN holds its first summit in Bali.  The nations announce the
ASEAN “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.”
April – Fending off a right-wing challenge by California governor Ronald
Reagan, President Ford announces his intention not to consider normalizing
relations with Vietnam until the United States receives a “full accounting” on the
POW-MIA issue.
-Throughout the spring and for the next year, the Khmer Rouge regime in
Cambodia undertakes a rapid series of execution programs and “purges” aimed in
many instances at those suspected as having ties to the Vietnamese.
- Vietnam loses around two millions metric tons of grain to a combination of
drought and floods, a pattern which will continue for two years.
July 2 – Northern and Southern Vietnam are reunified as the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (SRV).  Hanoi is named the capital.  September 2, 1945, when Ho Chi
Minh declared Vietnam’s independence from France, remains the primary
national independence holiday.
September 13 – The United States announces its intention once again to veto
Vietnam’s application to the United Nations.  Persuaded by the French delegation
484
to wait until after the American elections in November, the Vietnamese apply in
November, at which point they are met with another veto by the U.S.
September – The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian
Development Bank recognize the SRV.
November – Jimmy Carter is elected President of the United States, promising to
help settle the POW-MIA issue by moving toward normalized relations with
Vietnam.
December
-The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia
publishes its final report, declaring that no American prisoners are being
held alive in Southeast Asia and endorsing the normalization of relations
with Hanoi.
- The International Monetary Fund sends a mission to Vietnam to assess
the situation and determine the need for international aid.
December 14-20 – At the Fourth National Party Congress, the first since 1960,
The Vietnam Workers’ Party (Lao Dong) is renamed the Communist Party of
Vietnam (VCP). Le Duan, who has served as Secretary General of the Party since
the previous Congress, is elected Secretary-General of the VCP.  The Party also
announces its Second Five Year Plan (1976-1980), setting ambitious targets for
production and growth rates in all sectors of the economy.  By 1978 it becomes
clear that results will fall well short of the goals.
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March 16 – A Presidential Commission headed by former UAW President
Leonard Woodcock arrives in Hanoi with the goal of resolving the MIA issue and
move forward on normalization.
March 24 – Remarking on the success of the Woodcock commission, Carter
admits that the Vietnamese have done “about all they can do” in their efforts to
recover the remains of American soldiers.  Carter also declares, “the destruction
of the American war in Vietnam was “mutual.”
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- As China and the United States move closer towards normalized
relations, the Chinese agree to pay over $80 million to help offset close to
$200 million in American assets lost in the wake of the 1949 Revolution
April 18 – In an attempt to lure more foreign aid and investment, Vietnam
announces a liberal investment code.
April 30 – Khmer Rouge forces attack Vietnamese villages in the Parrot’s Beak
region of the Vietnam-Cambodia border in Southern Vietnam, killing hundreds of
unarmed civilians.
Spring and Summer - The Vietnamese economy continues to suffer for a variety
of reasons, not least of which are a series of natural disasters, including drought
and flooding.  Border clashes continue in the Parrot’s Beak region of the
Vietnamese-Cambodian border.
May 3 – Richard Holbrooke arrives in Paris prepared to normalize relations with
Vietnam.  The Vietnamese refused the offer without a promise of American
reconstruction aid and the talks stall.  At his press conference, Vietnamese foreign
minister Phan Hien reveals the contents of Nixon’s 1973 letter promising aid.
June 4 - The House of Representatives passes the Wolff Amendment to the
Foreign Aid Bill, further prohibiting any form of “assistance” or “reparations” to
Vietnam.
June 15- In another round of Paris talks, Holbrooke tells Hien that although
the administration is legally barred from providing direct bilateral aid to Vietnam,
it can channel aid through international lending institutions such as the IMF and
World Bank if the Vietnamese will further their efforts on the POW-MIA issue.
Hien again refuses to normalize without a strong aid commitment from the U.S.
June 20 – Congress revises the Trading With the Enemy Act to limit Presidential
powers to declare trade embargoes and terminate several existing “national
emergencies.”  The new version of the act grandfathers in existing embargoes,
including Vietnam, which now must be renewed every year by the President.  The
Vietnamese sanctions are renewed every year until 1994.
June 22 - The House passes Young amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill,
prohibiting international lending agencies from using American funds to provide
any aid to Vietnam.  The amendment is withdrawn, but only after the White
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House agrees to have its representatives at the institutions veto any requests that
would result in Vietnamese receipt of indirect American funds.
September –  Khmer Rouge forces launch another raid against a Vietnamese
village, killing hundreds of civilians.
– The SRV is admitted as a member of the United Nations.
December – Vietnamese and American delegations meet for another round of
talks in Paris.  The United States continues to refuse a pledge of aid before
normalization and the talks produce no new progress.
December 25 – Amid increasing border skirmishes in the Parrot’s Beak region,
Vietnam launches an attack on Cambodia, attempting to intimidate the Khmer
Rouge.  Vietnamese forces come within twenty-five miles of Phnom Penh, but
stop short of a full invasion.
December 31 – Cambodia breaks diplomatic contact with Vietnam.
1978
February – While trying to sponsor a popular uprising against the Khmer Rouge,
Vietnam openly calls for a truce with Cambodia.
March 23 – The VCP announces an acceleration of the economic transformation
of the South, outlawing private enterprise. The enforcement has a disproportional
effect on ethnic Chinese, particularly in the Cholon district near Saigon, many of
whom have long been central to various industries and markets in the South.
“Boat people” begin to flee Vietnam, beginning a refugee crisis throughout
Southeast Asia and further straining Sino-Vietnamese relations.
May – National Security Advisor Zbiginew Brzezenski arrives in Bejing to begin
negotiations for normalizing American-Chinese relations.  Border fighting
intensifies between Vietnam and Cambodia.
Summer – In the midst of an accelerated collectivization of agriculture in the
Central and Southern provinces, Vietnam is struck with the most severe flooding
in recorded history.  Over three million tons of rice and one million homes are
destroyed.
487
June 29– Suffering from natural disasters, a lack of international aid, and
especially the recent end of China’s aid, Vietnam becomes a full member of the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON), the Soviet-led
network of Communist economies.
August – Representative Sonny Montgomery leads a Congressional delegation to
Hanoi.  Pham Van Dong informed the group that Vietnam was officially dropping
its precondition of American aid and presented them with the remains of fifteen
American soldiers.
September 22 – Holbrooke meets with Nguyen Co Thach in New York and
recommends that the administration normalize relations with Vietnam.  The
administration, however, postpones further movement on Vietnam until after the
Congressional elections and after relations with China are normalized.
November 3 – Vietnam signs a twenty-five year treaty with the Soviet Union.
December 12 – The United States and China normalize relations
December 22 – Vietnamese forces assemble along the Cambodian border in
preparation for a major offensive.
December 25 – Vietnam invades Cambodia.
1979
January 7-11 – Vietnam captures Phnom Penh and announces the formation of
the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).  Prince Sihanouk appeals to the
United Nations to continue to recognize the Khmer Rouge delegation.
January 28 – Deng Xioping meets with Carter in Washington and informs the
administration of China’s plan to attack Vietnam in order to “teach them a
lesson.”
February 17 – China invades Vietnam.  The U.S. is publicly critical of the attack
but links it to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, calling on both nations to
withdraw their troops.
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February – Vietnam signs a Twenty-Five Year“ Peace and Friendship Treaty”
with The PRK.
March 5 – After destroying several villages, power stations, and factories, and
losing twenty thousand troops, China withdraws from Northern Vietnam but
maintains heavy troop levels along the border, occasionally threatening to teach
Vietnam “another lesson.”
September 21 – The United Nations rejects formal recognition of the PRK, with
the United States casting a vote in favor of the Khmer Rouge.
- The VCP’s Second Five Year Plan is acknowledged as a major failure, with all
sectors of the economy falling well short of goals, leading to another round of
liberalization measures enacted in Vietnam.
1980
January – A Major reorganization at the top of the VCP results in the
replacement of several leaders of the war against the United States, including Vo
Nguyen Giap.
Summer/Fall - Food riots and general unrest in several Northern provinces testify
to the ongoing struggles of the reorganization of the Vietnamese economy.
November - Ronald Reagan is elected President of the United States.
1981
The Third Five Year Plan, in response to the crises of 1979-80, calls for further
liberalization measures in the Vietnamese economy.  Although the economy
performs far better under this plan than the previous, targets are still not met and
underlying structural problems continue to plague the long-term prospects of the
economy.
July 13 – New York hosts an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK),
initiated and sponsored by ASEAN and attended by nearly 100 nations.  Vietnam
does not attend, and the PRK government is barred from participating, although
the Khmer Rouge is welcomed. An ASEAN-sponsored resolution calling for the
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disarmament of the Khmer Rouge as part of a negotiated settlement is rejected by
China and the United States.  No agreement is reached.
July 23 - On the heels of the failure of the ICK, Representative Stephen Solarz
(D-NY) chairs the first of several hearings over the next several years on the role
of the United States in Southeast Asia.
- Faced with mounting debts and a major balance of payments problem, Vietnam
accepts a series of loans from the IMF.  In 1982, the Vietnamese request a second
installment of loans, but are rejected by the IMF because they refuse to implement
price controls and end public food subsidies.
1982
February – The New York Times reveals that US and ASEAN members had met
secretly in Hawaii, with the ASEAN representatives urging the United States to
normalize relations with Vietnam to help end the occupation of Cambodia and
limit China’s power in the region.
March ___ - At a Presidential Press Conference, Ronald Reagan offers a
stunningly inaccurate history of the American involvements in Vietnam….
June 22 – A coalition government of Cambodia (CGDK), consisting of factions
led by Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge is announced.
Fall – The Coalition, labeled the “Non-Communist Resistance (NCR)” in
Washington, begins receiving covert aid from the United States through Thailand.
November – The Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C. is dedicated.
1984
January – Brunei becomes the sixth member of ASEAN after gaining its
independence from Great Britain.
- The Killing Fields, a film about the Cambodian holocaust is released in the
United States.  A scene implicating the United States in the rise of the Khmer
Rouge is deleted from the original print.
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-Seven chemical producers are ordered to pay $180 million settlement in a suit
brought by American Veterans exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.
1985
March - Vietnam publicly declares that it will withdraw if the Khmer Rouge
faction is excluded from holding any power in future Cambodian government.
April 30 – Hundreds of American journalists, including all three major news
networks, descend on Vietnam for the tenth anniversary of the end of the
American War in Vietnam.
Spring and Summer – A series of price and monetary reforms, including a major
devaluation of the Vietnamese Dong against the United States dollar, in line with
IMF and World Bank recommendations, result in major inflation and price
increases.
May - Congress approves $5 million in “non-lethal aid” to the NCR in Cambodia.
Congress remains unaware of covert aid already being supplied by the Reagan
Administration.  Aid to Cambodia is still technically illegal under the embargo
imposed in April of 1975.
July 8 – The Washington Post reveals that the CIA has been providing aid to the
NCR since 1982.  Questions are raised in hearings and the press about the funding
reaching Khmer Rouge forces. Although no direct link is established at the time,
it is revealed in 1990 that the Khmer Rouge had in fact been receiving aid from
the United States.
July 10 – Le Duan dies at age 79.
1986
December – At the Sixth National Congress, the VCP announces the
institutionalization of several major economic policies, known as Doi Moi
(“Renovation”).  The program acknowledged the role of private enterprise,
promoted a shift to lighter industrial production, and attempted to attract greater
foreign investment.  Several high-ranking members of the VCP, including Pham
Van Dong and Le Duc Tho, step down from their positions in the Party.
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1987
January - The cast of Oliver Stone’s film Platoon is featured on the cover of
Time, under the headline, “Vietnam As It Really Was”
February - President Reagan appoints General John Vessey, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Envoy to Vietnam in the hopes of restarting
stalled talks on Vietnamese “assistance” with the POW/MIA mission.
May – Vietnam reports that it has begun selling crude oil to two Japanese firms,
the first such sales to any major American ally since Vietnam’s occupation of
Cambodia.  Although Japan is publicly rebuked by ASEAN and the United States,
sales continue.
-U.S. Funding for the Cambodian coalition forces is raised $12 million.
August 1-3 – General Vessey visits Hanoi, reopening a dialogue of mutual
“Humanitarian Issues:” the POW/MIA issue and humanitarian aid to Vietnam.
September 2 – On the forty-second anniversary of the Declaration of
Independence from France, the VCP declares a general amnesty for former
members of the South Vietnamese regime, releasing several thousand prisonsers.
December – Vietnam enacts new law on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
allowing for greater percentage of foreign-owned private sector companies and a
greater influx of foreign capital.
1988
October – Sihanouk publicly claims that the United States has been supplying his
the Cambodian coalition forces with military aid
-Senate Intelligence Hearings reveal that the Thai government has been
diverting funds marked for the NCR in Cambodia.  The stolen funds are
estimated at $3.5 million.
492
November – Vice President George Bush elected President of the United States.
1989
January –Bush becomes only the second President to mention “Vietnam” in an
inaugural address, claiming that “surely the statute of limitations” on that war has
ended.
April 5 – Vietnam announces that the remaining troops stationed in Cambodia
will return home in six months.
July 25 – The First of the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) between Cambodian
factions is held.
August – A month-long conference on Cambodia opens in Paris with all four
Cambodian factions and twenty countries in attendance.  No agreement is
reached.
September – Vietnam announces the complete withdrawal of its troops from
Cambodia.
1990
April – ABC news airs a primetime news special, hosted by Peter Jennings,
which accuses the United States of supplying “lethal aid” and other military
assistance to the NCR and the Khmer Rouge.  Several high-level American
officials, past and present, appear on the program in an attempt to refute the
claim.
July 18 – The Bush administration eases restrictions on aid to Cambodia and
announces that it will no longer support the Khmer Rouge as the Cambodian
representative at the United Nations.
September – At another round of the JIM, the four Cambodian factions agree to
form Supreme National Council.
September 5 – American embargo of Vietnam is continued for one year.
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1991
January 3 – American and Vietnamese representatives meet in Hanoi to discuss
the POW/MIA issue.
January - After a decisive war against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Bush declares that
the United States “has kicked the Vietnam syndrome”
April 9- “Roadmap” to Normalization of relations between the United States and
Vietnam announced by Bush administration.
May 1 – The Cambodian cease-fire takes effect
June – A United States office devoted to MIA recovery projects is established in
Hanoi.
June 17 – The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves a resolution calling
for an end to the embargo on Vietnam.
August – The Soviet Union collapses.
October 23– The agreement ending the Cambodian war is signed in Paris.  At the
meeting, Secretary of State Baker meets with Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Nguyen Manh Cam.  Baker continues to stress the need for Vietnamese
“cooperation” on the MIA issue.
November – During hearings being held by the Senate Select Committee on
POW/MIA affairs, rumors are circulated by a former KGB official that the
Vietnamese did not return all American prisoners of war in 1973.  No evidence is
ever brought to substantiate the charges.
November 21– Vietnamese and United States officials meet again in New York
to discuss normalization.  The United States’ desire for access to classified
Vietnamese military and security records to further efforts for the MIA/POW
searches remains the primary obstacle to an agreement.
November– Vietnam and China restore normalized diplomatic relations.
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December – The Bush administration relaxes travel restrictions, allowing
privately organized trips to Vietnam
1992
February – The United States provides a $25,000 grant to typhoon victims in
Central Vietnam, the first such aid since 1975.
March – Bush administration representatives meet with Prime Minister Vo Van
Kiet in Hanoi.  The Vietnamese agree to help in searching for MIAs in exchange
for a lifting of the embargo.  Secretary of State Richard Solomon rejects the offer,
linking the embargo to a fuller accounting on the MIA issue, and Vietnam’s non-
interference in the upcoming Cambodian elections.  The Bush administration does
announce an expanded aid package to Vietnam, including health-related aid for
prosthetics, scholarship aid for students wishing to travel to the United States, and
the restoration of telephone communications.
April – The Senate Select Committee visits Vietnam.  Although the Committee
would again conclude that no American prisoners were being held in Southeast
Asia, its hearings throughout the year demonstrated the persistence of the
MIA/POW lobby and the anti-Vietnamese forces in Congress.
- The Bush administration further eases the embargo, allowing commercial
sales of items qualifying as meeting “basic human needs,” lifting
restrictions on NGO and non-profit projects in Vietnam, and allows
telecommunication development between the U.S. and Vietnam
May 5– At the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank, The United
States casts a lone veto, blocking the resumption of loans to Vietnam.
July – Vietnam and Laos are granted “Observer” status within ASEAN.
August – During the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIAs, Senator Bob
Smith of New Hampshire claims that live American POWs had been imprisoned
under Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum in Hanoi.
October – Vietnam agrees to allow the United States access to military files
related to the search for remains of American service personnel classified as MIA.
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October 29 – Japan announces that it will restore its full aid program to Vietnam.
November - Bill Clinton is elected President of the United States.  The Clinton
White House will endorse and follow the “Roadmap” to normalization begun
under Bush.
- Japan resumes full assistance program to Vietnam, pledging 1.5 billion
over the next three years.
December 30 – The Bush Administration eases the American embargo on
Vietnam. Under the new regulations, businesses can sign tentative contracts for
work in Vietnam, set up offices in Vietnam, and employ Vietnamese workers.
1993
January – The Senate Select Committee on Missing Persons releases its final
report, concluding that no Americans are being held in Southeast Asia.
March – China is granted Most Favored Nation status by the U.S.
April – The Khmer Rouge announces it will not participate in the Cambodian
elections.  Its forces begin erratic armed resistance.
July 2– In response to Japanese and French proposals to resume IMF lending to
Vietnam and allow Hanoi to restructure its arrears, Clinton announces that the
United States will end its opposition to IFI loans to Vietnam.  Under the embargo,
however, American firms remain barred from bidding on IMF, World Bank, and
ADB projects in Vietnam.
September – Clinton officially renews the embargo on Vietnam, but approves an
aid package similar to that approved by the Bush administration in March of
1992.
September 24 – Sihanouk elected King of Cambodia by national assembly after
UN supervised elections.
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December – The White House announces that American firms can bid on
Vietnamese projects sponsored by IFIs, “pending the lifting of the embargo.”
1994
January 27 – The United States Senate passes a nonbinding resolution endorsing
the lifting of the American embargo on Vietnam.
February 3 – The Clinton administration officially lifts the embargo.  The
measure will be signed into law on April 30.
February and March - Khmer Rouge and Government forces battle throughout
Cambodia.
July - The Cambodian National Assembly officially bans the Khmer Rouge.
October 17 - Vietnam officially applies for membership in ASEAN.
October 25 – Cambodia applies for observer status in ASEAN.
June – China’s MFN status with the United States is renewed.
July 27 – Vietnam becomes the seventh member of ASEAN.  Myanmar (Burma)
is admitted as an observer nation.
1995
January 28 – The United States and Vietnam reach an agreement releasing $90
million in Vietnamese assets frozen since 1975 and using other frozen assets to
pay American corporations’ claims on property lost during the war.  Close to two
hundred claimants, disproportionately from the petroleum and
telecommunications industries, receive compensation in excess of $200 million.
April – Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara releases his memoir, In
Retrospect, in which he admits that the war in Vietnam was “terribly, terribly,
wrong.”
July 11 – President Clinton announces that the United States will normalize
diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
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July 28 – Vietnam officially joins ASEAN
August 5 – Vietnam and the United States officially normalize relations, but
normalized economic relations are not advanced until 2000, when the United
States grant Vietnam “most favored nations” status.
November – McNamara visits Vietnam and meets with his former adversary, Vo
Nguyen Giap.  Giap tells McNamara “nothing happened” in the second Tonkin
Gulf incident of 1994.
December 15 – The first ever ASEAN Summit between the seven members and
the “CLM Countries:” Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar.  The nations sign an accord
declaring Southeast Asia a Nuclear-Weapon Free Area.
1996
March- Cambodia and Laos apply for ASEAN membership.
July – Myanmar applies for ASEAN membership
November – Bill Clinton is elected to a second term as United States President.
-Since the end of the embargo, over 400 U.S. firms have set up operations
in Vietnam.  U.S. exports to Vietnam for the year reach $600 million,
double the level from 1995. Total trade between the two nations in 1996
approaches $1 billion.
Vietnam Labor Watch is founded in response to reports of Nike and other
corporations operating sweatshops throughout Vietnam
1997
April 7 - Hanoi agrees to repay $145 million in loans taken out by the South
Vietnamese regime during the early 1970s.
April 10 – Senate confirms Douglas “Pete” Peterson, former POW, as the first
American ambassador to Vietnam.
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June – Secretary of State Albright lays the ceremonial cornerstone of the new
U.S. Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City.
July 2-4 – Several Cambodian factions fight in and around Phnom Penh.
July 10 – Cambodia’s admission to ASEAN is delayed because of ongoing
hostilities.
July 23 – Laos and Myanmar are admitted as the eighth and ninth members of
ASEAN.
1998
March 9 – Clinton issues the first Jackson-Vanik waiver to Vietnam, which
essentially bestows temporary MFN status on Vietnam, allowing, among other
things, the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) to underwrite U.S. business ventures in Vietnam.
March 19 – Following the approval of the waiver, Vietnam reaches an agreement
with OPIC to provide risk insurance and other financial guarantees to American
firms doing business in the country.
April 15- Pol Pot dies.
July – The House of Representatives votes against a resolution seeking to deny
the Jackson-Vanik waiver to Vietnam,  Similar resolutions would be defeated in
1999 and 2000.
1999
April 30 – At a ceremony held in Hanoi, Cambodia is admitted as the tenth
member of ASEAN.
2000
July 13 –  Five years after normalization, United States and Vietnamese
negotiators sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement, which still must be approved by
the nations’ respective legislatures and signed into law.
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November/December – In the closest electoral victory in American history,
George W. Bush becomes President.
- After a decline during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s,
bilateral trade between the United States and Vietnam reaches the $1 billion mark.
November 16-20– President Clinton visits Vietnam, the first American President
to do so since 1969.  At a speech at the National University in Hanoi televised on
live television in Vietnam, Clinton remarks, “Finally, America is coming to see
Vietnam as your people have asked for years -- as a country, not a war.”
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March – Vietnam announces plans to accede to the World Trade Organization by
2004.
June 8 – President Bush submits the BTA to Congress
July 26  - Secretary of State Colin Powell, a veteran of the American War, returns
to Vietnam to meet with ASEAN leaders.
September – The BTA passes by a voice vote in the House and 88-12 in the
Senate.
October 16 – President Bush signs the BTA into law.
November 28 – The Vietnamese National Assembly passes the BTA 278-85.
December 4 - Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong signs the BTA into law.
- Bilateral trade between the countries reaches $1.5 billion, with the
United States alone importing over $1 billion worth of Vietnamese goods.
December 10 – After a mutual exchange of letters acknowledging the accord, the 
BTA between Vietnam and the United States takes effect.
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